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Abstract 
In light of an increasing embrace of the notion of ‘emancipation’ by various theoretical and 
political perspectives in recent years, this thesis aims to scrutinise the philosophical 
connotations of the concept itself. It therefore returns to Karl Marx’s distinction between 
political and human emancipation, developed in his text ‘On the Jewish Question’, with the 
aim of excavating its theoretical stakes. The core argument of the first part is that Marx 
draws a line of demarcation between citizenship as the modern form of political, bourgeois 
emancipation realised by the American and French Revolutions, and human emancipation 
as necessitating a different kind of revolution that would allow for the constitution of a 
new type of social bond between the individual and the social. Marx’s formulation of the 
need for human emancipation is grounded in his critique of political emancipation, which 
he regards as failing to recognise the dialectical constitution of its social bond by both 
political and economic relations. The bourgeois social bond moreover makes ‘man’ exist as 
an individualised being who can only relate to his or her political existence and dependency 
on others in a mediated and abstract way. The second part turns to the post-Marxist 
critiques of ‘On the Jewish Question’, starting in the late 1970s with Claude Lefort, which 
coincide with a broader re-evaluation of the revolutionary legacy in France. It specifically 
interrogates Étienne Balibar’s alternative understanding of the form of emancipation 
achieved by the French Revolution under the name of ‘equaliberty’, with which he defends 
the struggle for citizenship as the unsurpassable horizon of a contemporary politics of 
emancipation. The aim is here to develop a deeper understanding of Balibar’s criticism of 
Marx’s dividing line, which allows the French thinker’s contribution to ‘thinking 
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1   Introduction  
“La liberté n’est pas ce qu’on nous montre sous ce nom…”1 
“The left lost the battle in the early 20th century by abandoning 
Marx’s commitment to the concept of emancipation and liberty, 
as opposed to equality and justice.”2 
In critical thought in general, and in Marxism more specifically, there exists a kind of 
common-sense understanding of emancipation. It functions as an almost uncontested 
common denominator used to express an allegiance to a certain kind of left, alternative, or 
radical political project that stands in opposition to the liberal or neoliberal mainstream. 
More than that, the political call for emancipation and the theoretical call to re-think 
emancipation have resounded with renewed force in recent years. Both observations are 
easily confirmed by looking at how frequently ‘emancipation’ has recently appeared in the 
title of journals, conferences, and books,3 and how rarely it is defined or interrogated in and 
of itself, as a concept with a specific meaning.4 These two tendencies combined carry the 
danger of reducing emancipation to a mere catchword5 that, by acting as a repository for a 
range of alternative theoretical and political projects, actively engenders the blurring of the 
dividing line between these projects and the mainstream liberal conception and enactment 
of politics. The first step of this thesis is then to actively reclaim emancipation as a 
philosophical and conceptual battleground worth fighting over, instead of giving in to a 
certain fuzzy sense of agreement that might hide potentially productive conflicts.  
More specifically, this thesis aims to contribute to a more pronounced 
understanding of the philosophical commitments made in the name of emancipation or 
‘emancipatory politics’, by excavating and analysing one specific line of demarcation that runs 
through past and present mobilisations. The line of demarcation around which this thesis 
centres was inaugurated by Marx, when he intervened in the 1840s into a debate that was 
                                                
1 Char 1971. 
2 Yanis Varoufakis in Novara Media 2015 min. 6:06. 
3 See Hypatia Special Issue: Emancipation, Summer 2015, 30/3, esp. the Introduction, Lettow 2015; the 
project ‘Penser l’emancipation’ with conferences in Lausanne and Paris (2012-2014, 
http://www.penserlemancipation.net/); Kalmring 2012; the journal Emanzipation – Zeitschrift für sozialistische 
Theorie und Praxis, founded in 2011 (http://www.emanzipation.org/); Hewlett 2007. 
4 There are only a handful of works that deal explicitly with ‘emancipation as a concept’. See especially 
Greiffenhagen 1971; Grass and Koselleck 1997; Laclau 2007; Pieterse 1992. A few more texts appeared 
recently, which introduce their takes on emancipation with usually a brief introductory overview of the 
conceptual history of the concept such as Scott 2012; Biesta 2008; Lettow 2015. 
5 A danger that is not at all new. Koselleck and Grass emphasise in their conceptual history of emancipation 
that emancipation became a catchword in the 1830s, just after it had assumed its properly modern meaning. 
But we will come back to this discussion in the second part of this introduction. 
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then commonly referred to as ‘the Jewish question’. In his text with the corresponding title, 
‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx introduces a distinction between religious, political and 
human/social emancipation. At stake in this distinction is much more than Marx’s more 
immediately legible dissociation from the Young Hegelian Bruno Bauer, and the latter’s 
attempt to subordinate the possibility of Jewish emancipation to the universal renunciation 
of religion and the radical secularisation of the state and its modern subjects. This thesis 
suggests that we should read Marx’s distinction between political and human emancipation 
as a much broader attempt to resolve the conceptual ambiguities that befell the concept of 
emancipation just after it had gained its properly political meaning in the late 18th century, 
in the context of the Enlightenment movement and the bourgeois revolutions. Marx’s 
most fundamental contribution to this endeavour is a critique of what he calls ‘political 
emancipation’, in which he assesses and distances himself from the possibilities and limits 
of the emancipation that he saw realised by the bourgeois revolutions in conjunction with 
Hegel’s and Rousseau’s theorisations. His next step is to delineate an alternative 
universalistic conception of what it means to realise emancipation from within and beyond 
the modern civil-bourgeois society, which he calls ‘human emancipation’.  
Whilst this thesis will argue that Marx’s conceptual distinction lacks an unequivocal 
demarcation of the goal, means, and temporality that separates political from human 
emancipation, and that it contains definitional ambiguities that are not easy to resolve, it 
also contends that the problems he raises are not reducible to Marx’s supposedly premature 
and pre-scientific Hegelian or Feuerbachian theorisations; nor do they find their proper 
definition and resolution in his mature work represented above all by Capital. Instead, the 
distinction between political and human emancipation draws a dividing line between 
citizenship on one side and revolution on the other that remains under-theorised in the 
existing literature on ‘On the Jewish Question’, and unresolved within Marx’s work as a 
whole. On the side of citizenship, Marx acknowledges the outcome of the bourgeois 
revolutions as a new dialectical relationship between the politics of citizenship and a new 
form of economic social relations, which he deems to signify overall progress. But he goes 
further than this and confers upon the newly constituted form of politics, which he 
understands to be determined by an essentially liberal definition of the individual at the 
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heart of human rights (or ‘the rights of man’) in conjunction with a democratic, republican 
state, an ideological role that is hidden from the modern citizen-subject and whose 
disemancipatory effects are denied by classical political philosophy. Marx’s central 
argument is here that the political sphere with its emancipatory potential is structurally 
subordinated to the economic sphere, which makes a second revolution necessary in order 
to overcome this structural limitation and realise truly human, universal emancipation qua 
instituting new social relations.  
One might object at this point that this approach to thinking revolution as human 
emancipation was superseded by Marx himself, once he introduced class struggle and what 
Louis Althusser would later praise as the scientific theory of historical materialism.6 Thus, 
even without embracing the Althusserian argument of the epistemological break, which 
marks perhaps the strongest antithesis in the history of Western Marxism to an attempt at 
rehabilitating ‘emancipation’ as a concept with continued relevance, one has enough reason 
to doubt the productivity of the angle on Marx’s work that this thesis takes. Above all, 
Marx himself never allowed the notion of emancipation back to the centre stage of his 
subsequent political or economic writings, which suggests that he himself did not believe 
that his theorisation was successful or forceful enough to be continued.  
But Marx’s radical critique of political emancipation and his critique of rights 
gained renewed relevance in light of the affirmative return of French post-Marxist thought 
in the 1980s to questions of citizenship, human rights, and the role of equality and liberty 
for a radical democratic politics. The moment of the 1980s was a post-revolutionary 
moment in its own right, in the sense that the French thinkers did not need to see the 
Berlin Wall fall in order to start assessing the political and theoretical consequences of the 
failure of the communist project, which many have subsequently referred to as the second, 
socialist revolution that Marx sought. That the year of the fall of the Wall coincided with 
the bicentennial of the French Revolution cannot be disregarded as an influence on the 
specific manifestations of French post-Marxist discourse: the crisis of Marxism, François 
Furet’s revisionist history of the French Revolution, the crisis of the French state evolving 
around the aftereffects of its colonial past as well as the ’68 movement, the first ‘headscarf 
                                                
6 See Althusser 2005, 229. 
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debate’, and the simultaneous assertion of a neoliberal capitalism without alternative – all 
these elements make up the conjuncture in which the post-Marxist debate turned back to 
the concepts of the young Marx that Althusser’s so-called structural Marxism seemed to 
have eradicated from the philosophical and political vocabulary.  
The first to explicitly return to Marx’s critique of political emancipation in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’ was Claude Lefort in the late 1970s, but many others followed, such as 
Étienne Balibar, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Ernesto Laclau, Antonio Negri and Slavoj 
Žižek, and also Lefort’s student Pierre Rosanvallon. Through a mix of explicit re-readings 
of the young Marx’s texts and alternative assessments of the relationship between what 
they understood to be the essence of modernity and modern politics, the French revolution, 
and the role of human rights, they all more or less agreed that Marx was ultimately wrong 
when, in ‘On the Jewish Question’, he placed citizenship on the side of ideology and 
political emancipation, and revolution on the side of human emancipation. It is this curious 
return to the Marxian distinction that seems to be unequivocally paired with the intention 
of critically re-evaluating and ultimately rejecting it that makes the investigation into the 
specific construction of the problem of this thesis a pertinent and timely endeavour. The 
analysis of this return to the Marxian problematisation in the second part of the thesis is 
intended to explicate the criticism directed at Marx, which is often developed by means of 
forced, or generalising arguments that need to be carefully dissected in order to carve out 
their productive critical insights. Further, the aim is to shed light on the other side of these 
criticisms, namely on the common post-Marxist embrace of those political concepts that 
Marx had criticised in ‘On the Jewish Question’ as ultimately complicit with the civil-
bourgeois social order and thus ideological, such as equality and liberty.  
In order to gain access to the detailed reasoning behind the – at least superficially – 
univocal criticism of the young Marx’s conceptual distinction, this thesis focuses primarily 
on Étienne Balibar’s writings, although it highlights his theoretical debts, convergences, 
and disagreements with the aforementioned group of contemporaries, as well as with other 
thinkers. The reason for this focus is a unique convergence in Balibar’s theory of a 
multifaceted – as well as meticulous – critical engagement with Marx’s overall work, and an 
embrace of a concept of emancipation qua citizenship that explicitly rejects Marx’s dividing 
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line between citizenship and revolution. The fact that Balibar’s work ranges from his 
earliest participation in the Althusserian project of reconstructing a philosophy (or theory) 
that would match Marx’s scientific analysis in Capital, to his development of a ‘proposition 
of equaliberty’ in his work starting from the late 1980s, makes him the most relevant and 
fruitful interlocutor for an inquiry into the return of the problem of emancipation in the 
French Post-Marxism7 of the 1980s. Balibar turned decisively away from his rejection, 
alongside Althusser, of the young Marx’s problematic as humanist and ideological, to 
embracing the importance of that problematic and some of its related concepts, whilst 
rejecting the early Marx’s critical stance on them. It is in the name of ‘equaliberty’ that 
Balibar develops his understanding of the role of the 1789 Declaration as a political and 
theoretical event that inaugurated a new understanding of politics. He opposes Marx’s 
critique of the Declarations by defining this new politics as a politics of citizenship that is 
not tied to any fixed, or substantive understanding of human nature, and that instead gains 
its specific force from the paradoxical declaration of ‘egalitarian sovereignty’ that cannot be 
contained by any political institutions. 
But this examination of Balibar’s later critical return to the young Marx only 
becomes properly comprehensible in light of Balibar’s previous deconstruction of Marx’s 
entire oeuvre as an ultimately contradictory attempt to rethink a concept of politics against 
the liberal separation of the political from the economic, to which he dedicated several 
texts in the late 1970s and 1980s. Revisiting Balibar’s earlier critical problematisations of 
Marx’s understanding of the state, of ideology, and of (proletarian) politics allows us to 
further clarify the conceptual uncertainties and unsolved problems in the early Marx’s 
distinction between political and human emancipation, and it makes the Marxian 
problematic of emancipation appear – historically as well as philosophically – in a new light. 
But it also brings out a purposeful shift of the theoretico-political terrain and commitment 
performed by Balibar. The second part of this thesis shows that there indeed exists a gap 
between Balibar’s critique of the early Marx’s theorisation of politics and his embrace of 
                                                
7 I use the term Post-Marxism in a broader sense than it is sometimes done, because I include besides 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, to whom it classically refers, Althusser’s students and other thinkers, 
who kept a certain, in different ways qualified fidelity to Marxism or at least to Marx’s oeuvre like Antonio 
Negri or Slavoj Žižek. 
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the proposition of equaliberty as the undeconstructible horizon of radical politics today. 
This gap is shown to develop out of Balibar’s desire to rectify Marx’s continued inability to 
think the materiality of ideology, but it ends with him rejecting not only the Marxian 
dividing line between citizenship and revolution, but also the very premise of Marx’s 
materialism, namely the determining role that ‘civil society’, or what is later called the 
economic ‘base’ (vis-à-vis the political superstructure), plays in the dialectical constitution 
of the modern social form. This is significant in two senses. First of all, it clarifies that 
Balibar’s reading of the revolutionary Declaration from 1789 and his criticism of Marx for 
missing the ‘materiality of the statements’ does not remain immanent to the Marxian 
project; instead Balibar presents us with a philosophical and political alternative, which 
needs to be read and scrutinised as such. Secondly, this alternative evades the challenge the 
young Marx set up for anyone attempting to think emancipation in his wake when he 
developed a critique of political emancipation by identifying its bourgeois limits.  
These findings are significant not only in order to explicate the limits of Balibar’s 
continued fidelity to the Marxian project, but because they affirm the relevance of the 
Marxian problematisation of emancipation for Balibar and post-Marxist thought more 
generally. They further allow us to separate out the theoretical limitations of the Marxian 
conception of emancipation from philosophical and political choices that have so far been 
hidden or downplayed in the name of rectifying untimely Marxist orthodoxies, which in 
turn led to somewhat forced critical interpretations of the Marxian text. This thesis finally 
asserts that Balibar’s return to the Marxian concept of emancipation is only in a very 
qualified sense still the one Marx sketched in the 1840s, because it rejects the – for Marx – 
crucial distinction between emancipation qua citizenship within civil-bourgeois society and 
emancipation qua revolution leading beyond it. Only after this specification of how the 
problem of emancipation returns in the 1980s, and by bearing in mind the conjunctural 
stakes reflected in the shift of the problematic away from Marx, can we begin to inquire 
into what a meaningful Marxian concept of universal emancipation could look like within 
the contemporary conjuncture, and why we might not want to give up too easily on its 
possibility or indeed necessity.  
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The following section will go on to clarify the stakes of the investigation in relation 
to existing attempts at conceptualising emancipation, before we conclude this Introduction 
with a chapter overview. Part of this effort at clarification is a methodical separation of the 
approach this thesis takes from more classical conceptual histories, and a discussion of the 
debts to and disagreements with the few existing accounts of the history of the concept of 
emancipation. It moreover allows the reader to get a first sense of the specificities and 
difficulties of emancipation as a modern theoretico-political concept.  
1.1   The canonical conceptual history of ‘emancipation’  
At this point, it is clear that this thesis – with its focus on the Marxian distinction between 
political and human emancipation introduced in 1844 – has more specific stakes than to 
reopen the general philosophical quest for a more precise understanding of emancipation 
as a concept. Whilst it thereby concentrates on a strictly delimited moment within the 
larger history of the concept of emancipation as the few historians of the idea, most 
prominently Reinhard Koselleck, have painted it, the argument of this thesis nevertheless 
interacts with the general history of the concept in a significant way. It however insists that 
the history of the concept of emancipation has not actually come to an end, especially not 
to a consensual one as several contemporary thinkers try to make us believe. No 
conceptual history – indeed no history at all – is theoretically, politically or normatively 
neutral, and most often the mainstream historical narrative imposes onto its conceptual 
object a liberal conception of politics in conjunction with a linear concept of time. We can 
witness this tendency in the specific context of this thesis by paying attention to the kind of 
past characteristics of the concept of emancipation that are declared as nowadays obsolete 
or no longer fruitful by the conceptual historians. 
I will proceed by introducing three distinct accounts of the history and characteristics 
of ‘emancipation’ as a concept that have all been developed in the 1990s. Together, they 
build what one could call the ‘canon’ of attempts to conceptualise emancipation in the 
Anglophone literature, as there don’t exist any other accounts that scrutinise the past and 
present connotations of ‘emancipation’ in the same systematic way.8 
                                                
8 I am aware that by referencing these canonical accounts I participate in side-lining other usages and critiques 
of emancipation, especially from the feminist and postcolonial tradition. A serious confrontation with those 
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We have already mentioned Reinhard Koselleck’s influential approach to thinking 
how the conceptual and the socio-political histories of ‘emancipation’ intertwine.9 It leads 
him to rich findings regarding the different valences of emancipation between its earliest 
utilisation as a legal category in the Roman Republic and its properly modern meaning, 
which, according to Koselleck, it had reached around 1840.10 Koselleck defines the most 
significant distinction between the Roman, legal connotation of emancipation and its 
properly modern meaning as stemming from the different relationships to the existing 
order that the term instantiates. As a Roman-legal category, emancipation is a clearly 
circumscribed process by which a son or daughter was, similarly to the manumissio of a slave 
or serf, relieved from the father’s hand (‘emancipatio’ from Latin e manu capere, which can 
be translated as ‘release from the hand’). They were granted their rightful and independent 
existence that was prescribed by law, i.e. their emancipation proceeds within an unchanging 
structure of domination.11 Whilst this legal meaning became heavily contested in Germany, 
because it was regarded to have disemancipatory implications, and was rejected as 
something alien to the Germanic legal system in the 18th century, Koselleck describes that 
emancipation’s modern meaning started to emerge when the word entered Western 
European languages between the 14th and 17th centuries – but it did so in its reflexive 
meaning, as self-emancipation, possibly as part of the earliest throes of the Enlightenment.12 
The essential difference in this usage is that it contradicts any legal utilisation, because it 
implies a challenge to the hierarchical structure of the social order that can be just as much 
                                                                                                                                          
voices would be an important aim for any future extension of this research project. See for conceptual 
accounts from a feminist perspective Sauer 2008; Lettow 2015. 
9 See Koselleck 2002, pp.20. Koselleck’s work on the conceptual history of emancipation comprises a long 
dictionary entry written together with Grass for the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-
sozialen Sprache in Deutschland and an essay included in his book The Practice of Conceptual History. More generally, 
conceptual history is defined as the linguistic articulation, processing and assimilation of social history and 
both levels are for Koselleck irreducible to each other. He argues that both levels came into existence in the 
Enlightenment, since when they either exist entirely separate or to explicate one another. 
10 See Grass and Koselleck 1997, 154; Koselleck 2002, 250. Especially in the German language there exist 
earlier conceptual histories of and philosophical inquiries into emancipation, mainly from the 1970s, which 
are not referenced by Koselleck, because his general conceptual history ends in 1840. For the remaining 
historical period, he focusses exclusively on particular, group-specific mobilisations. See Greiffenhagen 1973 
especially his introduction, pp.7-47; Schweppenhäuser 1973; Herwig 1980; Hartfiel 1975., and for the anti-
emancipation voices Kaltenbrunner 1975; Rohrmoser 1995. It is also interesting that this period generated 
some original philosophical developments in the name of emancipation, which can be found in 
Greiffenhagen, Herwig, Hartfiel and Rohrmoser. Most of these accounts are developed in a more or less 
critical relationship to the Frankfurt School, especially to Adorno and Marcuse; see e.g. Schmidt 1973. 
11 See Grass and Koselleck 1997, 154–155. 
12 See ibid., 157–160. 
 15 
directed against the law itself as against certain individuals, groups, or other entities, since 
its direction is decided and enacted by those who feel the need to emancipate themselves. 
The modern meaning of emancipation continues to encompass the legal connotation that 
relates emancipation to a singular act of lawful recognition, but only as one of its elements. 
When, in the context of the French revolution, emancipation is for the first time defined as 
“the demand to end any domination of humans over humans”13, then it has fundamentally 
enlarged its political meaning and objective so that the singular act becomes reduced to 
only one event within a temporally-enlarged, social emancipatory process – in the sense 
that legal recognition might not achieve the state of non-domination for humanity. Instead, 
what might be required is a revolution that properly interrupts the linear progression of 
history and founds a new right or a new form of social order that allows humanity to live a 
truly emancipated life. 
But, based on these historical semantics of “the traditional concept of 
emancipation”14, Koselleck concludes that emancipation only remains viable today as a 
polemical concept that constantly re-opens “the claim of all human beings to an equal 
right”15, i.e. to their legal inclusion as a substantive goal for political action. Koselleck 
emphasises that his understanding of equal rights is not reducible to the liberal concept that 
falls prey to the illusion it could realise them by focusing on the individual alone and 
ignoring interhuman and group relationships.16 Whilst he frames this reasoning in terms of 
‘preserving’ the essentially modern character of emancipation, he however ends up 
dispelling the possibility of imbuing emancipation with the revolutionary impetus with 
which it entered into modernity. Not on the level of the goal – here, Koselleck is happy to 
hold on to the utopianism that emancipation proclaims in the name of ‘freedom of rule’ for 
all – but on the level of the emancipatory process, Koselleck warns against anything more 
than single political acts that result in gradual change. He justifies this limitation of the 
meaning of emancipatory change to a “minimal consensus”17 by making the adherence to 
the pluralism of society that resulted historically in contradictory emancipatory demands 
                                                
13 Koselleck 2002, 249; Grass and Koselleck 1997, 164. 
14 Koselleck 2002, 261. 
15 Ibid., 262 see also 264. 
16 Ibid., 259 
17 Ibid, 264. 
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(between different groups) an absolute condition of preserving emancipation as a political 
concept. Otherwise, it would yet again dissolve into a mere ‘catchword’ without any real, 
political force. 
Another, methodologically very different, attempt at indicating a new contemporary 
direction for rethinking emancipation comes from Jan Nederveen Pieterse. He takes the 
rise of the new social movements of the 1990s as the key motivation to mirror this 
promising practical-political innovation in the theoretical concept of emancipation, which 
he saw as lagging behind. The starting point of Pieterse’s conceptual investigation is not 
dissimilar to that of this introduction: whilst he shows some frustration with the muddling 
of concepts such as emancipation, liberation, resistance, empowerment and participation 
and their meanings, he holds the conviction that the effort of disentangling them is 
worthwhile. Because 
[e]mancipation is a matter of critique and construction, of which resistance represents 
the first step and transformation, in the sense of structural change, the second.18 
But he is quick to add that despite this attractive conceptual trait, he is not sure whether its 
close link to the Enlightenment tradition will allow it to survive the poststructuralist turn.19 
To rethink emancipation in the 1990s means for Pieterse to wrest the concept from ‘the 
dark side’ of the Enlightenment and to invest it into a pluralistic and yet universalist (but in 
the negative or contingent, poststructuralist sense) democratic project that takes the 
“relativity of the social” as its ground.20 Curiously, just like Koselleck a few years later, 
Pieterse refers to this project as distilling “a minimum profile of emancipation” 21 . 
Differently to some of the post-Marxist thinkers, who are very close to such an approach, 
Pieterse does not try to conceal that his redefinition participates in what he regards to be “a 
wider trend towards a reconvergence of liberalism and Marxism”22.  
 Pieterse’s approach relates to another famous project of explicitly rethinking 
‘emancipation’ in the 1990s and 2000s, namely Ernesto Laclau’s work, which has been 
                                                
18 Pieterse 1992, 13. 
19 Ibid., 6. 
20 Ibid., 31, 33. 
21 Ibid., 31. There is however no reference in Koselleck’s conceptual-historical work to Pieterse’s text. 
22 Ibid. 
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brought together in his book Emancipation(s)23. Differently to Koselleck and Pieterse, Laclau 
does without any historical-semantic excavations and instead enters directly into an analysis 
of the different logical dimensions of emancipation. Quickly after having identified and 
defined each dimension, whose specifics are not relevant for our inquiry at this point, he 
concludes that emancipation as a whole is plagued by several incompatibilities between its 
various dimensions. 
It is … by playing within the system of logical incompatibilities of the latter 
[emancipation] that we can open the way to new liberating discourses which are no 
longer hindered by the antinomies and blind alleys to which the classical notion of 
emancipation has led.24  
We are here primarily interested in the negative delimitation of Laclau’s project. How does 
he oppose his attempt to think ‘real emancipation’ to ‘the classical notion of 
emancipation’? It is not difficult to identify the basic elements he ascribes to the latter: total 
transparency; an autonomous, self-emancipatory subject; a secularised version of Christian 
salvation; a total ground of the social that is positively identifiable; the absolute 
representability and rational conceivability of the real – basically everything that can 
somehow be subsumed under an extremely simplified idea of Enlightenment universalism. 
According to Laclau, these elements not only logically contradict the starting point of 
emancipation, namely the affirmation of an existence in need of being emancipated, i.e. in a 
state that is still lacking those characteristics. They are also, and more importantly, 
incompatible with the contemporary, poststructuralist understanding of society as 
irreducibly contradictory – an understanding that is for Laclau the only viable one. 
Without going into more detail at this point, this overview shows that 
contemporary projects of rethinking emancipation are often forcefully pitched as a turn 
against a classical Enlightenment concept of emancipation (in full or in parts) that is 
characterised as no longer timely or even as “disintegrating”25, as Laclau claims. Even 
Koselleck’s account, which is so attentive to the diachronic and synchronic aspects of 
emancipation as a typically modern concept, ultimately participates in painting such a linear 
                                                
23 The first essay from Emancipation(s), entitled ‘Beyond Emancipation’ was first published in the collection of 
essays edited and introduced by Pieterse called like his introductory text ‘Emancipations modern and 
postmodern’.  
24 Laclau 2007, 2. 
25 Ibid. 
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history of the development of emancipation when he settles on a minimal concept of 
emancipation in order to avoid earlier aberrations of the concept’s meaning. The Marxian 
concept of emancipation is in all of these accounts centrally located within emancipation’s 
Enlightenment heritage, which makes this thesis, at least from the point of view of the 
former projects from the 1990s and 2000s, itself a somewhat untimely endeavour. 
Methodologically, it means that whilst this thesis will punctually argue with certain findings 
and problematisations from those conceptual-historical accounts, it will bracket their 
conclusions. 
 But even those attempts that are inclined to rethink emancipation as an 
Enlightenment and as a Marxian concept (at least in a some limited sense)26, often do not 
go beyond affirming common places when it comes to defining what makes emancipation 
an Enlightenment or a Marxian concept, including the link between them. Whereas in the 
case of the previous, critical accounts, the Marxian concept is usually rejected in the name 
of labels such as philosophy of history, proletariat as subject of history and utopian 
concept of classless society, it remains unclear what a renewed commitment to a Marxian 
understanding of emancipation in these more affirmative approaches precisely entails. The 
latter group (including Hewlett as well as the thinkers, he studies, i.e. Badiou, Rancière, 
Balibar) seems to share indeed similar objections or problematisations of the Marxian and 
the Marxist projects of emancipation as the ones put forward by the more critical fraction, 
which renders the Marxian commitment a much more open and complex question. Even if 
the pronounced ‘needs to return’ to a Marxian concept of emancipation are meant 
extremely seriously (as in the case of Alain Badiou and Joan Scott), it is hardly possible, 
based on the current literature, to evaluate whether what they return to is indeed Marx’s 
concept of human emancipation and what the theoretical and political implications of such 
a return would be. 
 Above all, this situation attests to a lack of differentiation of the nuanced variety of 
emancipatory projects that the Enlightenment tradition combines, 27  which is instead 
                                                
26 As found in some German publications from the 70s (see footnote 10), and in Nick Hewlett’s more recent 
Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Rethinking Emancipation (see Hewlett 2007, 1) 
27 See for nuanced historical accounts the work by Jonathan Israel, especially Enlightenment Contested (Israel 
2008) and also Enlightenment and Emancipation by Manning and France (Manning and France 2006). 
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replaced by a kind of straw-man or common place. From poststructural, postcolonial, 
feminist and queer perspectives, there certainly exists an urgent need and strong 
justification for a ruthless criticism of various theoretical and political elements that 
emerged from the Enlightenment tradition. Foucault formulated this impetus very 
pointedly in 1980: 
Two centuries later, the Enlightenment returns: but now not at all as a way for the 
West to take cognisance of its present possibilities and of the liberties to which it can 
accede, but as a way of interrogating it on its limits and the powers which it has 
abused. Reason as despotic Enlightenment.28 
However, such a project is itself in danger of becoming empty of significance at the 
moment when it labels as ‘Enlightenment theory’ everything that defends a rationalist or 
universalist emancipatory project and subjects it to generalised suspicion or even just 
outright rejection.29 
Marx’s attempt to define human emancipation by distinguishing it from other, in 
his eyes, limited forms of emancipation in ‘On the Jewish Question’ could itself be read as 
an attempt to alleviate this lack, but his account is widely disregarded in its specificity and 
often conflated with other parts of his oeuvre. That does not mean that the criticisms 
coming from the anti-Enlightenment camp need not be taken seriously, on the contrary. 
But this thesis contends that only a careful, philosophical excavation of the Marxian 
problem of emancipation, which depends on a critical close reading of ‘On the Jewish 
Question’, will allow for an informed, non-ideological debate over its capacities and limits, 
as well as the dispelling of (post-)Marxist co-optations and monopolisations of what a 
Marx-inspired concept of emancipation might look like. Only then are we in a position to 
affirm or reject ‘human emancipation’, or elements thereof, as a useful politico-theoretical 
concept for the present. 
 Methodologically, this means that the question about what is specific to 
‘emancipation’ that makes it different from freedom, liberation and such concepts also 
needs to be bracketed for the time being. I am referring here, for example, to Koselleck’s 
definition of emancipation as concept of movement and goal30, or Pieterse’s definition as 
                                                
28 Foucault [from his article from 1980, ‘Georges Canguilhem: philosopher of error’, cited in Gordon 1993, 
20. 
29 See for the development of a similar argument in the context of ‘fanaticism’, Toscano 2010a, xix. 
30 Grass and Koselleck 1997, 153. See also more generally on ‘concepts of movement’ Koselleck 2006, 81, 84.  
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combining ‘critique and construction’. All those characteristics point more generally to the 
kinds of structure, universality, temporality and agency that are inscribed within the 
concept of emancipation. However, this thesis argues that there is no general answer that 
encompasses all definitional projects, and the specific characteristics of a Marxian concept 
of emancipation are something we will need to work out in the following chapters. We 
might say this makes this thesis a “partisan philosophical inquiry” – because it makes its 
stakes, and how they impact on inner-conceptual differentiations, explicit, rather than 
quietly implying a universal or objective validity of its findings that so often serves to cover 
over a partisanship with a hegemonic intellectual culture.  
 There remains undoubtedly a final concern for any Marxian inquiry, namely the 
relationship of a theoretical or philosophical inquiry as developed in this thesis and 
emancipatory practice(s). This inquiry aims to counteract certain solidified visions of 
emancipation that fundamentally mediate our contemporary representations and thus 
understanding of society, i.e. of the praxis that is always already on-going without the 
intervention of any emancipatory praxis. Part of this role falls to theory, which has the 
ability to revivify the thought of emancipation as a decisive and contestable element within 
the theory-practice couple.31 Or, to say it with Schweppenhäuser: 
Emancipation today needs to, from within its powerlessness, assure itself of its 
power with which it will expose the real powerlessness of the dominating power. It 
needs to be aware of this dialectics, or it is none.32 
1.2   Chapter overview 
The thesis is organised in two parts, reflecting the two historical moments through which 
the unfolding and return of the Marxian problem of emancipation is reconstructed.  
Part One contains three chapters on the Marxian conceptualisation of emancipation. 
Whilst a close reading of Marx’s text ‘On the Jewish Question’ lies at the core of the entire 
first part of the thesis, Chapter Two precedes this by introducing the relationship between 
religion and politics as a historical-political problem in the German Vormärz33 and as a 
                                                
31 My approach takes its inspirations from Schweppenhäuser (1973, 410), Löwy’s affirmation of “the partial 
automomy of the sphere of ideas” (2003, 5) and Tomba’s definition of the method of the historical 
materialist (2013, xii). 
32 Schweppenhäuser 1973, 410; my trans. 
33 Within German history, Vormärz [literally translated it would be ‘pre-March’] refers to the historical period 
leading up to the 1848 revolution. See Chapter 2.1 for a more detailed elaboration. 
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theoretical problem between Hegel and the Young Hegelians. It develops a careful 
examination of the continuities and divergences between Hegel’s and Bauer’s stance on the 
relation between state and religion in general and state and Judaism in particular, without 
which it is difficult to separate out Marx’s critique of the two as he develops it in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’. Above all, it is the very ground on which we will be able to re-evaluate 
the common narrative that Bauer remains closer to Hegel than to Marx, which contains 
several facets that Marx’s own polemic brushes over and which this thesis aims to draw out. 
Chapter Three takes up a close reading of ‘On the Jewish Question’ and thereby develops 
Marx’s critique of political emancipation as a double critique of the outcomes of the 
bourgeois revolutions and of Hegel’s theory of the state. The central argument of the 
chapter is that Marx develops a critique of modern, bourgeois man in conjunction with a 
critique of the modern state as a key force that allows for the creation of a republican 
ideology within civil-bourgeois society, namely by creating specifically bourgeois political 
abstractions. The latter half of the chapter clarifies the extent to which this critique is 
indebted to Hegel’s theory of the modern post-revolutionary society and where it breaks 
with it. By shifting the focus to Marx’s conflicted relationship to Rousseau’s theory of 
popular sovereignty, Chapter Four further explicates the key finding from Chapter Three, 
namely that Marx’s critique of political emancipation, which aims at defining the limits of 
the totality of bourgeois society, is not reducible to his critique of Hegel in the ‘Critique of 
Hegel's Doctrine of the State’. It shows that the basis for understanding the roughly 
sketched concept of human emancipation in the greatest possible specificity lies in its 
relationship to political emancipation, i.e. in Marx’s rudimentarily materialist account of a 
social totality that he understands as giving rise to political and economic abstractions. 
Human emancipation is therefore far removed from a Feuerbachian inversion thesis in its 
method but remains nevertheless indebted to Feuerbach’s aim, the realisation of man’s 
species existence. Thus the chapter ends with an explication of how we can understand 
Marx’s alignment of human emancipation with a second, non-bourgeois revolution that 
aims at a different form of human social existence, and how such a revolution is supposed 
to contribute to solving the ‘Jewish question’. 
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 With Part Two, the thesis moves forward in time into the moment of the 1980s in 
which the problem complex of Marxian emancipation forcefully reappears. The 
introduction to the section develops an overview of the key political and theoretical 
elements that make up this post-revolutionary moment or conjuncture. The aim is here to 
explicate the political, economic and intellectual force field in which the return to the early 
Marxian problems – somewhat surprising from a certain Althusserian perspective – takes 
place in order to make the return intelligible, on the one hand, and to allow for its context-
specific critical analysis within the overall comparative framework, on the other. Chapter 
Five explicates Balibar’s reading of the 1789 Declaration of the rights of man and the citizen, which 
he starts to develop in 1989. The analysis takes its main cue from Balibar’s distancing from 
the interpretation of the Declaration by Marx, who in his eyes had failed to conceive of the 
proper ‘materiality of the statements’. By rendering more precise the relationship between 
Declaration and revolution, and their impact on the emergence of the new citizen-subject 
and of a new form of politics in Balibar’s reading, this chapter identifies the exact point at 
which his assessment diverges from Marx’s. For this purpose, it further highlights the 
effects of Balibar’s selective alignment with thinkers such as Lefort and Hannah Arendt on 
what he frames as new and unique about post-revolutionary politics, especially concerning 
the concepts of sovereignty, citizen, and ‘man’. The chapter concludes that the ‘materiality’ 
Balibar accuses Marx of missing in his critique of the Declarations34 does not in fact refer 
to the textual materiality and performativity of the statements in and of themselves, but to 
a political materiality that Balibar locates between the statements and their historically 
contradictory modes of actualisation. Chapter Six turns back to Balibar’s earlier writings on 
Marx’s different approaches to thinking politics. Only by examining Balibar’s critique of 
what he portrays as Marx’s two conflicting concepts of politics, is it possible to identify the 
deeper ground for his disagreement on the interpretation of the Declaration. This ground 
is Balibar’s conviction that, throughout his entire oeuvre, Marx remains unable to 
conceptualise a materiality specific to ideology, which this thesis identifies as the 
                                                
34 Marx’s exegesis relies on the 1793 and 1795 versions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
and on different versions of the American Bill of Rights. Balibar, on the contrary, focuses solely on the 
Declaration from 1789, mainly Articles 1-6. These various references are the reason that I refer to all texts 
generically as ‘Declaration’ or ‘Declarations’ throughout the thesis, when I do not make the specific version 
explicit. 
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Althusserian remainder in Balibar’s theory. But the final section of Chapter Six shows that 
by carrying this objection over into what, after all, appears as a Derridean-Rousseauian 
conception of equaliberty, Balibar at once turns against a Marxian and an Althusserian 
project of re-thinking politics. He instead locates his new emancipatory politics on the 
plane of ideology and at a distance from the socio-economic, or capitalist, social relations. 
That means Balibar has given up on the Marxian challenge of human emancipation, 
because he refuses the possibility to conceive of a social totality and designates any thought 
of its overthrowing qua revolution untimely. Instead, emancipation can only be the struggle 
for citizenship taken absolutely – but conceived of and configured in primarily political 







Section 1: Conceptualising a Marxian notion of emancipation 
It is in the text ‘On the Jewish Question’ that Marx intervenes into the conceptual history 
of the notion of ‘emancipation’ with a triple distinction: religious emancipation is not political 
emancipation is not human emancipation. Despite the fact that the text in general, as well as 
these specific concepts, are frequently referred to, such references lack a rigorous and 
comprehensive examination – against the background of the on-going debates at the time – 
of what is at stake for Marx in these conceptual distinctions. This, as I argued in the 
Introduction, is a problem that manifests itself in many existing conceptual histories whose 
subsumption of Marx’s project under unexamined commonplaces – often based more on 
conceptual developments from other texts than on ‘On the Jewish Question’ – makes their 
subsequent claims about the need to leave Marx’s conceptualisation behind plainly 
unconvincing. On the other hand, a similar problem exists in the Marxological and Marxist 
interpretations of Marx’s definitions of the different forms of emancipation. They make the 
lack of rigour of the conceptual historians, who are of course to some extent reliant on the 
outcomes of this research, appear in a slightly more forgivable light. Whilst there exist 
several publications in English, German, and French on the text ‘On the Jewish Question’, 
only very few, as we will see throughout the subsequent chapters, deal comprehensively 
with Marx’s conceptual distinctions, without ascribing a disproportionate leverage either to 
Marx’s theoretical developments immediately before and after ‘On the Jewish Question’, or 
to the theoretical influences discernible in the text, namely Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, Hegel, 
Rousseau, and Moses Hess. Thus, the task of this section and the following three chapters 
is to re-read ‘On the Jewish Question’ with the aim of grasping more precisely why and 
how Marx differentiated political from human emancipation and how his theoretical 
developments within this distinction stand in relation to his predecessors, Hegel, and 
Rousseau, and to his fellow Young Hegelian colleagues and friends. Because only if we 
clarify what is unique about Marx’s delimitation of human emancipation from merely 
political emancipation, will we be able to assess the recent ‘returns’ to emancipation and 
their obvious, but undoubtedly qualified relationship to the Marxian problem complex in 
the 1840s. 
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‘On the Jewish Question’ is an extremely difficult text for several reasons that we 
will excavate step by step. It is a two-part article that Marx wrote in the autumn of 184335 
as a review and response to Bruno Bauer’s two texts, Die Judenfrage36 (March 1843), 37 and 
‘Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu werden’38  (June 1843). It was 
published in the double issue of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher in February 1844,39 when 
Marx was 25 years old and had just relocated from Kreuznach to Paris.40 We will start here 
with a nutshell presentation of the Marx–Bauer controversy as it is presented in the text by 
Marx, which gives us a first impression of the topics of the controversy and their respective 
standpoints, which in turn forms the kernel of our subsequent interpretation.  
Marx’s presentation of Bauer’s stance on the ‘Jewish question’ does not, at least at 
first sight, leave much room for discussion. Marx conveys extremely clearly that Bauer 
defends only a limited concept of emancipation, because Bauer “subjects to criticism only 
the ‘Christian state’, not the ‘state as such’, … he does not investigate the relation of political 
emancipation to human emancipation, and therefore puts forward conditions [for the 
emancipation of the Jews as well as of man in general] which can be explained only by an 
uncritical confusion of political emancipation with general human emancipation.”41 Marx 
here levels essentially two criticisms against Bauer and his approach towards solving the 
‘Jewish question’, namely that his critique of the state is too limited and that this limitation 
of his critical view of the theoretical and political problem causes him to lose sight of a 
truly universal, ‘human’ emancipation as well as of its conditions. Bauer thinks he has 
found a solution to Jewish emancipation and to human emancipation, i.e. the emancipation 
of the whole of humanity, disregarding religious beliefs, gender, race, class, but he is 
misled: neither has he found the solution, nor can his demands on ‘the Jews’,42 which he 
                                                
35 More specifically mid-October until mid-December of 1843. See Marx and Engels 1982, 648. 
36 English title: The Jewish Question; my trans. 
37 See Marx and Engels 1982, 648–649. The Jewish Question had been published earlier in the Deutsche Jahrbücher 
in November 1842. 
38 English title: ‘The Ability of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free’; my trans. 
39 See more on the publishing project of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher in Marx and Engels 1982, 529–554; 
esp. 545.  
40 See Bensai ̈d 2006a, 29–30. 
41 Marx 1975, 216 [350-351]; amended trans. The page number in brackets always refers to the German text, 
cited according to the Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW), Band 1 (Marx and Engels 1956.) 
42 When I paraphrase Bauer or the discussion about Judaism and Jews at the time more generally, I do not 
always place ‘the Jew(s)’ in inverted commas, because that emphasise my own critical distantiation too much. 
But I will use the inverted commas when appropriate in order to mark the ascription of a unified subject 
position to Jews as historically and theoretically contingent. 
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argues are necessary conditions for them to be emancipated, be justified. 
Bauer’s reframing of the question of how the Jews can be emancipated is based on 
inquiring into ‘the true nature’ of the subject that seeks emancipation and into the entity 
that is supposed to emancipate – “the nature of the Jew…and of the Christian state”43. 
Bauer’s supposedly crucial new angle on the question of Jewish emancipation is his 
identification of a particular, religious opposition between Judaism and Christianity, which 
is perpetuated by the Jewish people and by the Christian state. That leads him to denounce 
the Jews for making their emancipatory demands as ‘egoists’, because they demand 
something, namely their own ‘special’ emancipation, as Bauer calls it, 44  from the 
contemporary German ‘Christian state’ without participating in the emancipation of the 
entire German people, which would necessitate the renunciation of the Christian state’s 
religion. But the Jews are not interested in this, in Bauer’s eyes, bigger, more universal 
project, because they only think of their own need to gain recognition from this generally 
oppressive state as Jews – for Bauer nothing other than a demand of privilege – and 
therefore do nothing to push the state towards atheism. Further, the Jews have not 
understood that they are seeking emancipation by the wrong means, from an entity that 
cannot grant it to them, because it is itself not emancipated but instead functions based on 
a different religious privilege. The question for Bauer is no longer that of whether Jews 
should be granted citizenship – which is the question that liberals and conservatives were 
debating at the time – but that of whether they are able to receive it, and almost more 
importantly, whether the Christian state is at all in any position to grant it to them. Bauer’s 
answer to both is ‘no’. Focusing on the Christian state’s need to renounce its religion 
before anyone – be it Jews, Christians, or others – will be able to be emancipated in Prussia 
resolves the specific challenge of Jewish emancipation into the emancipation of the whole 
of humanity.45  
Bauer’s solution is framed, as Massimiliano Tomba rightly argues, as a new political 
universalism46: religion needs to be abolished in order for everyone to be able to become 
                                                
43 Marx 1975a, 147 [348]. 
44 Ibid., 146 [347]. 
45 See Bauer 1843, 61. 
46 See Tomba 2005, 113. 
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citizen and man 47  without the religious specificities that create an (in Bauer’s eyes) 
insurmountable difference between them.48 Religious beliefs are, for Bauer, particularities, 
which, when raised to the political level, as in the Christian state or in the Jewish 
emancipation movement, oppose the modern freedom that is supposed to be free of 
privileges and prejudices. All these particularities need to retreat behind the true, equal, and 
free citizen-man on the one side, and the atheist state, the true and real state on the other 
side.49 That means both sides have to free themselves from their religious attributes and 
give up trying to politicise them, because those attempts are logically unable to overcome 
exclusion. Essentially, Bauer believes in the ability of a truly atheist state to grant full 
citizenship to its people, and thereby allow them to fully emancipate themselves, as humans, 
under the condition that they, i.e. in this case specifically the Jews, in turn give up on the 
need to politicise their particular religious beliefs. In other words, that they renounce their 
religion as well, and instead of demanding to be emancipated as Jews, they should demand 
to be emancipated as abstract, universal human individuals. Each side involved has to give 
up their particularities.  
Against Bauer, Marx argues for the need to subject the “state as such” to criticism 
rather than only the “Christian state”, because “the state can free itself from a restriction 
[Schranke – i.e. religion] without man being really free from this restriction”50. Condensed in 
this statement is Marx’s rejection of the possibility that humanity will be emancipated by 
means of the state, even if this state has reached its truly modern, secular existence. On 
these grounds, Marx also rejects Bauer’s demand directed at the Jews to renounce their 
religion. This is, first of all, because Marx does not deny the emancipatory effect that the 
Jewish struggle for equal rights can have. Secondly, Marx is convinced that renunciation 
would not have the effect that Bauer thinks it has, and that it would not overcome the 
                                                
47 Even though Bauer uses both notions citizen [Staatsbürger] and human being [Mensch], he does not draw 
a systematic distinction between them, which becomes clear when Marx later on in the text introduces a 
distinction in order to criticise Bauer. See 3.1 and 3.2 for a more in-depth analysis. 
48 See Marx 2010, 154–155 [355-356]. Bauer had intended to publish The Jewish Question and Das entdeckte 
Christentum [Christianity exposed] at the same time, which might have made clearer that his criticism of 
Judaism was just as much directed against Christianity. Every religion, for Bauer, is a caste system, which 
excludes the other caste that is opposed to it; see on this point Tomba 2005, 107. We will come back to this 
issue in 2.4. 
49 See Marx 2010, 149 [350]. 
50 Ibid., 152 [353]; amended trans. 
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emancipatory limitations that those claims of equal right embody. Beyond all disagreement, 
Marx concurs with Bauer on the need to establish a comprehensive understanding of that 
which dominates humanity as a whole and that this understanding will provide a solution 
for the ‘Jewish question’. Marx goes beyond Bauer by contending that it is not religion 
alone that stands between man and his emancipation, 51  but other kinds of worldly 
‘religiosities’: first of all, the religiosity of the state as such and its forms of domination, 
further its manifestation in human rights, and finally the religiosity of money, of self-
interest, and of private property.  
Based on this undoubtedly all-too-quick summary we could now conclude on the 
Bauer-Marx debate: Bauer is a radical secularist, a defender of the truly atheist, republican 
state in whose name he demands Jews and Christians to “overcome their religious 
narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions”52 as interpreters like Douglas 
Moggach and Sara Farris have carefully argued53; Marx instead has already liberated himself 
further from this kind of Hegelian belief in the rational state [Vernunftstaat] and from the 
political project of secularism, at the time of writing his response, and therefore argues that 
it is the worldly, secular restrictions [Schranken] themselves that need to be overturned in 
order for man to be truly free from religion in all its forms. 
But of course such a summary of the Marx–Bauer controversy can only be preliminary, 
serving as an initial orientation of our inquiry towards the problems and questions at stake. 
In order to enable ourselves to break through Marx’s surface level dazzling rhetoric and 
shorthand criticisms, which make ‘On the Jewish Question’ such a difficult text – as we will 
see in Chapters Three and Four – we need to interject here a preliminary, yet indispensable 
analysis of the relationship between Bruno Bauer and Hegel on the topic of the historical 
and logical/philosophical relationship between the state, religion, and the ‘Jewish Question’. 
Only a clarification of the continuities and discontinuities between Hegel and Bauer will 
                                                
51 One of the difficulties of this work is not to leave the equation between ‘man’ as human [Mensch] and man 
as referring to the male sex and gender that led feminist discourses to reject universal emancipatory projects 
with very good reason unchallenged. Whilst all major thinkers of this thesis use ‘man’ in conjunction with the 
pronoun ‘he’, I will try to interject female pronouns whenever it is appropriate. 
52 Marx 2010, 151 [352]. 
53 See Farris 2014, 296–299; and Moggach 2006. 
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allow for a subsequent precise definition of Marx’s position between the two thinkers on 
different elements of the debate.54 
  
                                                
54 Whilst there is scholarship on the relationship between Marx and Bauer (see esp. Rosen 1977; Tomba 2005; 
Tomba 2015), and between Bauer and Hegel (see esp. Moggach 2002; Gascoigne 1985), none of the literature 
considers their triangular relationship in order to interpret ‘On the Jewish Question’, which is the unique 
angle of this first section the thesis. 
 30 
2   The ‘Jewish question’ between state and religion in Bruno Bauer 
and Hegel 
Long before Bruno Bauer turned his attention to the ‘Jewish Question’, he had identified 
the state as a political and philosophical problem deserving heightened critical attention. 
He regarded the Christian state, or as Marx specifies “the Christian-German state”55 as the 
embodiment of a “regime of general oppression”56, the barrier to the political emancipation 
of every German citizen – and in that sense also to the political emancipation of the Jews. 
The empirical referent for this critique is the Christian-Prussian state that dominated the 
German confederation in the years after 1815. The reason for the Christian state’s 
oppressive existence, the most famous element of Bauer’s critique, is that it still works on 
the old ‘privileges’, on “religious prejudice” 57 . Privilege, as Bauer argues in The Jewish 
Question, is thus the main obstacle to true, political emancipation as he understands it, i.e. to 
the transition towards a truly secular state and the rule of law, all based on the application 
of Enlightenment reason.58  
Marx’s polemical tone in his review essay makes it easy to read his critique of Bauer’s 
reformulation of the ‘Jewish question’, and of his critical account of the Christian state in 
the name of achieving ‘merely political emancipation’, as a total refutation of Bauer’s 
position. But such an assessment would miss the fact that the opening paragraphs of ‘On 
the Jewish Question’ contain a moment that lauds Bauer’s achievements before embarking 
upon its criticism. As Tomba rightly points out, Marx does not deny that Bauer made an 
important theoretical contribution, when he writes:  
 [Bauer] replies with a critique of the Jewish religion, he analyses the religious 
opposition between Judaism and Christianity, he elucidates the essence of the 
Christian state – and he does all this audaciously, trenchantly, wittily, and with 
profundity, in a style of writing that is as precise as it is pithy and vigorous.59 
But it unlikely that Marx is able to speak with such specificity of Bauer’s critique of the 
Christian state based on the two essays that he is reviewing for ‘On the Jewish Question’, 
because neither of them treats the problem of the Christian state at a length that allows a 
                                                
55 Marx 2010, 158 [359]. 
56 Ibid., 146 [347].  
57 Ibid. 
58 See Bauer 1843, 60–61. 
59 Marx 2010, 147 [348]; amended trans. See also Tomba 2005, 91. 
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full grasp of Bauer’s theoretical position.60 It is only against the background of Bauer’s 
earlier texts from 1841 and 1842, ‘Der christliche Staat und unsere Zeit’61, and ‘Die gute 
Sache der Freiheit und meine eigene Angelegenheit’62 – which we have good reason to 
believe Marx knew of, and to which he even contributed some core ideas63 – that we can 
understand what Marx values in Bauer’s critical analysis. In those texts, Bauer develops a 
complex genealogical and logical analysis of why the post-Reformation, post-revolutionary 
Protestant Prussian state did not achieve its proper secularisation. 
To develop a deeper understanding of these theoretical analyses, which Bauer arrives 
at through a close dialogue with Hegel’s theory on the state, religion, and self-
consciousness, is also important in order to grasp in their historical and philosophical 
significance and specificity Bauer’s solution to the ‘Jewish question’ and Marx’s rejection of 
this solution in the name of the need for a more radical critique of the state.64 This is the 
aim of this chapter, which will proceed from the political debate on the role of the state 
and religion in Germany in the early 1840s, to a discussion of Hegel’s theory, and 
subsequently to Bauer’s problematisation of the relation between state and religion. These 
elaborations will allow us to confront and qualify Bauer’s continued ‘Hegelianism’ from a 
new perspective that does not exist as such in the available secondary literature. This 
assessment provides the foil for our subsequent re-reading of the Marxian critique in 
Chapters Three and Four allowing for a more acute awareness of moments where Marx 
                                                
60 The few passages in The Jewish Question on the Christian state are almost all quoted or referenced in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’, see pp.156-158.  
61 English: ‘The Christian State and Our Time’; my trans. 
62 English: ‘The Good Cause of Freedom and My Own Concerns’; my trans. 
63 See the letter from Köppen to Marx in June 1841, where he congratulates Marx for influencing some of 
Bauer’s most pointed thoughts in ‘The Christian State and Our Time’, in Pepperle and Pepperle 1985, 812–
813. Zvi Rosen confirms that Marx knew this text well and argues for a far-reaching, even terminological 
influence of it on Marx’s critique of religion, see Rosen 1977, 139. 
Bauer himself mentions ‘The Good Cause of Freedom and My Own Concerns’ to Marx in a letter from 
December 1842, where Bauer rejects Marx’s criticism of his involvement of the clique “Die Freien” in Berlin, 
by which he feels offended and misjudged by his long-standing friend and protégé (see Pepperle and Pepperle 
1985, 862). In a later letter from Marx to Ruge from March 1843, Marx mentions the text to Ruge with the 
comment that Bauer has never written anything this good. Already in the next paragraph though, Marx 
mentions his worries about Bauer’s stance on Judaism (“the Israelite belief”) as too abstract. Instead Marx 
suggests that “one needs to punch as many holes into the Christian state as possible and to smuggle the 
rational inside of it” (Ibid., 872; my trans.). Marx says this as justification for signing a petition to support the 
Jewish cause in the state parliament.  
64 That implies that I do not claim to treat Bauer’s work comprehensively, which would go far beyond the 
scope of this thesis. See for the most important explicitly exegetical works in English Moggach 2002; 
Moggach 2006; Tomba 2006; Tomba 2015; Gascoigne 1985; Rosen 1977, and in German especially Tomba 
2005; Kanda 2003; Post 1975. 
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remains tied to the Hegelian-Bauerian arguments, where he returns to Hegel against Bauer, 
and where his critical developments of ‘political emancipation’ go beyond both theorists – 
and not only in a topical, but in a methodical sense. 
2.1   State and religion in the Vormärz 
2.1.1   Vormärz as post-revolutionary moment in the double sense 
Both Bauer and Marx write their respective contributions to the ‘Jewish question’ towards 
the later years of the German Vormärz, which in its narrow historical definition lasts from 
1830-1848. The Vormärz is the period in which Germany experiences its delayed transition 
into a modern, capitalist society interrupted by re-feudalisation tendencies.65 What finds 
plentiful expression in the writings of and about the Young Hegelians is that it was a time 
of an experienced generalised crisis, a specifically ‘German misery’.66  
Lucien Calvié’s historical-literary studies of this period, entitled The Fox and the 
Grapes,67 help us to grasp the historical and political factors that contributed to this crisis 
experience and therefore must be understood as influences on the theoretical answers that 
the Young Hegelians, and in our case specifically Bruno Bauer, produced. The sequence 
that Calvié develops places this crisis firmly within a revolutionary sequence that began in 
1789: the French Revolution (1789) as the starting point, the Jacobin attempt of 1793 
trying not to let go of the radical revolutionary demands, followed by Napoleon Bonaparte 
and the restoration period under Charles X, who was King of France between 1824-1830. 
In this periodisation, the July Revolution of 1830 marks the beginning of the second 
revolutionary cycle that once again gave rise to progressive, liberal, and radical 
revolutionary forces and hopes after the counterrevolution; an event that Calvié argues is 
just as important a social, political, and intellectual rupture as 1789 and 1848.68 The alliance 
of liberal forces led by the Bourgeoisie that united to bring down King Charles X on the 
“Trois Glorieuses” of July 1830 was in Calvié’s eyes so similar to that of 1789 that he calls 
                                                
65 See Kanda 2003, 38. 
66 See Tomba 2005, esp. p.24; Kanda 2003, pp.32; Post 1975. 
67 ‘Le renard et les raisins’ is the title of a famous fable that deals with the fox pre-empting the need to 
expend a lot of hope and commitment into developing a plan how to reach the problematically located grapes 
by telling himself that they are not ripe anyways and that it is not worthwhile to try at all.  
68 See Calvie ́ 1989, 99. 
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it the “small” French revolution.69  
But, in Prussian Germany, these revolutionary hopes, alongside the hope of finally 
breaking out of its specific backwardness, and of fully embracing the social and political 
modernisation processes that England and France had long undergone, and that Napoleon 
Bonaparte had started to introduce during his rule of the Rhineland, did not last very long. 
They were countered by backlashes and repressive measures taken by the conservative 
forces, notably the Austrian Metternich reign, in alliance with the Prussian state and its king, 
Frederick William III.70 Calvié describes how already in 1832 the liberal and revolutionary 
voices had become marginalized and had to retreat to South-Germany or into clandestine 
movements, and were properly isolated by 1834.  
In particular, two political developments mark the experience of crisis or ‘German 
misery’ of Bruno Bauer and his fellow Young Hegelians that deepened in the early 1840s, 
after the conservative Frederick William IV had replaced his father Frederick William III, 
who died in June 1840. The first element was the further concentration of power in the 
Prussian state and its manifestation as an absolute state,71 which the Young Hegelians 
perceived as a new form of “general oppression”72. This development, which had been 
taking place ever since Napoleon’s defeat, converged with a movement towards economic 
liberation for journeymen [Gesellen] through becoming labourers, and for serfs 
[Gutsuntertanen] through becoming day labourers, which was part of a larger modernisation 
reform in Prussia. Whilst this was a process of progress as well as regress, and initially 
excluded the granting of political rights, it led towards the dissolution of the hierarchical 
structures in the house and in the estates and towards the creation of a “mass of formally 
free labourers”73. These two developments – the reaffirmation of the state as absolute 
power and the dissolution of the estates – influenced the Young Hegelians in their 
intensive debates regarding the question of the mediation between individual and state and 
the revolutionary legacy more generally. They were driven by a sense of crisis and urgency 
nurtured by the continued blockage of the political revolutionary advances for the German 
                                                
69 Ibid., 116. 
70 See ibid., 100. 
71 See Tomba 2005, 26. 
72 Marx 2010, 146 [347].  
73 Tomba 2005, 27; my trans. 
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states due to the absolutist and Christian-Prussian state, whilst structural changes happened 
on the economic, and civil-societal level.  
Besides, Hegel, who had been the Young Hegelians’ primary source of theoretical 
orientation in relation to the modern revolutionary changes, died in 1831 and left them 
with his writings, that apparently allowed for a variety of vastly diverging political 
interpretations as the formation of Right and Left Hegelian Schools attests. This raised the 
question of whether his theory of the state still usefully supplied the necessary theoretical 
weaponry, in terms of method and formulated goals, against the Prussian state.74 Moreover, 
Hegel’s essential concept of mediation between individual and state, namely the figure of 
the estates, was in the process of empirical dissolution, leaving behind a vacuum and a 
bigger question mark over the value of his theory for the Young Hegelians.75 The legacy of 
the French revolution suggests that this vacuum would be filled with the concept of 
citizenship, which was, however, mere theory in Prussia at the time, as it lacked its 
necessary political foundations, such as a constitution. As Bauer makes perfectly clear when 
he addresses the Jews directly, “[i]n Germany there are no citizens”76.  
Thus, the pressing question was how to establish a new relationship between theory 
and practice that would allow the emancipatory promise that the Young Hegelians saw at 
the beginning of the 1840s in the French Revolution to spark off in Germany. But this 
commitment was paired with a certain subliminal loss of orientation in the face of the 
dissolution of the old world order and the doubts they developed about the role of the 
Hegelian legacy. It is upon these problems of identifying the obstacles to the proper 
modernisation of Germany, which would imply its true, political, modernisation and finding 
a solution to the crisis of mediation between individual and state against the existing, 
Christian-Prussian approach, that the Young Hegelians’ approaches focus, and around 
these problems that they diverge from each other. But it is not only a question of ‘how’ 
Germany could finally realise the revolutionary elements that were already present on a 
world-historical stage. As Marx makes explicit in his review, the decisive fractures between 
the Young Hegelian theorists become much more apparent in relation to the question of 
                                                
74 See Calvie ́ 1989, 99–100. 
75 See Tomba 2005, 24,30. 
76 Bauer paraphrased in Marx 2010, 147 [348]. 
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what it actually means for humanity to be emancipated, “what kind of emancipation” they 
were trying to realise by conjuring up the revolution in Germany77.  
2.1.2   The problem of the ‘Christian state’ 
The primary object of Bauer’s critical inquiry into the political crisis of Germany in the 
early 1840s was the formation and strengthening of the ‘Christian state’ since the brief 
upsurge in revolutionary hopes in the liberal and nationalist oppositional camps sparked by 
the July Revolution in France in 1830, and the unrest it inspired in Germany. But the 
reinforcement of repressive state measures was in many ways a continuation of the 
restorative policies that built the ground for the formation of the German confederation 
through the Vienna Congress in 1815. But, whereas there were several ways in which the 
restorative policies, led by the Prussian King Frederick William III. impacted the life of the 
German people – of course to a varying degree in the different states of the confederation 
– it was especially the relation between the state, religion, and the church that was seen, by 
rationalist and conservative forces alike, as the decisive battleground for realising their 
political aims. That is why questions of theology, of the role of the church, and of politics 
were so intricately intertwined with the attempts of the Young Hegelians to understand and 
criticise the anti-revolutionary, monarchical, and generally oppressive political forces that 
were held responsible for the state of experienced crisis.78  
Junji Kanda calls the time of the 1810s and 1820s the period of counter-
revolutionary “religious awakening”79, whilst Warren Breckman describes it as the “theistic 
counter-movement to rationalist philosophy” opened by Jacobi,80 or simply “the revival 
and transformation of Pietism”, which was notably led by aristocratic and intellectual elites, 
and for Breckman important in shaping the relation between religion and state in the post-
revolutionary period81. The second heavily political development in the religious sphere of 
the time was the state-led church unification project, which was supposed to form the 
Prussian Union [Preussische Landeskirche]. This “union of Calvinist Reformed and Lutheran 
                                                
77 Ibid., 149 [350]. 
78 See Breckman 1999, 4–9; Kanda 2003, 33–34, 89. 
79 Kanda 2003, 92. 
80 Breckman 1999, 27. 
81 See ibid., 44–45. 
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churches”, which was initiated in 1822 but only properly implemented against the 
protesting parties by 1835,82 served the purpose of asserting the existing alliance between 
the political authority and Protestant religion by means of enforcing the King’s liturgical 
interpretation as the one and only orthodoxy. 
Many liberal thinkers of the time, including Bauer, had initially looked hopefully 
towards Baron Stein’s attempt at rigorous socialisation [Verstaatlichung] of the church and 
his aim of integration, which was part of the Stein-Hardenberg reform measures initiated 
between 1806 and the early 1820s, as they thought it could transcend the religious influence 
on political matters precisely by properly political means.83 But what initially seemed as if it 
could bring about the success of the ‘state as rational state’ to Bauer and his fellow 
Hegelians, which caused them to tolerate even some hard state measures against those 
religious communities that protested against the unification in the name of freedom of 
belief, turned out to lead somewhere entirely different. The Romantic religious awakening 
appeared to have become much more ingrained in the supposedly rationalist state idea 
through the religious and educational reforms than many progressive thinkers had 
considered possible or likely.84 
When in 1840, the romanticist and retrogressive Frederick William IV succeeded 
his father on the Prussian throne – in Julius Carlebach’s words “an absolute ruler cast in 
the mould of feudal kings, a conservative pietist wholly divorced from the realities of his 
time and his people”85 – hopes for the long awaited change, which his predecessor had not 
managed to realise, were briefly rekindled. But after an initial moment of liberalisation of 
the press and the release of political prisoners, Frederick William IV turned quickly to an 
agenda of further enforcing absolute state power together with the orthodox-conservative 
forces that surrounded him. He was able to use the unified state-church complex to 
enforce hierarchisation, censorship, and repression and to spread the “religious awakening” 
via his Christian state throughout the whole of public life. By then, Bauer and his fellow 
                                                
82 The Prussian government initially failed to realize the protestant union because of the protest against it, and 
the date of the final establishment seems to be slightly unclear, as it differs between different sources. See 
Kanda 2003, 94–95 versus Breckman 1999, 44. 
83 See Bauer 1968a, 37. 
84 See Kanda 2003, 92–94; Breckman 1999, 67. 
85 Carlebach 1978, 65, see also 66. 
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Young Hegelians were firmly opposed to what they understood to be the cultural policy of 
a Christian-patrimonial state aiming to suppress any liberal and radical forces, and which 
they realised had nothing in common with the Hegelian concept of the modern 
bureaucratic state on which they were placing their hopes.86  
 However, this struggle over the alignment of the religious, spiritual, and 
institutional forces also complicated matters theoretically. Whilst Hegel had unequivocally 
lauded the German reformation to be the spiritual foundation of modernity and modern 
freedom, the new role of Protestantism in the 1830s and early 1840s, as an important pillar 
for the consolidation of the conservative and romanticist forces, complicated this 
assessment for the Young Hegelians and rendered Hegel’s theoretical standpoint moot. 
Whilst the rising opposition against any direct Hegelian influence in that time suggested 
that Hegel’s speculative philosophy contained a threat to the consolidation of the Christian 
state, and the connected personalist theories that saw worldly sovereignty originating in the 
personal God, it was nevertheless clear to the Young Hegelians that his theory of the state 
– on the one hand due to the ongoing modernisation measures that reached beyond 
Hegel’s theoretical elements, and on the other hand regarding the historical and logical 
modernising role Hegel had assigned to Christianity – needed to be critically reconsidered; 
not least, because it was obviously open to co-optation by the state, through an 
interpretation of the conservative Right Hegelians, which raised the crucial question of 
whether this co-optation was abetted by inner-theoretical elements. 
But before we can enter into Bauer’s critique based on an argument about the logical 
form of the Christian state, which builds the foundation for his critique in The Jewish 
Question, we need to understand the Hegelian contribution in its own right. In the following 
section, we want to clarify how Hegel’s concept of freedom is connected to his 
understanding of Christianity and to the state, in order to be able to specify where Bauer 
breaks with this understanding – if at all – and to what extent his position remains Hegelian. 
  
                                                
86 See Moggach 2002, 80–82. 
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2.2   Relation between state and religion: Hegel’s troubled secularisation thesis 
Hegel discusses “the state’s relation to religion” most famously and at some length in §270 
of his Philosophy of Right,87 a text that was for most of the Young Hegelians, especially for 
Arnold Ruge and for Marx but also for Bauer, 88  the decisive source for their critical 
reworking of the Hegelian theory89. It is in the annotation to §270 that Hegel states what 
we can easily identify as his most contentious definition of the relation between state and 
religion, which troubled not only the Young Hegelians but remains an unresolved problem 
to this day: that is, his affirmation that “religion is the foundation of the state”90.  
However, in relation to Bruno Bauer, we should clarify that his primary target when 
he re-examines this relationship is not Hegel himself. He wants to understand the logical 
form of the foundation of religion within the contemporary Prussian state of the 
Restoration period, and how it developed genealogically, in order to confront it properly by 
attacking its logical limits. As part of this undertaking, he attacks the most influential 
philosophers of this ‘Christian state’, which, not incidentally, self-identify as Hegelians 
themselves.91 Based on this, in Bauer’s eyes, perverse and wrong alliance, he writes very 
much in the name of developing the true, namely scientific, understanding of Hegel, who is 
the thinker of “atheism, revolution, and the Republic”92. It becomes apparent that this is 
not an unproblematic defence of Hegel when we bring Bauer’s affirmation into dialogue 
with the relation between state and religion that for Hegel has to be, at least in some sense, 
foundational. The first question in order to establish this dialogue is to clarify what Hegel 
means by this. 
 Hegel spends a lot of §270 distancing himself from what he does not mean. Because 
                                                
87 See Hegel 2003, 291 [415] (§270). The page number in square brackets always refers to the German 
original: Hegel 1986a. 
88 See Ruge 1842; Bauer 1985 [1841], esp. the reference on pp.333–334. 
89 The other most explicit passages on the relation of the state and religion are in §552 of the Encyclopaedia 
(Hegel 1971, pp.249) and in a section from the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, which, according to 
research, was added by Hegel when he gave them for the last time in 1831 (Hegel 2008, pp.451). For a 
placement of Hegel’s view of religion in relation to his theoretical system as a whole and the state in particular 
in its chronological development, see Rohrmoser 1995, chap. 4. Whilst the overall purpose of Rohrmoser’s 
book runs entirely counter to this thesis by trying to affirm freedom against the Marxist aberrations of the 
concept of emancipation (understood as emancipation from tradition), the chapter on Hegel provides insights 
on this issue in its own right. 
90 Hegel 2003, 291 [415] (§270). 
91 See Bauer 1968a, 17. 
92 See Bauer 1968b, 85–86; also Bauer 1968a, 7, where Bauer argues that religion needs to be transformed 
into thought. 
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even his qualification that “if, then, religion constitutes the foundation … it is at the same 
time only a foundation”93 leaves the claim open to one-sided misinterpretations, which he 
realises need to be exposed. One misinterpretation, which takes up most of the space of 
the paragraph – and can be related to Hegel perceiving this interpretation as an actual 
theoretical and political threat – disregards the qualification of serving ‘only as a 
foundation’. It is this interpretation that ends up determining the state as “confessional 
state”. The confessional state however does not realise religion as only a foundation of the 
state, but it subsumes the state under religion and religiosity. It turns religiosity, understood 
by Hegel as subjective feeling, together with representational thought and faith, into a false 
kind of piety which is regarded as the ruling force because it can access God’s will and 
translate it into laws. However, Hegel deeply rejects this translation of foundation into the 
determination of the state and its form by religion tout court, that is to say, into “an 
essentially valid and determining factor”94. Religion here becomes the essence of the state, 
but it remains as such an under-determined, merely abstract, determination: how God’s will 
is to be translated into laws is not a question of rational and scientific thought tied to 
actuality, but a question of subjective feeling alone.95 Hegel sees here the danger of religious 
fanaticism and arbitrariness ruling the state and its political institutions, because the content 
of the state can be arbitrarily defined as always already justified through its divine form. 
The second misinterpretation arises for Hegel from not taking the concept of foundation 
seriously enough, because “they refuse to go beyond the opposition of the form of religion 
against the state”96. Hegel describes this in the Addition to §270, where he writes:  
But the same proposition can also be misunderstood to mean that those human 
beings whose spirit is fettered by an unfree religion are best equipped to obey…that 
individuals must have religion in order that their fettered spirit can be more 
effectively oppressed within the state […].97 
This is, in Hegel’s eyes, a bad interpretation because it would make religion into a 
functional element for the state.98  But this function could only be fulfilled by turning 
religion into an untrue, namely unfree religion, which in turn separates the state from 
                                                
93 Hegel 2003, 292 [417] (§270). 
94 Ibid., 293 [418] (§270). 
95 See also Schick 2009, 25. 
96 Hegel 2003, 292–293 [418] (§270), amended trans. 
97 Ibid., 303 [430] (§270, Addition). 
98 See Schick 2009, 25. 
 40 
having religion as its true foundation, namely as content and essence, in a double sense. 
First, because religion has been rendered untrue, and second, because the state defines its 
own essence independently of subjective convictions, which separates the two and makes 
them external to each other. They are only aligned in their actuality, but not through a free 
and shared intentionality focused on the realisation of a shared essence. 
 Underlying both these critiques is, of course, Hegel’s positive understanding of 
‘religion as foundation of the state’, whose elements we have already started to glimpse but 
need to make explicit. What religion and the state share against the second 
misinterpretation is their content: they share a foundational commitment to universal 
freedom, or, in Hegel’s wording, to “truth and rationality”. But the second element of 
Hegel’s definition of the foundational relation is in fact negative, because religion and state 
“differ with regard to their form”.99 We will start to explicate the latter qualification before 
we come back to specifying the positive sense of what ‘foundational’ means. 
 By form, Hegel means the form of their respective consciousness. Religion and the 
state relate differently to the whole (the absolute or spirit), and therefore develop particular 
epistemological forms, differing types of authority and rationality. The state relates to the 
particularities and the specific purposes of the whole [“im Staat haben die Unterschiede eine 
Breite des Außereinander” 100 ], trying to realise them through practical effectivity. The 
epistemological form that corresponds to this relation to the whole is thought and 
knowledge. The state’s purpose is to apply thought to the content – that we will see it 
shares with religion, namely the realisation of ‘Sittlichkeit’ – and thereby to help realise it: by 
demanding legal duty as an objective demand, independent of the emotional attitude with 
which it is performed. Based on this formal definition, science has its seat in the state, 
because they share the purpose of “thinking cognition”101 as opposed to subjective opinion. 
Religion, on the other hand, relates to the whole in its abstract form, as totality.102 It does 
so, as I mentioned earlier, by the epistemological means of feeling – representational 
thought and faith – through which the religious abstractions qua doctrine [Lehre] enter into 
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the sphere of inwardness.103 Religion, as form, implies a right to this subjective and inward 
relation to the totality, which, however, needs to be understood as thoroughly separate 
from the state. Because, in this operation, the content of religion remains “latent 
[eingehüllt]”104, as opposed to the state, which establishes a stable, objective, and rational 
organisation that rationally grasps and erects the content’s inner necessity through 
thought.105  
 It is in this context that Hegel recognises the Reformation as a crucial historical and 
philosophical event. Most fundamentally, the differentiation of the religious confessions, 
and the loss of unity of the church, called the unity between church and state itself into 
question. This was the singular opportunity for the state to attain its particular existence, 
and establish a form of consciousness separate from the church. Because “only in so far as 
the church becomes divided within itself … can the state attain universality of thought as 
its formal principle and bring it into existence”106. This is because, if the separation of the 
church does not threaten the existence of the state by tearing it apart as well, it only tears 
the state away from its inessentialities, and allows it to realise that its purpose in relation to 
the whole differs from that of the church – namely, as we just learned, in the development 
of objective knowledge separate from religion’s subjective belief, and needs a separate, 
‘particular existence’ [besondere Existenz]. 107  In this respect, it seems that Hegel’s 
secularisation thesis is wholeheartedly defensible, in the sense that he is greatly concerned 
not to allow the religious form of consciousness to relativise the scientific-rational 
grounding of the state.108 
 But, what happens when we move to the positive side of the foundation thesis and 
examine in what sense – if not in the institutional one we have just considered – state and 
church build a unity, which lies, as Hegel tells us, “in the truth of principles and 
disposition”109? On a basic level, Hegel posits this unity as a historical interpretation, as the 
church did have a foundational role in the development of the state – which we will see in 
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more detail in Bauer’s genealogical account in 2.3 – as much as the secularisation of the 
state reflected back on religion.110 But Hegel’s thesis also has a philosophical meaning, for 
which we need to understand their unity in a double sense, namely by taking religion as a 
concept in a wider, and in a narrower sense. In our use of terminology, we have already 
loosened our definition of religion, once we used religion and church interchangeably, 
thereby mirroring Hegel’s usage. But, it is necessary to become more explicit about such a 
wider understanding of religion as opposed to a narrower one, both of which we find in 
Hegel’s text111 – especially as Bauer has his own way of dealing with this difference, as we 
will subsequently see.  
 The most fundamental and overarching aspect of the unity of religion and the state 
remains rather under-defined in §270 itself, though it is nevertheless presupposed at 
various points, for example when Hegel states that “church and state are not opposed to 
each other as far as their content is concerned, which is truth and rationality”112 or, in a 
statement that has raised rather more contention and doubt regarding its meaning, namely 
that “the state is the divine will as present spirit”113. Truth, rationality, divine will – these 
and others are all concepts that Hegel uses to define the shared content between religion 
and the state. In the final course of his lectures on the philosophy of religion, held in 1831, 
which constitutes also his last ever comment on the relation between the concept of 
religion and the state,114 Hegel adds a further concept and thereby provides us with an 
angle to explicate their shared content: “There is one concept of freedom in religion and the 
state.”115 Freedom is the highest truth and it means free spirit, “that man is in and for 
himself free”116. And if this is the shared ‘principle’ between religion and state, then Hegel 
argues that they are both modes of Spirit’s self-knowledge, which coincides with the 
freedom of humanity as community in the sense of a speculative truth.117 The important 
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question now is how does Hegel substantiate this claim? He does it in two steps.  
 Firstly, religion – taken as concept – develops the idea of human freedom that 
serves as the foundation of modern, rational civilisation. It serves as a foundation because 
it deeply influences the human spirit’s representational relation to the Absolute by way of 
its cultural expressions and its doctrine. As he argues in the Philosophy of History: 
The Germanic nations were the first to come to the consciousness, through 
Christianity, that the human being as human is free, that the freedom of spirit 
constituted humanity’s truly inherent nature. This consciousness first arose in religion 
[…].118 
But not in any religion. It matters crucially for Hegel what particular idea of freedom any 
given religion propagates, especially concerning the relationship between man and God. 
This relationship will determine how man perceives his or her own freedom, understood as 
the relationship to oneself vis-à-vis the relationship to the world, and it determines the 
possibilities of realising this freedom on earth, in the actuality of their lives, through the 
interplay of subjective and objective consciousness. This is why Hegel infamously 
privileges Christianity over other religions: because it is the only religion that recognises 
“the absolute as free spirit”119.  
We can understand this role of Christianity most usefully for our thesis if we 
develop what differentiates it from Judaism, which historically and conceptually 
immediately precedes Christianity in Hegel’s teleological scheme. As Nathan Rotenstreich 
and Steven Smith convincingly argue, Hegel conceives of Judaism in his early theological 
writings as antithetical to Christianity120: it is “a non-dialectical religion”121, which enslaves 
man by making him exist as entirely external to his God, who is also the law.122 Judaism’s 
God is the object that man fears; he obeys him as he obeys the abstract law, namely as a 
command, but lacks self-consciousness. This externality between God and life translates 
for Hegel into the Jew’s relationship to the world, “to his own life and mankind in general”, 
where man remains alienated, isolated, and passive. Judaism is therefore “a religion without 
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a subject”123, because it cannot conceive of man as in a self-conscious unity with the object, 
God, which implies that man cannot conceive of himself as existing in a dialectical unity 
with the word. 
Once Hegel reached his properly dialectical method in his mature work, to be found 
in the Philosophy of the History of Religion, in the Philosophy of World History, and in the Philosophy 
of Right, his appreciation and evaluation of Judaism in relation to Christianity changes in as 
far as it also becomes dialecticised.124  
Judaism “becomes now a stage in the dialectical process of the self-realization of 
Spirit. Judaism viewed by Hegel in the early period as a non-spiritual entity becomes 
now one of the partial manifestations of the total Spirit.”125  
Breckman is right when he summarises that for Hegel Christianity ultimately 
“consummates the history of religion, […] for it alone among the world’s faiths attributes 
freedom to human beings as such”126. But Judaism plays a significant role in the lead up to 
Christianity,127 which Hegel is now able to appreciate: he calls it “Religion of sublimity” 
referring to “its conception of God as infinite power”. 128  Hegel nevertheless remains 
critical of Judaism’s externality, as God and man, infinite and finite, remain separate from 
each other and, on the other hand, of the foreignness of the Jewish law to the modern state, 
of Judaism’s existence in the form of a theocracy.129 
  It is only the religion of universal love, Christianity, which will be able to reconcile 
the finite and the infinite, subject and object, man and world, into a dialectical, thus 
speculative, unity.130 How it achieves this reconciliation will not be discussed here in any 
detail, because it has to do with a specific interpretation of the Christian dogmas whilst 
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ridding Christianity of its essence, as Charles Taylor describes it, namely a view of God as 
absolutely free, and as the omnipotent giver. 131  It is thus certain that only a de-
mythologised or “de-theologised” understanding of Christianity132  becomes what Hegel 
calls the ‘absolute religion’, in which he sees a convergence between religion, which existed 
first in its immediate actuality, and philosophy, or between faith and Enlightenment.133 But, 
despite such a secularised version of Christianity, to which Protestantism comes the closest, 
this privileging of Christianity over Judaism, and all other past and present religions 
regarding the access to the Absolute, ties Hegel’s entire philosophy to a “Christocentric 
standpoint”, from his early to his mature writings.134 It also means that ‘the divinity of the 
state’ can be understood as the state’s task to realise this de-theologised, but nevertheless, 
at least originarily, Christian idea of freedom qua its specific mode, i.e. as a secular 
Rechtsstaat within the world.135 That does not directly contradict the secular vision of the 
state, but it raises some doubts about how secular the overarching idea of freedom behind 
the Hegelian system is, which we should remain attentive to throughout the rest of the 
section. 
 A question that we have however not yet answered, and which deeply concerns all 
Hegelians after Hegel, the Right as well as the Left, is what kind of freedom of humanity 
Hegel precisely envisions as given in Christianity as absolute truth, and to be realised by the 
state as ‘present spirit’. What is the relationship between the freedom of the person and a 
fuller account of freedom of the human community, the species as a whole? A contention 
arises around what the freedom of the person is modelled on, and whether this is a truly 
modern individual or a Christian person.136 In Hegel’s writings, it is clear that he rejects as 
abstract the idea of God as transcendent personality – an idea that served the Christian 
states of the Restoration period as the legitimating image of the personal, inaccessible ruler 
and the cult of the inwardly free person.137 Hegel places against it an interpretation of the 
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Trinity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost as a form of concrete personhood that 
portrays the absolute Being as a specific self-consciousness determined by “the mutually 
interpenetrating self-relation of the self in the other”.138 Thereby, concrete personhood as a 
relational concept becomes what guides the worldly attainment of spirit, the purpose of the 
state, whilst at the same time, an examination of the state’s actualisation of freedom will 
allow us to grasp how this relational concept works in actuality.  
 We thus have to specify the meaning of concrete personhood – how it leads to the 
attainment of freedom and what might still tie it to Christianity in the context of the state’s 
rational processes, beyond its initial emergence from a philosophical interpretation of 
Protestant dogma. This question confronts us with the role of religion in its narrower 
meaning, which is why we need to expand the scope slightly before we return to the 
question of personhood: first, the other, second dimension of the unity of religion and 
state, or of religion’s foundational role for the state, has to be included in the analysis.  
 The reason for this is that, for Hegel, the state’s most defining characteristic is not 
only its rational form, but also its existence as more than an external bond: Hegel’s state, at 
least as he develops it from the Philosophy of Right onwards, is an ethical state [sittlicher Staat], 
whose unity depends just as much on an inner integration of the convictions of its citizens 
as it depends on their external unification qua constitution.139 The state’s highest purpose is 
to achieve a substantial unity, or, as Hegel specifies in §261, a unity of “external necessity” 
and “inner purpose”, where the individuals see their particular interests immediately 
intertwined with the universal interests of the state.  
But, one might object, Hegel’s conception of civil society already sees the individual 
as simultaneously particular man (namely Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian etc.) 
and universal man or universal person, which for Hegel derives from the divine 
personhood of God.140 It is implied in this development that civil society itself has a non-
exclusionary character, because it is able to mediate between these two forms of human 
existence. The mediation takes place on an anthropological level and a private level. In 
§182 Hegel affirms what he had developed at length in the Phenomenology of Spirit: the 
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concrete, particular person with his own particular needs, who exists as his own end, is one 
principle of civil society; the other principle is that each particular individual can only fulfil 
his own ends and needs through others and by contributing to the welfare of others: we 
could call this the supposition of anthropological dependency.141 Thus, already at the level 
of civil society, particularity and universality exist in a dialectic that bears the potential for 
successful mediation, namely through man’s labour as his oeuvre sociale. 142  Successful 
mediation means to arrive at recognition [Anerkennung, Anerkanntsein]: the moment in the 
process where the isolated and abstract particular needs of the individual become one with 
concrete, societal needs.143 The success of the dialectic on this level depends on limiting the 
possibilities for aberrations of particularity and subjective selfishness, which makes 
necessary a complex “stratification of right” between the legal person, the moral subject, 
and the individual:144 
On the one hand, it is through the system of particularity [Partikularität] that right 
becomes externally necessary as a protection for particular interests [Besonderheit].145 
But, Hegel does not think that with the introduction of abstract right, morality, and the 
institutions of civil society that are supposed to mediate the merely private interests of the 
individuals like the administration of justice, the police, and especially the corporations (the 
moment of ethical life within civil society), that the universality of freedom is already 
ensured. 146  He explicitly points towards the limit of the administration of justice 
(Rechtspflege) within the confines of civil society: 
The principle of this system of needs, as that of the personal [eigene] particularity of 
knowledge and volition, contains within itself that universality which has being in 
and for itself, i.e. the universality of freedom, but only abstractly and hence as the right of 
property.147 
In other words, civil society is governed by the principle of need and its fulfilment, which is 
ensured by right – based on the right of property – but as a whole it only contains the 
universality of freedom abstractly, rather than realising concrete, substantive freedom. It 
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lacks the final moment in the system of stratification, the state as the moment of “concrete 
universality”. 
It is with regards to the task of attaining substantive freedom that the state becomes 
important for Hegel. The affirmation of everyone as a universal person, of the Jews, 
Catholics, Germans, and so on, as generic human beings, cannot be achieved by only 
granting them equal private rights, because this kind of recognition remains abstract. It 
needs another level of mediation, the state and its institutions, to grant everyone civil rights, 
to include them into the political sphere as active citizens in order to achieve concrete 
freedom. Hegel develops this step as follows: 
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom requires that 
personal individuality [Einzelheit] and its particular interests should reach their full 
development and gain recognition of their right for itself (within the system of the family 
and of civil society), and also that they should, on the one hand, pass over of their own 
accord into the interest of the universal148, and on the other, knowingly and willingly 
acknowledge this universal interest even as their own substantial spirit, and actively 
pursue it as their ultimate end. The effect of this is that the universal does not attain 
validity or fulfilment without the interest, knowledge, and volition of the particular, 
and that individuals do not live as private persons merely for these particular interests 
without at the same time directing their will to a universal end [in und für das 
Allgemeine wollen] and acting in conscious awareness of this end. The principle of 
modern states has enormous strength and depth because it allows the principle of 
subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, 
while at the same time bringing it back to substantial unity and so preserving this unity in 
the principle of subjectivity itself.149 
The state is at the same time ‘external necessity’ and ‘immanent end’ to family and civil 
society, in the sense that it transposes their quest for ethicality and universal freedom onto 
a higher level, namely the political sphere where the individuals now actively and 
consciously participate in the actualisation of freedom, with a free will: this is the second 
level of dependency, now between state and civil society.150 The free will is not the isolated 
free will of the autonomous individual, or a legally defined person,151 but it is the political 
will of a subject, i.e. it is consciously and willingly mediated by the active reason of the 
state’s custom and rational organisation. As Eric Weil puts it, “freedom’s coming to 
consciousness is elaborated in the progressive transition from right to morality, thence to 
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concrete ethical life, and finally to the State”152 and mediation means that particular will and 
universal will become unified as the will of the thinking, self-conscious, subject and the 
objective state institutions (i.e. constitution, constitutional law and the state’s relation to 
other states in international law153) that, as part of the ethical state, have access to the 
Absolute that civil society lacks.154 
 And here we have arrived back at the role that religion in the narrow sense, namely 
as ethical conviction or disposition [Gesinnung], plays within the state, alongside the state 
institutions and the positive legislation. Religion, Hegel writes in §270, “is that moment, 
which integrates the state at the deepest level of the disposition [of its citizens]”155, the 
state’s inner bond. But, we need to ask immediately, what is the content of this disposition, 
and is it bound to any particular religion? Surprisingly, Hegel is quick to specify that it can 
be any religious confession, as long as it is of a genuine kind and does not have a negative 
or polemical attitude against the state, and instead recognises and supports it. All citizens 
are thus required to be members in a religious community:  
but to any community they please, for the state can have no say in the content [of 
religious belief] in so far as this relates to the internal dimension of representational 
thought.156  
This is remarkable, in that Hegel speaks here of religion as religious belief or cult that is 
based on its own actions and doctrine, which the individuals relate to in the mode of 
feeling and of intuition. Remembering the earlier analysis of the difference in form between 
religion and state, it makes sense that Hegel argues that the state has no right to interfere 
with this level, even though it depends on its functionality: religion is (only) foundation. 
Hegel here does not speak of religion as church – even though every confession or 
religious community builds such an institution. As soon as these institutions play a role as 
institution, i.e. once they own property, employ individuals and act as a unified institution, 
they fall under state authority and are subjected to the mode of the state, its laws, and other 
rational processes. 
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In order to come to a conclusion on the secularisation thesis, it is interesting to 
question how seriously Hegel intends this seemingly liberal stance towards all confessions. 
I call this stance surprising because it stands in direct contrast to his teleological account of 
the different religions’ concepts of human freedom that he finds developed most fully only 
in Christianity, and more precisely in Protestantism. What happened, for example, to his 
critique of Judaism? Has it suddenly become a religion that counts as fully acknowledging 
and endorsing the state, even though its concept of an abstract God implies that it 
contradicts the Christian idea of freedom that serves that very state as its Idea? The 
immediate answer is no.  
Hegel does not deny that the view that Judaism needs to be regarded as “not just a 
particular religion, but also as members of a foreign nation”157 finds some ground in the 
Jewish doctrine. But he nevertheless rejects the consequences that liberal and conservative 
thinkers suggested at the time, namely to deny citizen rights to the Jews as a religious 
community. Instead, Hegel was a firm supporter of full legal equality of Jews.158 When 
Hegel writes in Philosophy of Right, in a footnote to §270, “the way in which governments 
have acted has proved wise and honourable”159, this is according to most interpreters to be 
understood as an acknowledgement of the Hardenberg edict from 1812, which he saw as 
part of the necessary abolition of the exclusionary treatment towards Jews on the part of 
the state.160 The first reason Hegel gives for his stance on Jewish emancipation is by way of 
referring back to §209 in the section on civil society, which we discussed above. He 
reminds the reader that those deniers of Jewish emancipation forget that Jews “are first of 
all [zuallererst] human beings”161. But that is not all. He goes on to explain that he regards 
this mediation of particular and universal on the level of civil society as no longer merely 
abstract. Instead, the self-esteem that arises from being recognised as a legal person with 
civil rights is an essential mediation that will allow the individual to assimilate freely with 
(hegemonic) conviction.162 Particular subjectivities are, for Hegel, not to be dispensed with 
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or overruled in the name of the ethical community of the state and its universal aims; 
rather, the state depends on their flourishing.163 However, even behind Hegel’s support of 
Jewish emancipation, there lies a Christian agenda of assimilating these ‘anomalies’ qua 
integration. This view of the modern state implies that Hegel, as Lars Fischer correctly 
emphasises, is part of that minority of post-Enlightenment thinkers who did not assume 
Jews to be afflicted by an inability to assimilate, which was part of their particular Jewish 
essence – as, for example, was asserted by Bauer. Fischer goes on to speculate that Hegel’s 
view could be based on his own theoretical understanding of Judaism as part of his 
dialectical system, where it has already been sublated, rather than negated, in history by 
Christianity, which, in that sense, would affirm that it can be assimilated by a higher truth. 
This is a view that he finds polemically ridiculed by Bauer in The Jewish Question, where he 
writes: “Judaism too represented a truth once, but how many truths has history come up 
with since!”164  
But, there is a second reason for Hegel’s stance. If Jews, or any religious or ethnic 
community, were denied full civil rights, the state would risk failing “to recognize its own 
principle as an objective institution”. It would become an exclusionary state that would 
have to take the blame for the failure to integrate all its citizens. But such a failure can be 
avoided, precisely because the Hegelian state is a strong state, with powerful rational 
institutions, and the power of custom (or conviction) that can tolerate even those divergent, 
i.e. non-Christian, religious communities that do not recognise their duties as citizens of 
this state for religious reasons. 
A state which is strong because its organization is fully developed can adopt a more 
liberal attitude in this respect, and may completely overlook individual matters which 
might affect it, or even tolerate communities whose religion does not recognize even 
their duties towards the state (…).165 
Hegel’s unconditional support for Jewish emancipation is theoretically to be explained 
through his conception of the state as an “instrument of universalization”166 that has a 
power of its own, which should not be underestimated or compromised. In relation to the 
Jews, he is convinced that they can be not only tolerated, but also assimilated without any 
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prior conditions, such as renouncing certain elements of their religious doctrine or their 
religion in its entirety. This is what Moggach calls Hegel’s “lax form of republicanism” 167, 
which he regards as typically German because it continues in different forms in the 
Vormärz thinkers. On the one hand, he bases this ascription on a definition of 
Republicanism as making “the practices and institutions of citizenship … integral to the 
experience of freedom”168. On the other hand, the adjective ‘lax’ implies that he thereby 
leaves the personality and motivations of the citizen of the Republic as they are, and does 
not demand their self-transformation. Without being able to subject Moggach’s not 
uncontested identification of Hegel as a Republican thinker to the scrutiny it would deserve 
at this point of the thesis,169 it is enough to note that Moggach’s statement is compatible 
with our portrayal of the Hegelian state and its relationship to civil society on the one side, 
and freedom as Idea on the other. We should, however, not be blinded by its description as 
‘lax’: that Hegel does not make such demands does not mean that he relies any less on the 
power of religion as conviction to realise the citizens’ transformation. 
Hegel also articulates the importance of a conscious determination of the 
relationship between state and religion in the negative mode in his subsequent writings on 
the relation between the state and religion. In §522 of the Encyclopaedia and in his Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Religion, he blames the French state for having banned religion, in France 
meaning primarily the Catholic religion, into the private sphere, without acknowledging 
that this left the ethical state existing in an unresolved, because unmediated and external, 
contradiction to the non-reformed religion.170 This one-sided solution, that implies the 
Enlightenment could be realised without considering the role of faith, purely on the 
ground of a constitution for which conviction and religion are irrelevant, ultimately blew 
up in the 1830 July Revolution. 171  That, however, should not lead to the overhasty 
conclusion that Hegel’s idea of the state instead resembles the contemporary Prussian state, 
as many commentators have convincingly warned.172  
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 We have now reached the point where we can develop some conclusive reflections 
on the secularity of Hegel’s secularisation thesis, before we move on to Bauer’s critique of 
the Christian state, and his own stance on the ‘Jewish question’, as both elements are 
crucial to Marx’s evaluation. For this purpose, I would like to refer to a summary 
Breckman puts forward: 
Secularization in Hegel’s thought means neither the withdrawal of religion from 
social and political life, … nor the transmigration of religious into profane concepts, 
…, nor the domination of political and social life by a theocracy. … He thus viewed 
secularisation in fully Christian terms, but only insofar as Christianity is understood 
here in its philosophically sublated form, not in any one of its narrow confessional 
manifestations.173 
Whilst several steps of our analysis developed in agreement with all of Breckman’s points, 
it is against the examination of the role of Judaism that the reconciliation between 
Christianity understood “in its philosophically sublated form”, and Hegel’s theory as 
properly secular or even ‘atheist’ – to anticipate Bauer’s angle – remains troublesome. 
Because even if philosophy has the ability to reconcile the two moments of religion – the 
concept of religion and religion as conviction – under a properly secularised Idea of 
freedom, 174  the Christian idea of freedom is still to some extent present in the 
philosophically sublated form, and is thereby also present in the state. In this context, 
Carlebach made an interesting and potentially far-reaching observation. He suggests a 
subtle shift in the 1840s revival of the ‘Jewish question’ in Prussia with regard to earlier 
framings of the question. Whereas he understood it to have a dual connotation as an 
economic and national-cultural question before 1840, he argues that it was the Hegelian 
emphasis on law, state and history, which caused an increased emphasis on Jewish law, 
Jewish history, and the Jew’s relation to the state, and gave the debate on the ‘Jewish 
question’ in Germany a “traumatic character”, which it, for example, never acquired in 
England, with its minimal state.175  
 But instead of drawing our own conclusions, we now need to see how Bauer deals 
with these ‘impassibilities’ in Hegel’s theory, and how he tries to wrest it away from the 
Right Hegelians and turn it into a weapon against the Prussian state. 
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2.3   Bauer’s critique of the Christian state as an attempt to realise an atheist 
Hegelian political theory 
We can initially read Bauer’s critique of the Christian state from 1841 as a further 
explication of Hegel’s critique of the reality of the Christian religion as confession from 
within his own political present, which had further disillusioned him regarding the 
progressive alignment of religion and the state;176 living within a narrowly confessional 
Christian-Prussian state, he sees religion as precisely working counter to all attempts at 
realising the potential of universal freedom that the revolutionary moments from 1789 over 
1793 to 1830 had unleashed, especially in the way it was tied up with the state.  
Bauer goes along with Hegel in so far as he identifies the Christian doctrine as having 
for the first time inscribed infinity or universality into man’s subjective consciousness, 
attainable for all of humanity.  
Christian love is universal, because it does not recognise any difference between 
peoples, and instead offers the gift of faith to all peoples.177 
Religion also knows love. Under Christianity humanity unified into a Holy 
brotherhood…178 
But Christianity’s universality only comes at a high price – a price it seems Hegel did not 
recognise. Because, Bauer writes in Christianity exposed,  
…this love was not yet true love because it was not the love of humanity towards 
itself. It did not acknowledge humanity but it unified people only through the strange 
medium of an other-worldly, superhuman focus. So love was narrow-minded and 
violent. It was very much an exclusive creature. It was hatred against the human 
bond.179 
Any religion, including Christianity, turns the love of humanity into hatred of the human 
bond, because love is only granted by a super-human instance beyond humanity. Religion 
binds the attainment of ethical life to the arbitrariness and otherworldliness of divine grace, 
to something beyond strictly human power.180  
So, Hegel was wrong when he upheld Christianity as ‘absolute religion’ that 
contained the modern idea of freedom, because he did not go far enough – he did not get 
rid of the angry gods of Christianity that try to separate humanity from man. Although, we 
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will see that Bauer, instead of turning against Hegel, will develop his critique by arguing 
that this atheist position was Hegel’s all along. Whilst the scope of this thesis forbids a 
separate in-depth examination of the triangular relationship between Bauer, Feuerbach and 
Marx with regard to their Hegel critique,181 it should be noted that the starting point of 
Bauer’s critique of Christianity is very close to Feuerbach’s: they are both concerned that 
the Christian gods are an illusion that divests humanity of itself. Bauer is, however, the one 
who translates his critique of Christianity into a critique of the state and into political 
consequences, whilst, as Kanda rightly contends, Feuerbach formulates, in his ‘Preliminary 
Theses on the Reform of Philosophy’, a one-off and embarrassingly emphatic concept of 
the state as “realised, developed, and explicit totality of the human being”182, which cannot 
be counted as a serious translation of his critique of religion into politics.  
Further, for Bauer, Christianity as a doctrine uses the concept of man polemically 
when it claims the universal love of humanity, whilst in other parts of its doctrine it 
narrows this humanity down to those who are Christian believers.183 Its universality is an 
exclusive universality – only those who have faith, who believe in the Christian doctrine, 
will be able to receive and experience Christian love.184 Bauer’s critique goes further and 
posits a homology between religion and church, i.e. between the doctrine and its 
institutionalisation.185 Whilst Christianity as doctrine inscribes infinity into the sphere of 
heaven, the church institutionalises it on earth, based on a claim to the only true 
interpretation of the doctrine – the supposed universality becomes a dogma that justifies 
exclusion on an institutional basis. Religion – which in principle, as monotheism, is a 
universalism [Allgemeinheit] – is thus overlaid with an institutional form, whereby the 
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universality can only take effect if you are inside the institutional boundaries, which are 
themselves particular and necessarily exclusionary. 186  Bauer thereby adds to Hegel’s 
concern that the heavenly focus should not divert humanity from realising substantial, 
worldly freedom, a more radical critique of the exclusionary and violent nature of the 
Christian promise itself, and of the church as institution. In the latter, Breckman identifies 
Bauer’s hostility to organised religion.187 Notable in this argument is a conflation between 
religion as concept, loosely based on its doctrine, and religion as institution, i.e. church and 
its own monopolisation of the doctrine, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, goes 
against Hegel’s separation of those levels.  
Following on from this critique of religion, “the Christian state” is that in which the 
religious determination, either as theological doctrine or as institutional rules of the church, 
“is the dominant moment …or supposed to be brought into being the dominant 
moment”.188  Bauer’s direct problem is the Protestant Prussian state of the Restoration 
period,189 but he develops an argument in ‘The Christian State and Our Time’ that places 
this form of the “Christian state” within a longer genealogy. The Byzantine state was the 
first form of the Christian state, its most Christian form, because it was theology itself that 
appeared uncontested as state. 190 It was followed by the state of the Middle Ages, which 
was properly god-less, spirit-less and entirely undivine, which made it easy for it to be 
entirely subjected to the divine power. Bauer argues that “the Reformation took place at a 
moment, when the building blocks of the divine hierarchy had been hollowed out enough 
so that the state could seize sovereignty in churchly matters and break down religious 
power, which had built the very top of the order, to let it fall into the inside of the state”191. 
That means it now contained the undivine, spiritless principles, as well as those of 
Christianity, within itself, but the Christian dogma was still hierarchically superior to the 
undivine spheres of state and civil society, which were only responsible for policing the 
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compliance to formal right.192  
The Byzantine state, so Bauer argues, had returned anew in the post-Reformation 
Protestant state, but saw its second overthrow in the 18th and first quarter of the 19th 
century, by the revolutionary and Enlightenment concern for a properly atheist state, which, 
in Bauer’s view from 1841 that he would revise in the subsequent years, manifested in the 
supposedly modernising Prussian reforms.193 Thus, in the 1840s, Bauer witnessed the third 
rise of the Christian state.194 This state became absolutistic and seized power over the church, 
whilst the estates were dissolving; 195  but it incorporated the religious principles of 
Protestantism into itself. In this final emergence of the Christian state, the church as 
institutional form did not in fact exist as separate from the state, Bauer argued. Instead, it 
received its existence as institution with a monopoly on religiosity, its legal form, from the 
state, whereby the church “appears as an inner moment of the state and the state as the 
outer moment of the church”196. The form of the Christian state in its last emergence is 
characterised by a contradiction between its formal atheist existence and its inner religiosity, 
which in the Restoration period is exacerbated in favour of the divine. 
One makes a big mistake, if one speaks of the decline of religious life. It was never as 
powerful as today.197 
Bauer’s assessment of this latest and final stage of the Christian state form, which Marx 
paraphrases in ‘On the Jewish Question’ based on the few passages on this matter from The 
Jewish Question,198 before he objects that it is the worldly democratic state that really needs to 
be examined and criticised, is worth understanding in its full complexity. How precisely 
does Bauer account for the inner religiosity within the state’s formal atheist existence? And 
how does this assessment relate back to Hegel’s state concept, for which Bauer’s 
characterisation could certainly be true? 
On a basic level, Bauer thereby acknowledges that the Christian reformation enabled 
the separation between state and religion.199 But this separation is not itself the solution 
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that brings about universal human freedom – as a crude secularism, but not the one Hegel 
himself developed, might suggest. First of all, the post-Reformationist state repeats the 
problems that Bauer already identified in Christianity itself. The state mirrors the church in 
that it becomes just as absolutistic (by identifying state power with the monarch), 
exclusionary, and based on privilege as the church had operated before it, only now it was 
supposed to exist externally to the church and its religiosity.200 Nevertheless, that externality 
does not matter once the state had made religiosity into the inner determination of its 
infinite self-consciousness. By holding absolute power over the church, the constitutional 
state made the church into an institution that was recognized by its law, and thereby gave it 
its form. For Bauer that meant that religion was in turn allowed to take effect on other 
parts of the state, because religion=church was now, if not its only one, nevertheless an 
inner moment of the state’s life as a whole. 201  
Thus, not only is Christianity an illusion of humanity – about itself, its destiny and 
especially about its freedom – but the bigger problem is that the state is now also 
subsumed under this illusion, and can therefore not function as a rational state. 202  
In The Jewish Question, Bauer writes: “The Christian state declares religion to be the 
essence and foundation of the state.”203 
And in Christianity exposed: “It is true, religion is the essence of the State…but it is an 
incomplete and chimerical essence of a yet incomplete and chimerical State.”204 
The state thinks of itself as absolute, and yet it exists under the spell of the primacy of the 
world beyond. Whilst some critics of the Christian state think that its existence in 
contradiction to the Gospel will ultimately lead to the dissolution of the state, Bauer firmly 
argues that this is not a necessary outcome due to the Christian state’s ability to realise “a 
turning-away from the state while making use of political forms for its realisation”205. The 
same illusion works on the monarch’s self-consciousness, who perceives himself as a State-
God with infinite power, whilst this power is entirely subsumed under a “higher generality 
of spirit”, God himself.206  
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“The church is only the isolated appearance of unfreedom, which, within the 
Christian state, pervades all spheres of life.”207  
The problem is no longer the church or religion itself, but the church having become a 
state institution, which makes the state repeat the illusion of freedom which is in reality 
nothing but unfreedom and paternalism that once and for all declares man’s life on earth to 
be worthless in contrast to life in heaven. Bauer’s diagnostic of his time is correspondingly 
dark: 
At the time of the Restoration, everything changed: the promised concessions were 
revoked, the ones that had already been put into effect were limited, and privileges 
returned…Everything suffered in that time: reason, common sense, the general 
rights of man.208 
This translates more concretely into the repression and exclusion that the sciences, art, and 
other religions experience from the state, something that Bauer himself knows all too well 
from his personal experience.209  
It is time to evaluate Bauer’s position vis-à-vis Hegel and to reach a better 
understanding of Bauer’s emphasis on self-consciousness, upon which we have so far not 
commented. We have seen in Bauer’s critique of religion his most fundamental turn against 
Hegel and towards his subjective, consciousness-centred conception of emancipation: he 
rejects Hegel’s concept of the secular state in the sense that he positions Christianity as an 
absolutely anti-emancipatory force – an exclusionary, chimerical instance of the domination 
of humanity by the superhuman – which needs to be negated because it will otherwise 
continue to subvert the truth of the atheistic Enlightenment that has historically emerged 
with the revolution.210 Religion and the church are not denied their contribution to the 
development of self-consciousness, but this contribution has now come to its end: “it 
could not give to self-consciousness its infinity and let it keep it”211. Thus, the embrace of 
atheism alone can lead in Bauer’s eyes towards human freedom.212  
 That means, first of all, that religion can no longer be accepted as the foundation of 
the state in either of Hegel’s understandings of ‘foundation’. In relation to the concept of 
religion, we might say that Bauer only embraces the philosophical sublation of religion in 
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order to access the Idea of freedom more unhesitatingly, or more forcefully and totally, 
than Hegel. Whilst he thereby remains in accord with several contemporary Hegel 
commentators, such as Gillian Rose or Eric Weil, we will see that such an embrace can 
have far reaching consequences. In relation to the role of religion in securing the inner 
bond of the state by way of integrating the interests and motivations of the citizens, the 
situation appears extremely radical: not only is it wrong to allow religion to enter the state, 
but even the Hegelian rational state is in danger of embodying a religious form of 
domination over self-consciousness – ‘religious’ taken in a wider sense. But let us 
understand step by step. 
It is in his seminal text ‘The Trumpet of the Last Judgement’213 (1841) that Bauer 
performs an atheist metamorphosis of the Hegelian concepts. Bauer is undoubtedly acutely 
aware of Hegel’s concept of the state and its relation to religion in this text, as he cites 
from §270 of the Philosophy of Right emphasising that, for Hegel’s state, the differentiation of 
the church into many is a good thing, because it allows the state to form its objectivity 
independent of the church, based on self-conscious rationality. Polemicising for an atheist 
interpretation of Hegel, Bauer refers to the ability of the Hegelian state to “tolerate 
religious parasites” within it, because it finds its ethical truth in an independent foundation 
based on laws and freedom.214 But even though ‘The Trumpet’ does not contain an explicit 
critique of the Hegelian state,215 Bauer takes a position that does not only reject the role of 
religion played in Hegel’s state as the inner bond, but it demotes the state as such from its 
position in the Hegelian system, which Bauer regards as an objective relation. The reason 
for the demotion is found in the following affirmations by Bauer: 
Infinite self-consciousness is all that persists.216 
Self-consciousness is the only power in the world and history, and history has no 
other purpose than the becoming and the development of self-consciousness.217  
For Bauer, self-consciousness has primacy over its incarnation in positive institutions, such 
as the state, because self-consciousness – other than in the Kantian version218 – develops in 
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a dialectical relationship with history, which is for Bauer the revolutionary history that is 
clouded but not lost by the Restoration period. This development is, however, without end, 
therefore infinite. 
[S]elf-consciousness thinks the essence of the whole natural and spiritual universe 
and rises to it as its own essence.219 
We can see here how Bauer’s atheist metamorphosis has much more far reaching 
implications for the Hegelian system, namely a revision of the doctrine of the Absolute, 
which Bauer regards as still dominating rational subjects instead of arising from their 
subjective power, and a critique of Hegel’s concept of mediation, especially in relation to 
the state.220  
Whereas a precise exposition of Bauer’s reworking of the doctrine of the Absolute 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis,221 it is significant to note that Bauer’s aim was to re-
open the historical process, which he feared Hegel’s Absolute had closed. And the state, as 
one of its fundamental mediations, participates in this closure, because it confines self-
consciousness to the objective and rational totality with which Hegel portrays the state. 
Bauer identifies in Hegel’s state an obstacle to the “unity of thought and being”222 that 
Hegel himself posited and that Bauer wants to hold on to, whilst he rejects the Hegelian 
state as its proper realisation. He identifies the Hegelian constitutional state that has 
eliminated popular sovereignty in the name of objective knowledge as an insufficient 
realisation of modern freedom, which they both defend, because the state gives Hegel’s 
Absolute an institutional, finite existence that is thereby posited as transcendental.223 In that 
sense the Hegelian ethical state, even though it manages to transcend liberal particularism, 
embodies the universal that is independent of and superior to self-consciousness. That 
makes it a pseudo-objectivity or, just like the Christian state, a false universal, because it is 
absolved from the dialectic, because it is not subjected to the dialectic of self-consciousness 
and history. When Marx rejects Bauer’s critique of the Christian state because it fails to 
address ‘the state as such’, does he overlook this aspect of Bauer’s work? Perhaps. But that 
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does by no means automatically imply that Marx’s critique ends up resembling Bauer’s, 
which makes a further elaboration of Bauer’s position crucial. 
For Bauer, as a good Hegelian with regard to his methodological framework, it is the 
religious illusion that contains the truth within it – the question is, however, in which form. 
“Self-denial is the first principle and freedom its necessary result.” 224  That is, Bauer 
acknowledges that the internalisation of the religious principle into the post-Reformation 
state created a new condition, which allows for the overcoming of the religious 
determination of the state; the core achievement is that the church is now internal to the 
state and can thus become subjected to the critical power of self-consciousness, which it 
currently dominates. 225  But, the fact that the critical power of self-consciousness is 
currently dominated also means that it is itself implied in Christianity’s promise, and only 
needs to be set free by transferring it from heaven to earth, from God to humanity itself – 
we might call this Bauer’s anti-dialectical inversion thesis. 
Let us no longer combine humanity with an otherworldly chimera, but let us convey 
a person to himself and unite people with other people.226 
Religion is unable to bring about this unification, instead it needs to be abolished, once and 
for all. The power to achieve this abolition emerges from the moral conviction [moralische 
Gesinnung] of the Enlightenment that values knowledge and science over faith.227 We could 
almost say that Bauer understands belief in Enlightenment values as an anti-religious 
religion to be embraced by every individual. 
Humanity no longer wants anything exclusionary. This is why it cannot want religion, 
which thus far limited its ability to be everything that it can be, any longer as its 
universal, dominating affair.228 
Religion is merely a weakness testifying to humanity’s lack of courage to assume its proper 
being. It does not matter if it remains a private affair, but it needs to be decoupled from the 
state, as humanity will only be able to bring about universal freedom for itself if it takes 
itself as absolute. 
The corresponding interpretation of history is, however, significant, in order to 
grasp this embrace of the Enlightenment against other, similar gestures. When Hegel writes 
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in his introduction to the Philosophy of Right “To recognise reason as the rose in the cross of 
the present”, when he speaks of the “reason as present actuality”, 229  which is to be 
discerned by the self-conscious spirit, then Bauer takes this extremely seriously, despite his 
disagreement with the content that Hegel gives it in the subsequent 360 paragraphs.230 
When Bauer asserts that “the critique is the crisis, which breaks the delirium of humanity 
and allows man to become conscious of himself”231, then crisis is synonymous with history. 
Bauer believed that the crisis that he experienced and theorised would ultimately bring 
about its own solution, 232  and critique, i.e. the self-consciousness of the critic, was 
supposed to draw out that which propelled the crisis in order to support the progressive 
forces that were immanent in it. On this basis, Tomba argues that Bauer was after all a 
good Hegelian, because he did not himself attempt to devise a new organisational principle 
that could help overcome increasing individualisation and atomisation, and bring about a 
new social synthesis in the future.233 It shows that Bauer refrained from projecting an 
endpoint to the ongoing, and, in his view, necessary conflicts and contradictions in the time 
of the Vormärz, in which he continued to see an emancipatory force: the power of reason, 
located in man’s self-consciousness.  
Self-consciousness and history are connected for Bauer on two levels. First of all, 
history as substance is for him the sum of man’s self-conscious achievements: the world 
spirit only has reality in human spirit, in man’s deed [Tat].234 And, at the same time, history 
is the objective truth that exists outside the ‘I’, which orients the emancipatory activities of 
self-consciousness in a dialectical fusion and allows for the “self-transcendence of 
particularity”235. Emancipation is therefore an act of self-relating or self-production, by 
thinking the universal in history, which is what leads Moggach to call it “immanent 
critique”236.  
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Bauer’s opposition of the Enlightenment to religion is thus not to be understood as a 
full, uncritical embrace of the former in opposition to the latter. It is precisely the 
Enlightenment’s outright and entirely ahistorical opposition to religion that Bauer criticises, 
in the same breath as he acknowledges its historical contribution to the critique of religion.  
The Enlightenment erected its kingdom on its universal principles, which it 
developed from its struggle with faith, on the basis that truth cannot contradict itself 
and on the postulate of moral conviction. To formulate it more resolutely: its entire 
kingdom is composed of nothing but these principles.237 
The implicit adversary of this polemical rejection of the Enlightenment as a kingdom 
erected on ahistorical, moral principles, is undoubtedly Kant. Whilst we have so far made 
the case that Bauer’s overcoming of religion is based on a historical and dialectical, critical 
application of self-consciousness, there is however a dimension to Bauer’s reworked 
Hegelianism that appears to fall prey to the same ahistoricism that he rejects so vehemently 
in Kant.  
 This has to do with what counts as ‘history’, and what does not. Translated into the 
concrete political context of the French Revolution, Bauer argues for “the astounding 
energy and force of the concept” – which is the unity of concept and being in line with 
Hegel – “against existence”, i.e. empirical existence.238 He translates it as liberty and equality 
against servitude and paternalism.239 But by ascribing such a Jacobin position to Hegel, he 
ignores the latter’s critique of that conception of ‘absolute freedom’. For Hegel, it implies a 
one-sided rejection of the state instead of its dialectical sublation, which can only lead to 
negative action and ultimately a fury of destruction.240 Bauer reads dialectical mediation as 
self-transformation that is, even though historically open-ended, nevertheless able to 
achieve revolutionary ideas through a reconciliation between self-consciousness and 
history.241 Breckman characterises Bauer’s position, with regard to the amalgamation of 
crisis, critique, and self-consciousness as “self-consciousness …revealed as the only power 
of the world and history”242.  
Moggach helps us to identify here an emphasis on “individual self-determination”, 
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from which acts emerge, which are not directed at any fixed or substantial ends, but are 
instead free and “autotelic”. 243 I think it is an extremely interesting suggestion to read, as 
Tomba does, this concept of attaining freedom as also a polemical one, i.e. as the polemical 
assertion of an already existing universality – everyone is a thinking human being – against 
those religious and state forces that deny this universality. 244  The force that makes it 
possible exists in history that is, in Hegelian fashion, distinct from empirical actuality. But 
Bauer hypostatises this difference in such a way that the affirmation of universality stands 
in opposition to everything that exists, especially all positive institutions. Which is why this 
universality becomes accessible to rational subjects regardless of the historico-political 
conditions and objective institutions in which they find themselves. Moggach describes this 
process as follows: 
Self conscious subjects…free themselves from the grip of the positive, and dissociate 
themselves from the social relations that constitute the existing totality.245 
But do they thereby not influence the subject’s self-consciousness in any lasting way that 
would complicate the possibility of casting them off? Bauer implies here a gap between 
substance – which implies a substantial definition of self-consciousness, as that which is 
affected by history – and self-consciousness as formal, and therefore able to oppose that 
which affects it on a substantial level. Whilst Moggach warns against such an interpretation, 
for which I used his own analysis, because, after all, the ends of self-conscious deeds 
remain immanent to the historically given material, it is also true that self-consciousness – 
as critique – is for Bauer the filtering instance for the identification of the difference 
between history and actuality, after he has abandoned the Hegelian state, Hegel’s own 
philosophical answer to closing that gap, as that which falsely fixes it and therefore avoids 
the continual challenge of subjective reason’s dialectical work.246 It is time to conclude and 
ask, one last time, what remains of the Hegelian dialectic, in which objective spirit plays a 
vital part?  
                                                
243 Moggach 2006, 120. 
244 See Tomba 2005, 139. Tomba draws here a parallel with Rancière’s conception of politics, which opens up 
an interesting research angle for a possible future extension of Section 2 of this thesis. 
245 Moggach 2002, 112. 
246 See ibid., 115; Bauer 1968a, 32. 
 66 
In relation to Hegel, Bauer has transposed the ‘deed’ that propels humanity towards 
concrete freedom, from the state to subjective consciousness, in the name of a more 
properly Hegelian interpretation of Hegel, saving him from his own error. This however 
places the duty of attaining emancipation entirely back onto the individual and his attention 
to his own subjectivity. Bauer’s subject can only struggle for freedom against the state – by 
becoming self-conscious of his generic quality as human being that leads him to transcend 
his particularity and demand from the state that it do the same. If we take it that the core of 
the republican principle for Hegel, like for Rousseau, who is regarded as a more classically 
Republican thinker, lies in the state’s active attainment of the unification of particular and 
universal, subjective and objective, in the name of a community of freedom, despite their 
disagreements on the specific form this would take, and on the content of those concepts, 
then Bauer fundamentally removes himself from this principle in the name of claiming a 
certain political autonomy of the subject that the state always denies. The subject that 
already possesses the objectivity of thought within himself can liberate himself from his 
particular, heteronomous interests that stand in the way of the principle of universality. 
What does this rejection of liberal particularism, which Moggach calls Bauer’s 
“rigorism”247, however, have to do with Republicanism, to turn back to the end of the 
previous section? There is disagreement between different Bauer interpreters over whether 
Bauer renounces Republicanism altogether, which is Tomba’s position,248 or whether he 
retains a certain “republican programme” despite “subjective one-sidedness” or ‘rigorism’, 
as Moggach suggests.249 In order to come to a decision, we need to ask what remains in 
Bauer’s theory of the positive and transformative influence of the institution of citizenship 
on the citizens? Does it still function as a mediation, despite the subjectivist turn that it 
experienced between Hegel and Bauer? That Bauer speaks, especially in ‘The Christian 
State and Our Time’, of the true and finally spiritless state suggests that he holds on to the 
possibility of a true objectivity of spirit within the state, which is, however, different from 
the state’s objective existence as ethical life that we find in Hegel. 250  This is further 
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confirmed when Bauer introduces a difference between the Christian state’s government, 
which he condemns for having allowed pietism to enter into the state’s rationality, or the 
state as such, whose essence for Bauer is ‘ethical self-consciousness’. 251  What shines 
through Bauer’s words is then his conviction that the contradiction between a merely 
formal, spirit-less state that relates to the divine world only externally, and its inner 
religiosity in the post-Reformationist form of the Christian state, bears within it the true, 
atheist state that the Enlightenment promised – but is blocked by the absolutistic 
government of the time.  
The problem, however, which suggests that citizenship as mediation has lost its 
power of mediation and integration, is that Bauer defines the true state as a creation of self-
consciousness that frees itself from the veil of illusion, which can be cast onto it by religion 
or the Christian state or both. Whilst it seems that this critical gesture of self-consciousness 
is born out of its historical conditions, its assertion against them needs to originate within 
the thinking subject, or citizen, as a gesture of courageously ridding himself of his 
particularities and ‘becoming himself’ qua absolute negation.252 That this is a politically 
problematic demand we will now see in Bauer’s take on the ‘Jewish question’. But 
moreover, it contains a belief in an individualised and autonomous self-consciousness that 
philosophy as critique can help to liberate from the debris of the objective crisis reality, 
which we should bear in mind when we discuss Marx’s critique of political emancipation, 
because it will enable us to assess Marx’s relationship to Bauer beyond what Marx tells us 
about their differences. 
2.4   The ‘Jewish question’ and Bauer’s radical ‘solution’  
The so called ‘Jewish question’253  developed in the context of the larger transition of 
Prussia towards modernity, and the debate about it has been going on for several decades 
when Bauer and Marx intervene into it. The Prime Minister of Prussia under Frederick 
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William III, Karl August von Hardenberg, is well known for his reform efforts, together 
with Baron vom Stein, to revolutionise Prussia from above, i.e. to introduce more political 
reason than the Enlightenment had brought, whilst following conservative goals. Part of 
these efforts was his development of an edict for Jewish emancipation254 that was signed by 
the King with some amendments in 1812 and which granted Jews the status of “Prussian 
inhabitants and citizens”.255 The King’s amendments, however, excluded the ability to hold 
public office or to be granted professional responsibility [Standesrechte] from their right to 
citizenship.256 Thus, their formal equality was limited to the area of private law. But, the 
Jewish community nevertheless saw it as a major advancement of their freedom as Prussian 
citizens.257 However, the advancement did not last long. With the occurrence of attacks on 
Jews all over Germany in 1819, known as the Hep Hep riots, the rights they had just gained 
were step-by-step revoked until 1840, the year in which the old King died and was replaced 
by Frederick William IV. With the new King, the opposition to any form of religious 
pluralism became even firmer, as it was now a matter of protecting restoration efforts 
towards the Christian state, which only allowed a nationalism that was at the same time 
Protestant.258 It was not until 1869 that the conflict was resolved and Jews had achieved 
“complete de jure (if not de facto) emancipation”259. 
Thus, the ‘Jewish question’ was reopened in the early 1840s by its Christian 
opponents.260 The anti-emancipatory efforts of the state authorities manifested in a draft 
bill that was circulated in 1841, which argued for the re-instantiation of Jewish corporations. 
Part of the text reads: 
 “The Government recognises a miraculous essence in the extra-ordinary historical 
development of the Jews…Legislation must allow this special essence to unfold from 
within without drawing it into the life of the Christian state;” without it “imping[ing] 
on the Christian state”.261 
The aim was to introduce Jewish corporations and “to keep Jews and Judaism totally 
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outside the state”262, after the example of the Polish province Posen. The bill caused a large 
uproar in Jewish and non-Jewish liberal circles, as this was a law that tried to confine the 
Jews once again to the Middle Ages. Whilst the law itself was “quietly shelved”263, it was 
defended by “the apostle of the Christian-Germanic state”, Carl H. Hermes, which 
Carlebach suggests, we should understand as the most direct provocation of Bauer’s and 
Marx’s replies.264 By analysing the background that had given rise to the bill in more detail 
than we can reproduce here,265 Carlebach offers us his own comparison of the situation of 
the Jews in Europe at the time of Bauer’s and Marx’s intervention into the debate: 
 In England, Jews were not yet fully emancipated, but they were respected and 
accepted by both government and people. In France, the Jews were emancipated but 
ignored. In Germany, and especially in Prussia, ….the Jews were not emancipated, 
not respected, not accepted.266 
According to Bauer and his interpreters, the defenders of Jewish emancipation that argued 
against the likes of Hermes had given it a specific liberal framing regarding representation 
and a new concept of nation, which is best summarised by the following position voiced by 
a politician at the time, Count Stanislaw de Clermont-Tonerre: “The Jews as nation should 
be granted nothing, whereas as individuals, they should be granted everything.” 267 
Following Tomba, this emancipatory stance is directed as much against the old order of 
estates as it is against the granting of religious privileges to any one group as a group, and 
embraces an idea of the nation as an association of individuals that are recognised as free 
and equal individuals by rights. In Wendy Brown’s view, this demand for individualisation 
and privatisation of the individual, who wants to belong to the nation state, is “the 
Protestantisation of the Jew”268. 
With Bauer’s text The Jewish Question, which was first published in November 1842, 
in the Deutsche Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Kunst,269 as well as with the subsequent, shorter 
‘The Ability of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free’, Bauer intervenes into 
this debate with the intention of rejecting both sides of the argument, the liberal defence of 
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Jewish emancipation, which he understood to assert particularism, and its conservative 
opposition, manifested especially in Hermes’ text, who saw Jewish emancipation as a threat 
to the Christian-Prussian state.270 That is why Bauer’s position is commonly called ‘radical’. 
Bauer’s rejection of both positions is grounded in a fundamental conviction he holds: 
namely that he himself, and all of Prussia’s citizens, are in fact just as much in need of 
emancipation as the Jews, because of the overarching two-fold oppressive entity: the 
Christian state and the liberal aim of subordinating the state to private interests and an 
economic rationale.271 
Overall, the question of what it meant to defend the legacy of the French Revolution, 
in general, and with regard to emancipatory demands of oppressed groups of society such 
as the Jews, had not become any less contested in the early 1840s than it was immediately 
after 1789. From within the young Hegelian movement and one of its early precursors, 
Heinrich Heine,272 the two levels of general emancipation, and emancipation of the Jews 
specifically, were understood to be linked under the aegis of the, yet to be fulfilled, 
revolutionary promises and overcoming of the Prussian “regime of general oppression”273. 
Already in 1828, Heinrich Heine had stated in his Reisebilder by means of a rhetorical 
question:  
What is the great task of our time? It is (the) emancipation. Not simply the 
emancipation of the Irish, the Greeks, Frankfurt Jews, West Indian blacks, and all 
such oppressed peoples, but the emancipation of the whole world, and especially of 
Europe,274 which has now come of age, and is tearing itself loose from the apron-
strings of the privileged classes, the aristocracy. … Every time has its task and only 
through its completion humanity can move further along.275 
And, in 1842, which is the year in which Bauer wrote The Jewish Question, he affirms that the 
task is still the same and makes it into his prime objective: 
 The question of emancipation is a general question, the question of our time. Not 
only the Jews but also we want to be emancipated. […] Not only the Jews, but also 
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we do not want to content ourselves anymore with the chimera; we also want to 
become a real people, real peoples.276 
The vision that both Heine and Bauer formulate is a vision of emancipation as a universal 
task for humanity as a whole, whilst they acknowledge particular groups, needs and 
demands.  
The question that arises from these statements, and that remains relevant for our 
subsequent interpretation of Marx’s position, is whether these two levels are indeed 
reconcilable as Bauer affirms at the heart of his radical position without sacrificing one 
level for the other, and what kind of universalism – regarding the concept of emancipation 
and oppression - hides behind Bauer’s claim that “not only the Jews but also we want to be 
emancipated”. Another way of formulating this question would be to ask more specifically: 
how does Bauer construct and justify his equation of Jewish emancipation with the 
emancipation of humanity, what does it mean for the existing efforts of Jewish 
emancipation, and how can this convergence of Jewish and human emancipation be 
attained? 
We already know one part of the answer from the previous section: Bauer’s equation 
of the oppression experienced by Jews and by Christians is based on the affirmation of a 
universally shared oppressor: the Christian state and the absolutist, God-like monarch at 
the top, which together keep humanity bound to their illusion of freedom. However, from 
this equation Bauer deduces a violent rejection of any demands that Jews make to the state, 
in order to be relieved from their status as lesser or non-citizens of the Prussian state, and 
to reach the same recognition, access to public offices and military service, property rights, 
and so on as Christian Prussian citizens. Bauer’s argument is two-fold: on the one hand, he 
argues that the Christian state is in no position to emancipate anyone, so the Jews should 
understand that their demands are futile and indeed “unconscionable” as Moggach 
paraphrases, because it implies legitimating the state power as it exists.277 On the other 
hand, however, he argues that Jews are ultimately unable to be emancipated if they do not 
give up their religion once and for all.278  
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We will direct our critique at both sides of the contradiction: it is the only way that it 
will find its resolution.279 
This affirmation, in the introduction to the text, plays out in a curious way. Of the sixty-
two pages that The Jewish Question comprises, it is only on page fifty-five that Bauer comes 
at all close to a general critique of the Christian state. The overwhelming part is instead 
dedicated to a critique of Judaism based on the argument that Jews are themselves 
responsible for their own oppression, ultimately unable to be emancipated by anyone, even 
a proper atheist state. This is because they hold on to a backward, particularistic religion, 
which, in comparison to Christianity, removes them much further from becoming 
emancipated than the Christians, for whom it is basically the logical next step.280  
Bauer thus spends the most part of The Jewish Question, and the whole of ‘The 
Ability…’ essay, repeating the orthodox, anti-Jewish doctrine of the time, and affirming a 
hierarchical difference between Christianity and Judaism, which Hegel had developed 
before him, except that he did not go far enough. Christianity is the religion that has the 
most unlimited concept of humanity but, as we argued earlier, it projects its attainment into 
an otherworldly love. It thus drives inhumanity higher than any religion before it did, 
becomes pure religion.281 It contains the most absolute freedom, i.e. it is the true religion of 
the Enlightenment, and at the same time the most absolute bondage, and is thus only one 
step away from humanity attaining full self-consciousness of freedom, and throwing off the 
illusion, i.e. the limit that is Protestantism.282  
Judaism, on the other hand, remains tied to its own egoism283– an argument that had 
already been developed by Feuerbach in The Essence of Christianity. 284  There, Feuerbach 
writes: 
Egoism strengthens cohesion, concentrates man in himself, gives him a consistent 
principle of life; but it makes him theoretically narrow, because indifferent to all 
which does not relate to the well-being of self.285 
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This argument goes so far in Bauer that he denounces Judaism as not merely a religion as 
Christianity is a pure religion, but as a belief that follows its own divine law also on earth, 
i.e. that constitutes its own people, its own law, its own nation – all in absolute 
contradiction to any – Christian, atheist – state and thus to any other people.286 The Jews 
practice their own exclusion, which is why they are themselves experiencing exclusion.287 
Christianity, also exclusionary, practices an exclusion that is not particularistic but universal. 
Thereby, it brings to an end that which is only nascent in Judaism, namely the exclusion of 
everything that contradicts its equation of true man with the believing, the baptized 
Christian: universal exclusion. 288  Judaism is guilty of denying Christianity as its proper 
consequence.289 
My primary interest here is not in discussing Bauer’s very clearly anti-Judaic image 
of Judaism, which repeats the anti-Jewish sentiment of his time instead of radically 
challenging it, as my study is not about the relation between religious and political 
discourse in general. This task is in any case much better realised by Carlebach, who offers 
an excellent study that places Bauer’s critique in context with the intra-Jewish struggle for 
emancipation, and for different reforms of Judaism as doctrine, as well as with the Jewish 
responses to Bauer’s critique. 290  I nevertheless cannot accept that Bauer’s critique of 
Judaism is on an equal footing with his lengthy critique of Christianity written shortly after 
The Jewish Question (entitled Christianity Exposed), because the fact that they both have 
religion as such as their polemical target does not change in any way the hierarchical 
argument that Bauer makes about Judaism’s inferiority to Christianity. Bauer does not 
redeem himself of the Hegelian dialectical hierarchy by adding atheism to the teleological 
progression. My contention is further that we cannot subordinate Bauer’s critique of the 
Jews to his critique of the state that is also present in The Jewish Question, if much less 
prominent,291 because his critique of the state precisely leads him to his anti-Judaic and 
‘rigorist’ treatment of the Jews – which thereby is not a “purely religious” problem in 
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Bauer’s framework, as Marx tries to make us believe.292  
Bauer’s conclusion is that neither Jews nor Christians, with their, on different levels, 
exclusionary appeal to humanity, can ever reach true emancipation by only politicising their 
particular oppression against the oppressor, and holding on to their religion as their 
particular truth. Except that, Christians are closer to overcoming their particular exclusion 
than Jews, as their exclusion is already universal and thus their human spirit on a higher 
level of development.293 But that does not imply, as one might easily assume, that Bauer 
saw conversion to Christianity as a solution to the problem. He denied that baptism was 
the right way for the Jews to solve their backwardness.294 Only a radical renunciation of 
religion was the solution, the total abolition of all privileges – for Jews as well as for 
Christians.295 What this means in practice is, however, once again different for Christians 
and Jews. Whereas Bauer has no problem with leaving the Christian religion alive as a 
“purely private matter” 296 , as he believed that this would mean its automatic 
disappearance,297 the same was not the case for the Jews. Judaism, due to its history and law, 
cannot exist as a private matter because it contradicts the political Enlightenment goals that 
Bauer followed.298 That does not mean that Bauer refuses the concessions that had been 
historically granted to the Jews. But he conceives of them not as progress towards true, 
human emancipation. Instead, that they permit religious particularities to persist means that 
they change nothing of the general limit, that they leave the ultimate barrier to 
emancipation intact. The backlashes in the Restoration period are only a specifically strong 
manifestation of this general limit.  
We can conclude that whilst Bauer seemingly “de-theologises” the concept of the 
Jew, as Tomba argues,299 he remains confined to an anti-Jewish critique that is based on an 
anti-Jewish interpretation of Judaism as religion. Carlebach is therefore right to reject Bauer’s 
claim that criticising and hating Jews are two distinct views in his theory: after all, Bauer’s 
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criticism not only “leads to a denial of the right of the Jew to exist as a Jew”300, but he 
confirms a hatred of Judaism – a hatred that he projects onto Hegel, by putting these 
words into his mouth. 301  Whilst we have already portrayed a quite different Hegelian 
position on the Jewish religion, which is not unproblematic either, what interests here is to 
ask why Judaism, and religious particularities more generally, have become so troublesome 
for Bauer’s concept of emancipation that they cannot be integrated by a rational state? 
The only place where Bauer extends on the problematic role of the state in the quest 
for Jewish emancipation is in the appendix to The Jewish Question, where he critically 
discusses the juste-milieu politics of the French state vis-à-vis its religious groups on the issue 
of public holidays. Bauer’s focus lies in the formal universality of the law when he refers to 
the situation of the Jews in France, who were granted concessions towards civil and 
political rights in the context of the July Revolution:302 
In France, universal freedom is not yet the law, the Jewish question too has not yet 
been solved, because legal freedom – the act that all citizens are equal – is restricted 
in actual life, which is still dominated and divided by religious privileges, and this lack 
of freedom in actual life reacts on law and compels the latter to sanction the division 
of the citizens, who as such are free, into oppressed and oppressors.303 
Bauer refers here especially to the contradiction between the citizen’s formal equality 
before the law, which includes equality of religions, whilst this same law has legislated the 
Christian seventh day, the Sunday, to be the day of rest and thereby privileges the 
Christians over the Jews, who are only left with the choice of ignoring their Sabbath and 
assimilating themselves. Bauer’s conclusion seems to be that public law will always end up 
as a tool for the authority of the state to overrule minorities and their needs, rather than 
building a rational institution protecting individual particular interests, as Hegel thought it 
would.  
In this paragraph, Bauer’s politicisation of his critique of religion appears to be less 
distinct from Marx’s own critique than it seems from reading Marx’s interpretation in ‘On 
the Jewish Question’. At this point, Bauer has transitioned from initially criticising the 
Prussian Christian state for standing in the way of properly political emancipation, i.e. 
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demanding from the state that it renounce its religion in order for it to retreat into private 
life and free politics from religious issues, towards making a claim much closer to the one 
Marx develops in his own answer, namely that there is a fundamental divergence between a 
properly constitutional state that has abolished the state religion (here the French state in 
1830), with its abstract laws and actual life in civil society, in which the state nevertheless 
ends up using the law to realise interests of the majority that ignore and oppress the 
minorities.304 Bauer’s critique of the juste-milieu politics concludes: the majority principle can 
only lead to the oppression of minorities. 305  It suggests that even a non-Christian, 
constitutional state is unable to deal with religious particularities in a just way that ensures 
the freedom and equality of each citizen. This supports what Bauer had concluded before: 
that freedom of religion is only possible by means of freedom from religion and religious 
privilege.  
Once again, Bauer’s portrayal gives the impression that the state, even as an atheist 
state, is not really able to do much, as long as the minorities have not given up their claims 
on their religious privileges, which Bauer frames through the concept of finding the 
‘courage’ to do so, as well as the consciousness of what it means to be truly free. It is a 
demand which Sara Farris rightly calls the enforcement of “political neutrality” in the 
public sphere, a demand for assimilation to a yet-to-be-realised truly secular state.306 We 
thus witness, in the context of the ‘Jewish question’, an exacerbation of an anti-institutional 
account of emancipation. Bauer opposes Hegel’s view on emancipation with a position, 
that, in Fischer’s words, “assumed that gradual emancipation presupposed incremental 
assimilation as part of a quid pro quo”307: only if the Jews renounce their law that makes them 
into a privilege seeking, separate nation, will the state, if it will have itself renounced its 
Christianity, be able to grant them the rights they demand. In the end it appears as if Bauer 
helped Hegel out, with his theory of a strong state that was, however, nowhere to be seen, 
nor were the historical conditions that could bring it about.  
The alternative allocation point of the emancipatory power or agency in the 
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individual subject that seeks to be emancipated, e.g. the Jew, does however not act as a 
theory of empowerment, but it comes, in Bauer’s theory, at the expense of making the 
oppressed responsible for their oppression.  
In The Jewish Question, Bauer asserts: 
If they understood Christianity and the Christian state, they would themselves no 
longer want to be emancipated; they would work towards their true freedom.308 
First become man, then citizen, and maybe keep your religion private, if it is Christian. In 
the name of wanting to theorise the elimination of the very possibility of domination or 
‘interference’, Bauer seems to have, after all, fallen prey to misunderstanding the material 
conditions of domination in modern society, which can neither easily be cast aside by those 
who suffer under it, nor will the problem be necessarily solved once the dominating ideas 
are renounced. But this is something that we will need to discuss further in the following 
two chapters.   
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3   Marx’s attempt to break with the (post-)Hegelian conception of 
emancipation: Re-reading ‘On the Jewish Question’  
We have sufficiently clarified Hegel’s and Bauer’s diverging positions on the ‘Jewish 
question’ and exposed their apparent as well as their less obvious disagreements and the 
continuations between their theoretical and political positions. Both derive their respective 
positions from the undeniably ‘good reason’ of wanting to realise modern freedom for the 
whole of humanity. This however does not prevent the problematic implications of their 
theories that we pinpointed. It is now time to let Marx speak. The aim of this chapter is to 
develop his theorisation of emancipation and delineate it from Bauer and Hegel. We are 
now well equipped for this task in terms of being able to cut through the heavy 
‘phraseology’ that Marx’s review of Bauer’s texts contains and reaching the conceptual 
propositions that he makes in this rather short text, which have far reaching philosophical 
and political implications. 
According to research conducted for the Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Marx 
had been occupied with the ‘Jewish Question’ since 1842, while he was still an editor for 
the Rheinische Zeitung. During the summer and early autumn of 1842 the Rheinische Zeitung 
published various articles that defended “absolute Jewish political equality”. 309  Bauer’s 
article, The Jewish Question could not be included at that point due to censorship and was 
instead published in November 1842 in the Deutsche Jahrbücher. The other context in which 
we need to understand Marx’s text is that it was written in between the ‘Kreuznach 
Manuscripts’, also known as ‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State’310, which remained 
unpublished in Marx’s lifetime, and the ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. 
Introduction’311 that was published in the same volume of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher 
as ‘On the Jewish Question’. Daniel Bensaïd therefore labels it a “threshold text” within 
Marx’s early works, by which he implies that it stands on multiple thresholds at the same 
time, without definitively entering into the spaces that it breaks open – a hypothesis this 
chapter and the next will be examining.312 Whereas the MEGA research has shown that the 
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source material Marx used for ‘On the Jewish Question’ must have been more extensive 
than that which he consulted for the ‘Critique’ – information that is based on his 
Kreuznach Notebooks -, it is nevertheless not without relevance for a careful reading of 
‘On the Jewish Question’ that Marx had been reading the main works of state theory by 
Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and Rousseau, alongside of various historical accounts of the 
French and American revolutions while he was at Kreuznach drafting the ‘Critique’.313  
I am referring to the type of source material in order to sketch out the scope of my 
reading of ‘On the Jewish Question’; a reading that follows so many previous attempts that 
it might seem doubtful that it can add anything of relevance to the debate. What is 
primarily at stake is, on the one hand, Marx’s historically-specific analysis of the limits of 
any emancipatory project within the confines of the civil-bourgeois (or today we would say 
capitalist) society and, on the other hand, his attempt to elucidate a concept of 
emancipation that aims to overcome those confines. Only from this perspective, which will 
be developed in this and the next chapter, is it possible to explicate those issues that are 
often discussed separately from each other; namely how Marx diverts from Bauer and 
breaks with the Young Hegelian school; to what extent he nevertheless remains the young, 
Hegelian Marx; his anti-Judaic symbolism in the second part; the Feuerbachian 
anthropological and humanist language with which he hints at what he means by human 
emancipation; and finally his relationship to Rousseau’s concept of popular sovereignty. All 
these questions and problems appear within my reading, but as part and parcel of reaching 
a clear, comprehensive and critical delineation between political and human emancipation. 
It is this delineation that will allow for a purposeful investigation of the connections and 
shifts within the discourse that arises in the 1980s in France around the issues of secularism, 
citizenship and revolution and Marx’s problematisation.  
We will therefore start by examining Marx’s direct confrontation of Bauer’s 
theorisation before we move on to the territory where Marx’s critique of the state and of 
civil society, or what he calls ‘modern man’, goes beyond Bauer in terms of the problematic 
as well as of the methodological conceptualisation of his objects of analysis. We will 
demonstrate that Marx moves beyond Bauer in a substantial way in this chapter, firstly by 
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clarifying Marx’s account of the constitution of modern man as split between bourgeois and 
citoyen in 3.2, and secondly by defining the role of the republican-democratic state, or the 
‘state as such’, as ideological, including its relationship to civil society, in 3.3. In the final 
section of the chapter, we will provide the background debate to these corner stones of 
Marx’s analysis in ‘On the Jewish Question’ by detailing the extent to which it relies on 
Hegel’s theorisation of the modern social form and by identifying where the fracture lines 
between both of their accounts open up. I argue that the conception and critique of 
‘political emancipation’ is Marx’s core achievement of the text and of his entire 
conceptualisation of emancipation, which is in no way reducible to Bauer’s politicisation 
and universalisation of Jewish emancipation. However, this by no means implies that Marx 
moves beyond Bauer in a total, all-encompassing way, which will become apparent 
throughout this and the next chapter. 
3.1   Marx’s critique of Bauer and his framing of the ‘Jewish question’: from 
theological criticism to a secular, political critique of the state 
Moggach accuses Marx of “misconstruing” Bauer’s concept of emancipation in that Marx 
immediately in the second sentence of ‘On the Jewish Question’ refers to it as ‘civic’ or 
‘political emancipation’ in opposition to true, human emancipation; taking this accusation 
seriously can help us enormously to disentangle what actually happens in the text.314 For, 
while Moggach is correct that Bauer himself sought to conceptualise ‘human’ emancipation 
based on transposing Hegel in his own way, Marx has good reason to make his, I would say, 
hyperbolic accusation, which he does not however spell out all that clearly. By distancing 
his own position from Bauer’s in the name of human emancipation as opposed to political 
emancipation, Marx gives us the impression that his position is not only fundamentally 
different from that of Bauer, but also that it fundamentally surpasses the latter with regards 
to its radicalism, universality and properly political framing - despite his initial 
acknowledgement of Bauer’s laudable achievements. It is this implicit presupposition of 
Marx’s text that needs to be interrogated against the background of the previous chapter. 
Marx summarises Bauer’s solution to the ‘Jewish Question’ as follows: “We must 
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emancipate ourselves before we can emancipate others.”315 Thus he sees Bauer affirming 
the need to renounce any form of religion, Protestantism as the state religion of Prussia as 
well as Judaism and Christianity as private individual belief systems, in order for humanity 
to become emancipated: emancipation needs an atheist state and atheist subjects, also 
called citizens. However, by calling Bauer’s position “political emancipation” Marx frames it 
in a specific way, which I agree with Moggach, is problematic, in that, as I have shown in 
the previous section, Bauer himself is much less wedded to the idea of a secular state with 
the task of making the people into citizen subjects than Marx suggests in his reading, e.g. 
when he implies that the true state is just as much Bauer’s aim as is the atheist individual.316 
Bauer’s position on how a secular state should look remains however entirely obscured by 
his own emphasis on the subjective, individualist or ‘rigorist’ side of his approach to the 
‘Jewish question’. Marx somewhat silences this by overlaying his critique of Bauer with that 
of the outcomes of the French and American revolutions and of Hegel’s theory of the state.  
That does not mean that Marx does not seriously engage with Bauer’s position. He 
understands that an essential part of Bauer’s solution to the ‘Jewish question’ is his demand 
that man – either Jew or Christian – casts off his ‘snake skin’, i.e. renounces his religion, in 
order to appear as generic man (the sloughed snake) that can be emancipated through 
being granted citizenship rights by an equally atheist state. The work that leads man to 
become conscious of his genericity is the work of critique, or science [Wissenschaft].317 But 
because, in Marx’s eyes, an atheist state is no guarantee at all for man’s emancipation, he 
does not believe that anyone should be asked to renounce their religion for this end. 
Individual religious beliefs are, in Marx’s view, not part of Bauer’s problem – the problem 
of political emancipation –, and to demand their renunciation is a condition, which is “not 
based on the nature of political emancipation itself”.318 This means not only that an atheist 
state is no guarantee for man’s emancipation, but that the level of emancipation at which 
Bauer’s theory aims can be reached without his rigorist demands.  
We can hear at this point Marx criticising Bauer for having chosen an ineffective 
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critique of political emancipation, because rather than pushing for its overcoming, he 
extends it with an anti-religious, and more specifically anti-Judaic rigorism. Marx objects 
that Bauer remains tied to an essential, but negative relationship between religion and 
emancipation and he regards this as not only theoretically questionable, but also as 
empirically disproven. Marx refers to the empirical example of the free states of North 
America, which already exist as a properly atheist, secular state. He thereby emphasises that 
the problem Bauer is primarily concerned with, namely the impossibility of Jews and 
Christians to be emancipated by either the Prussian-Christian state, the “theologian ex 
professo”319, or the French constitutional state with its juste-milieu politics, has already been 
solved behind Bauer’s back as it were. And yet, religion despite being no longer bound up 
with the state has not, as Bauer speculated, disappeared in the United States, 320 but instead 
is merely displaced into the private sphere where it “displays a fresh and vigorous 
vitality”321. 
Thus, Bauer’s emancipatory aim, as Marx understands it, of the becoming atheist, 
generic and thereby political man, who is free and equal qua citizen rights has already taken 
place, just not in the two cases that Bauer examined (Prussia and France), and without the 
effects he prognosticated. That is why, Marx contends, the constitution of modern society 
with a truly secular state, i.e. that which is empirically visible in the US, still has 
fundamental, namely structural, disemancipatory effects that need to be criticised and 
overcome. The persistence of religion is for Marx at this point a symptom of “secular 
limitations”322, of a defect in society as a whole that needs to be addressed. But for this 
purpose, Bauer’s theory is only of very limited relevance, because on the one hand, it treats 
the problem of the state as secondary to the rigorist position and on the other, by giving 
this problem little attention, it does very much place itself within Hegel’s concept of civil 
society as a necessary opposition to the itself necessary political state.323  
By proclaiming this alignment between Bauer and Hegel, Marx operates a crucial 
double shift inside his development of a critique of political emancipation. On the one 
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hand, he criticises Bauer for not treating the problem of emancipation at the height of its 
contemporary conditions. By remaining focused on the negation qua renunciation of 
religion, including the state’s broader religious structure, as discussed in 2.3, his theorisation 
of the ‘limits’ of emancipation is not only not worthy of being called ‘human emancipation’, 
even though Moggach is right that Bauer did not conceive his endeavour limited in this 
way, but it even remains an impaired theorisation of the specificities and therefore also of 
the limits of the contemporary condition, which Marx refers to as ‘political emancipation’. 
Bauer’s theory of emancipation is not only limited to political emancipation as its outcome, 
but its theoretical analysis does not even grasp the crucial, structural elements of political 
emancipation. In the latter regard, it is precisely Hegel, who, with his theory of civil society 
and the state as two separated but dialectically united spheres of the modern social form, 
presents the superior theory of political emancipation, which needs to be confronted, 
because it captures most closely the practical, political reality, including the obstacles to 
true, human emancipation.324 That Hegel thereby takes the theoretical position analogous 
to the empirical role of the US state is an idiosyncrasy of Marx’s theorisation that will be 
clarified and discussed in more detail in the later parts of this chapter (3.3 and 3.4). Marx 
thereby moves from a critique of Bauer’s position to his real problematic that is constituted 
by the outcomes of the bourgeois revolutions, by natural right theory and by Hegel’s 
theory of the modern state.  
That does not however mean that he has gone entirely beyond the Bauerian framing 
of the search for a solution for the ‘Jewish question’. Marx concludes early on in the text: 
Only the criticism of political emancipation itself would have been the conclusive 
criticism of the Jewish question and its real merging in the “general question of the 
time.”325 
Whilst the first section of the sentence confirms his move from Bauer back to Hegel - 
although to a Hegel that has a properly secular, atheist conception of the state with religion 
flourishing in the private sphere, and which certainly stands in a problematic and 
unresolved relation to our portrayal of the relationship between state and religion in Hegel 
in 2.2 –, Marx remains in agreement with Bauer in the latter half. The ‘Jewish question’ will 
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be solved once universal, human emancipation, the ‘general question of the time’, has been 
reached. But we will return to this parallel in Chapter Four.  
3.2   The creation of modern man: political emancipation qua bourgeois revolution 
Rather than reading the text chronologically, I want to suggest that the first step should be 
to reconstruct Marx’s understanding of the creation of modern man, before we enter into 
his critique of the modern state. Because it is ultimately his historically situated assessment 
of the conditions of emancipation on a global scale that positively distinguishes Marx’s 
critique from Bauer’s, who, to some extent, seems unable to abstract from his experience 
of the oppressive reality of the Prussian Christian state in order to reach a more general 
level of critique of that which Marx conceives to be the modern condition. It is further 
only by starting from Marx’s historical analysis, which becomes more pronounced in the 
latter part of the first section of the text, that we can disentangle his criticism of historical 
events from his critique of theoretical contributions, especially of Hegel’s theory of the 
modern state, which are the two levels of critique around which the text moves without 
always making its precise reference point explicit.326 
Political emancipation for Marx is, first of all, a concept that he uses synonymously 
with “political revolution” 327  and bourgeois revolution, or, as he also phrases it, the 
revolution of bourgeois society. The concept is, in this regard, based on his historical 
analysis of the changes that were brought about by the French and the American 
Revolution. The Declarations of the two revolutions, which Marx does not discuss as 
distinct from each other,328 attest to “the dissolution of the old society” that is feudalism.329 
The main characteristic of the feudal order was for Marx the directly political character of 
its elements, such as property, the family, or the mode of labour. Through the institutions 
of seniority, estates and corporations these elements were part of the state as a whole, and 
defined the relationship between individual and state. Examples that Marx gives are the 
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property qualification [Zensus] for the right to elect or to be elected and other factors that 
influence the ability to participate in political life, such as birth, social rank, education, and 
occupation.330 But just as the individual’s political rights are in this sense bound to the 
particularity of their existence through which they are excluded from other parts of that 
same society, the feudal state, its general power that is in France prior to the revolution 
united in the power of the absolute monarch, appears particular and thereby dissociated 
from the people as a whole. The political revolution overthrew the absolute monarchy in 
the name of giving state affairs over to the people and thereby constituted the modern state 
concerned with man’s universal, political issues rather than existing in a separated sphere in 
which the only relationship to the people takes place via estates, corporations, guilds and 
privileges; in other words at the largest possible distance to the people. At the same time 
the people themselves were supposed to be freed from their limited political influence 
which was bound to their static particular material and spiritual existence, by asserting the 
universal value of man’s liberty and equality vis-à-vis the state.331  
This development leads according to Marx’s analysis, 332  to the abolition of the 
political character of civil society with the aim of finally constituting a united, universal 
political spirit.333 The state “assert[s] itself as a state” by renouncing its particular attributes, 
such as a state religion, which are subsequently transferred to the private sphere.334 That 
implies the political annulment, but not the annulment tout court, of the previously directly 
political elements of civil society. Of these Marx mostly emphasises religion, private 
property, and the freedom to engage in business. 335  Marx’s historical basis for this 
argument is the example of the North American states. In turn, the state thereby becomes 
the space where man as species-being exists as political man. Thus, Bauer’s problem is solved 
for the first time as such a post-revolutionary, atheist and democratic state, which Marx 
suggests, is the true essence of all post-revolutionary states despite their backward 
appearance, and can undoubtedly grant citizenship rights to anyone, regardless of their 
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religion. 336  The dominance of Christianity has been essential for the “sever[ing] of all 
species ties”337, but it thereby brought its own dominance to an end, handed it over to civil 
society and opened up the political space to universal man. 
Marx qualifies his statement to say that of course there was a moment within the 
French Revolution which gave the impression that the birth of the modern political state 
from the existing civil society necessitated the progression of the state’s struggle towards 
the total annulment of confessional religion as well as of private property, confiscation and 
progressive taxation, even the ending of life under the guillotine. He refers here to the 
Jacobin reign. But, Marx argues, this attempt to violently unite individual and species life 
happened in direct contradiction to the very preconditions for the birth of the modern 
political state, and in fact lay in their separation. The Jacobins had in their revolutionary 
fervour misunderstood the theoretical and political implications of the revolutionary 
project as a whole.338 Bauer, in his own attempt to demand the abolition of religion from 
Jews and Christians alike in order to be granted citizenship rights, might be accused of 
repeating a similar error. 
In his analysis, Marx is therefore importantly not concerned with the unfolding of 
the French Revolution itself (which has undoubtedly caused plenty of disagreements ever 
since the first analyses were published in the early 19th century); he does e.g. not examine 
the class composition of the struggles at different points between 1789 until Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s declaration of the end of the revolutionary period in 1799. 339  Instead he 
attempts a broad reckoning of the revolutionary achievements from his temporally 
distanced position in 1843/44, as he is more concerned with what the events overall meant 
for his present – already in this sense his approach is similar to Hegel’s political-
philosophical endeavour.340 He finds the basis for his analysis therefore not in any particular 
French or North American state, even though these states offer him an entry point into his 
analysis, but he attempts to delineate a critical theory of the transhistorical outcomes, i.e. 
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the political constitution that is characteristic of modernity as such and that he understands 
at this point to be the long-term outcome of what he refers to as the bourgeois revolutions.  
This aim leads Marx to a second insight into the essence of political emancipation as 
brought about by the revolutions. He moves beyond the, as it seems for him, most obvious 
historical change that is the separation of political civil society and absolute monarchy into 
merely social, private civil society and public, universal state, in order to point our attention 
to an underlying, deeper separation, a separation within humanity itself. The starting point 
for his analyses are the documents that were drafted by the revolutionaries themselves 
regardless of their specific state of implementation: the different versions of the Declaration 
and the Bill of Rights that defined the universal rights of man “in their authentic form”341. 
Partly, Marx begins, those Declarations contain explicitly political rights – the droits du 
citoyen - whose content concerns the life within the political community, which he equates 
with the state. Regardless how these civil rights define political freedom, their effectivity is 
for Marx limited, because they stand in opposition to civil society, and to the droits de 
l’homme, the rights of man or human rights.  
Marx argues that the reference to the rights of man and citizen, already in the title of 
the 1789 Declaration, implies not an equation but a division within the individual between 
man and citizen, as, on the one hand, a private and, on the other hand, a public individual. 
This is because the Declarations contain a very precise anthropological definition of one 
side of this split, namely of modern ‘man’, i.e. the member of civil society, within its 
definition of human rights. Marx finds this anthropological definition once he looks closer 
at the revolutionary statement from the Jacobin Declaration from 1793 that reads:  
These rights, etc., (the natural and imprescriptible rights) are: equality, liberty, security, 
property.342 
Looking at what hides behind the assertion of the imprescriptible right to liberty, Marx 
finds that its content focuses on liberty as the right “to do everything that does not harm 
the rights of others” 343 . He concludes that this ‘right’, rather than giving a positive 
definition of freedom as emanating from a human community, only succeeds in defining 
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man’s freedom in isolation from another man’s freedom: freedom as non-interference. The 
right of liberty is therefore in his eyes “the right of […] separation, …of the restricted 
individual”344. In this sense, the right of private property, which, Marx implies, one might 
imagine to oppose the right to liberty, because it is about enclosing and thus separating the 
common into privately owned sections, is merely its practical application. Where the 
separation of man from man is defined as essential to his liberty, “the right to enjoy one’s 
property … à son gré”345, i.e. based on one’s self-interest rather than on the interest of other 
men, is its logical realisation346. The right to equality – “the law being the same for all”347 – 
then merely means that everyone is from now on self-sufficient to an equal degree. And 
finally the right to security – “the protection afforded by society to each of its members for 
the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property”, is, in Marx’s eyes, nothing else 
than the concept of police: it is “the insurance” of civil society’s egoism, of the existence of 
all of its members as self-sufficient and self-interested monads.348 We will see in Chapter 
Five that the supposition of the modern, split man which Marx draws from his 
interpretation of the articles of the different versions of the Declarations, and which he 
reads as still part of natural law theory, is the main ground to which Balibar takes offence. 
Marx’s analysis leads him to several conclusions. On the one hand, he argues that 
he has solved Bauer’s ‘Jewish question’ problematic a second time. The text of the various 
Declarations Marx reads leaves him in no doubt that what is for Bauer a “privilege of faith”, 
contradicting the revolutionary project of abolishing privileges tout court, is already 
redefined as one of the rights of man, subsumed under the right of liberty.349 To practice 
religion now falls under the ‘freedom of conscience’. It is thereby transformed from a 
directly political attribute into a non-political, individual activity within the sphere of civil 
society. When Bauer argues that ‘the Jew’ specifically cannot receive human rights because 
in his particularity he isolates himself from other men and fails to affirm his generic being, 
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Marx rather than refuting Bauer’s anti-Judaic image, counters that human rights as a whole 
are in any case the rights of separation of man from man. In this sense they are for Marx 
extremely real with a worldly effect that has nothing to do with particularised privilege. 
Thus, ‘the Jew’ – in his isolated existence, which Bauer attributed to him and which Marx 
leaves unproblematised350 – does not contain in himself a constraint to emancipation, he 
instead stands for a general constraint in which he takes part351: ‘the Jew’ has at this point 
become what Tomba calls a “synecdoche”, in the way that he stands in for all modern 
citizens; they in turn jointly build Marx’s and Bauer’s subject of emancipation.352  The 
general constraint is the intended inability of the natural rights formulated in the 
Declarations to give content to man as free and equal in association with other men.353 In 
other words, the emptying out of particularity that Bauer demands from ‘the Jew’ and ‘the 
Christian’ in relation to the political sphere, in order for it to be possible for him to be 
emancipated, is already taking place if we take, as Marx suggests, the natural rights 
formulated in the Declarations, and its anthropological remaking of man, to be the essence 
of the revolutionary achievement.  
The question that follows on from Marx’s critical reading of the Declarations is, 
however, how the construction of the ‘split man’ translates into a more general assessment 
of the revolutionary outcome. Most fundamentally, he understands the French Revolution 
to be representative for the bourgeois revolutions more generally, defined and limited by 
the fact that it is grounded in the principles of natural law discussed above. Marx unmasks 
those principles as doing something other than they appear to be doing. They appear to 
affirm a radical liberty and equality of man based on nothing but human nature itself, i.e. 
liberty and equality are rights that are given to everyone at the moment of birth. In reality, 
however, these ‘natural’ rights constitute man as an egoistic being, an atomistic individual, 
who needs to be protected from the rest of society. That means that these natural law 
principles are identified by Marx as an active political act, which however presents itself as 
merely realising that to which man has always already been entitled due to his or her 
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‘nature’. Consequently, ‘man’ as defined in natural law terms, perceived as the 
emancipatory act par excellence, turns out to be the truly enchaining category in the 
context of civil society, as ‘‘[i]t makes [lässt] every man see in other men not the realisation of 
his own freedom, but the barrier to it”354. We should note here Marx’s usage of the German 
word “lässt” [from the infinitive “lassen” = to let] because, as Daniel Loick suggests, this 
description allows for a double definition of what precisely man’s natural rights do: on the 
one hand, they create a subjectivity that focuses on ‘bourgeois freedom’ as defined by 
different articles of the Declarations. But in a second sense, “lassen” has a passive meaning 
of letting the egoisms that are already at work in civil society, having been carried over 
from feudalism, flourish in harmony with the political, and collective rights. 355  Marx 
identifies, what is called ‘human nature’ in the natural rights context, to be an actively 
instituted form of existence, the de-politicised and individualised, liberal modern human 
condition that builds the substance of post-revolutionary, political and economic life.356 
In this sense, the realisation of political emancipation does, contrary to the 
impression that Marx’s text conveys at times, imply a social revolution. After all, the 
French Revolution did dissolve “civil society into its component parts” and it did remove 
the social-political bonds that formed feudal society and replaced it with “natural necessity” 
as the “sole bond” that holds individuals together. It created, as Andrea Maihofer expresses 
very pointedly, a “hegemonic generalisation of the bourgeois idea of man and of society” 
and thereby “reduced concrete individuals to their abstract human existence”. 357 
Community itself, what Marx calls “species-life” is thereby reduced to an external and 
abstract framework.358  That means, in Marx’s eyes, that “civil society” as a concept is 
afflicted by the same problem pre-and post-revolution, which nevertheless does not 
contradict that social change has been reached, factors which Marx’s portrayal makes hard 
to differentiate at times. But the social revolution that took place, did not go far enough. It 
failed in the emancipatory task Marx had seen historically emerging, and remained merely a 
political revolution.  
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The political revolution resolves civil life into its component parts, without 
revolutionising these components themselves or subjecting them to criticism. … It 
regards civil society, the world of needs, labour, private interests, civil law, as the 
basis of its existence, as a precondition not requiring further substantiation and 
therefore as its natural basis.359 
It ultimately merely continues the egoistic essence of man that had also been the 
foundation of feudalism, albeit in a purified form. That means it was progress, because at 
least one could see the contradiction between the abstract promise of political universality 
on the one hand, and the concrete, material existence of man as isolated individual on the 
other, as an “unconcealed contradiction”360. Bauer’s main critique of natural right focused on 
the implication that natural rights existed as a presupposition, whereas he believed that 
individuals had to actively conquer them.361 Marx’s critique, however, targets the need to 
overcome the individuals’ entire horizon, namely the naturalisation of the liberal social 
form that is civil society, if the aim is supposed to be the realisation of human 
emancipation. Human emancipation is here implicitly defined as Marx’s mission to define 
an alternative social bond to the one that has been perpetuated from feudalism until the 
North American or (ideal) French democratic republic, and which is the supposedly natural 
bond, the association of liberal, individual men reduced to needs and private property. 
3.3   Marx’s critique of the state = critique of republicanism as ideology  
We saw that Marx understands the Declarations as documents that are not only the 
expression of natural law, but also inscribe the ultimate aims and thus limits of the 
diremption of the state and civil society on the level of the individual. Marx’s argument that 
the Bürger, the bourgeois, constitutes the substance of political life further implies his or her 
domination over the political sphere. On the other hand, we need to follow Marx’s reading 
of the Declarations one more time, as it also contains and relates to a critique of the 
republican state form, which in turn follows on from his definition of the substance of 
modern civil society. This needs to be emphasised because the way that Marx presents his 
critique in ‘On the Jewish Question’ starts from the critique of the state and moves towards 
his critique of human rights, and thus arguably gives a misleading impression as to the 
construction of his argument, and makes it much harder to pin down Marx’s theory of the 
                                                
359 Ibid., 167 [369–370]. 
360 Kouvelakis 2003, 299; original emphasis. Cited from Marx’s ‘Critique’, 1975b, 141; amended trans. 
361 See Moggach 2002, 15. 
 92 
state other than in contradistinction to Bauer’s problematisation of the Christian state. 
The starting point is a reading of two articles from two different versions of the 
French Declaration: 
Article 2 (1791): “The aim of all political association is the preservation of the 
natural and imprescriptible rights of man.”  
Article 1 (1793): “Government is instituted in order to guarantee man the enjoyment 
of his natural and imprescriptible rights.”362 
Based on the split between man and citizen, Marx’s strong interpretation of these two 
articles leads him to conclude that the state, and its government, i.e. the whole political 
sphere, is reduced qua natural right to the henchman of a liberal figure of man. Citizenship 
and the struggle for recognition within its confines cannot have a truly political, that is to 
say revolutionary, value precisely because they are dominated by the logic of civil society and 
its egoistic, property-owning man,363  and would themselves be the necessary target of 
revolutionary politics.  
Historically, Marx supports his argument by showing that this problematic precisely 
undermined the Jacobin republican project. On the one hand, as shown above via Marx’s 
reading of the articles of the 1793 Declaration, even the Jacobins did not theoretically 
break with the demotion of the state (i.e. the political community as a whole, and more 
specifically of the government) to a mere means for the egoistic, individualist ends of civil 
society. And even Gracchus Babeuf, who was a more rigorous critic of private property, 
remained, like Robespierre, faithful to the possibility of reinterpreting the rights of man as 
the rights of the people. Both criticise the rights of man as they have been formulated in 
the pre-1793 Declarations – in particular the right to equality – as abstractions, which need 
to be factually realised, with positive results.364  But this means that their criticism was 
directed against those political acts that did not sufficiently realise the rights as inscribed in 
the Declarations. Their own revolutionary political practice was built on the aim of 
“realising” the rights of man for all people, as the Declarations promised. Based on his 
previously elaborated critique of the rights of man, Marx however contends that their 
political practice, undertaken in the name of public liberty, stood “in flagrant 
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contradiction”365 to the articles of their very own 1793 Declaration. This is not only visible 
through Marx’s own analysis but, as he points out, also by taking note of the Jacobins’ 
justification of invalidations of certain liberties. Marx therefore does not enthusiastically 
celebrate the Jacobins’ temporary contradiction of the domination of civil society by the 
state in the name of republicanism, but he exposes it as merely a “republican ideology”366. 
An ideology, or as Bertrand Binoche calls it, an ‘ideological subterfuge’, that never stood a 
chance, because it did not understand that its real enemy was inherent in its own 
revolutionary theory. When Marx later accuses Robespierre in the 18th Brumaire for 
mistaking the revolutionary situation for antiquity, it is a critique based on the same 
analysis: Robespierre and the fellow Jacobins had disregarded the theoretical and historical 
force of the split between man and citizen, because they misunderstood the bourgeois 
nature of the French Revolution.367 
From this historically-specific critique of the Jacobin republican ideology, Marx 
now extrapolates a general critique of “the idealism” of the democratic republican state, 
which is for him the state ideal that is necessarily implied in the reconstitution of the feudal 
state as the modern, “real state”.368 Marx refers to this state throughout the text varyingly as 
state, political state, perfect [vollendeter] political state, atheist state and democratic state – an 
imprecision that does not make a rigorous analysis easy. Empirically, all these attributes 
seem to refer most closely, but not necessarily directly, to the North American states 
[Freistaaten].369 Further, Marx introduces Hegelian references into his critical discussion of 
the state, which create another object of critique, but which he does not care to 
differentiate.  
Marx’s critique of the state – the state as the product of the political revolution – 
focuses on its existence in a different sphere from that of civil society, i.e. external to man 
as bourgeois. Now that ‘man’ of civil society has been stripped of his feudal political 
attributes and privileges, the state constitutes a new political sphere, a universal sphere, or 
sphere of the community, outside of man. Whilst man, as we have seen at length, forms the 
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precondition of this state, he will need to seek recognition in or from it in order to be 
recognised as ‘political man’ or citoyen. On one level, Marx recognises that the sphere of the 
state is precisely that sphere where man is no longer confined to his liberal existence, but 
where his freedom is defined as positive freedom, and in conjunction with other men, the 
community of ‘species-beings’. But that Marx defines this sphere as existing “outside” of 
man’s bourgeois existence has invoked many criticisms, which means that we need to try 
and examine very carefully how this externality is defined and what it implies. 370  
First of all, the state, which has freed itself from religion by displacing the latter 
into the private sphere of civil society, emancipates man politically from religion. But that 
means that man is only emancipated through the medium of the state, who acts as the 
emancipatory intermediary [Mittler].371 The state is the intermediary that stands “between 
man and man’s freedom” 372 . This intermediary function of the state within the 
emancipatory process provokes Marx to draw a parallel between the state and Christ as the 
mediator between man and his divinity. Just as Christ bears the promise of man’s freedom 
in heaven, the state bears the promise of man’s freedom in the political sphere. Both of 
these two intermediaries impose a detour on man in order to reach his freedom, rather 
than founding man’s freedom directly in the application of his own powers, by himself. 
When Althusser argues in For Marx that “[a]rticles like ‘On the Jewish Question’ … 
cannot be understood outside of the Feuerbachian problematic” because, whilst “Marx’s 
themes go beyond Feuerbach’s immediate preoccupations, […] the theoretical schemata 
and problematic373 are the same”374, then his criticism is precisely levelled at this portrayal of 
externality between man and state: just as for Feuerbach the essence of religion is man as 
his free, self-directed existence, but in its alienated form, Marx frames the role of the 
state. 375  For Althusser this means that Feuerbach and Marx keep sharing the same 
problematic, however Marx transposes it into the sphere of politics by applying it to the 
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state.376 Thus, it is only a question of understanding that the status quo (religion or the 
state) is an illusion – which is the task of theory, or critique – and of shaking it off, in order 
to set man’s essence free. We should note in the background that despite Feuerbach’s and 
Bauer’s disagreement about the nature of the essence of man - whether generic/species 
being [Gattungswesen] or subjective self-consciousness - they share the identification of the 
Christian religion as the highest, most universal form of man’s alienation, and also as the 
last stage of alienation before it can be, once and for all, cast off as a “snake skin”377. The 
core assertion of Althusser’s critique of what is known as a critique of the ‘inversion thesis’ 
is that by merely inverting Hegel’s dialectic – i.e. by moving from positing the religion or 
the state as the present spirit of the Absolute, to positing the religion’s or the state’s 
predicate, man’s concrete life, as the real subject – Feuerbach and Marx keep the Hegelian 
dialectic intact.378 As we have seen in our discussion of Bauer’s relationship to Hegel, this is 
not a straightforward argument, and even though we cannot offer a general interpretation 
of Althusser’s accusation, we need to discuss whether it is a justified criticism of Marx’s 
critique of the state in ‘On the Jewish Question’. Whether the problem lies in Marx’s 
continued Feuerbachianism or in his continued, but inverted Hegelianism (which we 
should not mistake for the same thing), the core problem for Althusser is here a purely 
theoretical identification of the ‘concrete’ as the ‘true’. This thereby implies that the 
concrete as well as the theory that claims knowledge of the concrete-real is uninfluenced by 
the “illusion”, and more generally by the material reality that gives rise to it. Further, the 
concrete and real is here pitched against the bad abstract, placing knowledge on the side of 
the former, while associating abstraction with false illusions. Here Althusser sees Marx as 
falling prey to empiricist ideology.379 The rest of this section will go on to contend that 
Marx’s critique of the state in ‘On the Jewish Question’380 continues beyond this first level 
of critique, which in retrospect even invalidates the critique Althusser levels against it. But 
we will return to this problem again in 3.4.3, and in Chapter Four, when we examine in 
more detail Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of the state in the ‘Critique’, which certainly 
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supplies the more rightful object of Althusser’s criticism with its subject – predicate 
inversion approach. 
Penetrating Marx’s critique of the state in ‘On the Jewish Question’ further, the 
political sphere, as with heaven in Christianity, contains a promise of freedom that is not 
only out of man’s immediate reach, but is itself an abstraction, an “unreal universality”381. 
The state creates an illusion of the sovereignty of the people, in which everyone takes part 
regardless of their profane, everyday existence. This participation in turn makes the 
everyday existence appear unimportant, or ‘fictitious’ to political man. Where Bauer 
worried in his critique of Judaism that ‘the Jews’ recognise a different law to the state law, 
Marx shows how every citizen recognises the law of the state which forces him to exist 
with disregard to the real laws of life, the laws of civil society. It is, Marx concludes, “the 
same contradiction”, whereas only its latter manifestation is the real problem of the time.382 
Life in the state, and its political implications, as they are imagined by the citizens, i.e. their 
unconditional participation in the political affairs [Volkssouveränität] of their nation through 
universal suffrage and representative state institutions, are an outright illusion for Marx – 
but an illusion that exists counter to, or one could say in tandem with, life in civil society, 
that being the reality that the illusion misrepresents. On this level, we could summarise 
Marx’s critique as an exposure of a republican-democratic illusion that gives the citizen a 
wrong idea about his political powers, which are in fact determined very differently in a 
different sphere of his life. The state itself perpetuates the existence of the citizen in 
contradiction to the bourgeois, by only politically annulling the categories of feudal 
distinction. But the political annulment is not the only active achievement of the 
instantiation of the modern state. The other part of the state’s work is the creation of 
“political man” as an abstraction, which it does precisely via the creation of its 
representative institutions. Confusingly, Marx defers in his theoretical explanation of this 
process to Rousseau’s concept of aliénation totale: the state, which wants to establish “a 
people’s institutions…has to take from man his own powers, and give him in exchange 
alien powers which he cannot employ without the help of other men”383. I refer to Marx’s 
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deferral to Rousseau as ‘confusing’ because Rousseau’s argument is precisely not based on 
an insurmountable differentiation between man and citizen, but on the possibility of their 
reconciliation (but we will return to this issue at the end of 4.1). For Marx, the creation of 
‘political man’ affirms rather than overcomes the contradiction between man and citizen, 
which is an essential and, for Marx, deeply problematic element of the revolutionary 
incarnation of ‘Enlightenment reason’. Political man in turn undermines the modern 
representative state’s ‘authentic rationality and universality’, its dedication to the res publica 
via its constitutive principle, or, in other words, its true sovereignty,384 because vis-à-vis the 
reality of civil society, it is a merely abstract universality. But this also means that the state 
as the God-like mediator between man’s freedom and man is not the only force that 
separates ‘man’ from a concretely free life. 
This is because there is a third dimension to Marx’s critique of the state as illusion. 
The state and its republican ideology is also the condition of a flourishing liberalism on the 
part of civil society. Moreover, the liberal principles of civil society dominate the state. They 
make the state’s universality [Allgemeinheit] not only into an illusion that deceives its citizens, 
but it disproves the entire idea of the rational state, as for example central to Hegel’s 
political philosophy. Hegel is correct in Marx’s eyes to define the modern state’s existence 
“above the particular elements” of civil society,385 e.g. ‘above the particular churches’. But 
Marx’s strong emphasis on the ‘above’ leads him to dispute the state’s rationality qua its 
mediating powers as he finds it theorised in Hegel and other Young Hegelians (especially 
Ruge). It is ultimately only ‘above’, in the sense of fulfilling its ideological role without the 
ability to really influence what takes place in the reality of civil society. Marx expresses here 
a strong judgement about the inability of the political state form to have any transformative 
effect on the essentially liberal substance above which it exists. Wendy Brown rephrases 
this problematic very pointedly:  
If civil society is striated by forms of social power that the state declares politically 
insignificant, and the state’s universality or “perfected secularism” is premised upon 
its transcendence of the particularism of civil society, then the state is premised upon 
that which it pretends to transcend…. .386 
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This means the state “having always to acknowledge it [civil society], to restore it, and allow 
itself to be dominated by it”387. For Marx, the, if we like, ‘republican’ state form,388 thereby 
fulfils an important task in relation to the liberal substance. Due to its institutionalised 
sophistry, it helps to maintain and strengthen the liberal way of life, because, as Brown said, 
it is itself premised upon it. Democratic republicanism as “the language of civil virtue” and 
liberalism as “the language of individual rights” are thus by no means mutually exclusive,389 
despite existing in a contradictory tension with each other. Or, as Stathis Kouvelakis 
formulates it, “political emancipation [by which he refers only to the state-side of it] is no 
more an illusion than it is a strictly functional mechanism of bourgeois domination”390.  
When Marx now asserts repeatedly that in the democratic state “the human basis of 
religion is realised in a secular manner”391, this means two things. On the one hand, he 
accuses humanity of perpetuating its religious spirit in a double sense: by subscribing to the 
political ideology that ties its freedom to an alien existence of itself, namely the existence as 
abstract, political man, and by perpetuating an apolitical religious and theological 
consciousness in their private lives.392 On the other, the state functions along religious lines 
because it acts as a God-like mediator, and flourishes on this religious ideology that is its 
basis as well as its principle of operation, its reality, because it allows the state to uphold its 
abstract, fictitious universality. Meanwhile, the real universalism, that is the liberal 
particularism of civil society, can operate behind the ideological shield of the state, as “a 
principle of hidden exclusion” as André Tosel calls it.393 The “political lion’s skin” is just as 
essential to the workings of the civil-bourgeois, or emerging capitalist, society as its liberal 
basis.394 That Marx refers to all these different processes as ‘religiosity’ is certainly not 
helpful for a rigorous understanding of his critique. 
Let us conclude by restating why the state’s republicanism should be regarded as an 
‘ideology’ rather than a mere ‘illusion’. This is because republicanism, just as liberalism, is 
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constitutive of the reality of civil-bourgeois society, in the sense that man’s double 
existence as citizen and bourgeois is a practico-social reality in both dimensions that exists 
independent of man’s consciousness. My use of ‘ideology’ is not the derogative use of the 
term as applied to the Jacobin politicism, because I am using it in a loosely Althusserian 
sense, who defines it at one point as the “imaginary ‘representation’ of individuals’ 
imaginary relation to their real conditions of existence”395. To label the creation of illusions 
of the state ideological in this sense is to ascribe to the state’s production of political 
abstractions, as Marx understood it, a reality of its own that has lasting effects in its own 
right, namely on the subjectivities and self-conceptions of men. But it also means that the 
domination of the real conditions of existence – which Marx refers to with the term civil 
society – do not directly determine the ideological representations, which Althusser 
expresses of course more precisely than Marx, when he defines the relationship as doubly 
imaginary.396 But it is in this sense that we can productively read Marx’s elaborations on the 
illusions that the state creates and its ‘religiosity’. That however also implies that illusions 
and religiosity do not have the alienating circumstances of civil society as their 
unidirectional and transparent cause, which means that the contradictions Marx identifies 
are much further away from appearing in an ‘unconcealed’ manner to those subjected to 
the illusions (including the theorists) than Marx seems to be aware of.  
That Marx understands ‘illusion’ more as ‘ideology’ in this Althusserian sense than 
as a mere reflection of the “real alienation” that people experience in civil society is also 
expressed by the imagery that Marx uses in ‘On the Jewish Question’, which marks a clear 
distance between him and Bauer (as well as Feuerbach). The citoyen, or political man, 
wears a “lion skin”397, which makes him feel stronger and more politically potent than he is 
underneath. But it is not a snake skin, the metaphor Marx uses when he paraphrases 
Bauer’s rigorist solution to emancipation, and which man can slough off by rejecting the 
illusions (political freedom, sovereignty or religious illusions in Bauer’s case) that dominate 
him. The conclusion that Marx draws, which should be related to the conclusion of the 
previous section, is the need to push beyond the illusion of the political community. This 
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was an aim, which the Jacobins attempted most radically, but with the wrong means as they 
themselves were victims of the illusion they tried to fight. Marx’s alternative method will 
focus on meeting the contradictions at the height of their own operation, which will be 
discussed in 4.2. 
There is however one remaining issue, which is Marx’s identification of civil society 
with the political ideology of liberalism. This impacts decisively on how we can understand 
Marx as developing a more nuanced concept of ideology. Identifying civil society with the 
political ideology of liberalism appears at first dissonant with Marx’s affirmation in the text 
that “the completion of the idealism of the state was at the same time the completion of 
the materialism of civil society”398. We need to note here that liberalism does not exhaust 
Marx’s definition of civil society, which, he argues, consists of spiritual and material 
elements.399 It is the spiritual elements that we call ‘liberalism’, the rights of man that bring 
about individualised self-interest. The material elements are specified throughout the text 
as private property, engaging in business, and in the second part, as huckstering, and 
wielding the power of money.400 Marx utilises once again the concept of ‘the everyday Jew’ 
or ‘the practical Jewish spirit’ as a synecdoche, this time in order to deepen his description 
of the materiality of civil society,401 which raises many of the same problems as those 
generated by Bauer’s theoretical translation of his own anti-Judaic views.  
This is not to say that Yoav Peled is wrong to emphasise that in both parts of the 
essay, “Marx’s overall purpose” was “to demonstrate the absence of any difference 
between Jews and Christians which could justify denying Jews equal citizenship in the 
political state.”402  And in opposition to Bauer, Marx left the very German standpoint 
behind and realised that the French and American revolutions had achieved a structural 
dislocation of religion from the state into civil society and a political elevation of man over 
religion. Thus, Marx rejected Bauer’s problem, which was not dissimilar to Rousseau’s, 
where the latter argued for the need for a civil religion that could replace all particular 
religions, especially Catholicism, and thereby overcome the problem of having two heads, 
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God and the secular sovereign, to govern the people.403 Marx especially criticised Bauer for 
having learned from Hegel “the art of changing real objective chains that exist outside me 
into mere ideal, mere subjective chains existing in me, and thus to change all exterior 
palpable struggles into pure struggles of thought.”404. In Marx’s eyes, Judaism is not a 
subjective chain that each individual can cast aside once he subscribes himself to his 
generic humanity.405 
Thereupon, Marx poses a different problem, namely the contradictory nature of the 
modern human condition that gives rise to religiosity everywhere, because it is a necessary 
compliment to the contradictory nature of modern man’s existence.406 He at once makes 
religion into a material phenomenon and reduces it to a symptom of something else; it 
becomes the mechanism of real abstraction 407  that is given rise to by inner-societal 
contradictions and in turn fulfils a role of its own in reproducing that society. Only in that 
sense can we read phrases especially in the second part of ‘On the Jewish Question’, such 
as “the Jewish narrowness of society”, the need for society to “abolish the empirical essence 
of Judaism” or indeed the final sentence of the essay: “The social emancipation of the Jew is 
the emancipation of society from Judaism”.408 
In all those claims, Judaism is seen no longer as a particular religion whose followers, 
the Jews, are an oppressed minority throughout Europe, struggling for political recognition. 
Instead, Judaism has become synonymous with any kind of religiosity that is the ‘waste-
product’ and at the same time the material ‘architecture’ and spiritual ‘glue’ of the post-
revolutionary, bourgeois, social form, which Marx wants to overcome by means of a social 
revolution.409 Breckman criticises Marx in this regard in that he thereby “succumbs to a 
dubious ‘metaphoric identification of secular and theological phenomena’”.410 This does 
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not just turn ‘theological questions into secular ones’, as Marx does in relation to Bauer’s 
problematisation; Marx is also criticised for having “metaphorically converted secular 
phenomena into theology”411. Breckman’s critique culminates in his ascription to Marx of 
the “last great act in the history of secularization”412 instead of truly leaving it behind. 
Secularizing zeal and hostility toward the intrusion of theology into human affairs 
lived on in his totalizing equation of social and political emancipation with human 
emancipation from all religious illusions.413 
However, if we regard the material organisation of human affairs as giving rise to 
autonomous, religious phenomena,414 then at least in this regard, we can redeem Marx from 
Breckman’s criticism by replacing his own terminology of ‘religiosity’ with ‘ideology’. We 
should further note – looking forward in Marx’s theoretical development – that his 
application of anti-Judaic imagery in relation to the material basis of civil society testifies 
first and foremost that his concept of materialism was not very far developed when he 
wrote ‘On the Jewish Question’. Marx had not reached a solid definition of the materialist 
basis of modern bourgeois society and its forms of ideological domination. This means that 
Marx at this point still fails to acknowledge that civil society is itself riven by contradictions, 
contradictions that penetrate the category of individual man based on his or her class 
position within the political economy415 as he himself theorises later on, from The German 
Ideology over the Grundrisse to Capital.416 Nevertheless, already in 1844, civil society has for 
Marx a material and spiritual existence that together make up its substance, which 
dominates the state, in the sense that it overdetermines its purpose, and gives rise to its 
own religiosity in the shape of republican ideology. 
3.4   The relationship between Marx and Hegel implicit in ‘On the Jewish 
Question’ 
We however cannot reach a complete understanding and assessment of Marx’s critique of 
the state and of civil society in ‘On the Jewish Question’ if we disregard the extent to which 
it is also a reworking of his critique of Hegel developed primarily in the ‘Critique’. We will 
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therefore need to clarify their complex relationship in this final section of the chapter, 
before we move on to a comprehensive analysis of the continuities and breaks between the 
‘Critique’ and ‘On the Jewish Question’ and Marx’s move from political to human 
emancipation in the context of the following chapter. But first, we need to assess the extent 
to which Marx’s supposition of a historical and political divide between state and civil 
society is based on an alignment with Hegel’s account. For this we will consider their 
respective critical positions especially regarding natural law and the political state. Our 
attention is thus aimed at the fracture lines between the Marx and Hegel that remain 
without explicit articulation in ‘On the Jewish Question’ but subtend Marx’s critique of 
political emancipation and his subsequent advocacy of the need for human emancipation. 
3.4.1   On the French Revolution 
As we have seen, Marx argues that it was the historical achievement of the French 
Revolution as a ‘political revolution’ to constitute state and civil society [Staat und bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft] as two separate spheres, whereas the latter with its materialism dominates over 
the former’s idealism. Further, he contends that both, this separation and the hierarchical 
relationship, were not in any way unexpected outcomes of the revolution, because both, 
separation and hierarchy, were inscribed in the documents drafted by the revolutionaries 
themselves, specifically in the French Declarations, but also in the different versions of the 
American Bill of Rights. In his analysis, Marx merges his interpretation of the outcome of 
the French Revolution, its remaking of civil society as a depoliticised sphere that exists 
separate from the state, with his interpretation of the revolutionary documents, which for 
him unquestionably stand in a modern natural law tradition: the latter coincided with and 
perpetuates the empirical achievements of the former. 
As Hegel’s theory of the modern state becomes the prime target of Marx’s criticism, 
it is essential to initially realise that Hegel’s theory and Marx’s critique are both based on a 
fundamental critique of the natural law tradition (as well as of its opposition by the 
German Historical School of Law) and also of the outcomes of the French Revolution. 
Hegel’s line of attack is twofold. On the one hand, he disagrees with the specific 
Enlightenment interpretation of natural law, which posits that which is rational, i.e. the 
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content of natural law, in absolute contradiction to everything that is; in other words, as 
something that thought could access independently from the rationality that is already 
embodied in the existing present. 417  When Hegel defines the task for speculative 
philosophy as “[t]o recognise reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to 
delight in the present”418 he directly rejects the concept of reason he sees incarnated in 
natural law, namely reason that turns against the present and merely gears itself towards an 
inexistent future. Whilst Hegel does not in turn advocate a mere justification of the present, 
i.e. of law as it exists, which he regards as the deeply problematic project of the Historical 
School of Law in relation to the Prussian state, he takes a third route. He argues for the 
possibility of speculatively rooting reason in the present, which in his view contains both 
the historical present as it appears (history) and History, history’s true rational incarnation, 
which it is philosophy’s task to help unearth and constitute.419 Natural right, which we 
could according to Hegel also call philosophical right and which stands in opposition to the 
Historical School of Law’s rejection and to the Enlightenment interpretation of natural law, 
is to be based on the nature of the concept that is simultaneously rational and actual. 
From this general critique follows Hegel’s ambiguous assessment of the French 
Revolution. On the one hand, very much in the spirit that Ritter ascribed to Hegel when he 
made him the philosopher of the revolution,420 he lauds the revolutionary event as the first 
moment in history in which man tries to build the world based on his thought. 
The thought, the concept of right asserted itself for the first time, and against it, the 
old system of injustice was powerless. In the thought of right there now arose a 
constitution, on whose foundation everything should be based from now on. For as 
long as the sun has stood in the firmament and planets have circled about it, this has 
not been seen, that man stands himself on his head, that is, on thought, and 
constructs actuality according to it. … This was a magnificent sunrise… .421 
Just as Marx insists that, despite all his criticisms, the political revolution was “a big step 
forward” in the history of humanity,422 Hegel fully embraces it as the moment where man 
finally tries to realise the philosophically sublated, Christian notion of freedom on earth. 
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However, Hegel formulates concrete reservations as to the form that the revolution 
gave to freedom and it is to this critique that Ritter remains blind, when he reduces Hegel’s 
philosophical endeavour to that of solving the problem of the political realisation of the 
freedom that the revolution had announced qua its natural law-based Declarations. 423 
Instead, Hegel argues in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History that the Declarations only 
contain a formal principle of freedom.424 Freedom and equality, he contends, in line with 
his critique of Enlightenment reason, are mere products of the abstract thought that 
understands itself to be opposed to everything speculative: abstract thought can only think 
in the categories of identity and contradiction.425 It therefore perceives religion and any 
other concrete, historical content to be opposed to the autonomous application of pure 
reason; for Hegel, Kant is Germany’s theoretician of abstract thought par excellence. As 
much as freedom and equality are products of this abstract thought, they necessarily have 
to remain abstract themselves, insufficient for any substantive realisation. 426  Hegel 
continues that the formality and abstraction of freedom is not only insufficient, but “they 
do not allow” any concrete organisation of substantive freedom to arise.427 They stand in 
active opposition to a political realisation of freedom. Very close to Marx’s critique and on 
a different basis from the liberal condemnations, Hegel criticises the Jacobin attempt to 
radicalise the revolution along these lines as ‘terrorism of abstraction’428.  
This limitation of the theoretical ground of the French Revolution gives rise to a 
more general problem for Hegel. On the basis of the abstract notions of freedom and 
equality in the Declarations, liberalism is given free reign to realise its own principle of 
freedom: the principle of atoms, of individual wills as the determination of the social 
bond.429 Hegel expands on this problem in the Philosophy of Right: 
If the state is represented as a unity of different persons, as a unity which is merely a 
community [of interests], this applies only to the determination of civil society. Many 
modern exponents of constitutional law have been unable to offer any view of the 
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state but this. In civil society, each individual is his own end, and all else means 
nothing to him.430 
This means that Hegel – almost in diametrical opposition to Marx – argues that the 
Declarations as documents of modern natural law ultimately confuse the state with civil 
society due to the after-effects of classical natural law, instead of positing them as two 
radically different spheres, as Marx does in ‘On the Jewish Question’.431 This view is also 
the foundation for Hegel’s critique of contractualism, especially of Rousseau’s social 
contract, which can serve as a critique of all post-contractual liberalisms in France and 
England that subordinate the state to civil society.  
On the one hand, Hegel acknowledges what Rousseau had at length thematised 
before him, in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Emile, and The Social Contract; the 
division between private man and public citizen as the constitutive challenge of modernity 
and modern man. And despite Hegel’s very pronounced criticism of Rousseau, namely that 
his general will was precisely not a universal will as Hegel understood it, they share the 
project that is commonly characterised as ‘republican’: they both try to find a means of 
reunification or, in Hegel’s case, mediation between particular and universal wills in view of 
the modern diremption of the two spheres of private and public life.432 Breckman for 
example identifies the problematisation of this tension and the implicit aim “to liberate the 
citizenry from the narrowness of civil society through the creation of a genuine public life” 
a “classic republican theme”433.  
For Rousseau, this project was driven by the realisation that a historical point had 
been reached where the state of nature [l’état de nature] was no longer conducive to the 
persistence of humanity and where natural freedom needed to be replaced by the creation 
of civil freedom [liberté morale].434 For Rousseau that meant that man had left behind his 
primitive life, which was just as much governed by physical inequality as by natural equality. 
This was because primitive life had been devoid of the social bonds that placed men in 
relation to other men where they would have experienced their physical inequality as a lack. 
Modern man was in the process of becoming an intelligent being and a rational sovereign, 
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whose task was now to actively create equality within modern sociality by means of 
contract and right.435 Rousseau therefore posits the need for a political body – the social 
contract – that subsumes the individuals and imparts a common, political existence: it 
“formerly took the name city, and now takes that of republic or of body politic.”436. Within it, 
man exists as individual with his particular will and as citizen, embodying the general will, 
which makes the citizen as much into a sovereign – he is the source and the only source of 
the general will – as into a subject to the sovereignty of the state.437 The state is then an 
artificial body, a work not of nature but of political art, whose flourishing depends on 
giving it the best possible constitution.438 
I therefore call a republic any state ruled by laws, whatever the form of 
administration may be: for then alone does the public interest govern and does the 
commonwealth [chose publique] truly exist.439 
Now, Hegel disagrees with Rousseau as to whether the social contract can really achieve a 
mediation between particular and universal will, which truly transcends the level of the 
particular. This is because, for Hegel, a contract is a form of mediation adequate to the 
sphere of abstract law and therefore a guardian of private interests,440 but not to the sphere 
of the state. In Hegel’s view, the contract merely assembles singular ‘wills’ of individuals 
and their individual opinion into a ‘will of all’ in an arbitrary manner. It does not really 
matter for him that Rousseau explicitly states that the will of all is not the same as the 
general will441 and that Rousseau spends large parts of the Social Contract outlining how the 
general will is to be created and secured against the influence of individual wills. The law 
with its different levels, 442  the prohibition of partial societies within the state, such as 
parties,443 civil religion,444 and education, are all means with which he tries to shield public 
affairs from the influence of private interests.445 Whilst Hegel praises Rousseau for having 
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identified the rational ‘will’ as the principle of the modern state, he does not acknowledge 
his attempts at mediation.446  
For this reason, Rousseau’s concept of the state is, in Hegel’s eyes, unable to realise 
the revolutionary promise and achieve substantive freedom, because it allows the atomism 
that reigns civil society to dominate the ultimate realisation of modern freedom.447 The 
confusion of civil society with the state, which leads to the foundation of modern society 
based on liberal principles of freedom and equality in the natural law tradition, as contained 
in the Declarations of the French Revolution – is then the real collision, the knot or the 
problem of post-revolutionary history. From this viewpoint, Rousseau’s Republicanism is, 
whilst not to be conflated with the classical liberalism of the time, nevertheless a liberalism 
in disguise. Whilst the French Revolution was successful in destroying a state that was 
unable to realise freedom as consciously conceived by the spirit of the time, it did not 
manage to complete its second challenge, namely to find a new foundation for this new, 
modern freedom.448 This is then the object of Hegel’s theory and his starting point for 
finding an alternative path for the realisation of substantive freedom.  
Precisely from their diametrically opposed interpretation of natural law, Hegel and 
Marx nevertheless reach a certain agreement about this problematic outcome of the French 
Revolution. For both, the French Revolution has led to a form of community, in which 
civil society with its liberal principles of individual need and abstract freedom and equality, 
determines the social bond. This situation is for Hegel just as untenable as for Marx.  
3.4.2   On ‘civil society’ 
They also agree on another level, which concerns the empirical existence of civil society as 
a separate sphere, distinct from the state with the further diremption of man into social and 
political man as portrayed in ‘On the Jewish Question’. The explication of this agreement 
requires however a more differentiated argumentation because Marx has, especially in the 
‘Critique’, often presented it as a point of fundamental disagreement between him and 
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Hegel, although I will try to show that his own presentation is already then pervaded by an 
oscillation between both sides. The problematic aspect is that in the ‘Critique’, Marx 
continually accuses Hegel of making the “real subject”, namely man, as he exists in the 
family and in civil society, into a mere phenomenon, a predicate of the subject,449 which for 
Hegel is the self-conscious and willing spirit that takes the form of the state.450 Marx argues:  
If, for example, the analysis of the family, civil society and the state etc. leads us to 
regard these modes of man’s social existence as the realisation and objectification of 
his essence, then the family etc. will appear as qualities inhering in a subject. In that 
event man will remain the essence of all these realities, but these realities will also 
appear as man’s real universality and, therefore, as common to all men. If, on the 
other hand, the family, civil society and the state etc. are determinations of the Idea, 
of substance as subject, they must acquire an empirical reality and the mass of men in 
which the Idea of civil society is developed takes on the identity of ‘bourgeoises’ 
[Bürger] of civil society, while that in which the Idea of the state is developed assumes 
the identity of citizens of the state.451 
In Marx’s view of Hegel, whose method is described in the latter part of the citation, men 
are merely vessels in which the Idea will be inscribed, they do not exist in their own right. 
That means that the outcome and purpose of the imposition of the Idea is for Hegel to 
deny true universality to the individual. The split itself, including both its poles, becomes in 
this portrayal something Hegel posits merely as an Idea. We have here Marx’s utilisation of 
Feuerbach’s subject – predicate inversion thesis in a nutshell – and we will return to it for a 
more thorough explication in the next section.452 
On the other hand, in the same text Marx acknowledges that for Hegel, the existence 
of civil society, as divided from its feudal, pre-revolutionary meaning, is undoubtedly real.  
Summarising this definition we find that ‘civil society is the class of private citizens’, in 
other words the class of private citizens is the immediate, essential, concrete class of civil 
society. … The new attribute thus acquired is a particular function; for its very 
character as a class of private citizens indicates its anthithesis to political significance 
and efficacy, its absence of a political character: it expresses the idea that civil society 
is in and for itself without any political significance and efficacy.453 
 Subsequently, Marx only says that Hegel “proceeds from the assumption that ‘civil society’ 
is separate from the ‘political state’” in distinction from the fact that “this separation really 
does exist in the modern state”.454 As he proceeds, he finally argues that Hegel’s idea of 
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mediation between state and civil society and the different forms it takes is “just the idea of 
a separation that actually exists”.455  
But if ‘being a member of a state’ is an ‘abstraction’ this is not the fault of thought, but 
of Hegel’s theory and the realities of the modern world, in which the separation of 
real life from political life is presupposed and political attributes are held to be 
‘abstract’ determinations of the real member of the state.456 
What Marx says here is an accusation that Hegel theoretically creates political abstractions 
that would otherwise not exist, an accusation that also contradicts what we believe to be 
Hegel’s view on the origin of political abstractions in 3.3.  
Based on this critique, Marx denies that Hegel has an account of the real, specifically 
modern challenge of the separation between civil society and state because he interprets 
Hegel’s theory as the doomed attempt to ‘idealise it away’. Whereas in fact, Hegel would 
very much agree 457  with Marx’s assessment that the French Revolution was the final 
realisation of the conversion of political estates into merely private, individual, social 
differences, with no political significance that had already started under the absolute 
monarchy.458 We might want to follow some strong defences of Hegel against this Marxian 
critique, made by commentators such as Manfred Riedel, Domenico Losurdo and Rose. 
We could then even go so far as to assert that Hegel, through his pronouncement of an 
irreversible split between ‘status naturalis’ and ‘status civilis’, following on from his critical 
interpretation of Rousseau and of the modern condition that he observed, broke with the 
entire preceding history of political philosophy; further, that he thereby affirmed the 
achievement of the emancipation of the state from civil society and vice versa without 
loosing sight of the inherent contradictions and pitfalls that this split gave rise to.459  
For Hegel, the political revolution had freed the pre-revolutionary Bürger, the 
bourgeois, from feudal political dependence and the general state of unfreedom, united him 
with man, and gave him the freedom of self-determination in the context of the already 
existing dependencies of civil society460: this was for him the new modern man or ‘bourgeois’.  
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“…the creation of civil society belongs to the modern world…”461 
The question of what the political would become in relation to this new ‘man’ was 
for Hegel an open question, the question of philosophy as he defines it in the Preface to 
the Philosophy of Right – and the answer was for him not, as later for Marx, readily inscribed 
in the Declarations, neither negatively nor positively. But before Hegel even starts to 
conceptualise the political sphere in relation to the negative, disemancipatory tendencies of 
civil society and in relation to the positive aim of realising substantive freedom, he asserts 
what he understands to be the prime achievement of the political revolution as a universal 
of modernity: the individuation [Vereinzelung] of man within civil society. The right to 
particularity of the subject, or the right of subjective freedom, which was pronounced in 
Christianity, has become the real principle of the new form of the world, 462  and the 
principle of civil society where it is sublated into universality (if only, as we discussed 
already in the previous chapter, as an abstract universality).463 It is the new historical ground 
for the development of the ethical totality [totale Sittlichkeit], which stands against any 
invocation of a state of nature. When Hegel affirms in relation to the ‘Jewish question’ that 
man is a universal person, because he is man, then, again, that universality is still abstract.464 
But, as Binoche points out, the individual is not merely the empirical individual with an 
abstract and indeterminate universality, as in the liberal interpretation of natural right, (e.g. 
in B. Constant), but he is also Jewish, Catholic, Protestant etc. The man of civil society is a 
determinate or concrete universal that as such enters into Hegel’s processes of mediation.465  
Implied in this valuation of the particularity of man of civil society is a rejection of 
Rousseau’s concept of ‘alienation totale’. Rousseau believes in the possibility of creating 
“the total alienation of each associate [citizen] with all his rights to the whole community”466. 
For Rousseau it is thus possible to reconcile the citizen with the individual and his private 
interests, precisely because sovereignty is popular sovereignty.467 But for Hegel this concept 
of Rousseau’s contract implies the return to a pre-revolutionary, pre-modern state, which 
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for Hegel lacks the particularly modern promise of freedom. Löwith summarises Hegel’s 
rejection of any too close association with the Greek polis on the one hand, and with 
natural law theory on the other, as follows: “The State of civil society is not a polis, and the 
man of this state is not a “zoon politikon” qua nature”468. I explored this disagreement 
between Hegel and Rousseau because in ‘On the Jewish Question’ Marx seems to conflate 
Hegel and Rousseau when he portrays the Rousseauian total alienation as the typically 
modern abstraction of political man,469 a judgement that in Marx’s text encompasses Hegel 
as the prime theoretician of this modern abstraction. As with Bauer earlier, Marx’s 
conflation leads to the unresolved issue that the specificity of the Hegelian strong state gets 
lost when treated in one with Rousseau, even though confronting it on its own terms 
would have been needed.470  
For Hegel, the achievement of political emancipation is precisely not the 
Rousseauian taking away of man’s “own powers” in order to replace them with “alien 
powers” that then bind man directly to a larger whole in the sense of a fundamental 
political alienation. Instead, the political revolution has divided the bourgeois from the 
political sphere precisely because in the modern civil society, man is already constituted 
simultaneously by natural and spiritual needs, by outer and inner arbitrariness, by himself 
and by his relation with and his dependence on others.471 Whilst Hegel agrees with Marx 
that political emancipation has failed to achieve substantive or concrete freedom once and 
for all, and that civil society is by itself unable to achieve it, Hegel perceives the modern 
constitution of civil society as the ground that makes its achievement possible and which 
therefore requires protection against its self-destructive tendencies. It is against this 
background that Hegel calls civil society also “the external state, the state of necessity and 
of the understanding”: it is a system of “all-around interdependence”,472 where the selfish 
need of the individual is interwoven with the subsistence, well-being and the right of all, 
prior to any involvement of a political rationale. Marx’s reference to Hegel’s state of 
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necessity and understanding in relation to the Declaration’s article on individual security in 
‘On the Jewish Question’473, which Marx regards as the epitome of the Declarations’ effort 
to create the bourgeois as a possessive individual, is in that sense misleading. The 
protection of the individual in the Declaration refers, at least after directly confronting the 
natural law tradition with Hegel’s account, to the abstract individual. However, Hegel’s 
individual is the determined universal that already exists only in relation to other men, i.e. 
whose freedom, even in the sphere of civil society, is different from the abstract freedom 
of modern natural law.  
3.4.3   On the political state 
It is only in light of a deeper ‘disagreement’ between Marx and Hegel vis-à-vis the natural 
law tradition and its pertinence to the interpretation of the French Revolution that we can 
fully judge Marx’s critique of Hegel’s notion of civil society. This disagreement is about the 
nature, function and existence of the state and its relation to civil society, in its constitutive 
moment as well as more generally. For Marx, as we previously saw, the Declarations 
posited the problem of the modern social constitution as it was realised by the French 
Revolution (separation and domination of civil society), but it did not contain even the 
slightest hint for its solution or overcoming, because, in Marx’s view, it was wedded to the 
“hitherto existing world order”474. For Hegel, who is just as critical of the unconstrained 
reign of the liberal abstractions that are manifest in the modern civil society, the 
Declarations did not capture this specifically modern challenge, and in that sense the 
solution was not contained within them either. But, even though Hegel criticises the 
fundamental categories of the natural law tradition, he continues its attempt to 
comprehend and rationally justify a modern state. 475  In this sense, Hegel continues 
Rousseau’s project despite his critique of Rousseau’s conception of the state as contract. 
Hegel explicitly acknowledges Rousseau’s achievement in this regard:  
As far as the search for this concept [the philosophical concept of the state] is 
concerned, it was the achievement of Rousseau to put forward the will as the 
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principle of the state, a principle which has thought not only as its form (…) but also 
as its content, and which is in fact thinking itself.476 
Regarding his subsequent critique of Rousseau and more generally of natural law, the 
problem for Hegel is the lack of a theory of the state as a distinct, and yet immanently 
necessary entity in relation to civil society, which, as rational state, is able to mediate the 
abstract universality of civil society in order to achieve ethical life [Sittlichkeit] – an aim that 
tries to circumvent a liberal as well as a counterrevolutionary solution.477  
For Hegel, such a concept of the state would neither claim to be able to re-unite with 
civil society, which Hegel regards as problematic in Rousseau’s account, nor to remain 
entirely external to civil society, which would make it into a formal abstraction, as it is the 
case with Kant. The fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s concept of the state, which also 
forms the building block of Marx’s critique in the ‘Critique’ and in ‘On the Jewish Question’ 
is that the Hegelian state as the whole comes before its parts.478  Hegel develops and 
justifies it as follows: 
Civil society is the [state of] difference [Differenz], which intervenes between the 
family and the state, even if its full development [Ausbildung] occurs later than that of 
the state; for as difference, it presupposes the state, which it must have before it as a 
self-sufficient entity in order to subsist [bestehen] itself.479 
This development of real ethical life through the division of civil society and on to 
the state, which is shown to be its [civil society’s] true ground…Since, in the course 
of the development of the scientific concept, the state appears as result, in that it 
turns out to be the true ground, the mediation and semblance already referred to are 
likewise superseded by immediacy. In actuality, therefore, the state in general is in 
fact the primary factor; only within the state does the family first develop into civil 
society, and it is the idea of the state itself, which divides into these two moments.480 
This argument contains a historical as much as a philosophical claim – claims that for 
Hegel are both intertwined in the speculative concept. The historical claim is that Hegel, 
similarly to Marx, perceives the constitutional monarchy in France as the precondition for 
the development of modern civil society. That means he understands it to have helped to 
propel the development of political estates into the apolitical civil society without truly 
conforming to the concept of the state, to its Idea. The whole as concept comes before its 
parts, because the parts and their individual interests are unable to form anything other 
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than an arbitrary “communality or totality”. On the other hand, the state, if it came after its 
parts, could exist in relation to them merely as an external abstract universality.481 Only the 
state that exists historically and logically prior to its parts can be external necessity and 
immanent end at the same time. It is external necessity in as far as the well-being and 
private law of the bourgeois are dependent on the constitution, on being ensured as rights 
by the state; these rights imply of course the bourgeois’ duty towards the substantial, or, in 
other words, the subordination of his private interests under the universal. It is an 
immanent end as opposed to an external moral end, because duty and right, universal and 
particular will, necessity (in the name of substantive freedom) and freedom (in the name of 
the freedom of individuality, of the inner life of the bourgeois) become one in the 
speculative organic totality of the state. That means that my particular will is not 
suppressed by the universal, I do not, as we saw in Bauer, have to renounce it in the name 
of universal freedom, but it is harmonised with the universal, because the state’s concept of 
substantive freedom ensures the realisation of my particular will, whilst I acknowledge the 
goal of the state, “the universal cause” as my own cause. 482 This harmonisation is not seen 
by Hegel as once and for all realisable by the true state. The speculative concept of the 
rational state exists before its parts and yet in a complex differentiated organic totality of 
separate but complementary spheres that implies a multileveled stratification of right: 
person (abstract law), subject (morality), individual and state (ethical life) are all mediated 
with each other without either sphere being suppressed.  
The state comes before its parts in yet another way. The ideal state form that Hegel 
envisions for this endeavour generally splits into the legislative and the executive whilst the 
crown, in the form of the constitutional monarchy unites the different powers within it.483 
Whereas readers have often taken this to justify the pre-revolutionary constitutional 
monarchies in France and Germany, Hegel does not give purely historical, but conceptual 
reasons for his definition, which we are interested in primarily from the negative 
perspective of what he tries to avoid. He starts the debate by affirming that the general 
issue as to which form is superior to another, monarchy or democracy, is somewhat a moot 
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point, because “all forms of government are one-sided, and are unable to sustain within 
themselves the principle of free subjectivity (the principle of the modern world) or to 
conform to fully developed [ausgebildet] reason”484. Despite this general problem, Hegel’s 
prime goal is to mediate between particularity and universality in order to avoid by all 
means the arbitrary rule of particular wills, in other words, liberal individualism. That 
translates for Hegel directly into his mistrust and rejection of the democratic element as 
constitutional form. 
The idea that those communities which are already present in the circles referred to 
above can be split up again into a collection of individuals as soon as they enter the 
sphere of politics, i.e. the sphere of the highest concrete universality, involves 
separating civil and political life from each other and leaves political life hanging…in 
the air; for its basis is then merely the abstract individuality of arbitrary will and 
opinion, and is thus grounded only on contingency rather than on a foundation 
which is stable and legitimate [berechtigt] in and for itself.485 
Democracy, giving the sovereignty over to the people who are nothing but an inorganic 
assemblage, a mass of irrational individuals that constitute civil society – the object of 
critique of both Marx and Hegel, but in very different ways – would reduce the rational 
state to a mere government.486  
Without its monarch and that articulation of the whole, which is necessarily and 
immediately associated with monarchy, the people is a formless mass. … It is only 
when moments such as these which refer to an organisation, to political life, emerge 
in a people that it ceases to be that indeterminate abstraction with the purely general 
idea of the people denotes.487  
This “purely general idea of the people” occurs for Hegel in theories of popular 
sovereignty that are often referred to as ‘republic’ – an unsubtle dig at Rousseau. The 
democratic element in general lacks a rational form, because it allows everyone, purely by 
being a member of the state, to participate in the universal concerns of all, and this 
corrupts the state organism as a whole.488  
Marx’s critique of this understanding of the state plays only a marginal role in ‘On 
the Jewish Question’ and is far more pronounced in the ‘Critique’. In the former, he fits it 
into what we could call a sideswipe against Hegel. When referring to Hegel’s definition of 
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the the state as universality of thought that exists “only above the particular churches”489, 
he sarcastically concludes:  
Of course! Only in this way, above the particular elements, does the state constitute 
itself as universality [Allgemeinheit].490 
We can understand this statement as referring back to the criticism that Marx spelled out in 
the ‘Critique’. There he firstly objects to Hegel that his state as simultaneous external 
necessity and immanent purpose of civil society and its particularities can only be thought 
as a single concept because Hegel reduces both, state and civil society, to logical entities of 
the Idea, that are neither given by historical-empirical reality, nor is their resolution qua 
mediation therefore conditioned by historical possibilities. The resolution process of the 
two contradictory dimensions happens for Marx entirely in the realm of the Idea, which he 
equates with idealism tout court. To posit the state as “the actuality of the ethical Idea”491, 
as ethical spirit whose essence is substantial freedom, is for Marx not only the false 
subjectivisation of the Idea, it also implies the reduction of real man – the individual, the 
bourgeois – into a predicate of the Idea. This deprives him of his reality, and accordingly, 
of his political effectiveness. Thus, Marx argues in response to Hegel’s justification of the 
monarch: 
If Hegel had begun by positing real subjects as the basis of the state he would not 
have found it necessary to subjectivise the state in a mystical way [namely by 
installing a hereditary monarchy at its top]. … Because Hegel starts not with an 
actual existent but with predicates of universal determination, and because a vehicle 
of these determinations must exist, the mystical Idea becomes that vehicle.492 
That means that Marx reproaches Hegel for his ahistorical – idealist and mysticist – 
conception of the “dualism” and its resolution, which solves the problem of a liberal 
determination of the social bond of modern society far away from and against social reality 
with its abstract and imaginary subject of the state. This finds its most concrete 
embodiment in the figure of the person of the monarch.493 For Marx, the relationship 
between state and civil society instead remains an “unresolved antinomy”494.  
                                                
489 Marx 2010, 153 [354]. 
490 Ibid., 153 [354]; amended trans. 
491  Hegel 2003, 275 [398] (§257). Marx’s commentary on this first paragraph of the “State” chapter is 
unfortunately missing. 
492 Marx 1975b, 80 [224]. 
493 See ibid., 192 [327]; also Breckman 1999, 286. 
494 Marx 1975b, 60 [204]. 
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As we discussed earlier, Marx’s criticism in the ‘Critique’ is not at all unproblematic, 
especially in light of the speculative nature of the concept in Hegel. Gillian Rose argues 
uncompromisingly that Marx’s accusation of Hegel – which is in form very close to the 
criticism Feuerbach pronounces in the ‘Preliminary Theses’495 regarding Hegel’s logic – 
namely that he mistakes the real subject, real men, for the predicate, is based on a 
misunderstanding on Marx’s part of the speculative nature of the concept of the state itself. 
She argues that a speculative proposition, as Hegel advances, does precisely not allow for a 
mere “formal identity”, i.e. it is to mistake something (the concrete) for something else (the 
abstract), whilst it really is the other, because they do not stand in a formal opposition to 
each other to begin with. 496 And specifically in the Philosophy of Right, “the derivations in 
th[e] text undermined the dominance of the concept”497. Marx’s logic of inversion on 
which he bases his critique of Hegel, turns out to result in two limiting understandings on 
Marx’s part that are often portrayed as directly impacting on his conceptualisation of 
emancipation. On the one hand, his understanding of Hegel’s overall project is supposed 
to be blocked by framing it as a problem of inversion 498  and secondly, Marx’s own 
inversion of the inversion supposedly remains limited by the natural law tradition that 
Hegel seeks to exit with his concept of the rational state. But is that indeed the case? 
Marx and Hegel are both critics of the dominant models of political representation, 
whilst their starting points and their solutions fundamentally differ. Hegel’s critique is 
aimed at the liberal and republican illusion that believes the representative government to 
realise the ‘will of all’, i.e. the real will of the people.499 This, in Hegel’s eyes, is not only a lie 
but also a misunderstanding of the function and power of the state in relation to civil 
society. For Hegel, civil society is one element that needs to be represented within the state 
besides other elements in order to ensure the rational quest for ethical life. Against that 
                                                
495  In ‘The Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy’, Feuerbach accuses Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy of maintaining ‘theology’ in the form of consciousness as divine essence as its secret truth. 
Because this consciousness is “only an idea without reality”, i.e. distinct from real consciousness, Feuerbach 
posits that “[w]e need only turn the predicate into the subject and thus as subject into object and principle – 
that is, only reverse speculative philosophy” (Feuerbach 2013, 154). 
496 See Rose 2009, 52–53. 
497 Ibid., 89. 
498 Hyppolite affirms: “Marx’s entire critique of Hegelian idealism is contained in the reversal of its inverted 
conception of the state.” (Hyppolite 1969, 112). 
499 See Fine 2001, 65. 
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background, he neither regards it as helpful to fall prey to the illusion that this 
representation could really encompass the will of ‘all’, as it will never hold more than “the 
many as single individuals”500, nor will it follow the republican critique of representation à 
la Rousseau, which opposes the people and their will - popular sovereignty – to the 
executive, seen as the oppressive institution. The latter misunderstands the need to 
“respect and despise” popular opinion,501 which is an expression of Hegel’s cautiousness 
vis-à-vis idealising one element of the state – here the legislature and the people – as 
rational in and of itself above the others. He is concerned that such an idealisation will lead 
to destruction, as it is only the interaction of all elements as the necessary and immanent 
building blocks of the organic whole, that produces rational knowledge able to realise 
ethical totality.502  
 Marx’s critique of representation instead focuses on the ways that Hegel tries to 
achieve mediation between state and civil society without taking the needs and desires of 
the people as his starting point. Marx develops this angle of his critique by discussing the 
specific forms of mediation that Hegel advocates. These are the prince, hereditary 
monarchy in the Crown, bureaucracy 503  in the executive and constitution based on 
Estates, 504  prolongation of primogeniture, and rejection of universal suffrage as the 
democratic element in the legislature. Without being able to go into too much detail at this 
point, Marx concludes that by either being too anarchic 505  or by taking the modern 
condition too much as a given (as e.g. private property in the institution of 
primogeniture),506 these forms of mediation end up fixing or covering up the persistence of 
the contradiction of universality and particularity.507  
Marx then rejects the Hegelian state because it remains uncritical towards the 
contemporary post-revolutionary situation, in that it does not and cannot achieve the 
mediation between particular and universal that it promises. But the reason for this is not 
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reducible to the failure of any single element of mediation that Hegel presupposes as part 
of his theory within the executive and the legislature, and which Marx thoroughly 
deconstructs in the largest part of the ‘Critique’. Instead, the source of the problem lies, as 
becomes obvious in ‘On the Jewish Question’ in case one remained doubtful in the 
‘Critique’, with the underlying “idealism of the state” as such. But, against Rose’s and 
others all-encompassing criticism, I want to insist that it matters hugely how we understand 
what Marx means by this “idealism” in both texts in order to grasp the gap between them, 
even though they both undoubtedly express a fundamental disagreement with Hegel’s 
concept of the state.  
Marx critiques Hegel’s forms of mediation as failing to realise what he argues they 
do, namely to overcome the arbitrary rule of the materialism of civil society. This critique is 
problematic in so far as it is always already based on the more abstract critique of the 
concept of the state as idealist. However, we should not overlook the fact that Marx’s text 
contains both those levels of critique. And, despite Rose’s criticism, any re-valuation of 
Hegel’s speculative concept of the state certainly needs to take the potential and historically 
manifested failure of his means of mediation seriously, which includes his solution for 
Jewish emancipation. Otherwise there is every reason to worry that the Hegelian state 
might end up manifesting “the religion of private property” in the name of “the reality of 
the ethical idea”.508 Bloch comes to precisely this conclusion, when he contrasts Hegel’s 
general dialectical method, which he understands, just as does Rose, as positing a 
speculative non-identity between the rational and the actual, with his theory of the state. 
The latter for Bloch “turns dialectic into a movement in a closed house and leaves it 
standing still in the domain of law”, because it is so preoccupied with stabilising the 
rational away from possible interferences by the demos.509 But this Blochian criticism is, as 
shown in Chapter Two, much closer to Bauer’s problematisation of the Hegelian state, 
than it is to the critique that Marx develops in ‘On the Jewish Question’, as we are about to 
explicate. 
There is no doubt anymore about Marx’s account of the modern state’s emergence. 
                                                
508 Ibid., 171 [307] (concerning §257 and §268). 
509 See Bloch 1996, 125. 
 121 
The abstraction of the state as such was not born until the modern world because the 
abstraction of private life was not created until modern times. The abstraction of the 
political state is a modern product.510 
The establishment of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into independent 
individuals…is accomplished by one and the same act.511 
Not only do the modern state and civil society emerge together, but the abstraction of the 
state as such, or of the political state, implies for Marx also a coincidence between the 
modern state, born in the political revolution, and Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: one is its 
practical, the other its theoretical birthplace. Whilst this supposition remains rather implicit 
in the few references to Hegel in ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx explicates it at two places 
in the ‘Critique’: 
In the modern state, as in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,… .512 
This uncritical mysticism is the key both to the riddle of modern constitutions 
(especially constitutions based on Estates) and also to the mystery of the Hegelian 
philosophy, above all the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of Religion.513 
By affirming this double coincidence, Marx does not only set himself up with the 
theoretical tool which will allow him, if negatively, to grasp the contemporary social form. 
He also introduces the most fundamental problem that he has with the modern social form 
and with Hegel’s philosophy and which, we could say, justifies his parallel treatment 
retroactively, into a more precise view. In turn this means that once his analysis of either 
part of this equation changes, the other changes too. 
As we already discussed in 3.3, in ‘On the Jewish Question’ Marx rejects the state as 
exercising just another form of external, ‘religious domination’, because it only formally 
represents universal interest, while the ‘real’ interests are without political significance, 
suppressed and due to perish. This was as a result of the ideology that makes individuals 
believe the separation to have been overcome despite such an overcoming being 
impossible in Marx’s eyes. Based on his conflation of the modern political state born in the 
revolution, and Hegel’s theory of the state, Marx rejects both in one theoretical stroke: the 
effect of Hegel’s theory is just as enslaving to the conditions of everyday life in civil society 
as are the effects of the really existing political state. Marx defends this conflation even 
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though he agrees with Hegel on the failure of the French Revolution to institute ‘human 
emancipation’ or ‘concrete freedom’ and on the reality of depoliticised civil society with its 
modern individualised subjects. But Hegel’s theory of mediation is no less ideological than 
the political state as the revolutionaries founded it, because ultimately, both take civil 
society – “the world of needs, labour, private interests, civil law” – as their basis of 
existence, “as a precondition not requiring further substantiation and therefore as its 
natural basis”,514 whilst misunderstanding its material effects.  
Whilst this is not unconditionally true for Hegel, he does indeed defend civil society, 
as we saw above, as an achievement of modern freedom that he wants to protect, without 
allowing it to become the sole ground for the state, i.e. he aims to correct and limit its 
impact. Marx does not acknowledge this difference, because, for him, the very fact that 
civil society is allowed to remain unchanged in Hegel’s, or any other possible theory of 
mediation, is enough for him to reject it.515 We can thus conclude this section by first of all 
confirming that Marx persists in his conviction that Hegel’s strong ethical state cannot 
achieve the successful mediation as Hegel envisions it. It is however, and importantly, 
Marx’s analysis of why the Hegelian mediation necessarily fails, that changes. Only in ‘On 
the Jewish Question’ does it become clear that it is Hegel’s implicit acceptance of the social 
bond of civil society based on the modern, split man, and his liberal, hyper-individualised 
existence, that Marx primarily objects to in Hegel’s concept of the state. This is the reason 
why the social form as a whole necessarily, we could also say ‘structurally’, resists 
transformation qua mediation, because the state is premised on the material and spiritual 
logic of civil society whilst it is supposed to overcome it. That analysis however does not so 
much amount to a Bauerian and Blochian critique of the state as bringing the dialectic to a 
standstill, but it instead identifies one of the dialectic’s presuppositions as overdetermining 
its possible outcomes. 
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where Marx refers separately to the ideal state of the theory and the present conditions. 
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3.4.4   On right 
Before we can enter into the details of Marx’s positive theory of transcending the separated 
unity of state and civil society as a means to overcome the atomistic and egoistic existence 
of the ‘bourgeois’ that the political revolutions with their Declarations instituted as the 
hegemonic form of human existence, we need to pay attention to the implications of 
Marx’s critique of right in this context. Marx does not only posit the co-constitution of the 
political state and the autonomous individuals of civil society, but, as previously shown, he 
includes a critique of what he regards as the new basis for their relation: law (analogous to 
privilege under feudalism).516 Law only became a necessary tool of mediation between state 
and civil society due to the scission that was ‘accomplished by one and the same act’, the 
political revolution. More specifically, in the form of the rights of man, or human rights – 
which is the sole angle on law that Marx takes in ‘On the Jewish Question’ - it helped to 
proclaim the generalisation of human life into bourgeois, individualised life. As Marx 
rejects the state because it allows civil society to persist in a separate sphere, as the ‘untruth’ 
of man,517 the only reasonable conclusion can be to include right into this criticism.518 
Because after all, to understand modern political ideology means to understand that the 
rights of man (as natural rights) ended up constituting and helping to secure the modern 
bourgeois, “man-as-property-owner”, and his private existence, separate from his public, 
political existence; they were revolutionary acts, but of the bourgeois revolution.519 Like the 
political state, right in general, in its very form, is a precondition and product of the 
separation that in the name of overcoming the separation once and for all, needs to be 
abolished, if the modern human condition –the product of this separation– is supposed to 
be truly revolutionised. Bloch captures Marx’s insight very accurately: 
 [A]ll peoples only have and achieve the sort and degree of revolution that they are 
ready for on the basis of the human rights they have acquired and preserved.520 
                                                
516 See Marx 2010, 166-167 [369]. 
517 Calling civil society ‘untruth’ is clearly a critique of Hegel’s ‘true, rational state’; it does not imply that Marx 
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Marx’s rejection of human rights is a radical step that encountered much resistance 
from interpreters of ‘On the Jewish Question’, as for example formulated by Claude Lefort, 
who cannot accept that Marx thereby denies rights in general, and human rights more 
specifically, a political value that could be utilised for human collectivisation against 
authoritarian or totalitarian state systems.521 We will return to this specific objection in 
detail in 6.1, because of its conjunctural specificities. But it should be stated here that Marx 
definitively discusses the problem of right in the context of the ‘state as such’ in which the 
social-material basis functions in harmony with the rights of man, and not in opposition to 
it, as it was the case with the totalitarian state that led to the atrocities of the 20th century.  
But apart from that difference, Lefort’s and others’ criticisms nevertheless cause us 
to ask the more general question whether Marx does indeed say that right and rights are 
without political value or impact? Not really. In so far as rights are a fundamental part of 
the achievements of the political revolution, they constitute, just as the political state does, 
progress regarding the alleviation of man’s oppression within the context of the existing 
world order.522 With regard to Kouvelakis’ contemporary reinterpretation of this question 
in the context of social citizenship and to Hegel’s earlier attempt to bridge the political – 
economic divide with material rights or what we would today call social rights, it is clear 
that it would not make sense on Marx’s part to deny them political effectivity.  
When Losurdo defends Hegel’s state against Marx’s critique, he focuses precisely on 
this point. Losurdo ascribes to Hegel a sensitivity for potential conflicts of freedom that 
can arise between the need for emancipation from the state as Marx has formulated it, and 
a need for emancipation within the sphere of civil society, for which one chooses the 
struggle against the hegemonic classes by appealing to the state for protection or 
emancipation through the granting of rights.523 Losurdo argues that this conflict cannot 
simply be theoretically solved or rejected as a conflict between substantial and formal, or 
positive and negative freedom, a conflict in which one can easily pick sides, but that 
historical situations are more messy and that different solutions appear to be radical and 
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effective in different situations. 524  Both demands for freedom are in Losurdo’s eyes 
legitimate. That Hegel has fundamentally understood this, is according to Losurdo visible 
in his conception of the state, but more specifically, of right, namely of his notions of 
material rights and of “the right of extreme need”525: they allow the political dimension of 
the state to ‘spill over’ into the workings of civil society. Hegel understands that the state’s 
task to guarantee inalienable rights to every citizen implies the insurance of their material 
content without entering into a sphere that is supposedly purely governed by individual 
needs, private law, contracts and the police.  
Thus, even before Marx, Losurdo argues, 
Hegel had the merit of justifying the existence of inalienable "material rights" 
(Berliner Schriften., 488): he highlighted the fact that, if pushed to a certain level, 
inequality annihilates even freedom itself, concrete freedom. A situation of extreme 
need "attacks the whole scope of the realization of freedom" (v.Rph., Iv, 342), it 
results in a "total lack of rights" (Rph., § 127).526 
It is in this sense that Hegel addresses the social question, acknowledging that it can only 
be solved when economic and political questions are understood to overlap and influence 
each other, as is the case with economic inequalities between the working class and the 
owners of riches, the extent to which they lead to the creation of the rabble as a social 
underclass, and the need for redistribution. 527  Hegel did understand that violence was 
inherent to the social relations of civil society, i.e. “in the property relation, and in the 
absolutisation of the right to property”528, and that the unlimited reign of need would 
undoubtedly lead to increasing dependency, poverty and growing inequality.529 His attempt 
was to counteract it by instituting material rights that allowed the state to intervene in the 
name of every individual’s ‘right to live’.530 
Kouvelakis implicitly validates Hegel’s justification of material or social rights, 
when he shows that, historically, the extension of citizenship through those social rights, 
ensuring the endurance of the community and its members against the primacy of private 
                                                
524 The example Losurdo gives is the struggle against slavery during the American Civil War and Lincoln’s 
“Jacobin methods”.  
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property, has not only become the prevalent form of our contemporary Western welfare 
states, but it thereby did in fact allow for a politicisation of ‘merely social differences’ with 
significant emancipatory effects. 531  Kouvelakis argues that they can contribute to a 
“disabstractification” 532 , which always involves a displacement of the border between 
public and private that can expose otherwise hidden, because depoliticised, exclusions. But 
whilst he thereby agrees with the political potential Losurdo sees in Hegel’s conception of 
material rights, he sides with Marx: social rights and the struggle for them are able to 
displace the border between public and private, but they thereby participate in the border’s 
prolongation and ultimately leave it intact.533 Once again, now in the domain of right, we 
have hit the limit of political emancipation, its “structural limit” as Kouvelakis refers to 
it.534 That does not mean that one needs to abandon or abolish the law and outrightly 
dismiss the struggles that are fought in the name of specific rights. These struggles might 
themselves, whilst being expressed in the language of rights, already speak of a world that 
only lies beyond what can be realised within the limits of granted rights claims. “Being 
regarded as if we were free and equal”535 not only marks progress to the state of natural 
subjection in feudal society, it also implies, as Brown argues, the possibility of living in a 
community that has overcome the ‘as if’ mode and has realised universal freedom and 
equality within itself, in everyday life instead of placing it in another sphere. But this is no 
reason for closing one’s eyes to the double nature of right that persists as long as the 
separation of civil society and state persists, as they are premised on each other. And 
Brown is fully aware of this other side of right, when she argues:  
The point is that rights converge with powers of social stratification and lines of 
social demarcation in ways that extend as often as attenuate these powers and lines. 
… [just as] [h]istorically, rights emerged in modernity both as a vehicle of 
emancipation from political disenfranchisement or institutionalised servitude and as a 
means of privileging an emerging bourgeois class within a discourse of formal 
egalitarianism and universal citizenship.536  
And whereas Losurdo lauds Hegel’s ability to understand and consciously navigate this 
conflict inherent in the modern form of sociation [Vergesellschaftung], the Marx, who writes 
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‘On the Jewish Question’, is not content to give in and acknowledge that the structural 
functions of bourgeois domination at work within this conflict, are insurmountable, only 
ever to be alleviated momentarily.  
In the ‘Critical Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a 
Prussian”’537 – Marx’s brisk reply to Ruge’s article where Ruge, in his Republican manner, 
belittles the Silesian Weavers for lacking political spirit in their merely industrial uprising –
Marx underlines his reservations about a political, rights-based solution for “defects of 
society” [soziale Gebrechen], in this case concerning the extreme poverty of the factory 
districts. After having examined the political measures taken against pauperism in England, 
in France under Napoleon and in Prussia, Marx comes to the conclusion that “in their 
attempts to come to grips with pauperism every government has stuck fast at charitable and 
administrative measures or even regressed to a more primitive stage than that”538. The reason 
for this “impotence of its [the state’s] administration” lies for Marx, we will not be 
surprised to discover, in its enforcement of laws against the machinations of private life or 
“the world of modern business”, on which it however depends.539  Marx thereby only 
confirms the impossibility of overcoming these specifically modern contradictions by 
purely political problematisations and means, something Hegel had himself implicitly 
acknowledged, when he grappled with the figure of the ‘rabble’ that kept haunting his aim 
of reaching a state of real recognition. This was because the rabble is excluded from the 
possibility of recognition based on political and non-political structures that however allow 
civil society to function. 540  The fact that the state depends on the socioeconomic 
presuppositions of civil society protects the latter from the attempts of human rights or 
material rights to undermine its violent implications. And these rights do not fail due to 
bad attempts of realisation, but because they are part and parcel of the constitution of the 
modern civil-bourgeois society with its bourgeois, isolated, individual. 
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1844. 
538 Marx 1975a, 411 [400–401]. 
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4   Human emancipation as revolution 
Now that we have thoroughly examined Marx’s development of his critique of political 
emancipation, based on a close reading of ‘On the Jewish Question’, and on a more 
thorough inquiry into how this critique relates precisely to Hegel’s theory of civil society 
and the state, it is time to move on to an examination of Marx’s vision for overcoming the 
limitations of political emancipation, and realising universal, human emancipation. The 
core argument of this chapter is that Marx binds human emancipation to a concept of 
revolution, based on his identification of the absolute limit of political emancipation, which 
is grounded in an account of the civil-bourgeois social totality as defined in 3.3.  
But before we can begin explicating this link, and the characteristics of the revolution 
that Marx envisions could uniquely lead to human emancipation, we need to engage with a 
conflicting strand of interpretation that tries to tie Marx’s concept of human emancipation 
back to his earlier commitment to a Rousseauian notion of ‘true democracy’ in the 
‘Critique’. Afterwards, we will develop our counter-argument that elaborates the 
implications of understanding Marx’s concept of human emancipation as revolution. In the 
last section of the chapter, we will return to the problem that underpins all these 
developments, namely the ‘Jewish question’. As we did in relation to Bauer earlier, we will 
discuss to what extent Marx’s concept of human emancipation solves the ‘Jewish question’, 
and what that solution would mean for the Jewish people and their relation to their religion. 
We will link this question to a brief inquiry into the figure of ‘man himself’, which is the 
end point of the revolution, and the starting point of a truly emancipated society.  
4.1   Marx and Rousseau: one or two visions of emancipation? 
When Marx accuses Hegel in the ‘Critique’ of inverting subject and predicate, and 
mistaking the real people for an Idea whilst taking the ideal state to be real, he rejects 
Hegel’s idealist state mainly because it denies sovereignty to the people themselves, to 
‘really existing man’.541 Marx writes: 
Hegel proceeds from the state and conceives of man as the subjectivised state; 
democracy proceeds from man and conceives of the state as objectified man. …the 
constitution does not make the people, but the people make the constitution. … 
democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, socialised man as a particular 
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political constitution. … In democracy, man does not exist for the sake of the law, 
but the law exists for the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other political 
systems man is a legal existence. … In democracy the formal principle is identical with 
the substantive principle…it is the first true unity of the particular and the universal. … 
all forms of state have democracy for their truth … .542 
Marx develops here a vision of democracy with which he wants to supersede Hegel’s 
constitutional monarchy, in the name of giving priority to ‘human existence’ over man’s 
‘legal existence’. As an overall aim, that sounds very similar to how Marx defines human 
emancipation at the end of the first part of ‘On the Jewish Question’, namely as the 
reunification of the individual man of civil society with the abstract citizen, or political man. 
In both cases, Marx’s main concern is to reunite man with his own powers, so that his 
political powers are one with his social powers, and to make man as his own sovereign the 
starting and end point of the social organisation that he collectively gives himself.  
Both texts, the ‘Critique’ and ‘On the Jewish Question’, are very clear on what these 
ideas of ‘true democracy’ and ‘human emancipation’ stand in opposition to: namely the so-
called ‘democratic republic’ that Marx equates with the example of North America.543 The 
democratic republic is for him just another state form, whose content “lies beyond” the 
state’s constitution. ‘Content’ refers to the opposite of the political state, which Marx also 
calls “material state”544, i.e. the life of the people or civil society. Because the democratic 
republic, as we have discussed at length with regard to ‘On the Jewish Question’, is unable 
to abolish the gap between civil society and the political state, it is in principle no different 
from the Prussian monarchy: the only difference is that whilst “[t]he monarchy is the 
perfect expression of this estrangement, [t]he republic is the negation of that 
estrangement”545. But, as long as the constitution exists separate from “the real life of the 
people”546, as itself a ‘particular reality’ that ideologically dominates the material reality, it 
cannot be anything close to a democracy. Certainly, it is not the tool that will help the men 
of civil society to overturn their separation from politics, which implies that they do not 
regard their everyday struggles as in themselves political, because, as we showed in 3.3, the 
ideology of the republic is precisely there to conserve that separation. Lucio Colletti 
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emphasises this dimension, even though he is already talking about it in the context of the 
‘class society’, a conception Marx had not developed when he wrote the ‘Critique’ or ‘On 
the Jewish Question’: 
[T]he constitution of the bourgeois democratic republic is the résumé, the 
compendium of the contradictions between the classes in capitalist society. But […] 
the republic is, for Marx, by no means the resolution or supersession of the basic 
antagonisms. On the contrary, it provides the best terrain for them to unfold and 
reach maturity.547 
The real question is, however, how precisely Marx develops the positive contradiction 
and supersession of the democratic republic through ‘true democracy’ in the ‘Critique’, and 
through ‘human emancipation’ in ‘On the Jewish Question’. That implies two necessary 
specifications. We need to clarify how the aim of reducing man to himself, conceived as a 
reunification of him with his political and social powers, relates to the most prominent 
version of such a theory in the history of political philosophy, namely to Rousseau’s notion 
of popular sovereignty, which plays a role in both of Marx’s texts and should not be 
overlooked or treated ancillary to his relationship to Hegel. The second question is whether 
there exists a continuity or a discontinuity between Marx’s two texts and their concepts of 
emancipation.  
In a fundamental way, both accounts – true democracy and human emancipation – 
appear to be steeped in typically Rousseauian language and concepts of popular sovereignty 
and direct democracy.548 Does that mean that Marx’s critique of Hegel in the ‘Critique’ and 
in ‘On the Jewish Question’ – his rejection of taking the separation between civil society 
and state as constitutive of the modern social form, and his aim to overcome Hegel’s 
theory and contemporary socio-political reality and to institute a new social bond – is, after 
all, a full-fledged return to Rousseau? We will need several steps in order to answer this 
question satisfactorily. 
In one way, Marx certainly ties in with Rousseau’s critique of representation and his 
defence and theorisation of the political self-organisation of the people.549 It is on this level, 
the level of the definition of the overall aim of emancipation, that ‘On the Jewish Question’ 
continues the argumentative path of the ‘Critique’. When Marx rejects Hegel’s 
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problematisation of representation, who regards the introduction of the democratic 
element into the state as lacking a “rational form”550, Marx rejects it as being itself born out 
of the separation between state and civil society that stands in the way of true democracy.551 
Implicit in Marx’s critique is a rejection of Hegel’s critique of Rousseau, which, as we saw 
earlier, is based on the same argumentative logic: Hegel accuses Rousseau of confusing the 
state with civil society when he allows the individual wills, ‘subjective freedom’, to 
immediately determine the state and its political matters in the name of the ‘general will’. 
Hegel portrays Rousseau’s conception of the general will here as much more one-
dimensional than it appears in Rousseau’s text, where the unification of the individual wills 
into the general will is not an arbitrary lumping together, and Rousseau acknowledges that 
“[t]here is often a considerable difference between the will of all and the general will.”552 
But, more importantly, he also fails to recognise with this portrayal the primary concern for 
Rousseau that is shared by Marx. Their shared primary concern is, in fact, an affirmation 
that the essence of, for Rousseau, the republican form of government, for Marx, true 
democracy, lies in locating legislation in the hands of the people so that they make the law. 
Why? In order to guarantee the freedom and preservation of the individual that both 
Rousseau and Marx see endangered by the existing forms of association, at the moment of 
their respective theorising. To guarantee freedom of the individual in association, however, 
means, for Rousseau, that a form needs to be found “by means of which each, uniting with 
all, nonetheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before”553. 
Whilst we will shortly move on to examine in more detail what it means for 
Rousseau that man should ‘remain free as before’ and ‘only obey himself’, and how that 
relates to Marx’s “reduction…to man himself”, at least we can affirm at this point that Marx 
follows Rousseau in committing himself to finding a form of association where man is not 
subordinated to an external power that annuls his own sovereignty over his social and 
political life. That this involves a difficult negotiation between individual wills, other, 
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institutional, particular wills and the general will is clear to Rousseau,554 but it is a secondary 
problem, similar to the question of the state form.555 It is important that laws become a sort 
of register of the general will or the peoples’ will,556 and that their execution is never more 
than the administration of this will. The executive is the administrator of the sovereign, it 
has no sovereignty in itself.557 Because sovereignty is “inalienable and indivisible”558, every 
formal exclusion endangers its universality: “the moment a people gives itself 
representatives, it is no longer free. It no longer exists.”559 In this sense, we can understand 
Marx’s critique of Hegel’s representation qua estates as “a people in miniature”: it is “the 
same abstraction of the political state vis-à-vis civil society, as the executive is vis-à-vis the 
sovereign”560; just another expression of the falsity of the legislature in the political state, 
which is divorced from its true ground, the people. True democracy and human 
emancipation are, after all, both based on the withdrawal of the external state back into 
civil society, the closing of the gap between social and political man and a new unity that 
implies a double existence as sovereign and subject [Untertan] or subjectum and subjectus.561 
This double existence is then no longer the symptom of the domination of man by an 
external political force, but it is the very condition for the Rousseauian contract not to be a 
contract of subjugation [Unterwerfungsvertrag].562  
Another element of Marx’s conception of true democracy, which is continued in its 
transposition to human emancipation, but in tension to Rousseau’s theory of the state, is the 
problematisation of private property or, in Rousseau’s case, better called individual 
property. When Rousseau states, in On the Social Contract, that through the social contract 
man “gains…civil freedom and property in everything he possesses”563, then Rousseau ties 
the historical institution of individual property unmistakably to the newly instituted civil 
freedom.564 That Rousseau subsequently warns that individual property can lead to growing 
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inequality, that laws often only support the propertied and not the propertyless, and that it 
is therefore important that everyone owns something, nobody nothing, and that the right 
of the individual to his property (e.g. ground) is always subordinated to the right of the 
community,565 does not annul the ruling of the principle. His efforts to limit the reign of 
property fall into a similar category as Hegel’s material rights: they are to ensure an 
egalitarian principle against a mechanism that tends to lead to social inequality. 
For Marx, it is only with the realisation of political emancipation and ‘man’s right to 
private property’566 that private property has reached its true power. When he argues that 
“[t]he property qualification for the suffrage is the last political form of giving recognition to 
private property”567, before it was politically annulled, which for Marx means that it was 
given properly free reign over man. “[M]an…was not freed from property, he received 
freedom to own property”.568 Whilst Rousseau accepts individual property as one of the 
historical conditions that brought about civil society, and thereby builds the foundation on 
which the social contract is entered, Marx understands true democracy and human 
emancipation to imply – besides the overcoming of the separation of political state and 
civil society – the proper abolition of the modern institution of private property.569  
This tension between Rousseau and Marx regarding their respective stances on 
private property prefigures another fundamental difference, which concerns their 
respective notions of civil society and its present and future role in the social form as a 
whole. It is on this point where I want to argue that the inversion of the Hegelian inversion 
of subject and predicate from the ‘Critique’, and ‘the reduction of the human world and 
relationships to man himself’ from ‘On the Jewish Question’, stand in a significantly 
different relationship to Rousseau, which we should not overlook, and instead explicate as 
carefully as possible.  
In the ‘Critique’, Marx shows how previous historical models of monarchy, 
democracy, and aristocracy in feudalism, the ancient Greek polis, or Asiatic despotism, all 
differed from the democratic republic, in that they presupposed a “substantive unity 
                                                
565 See ibid., 176–178 [45–53]. 
566 Marx 2010, 163 [364]. 
567 Ibid., 153 [354]. 
568 Ibid., 167 [369]. 
569 See also Behre 2004, 189. 
 134 
between people and state”570. Whilst Marx does not advocate returning to any of those 
state forms, his own notion of democracy as the ‘truth’ of all forms of state implies the 
overcoming of the existing ‘untruth’ of the abstract dualism between political state and civil 
society, through the institution of a new form of such a substantive unity and a 
transference of power from the state to the people.571 That Marx calls democracy the ‘truth’, 
‘essence’, or even “solution to the riddle of every constitution” is an indicator of the extent 
to which he remains dedicated to the aim of reversing Hegel’s affirmation of the ‘true’, 
rational state that equals the “existing untruth” of the anti-popular sovereignty of the God-
like democratic constitutional state.572 
The first step towards Marx’s vision of such a new unity as true democracy in the 
‘Critique’ – or radical democracy, as it is often referred to – would be to reject the existence 
of the constitution separate from the people, ruling above them. Instead, he wants to make 
the fact that ‘democracy proceeds from man’ reality. That means that the people make the 
constitution themselves, as their own creation and establish popular sovereignty, and that 
civil society would be the real political society, making the legislature, as a special 
representative body, superfluous. The man of civil society, who was so far merely the 
object of the constitution, unconsciously subjected to its rule, thereby becomes the 
conscious enactor of political change and, potentially, progress. From then on, the rational, 
self-conscious will of the people is the source of the people’s self-determination, and it 
wholly intersects with the formally and materially determined species-will [Gattungswille]. 
The people are simultaneously the subject, that realises its species-will in the constitution, 
and the constitutions’ object that is ruled by it, subjected to its laws.573 
In democracy no moment acquires a meaning other than what is proper to it. Each is 
really only a moment of the demos as a whole.574 
Further, in the ‘Critique’ Marx advocates universal suffrage as a crucial demand that 
could achieve radical democracy, because it has the ability to force the political state, which 
is based on abstraction and thus on restricted suffrage, towards its dissolution [Auflösung] 
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from within its own representative instruments. 
What is crucial is the extension and the greatest possible universalization of the vote, 
i.e. of both active and passive suffrage. … Only when civil society has achieved 
unrestricted active and passive suffrage has it really raised itself to the point of 
abstraction from itself, to the political existence, which constitutes its true, universal, 
essential existence. But the perfection of this abstraction is also its transcendence 
[Aufhebung].575 
If suffrage becomes truly universal and the whole demos has entered the political state, its 
political existence is no longer its illusory authentic existence, but it has become fully 
realised and thereby marginalises the bourgeois existence into an inessentiality. The 
abstraction of the political state rests upon the people’s exclusion from it, in the name of 
protecting its objective determination from a mere subjective determination by their 
opinions. Against that background, universal suffrage is at the same time the dissolution of 
the political state, in the sense that the people’s invasion into it achieve its radical 
incompletion, and the establishment of civil society’s political existence that has as its 
consequence “the dissolution of civil society”576 as it existed before.577  
In his portrayal of Marx’s concept of true democracy, Robert Fine is sceptical over 
whether Marx manages to avoid the trap of his own methodological approach. The 
problem here is that Marx’s inversion critique of Hegel posits ‘real man’ or ‘real civil 
society’ against the state endowing him thereby with the ability to dissolve the entire 
modern political form, of which he himself is a product. Fine worries that Marx ends up 
“mirroring the unrealism of the society it seeks to overcome”578, implying that Hegel might 
have good reason for instituting an instance of objective knowledge above civil society, 
which we discussed in more detail in 3.4.2. But Fine himself wonders whether this 
inversion approach is indeed representative of the early Marx’s method.579 And in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’, Marx in turn admits that the man of civil society, instituted as the 
sovereign of political democracy, is the very problem of the democratic form. 
Political democracy is Christian since in it man, not merely one man but every man, 
ranks as sovereign, as the highest being, but it is man in his uncivilised, unsocial form, 
man in his fortuitous existence, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted by 
the whole organisation of our society, who has lost himself, been alienated, and 
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handed over to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements – in short, man who is 
not yet a real species-being.580 
Thus, there is a difference between the ‘Critique’ and ‘On the Jewish Question’ regarding 
the problematisation of civil society itself. Whereas in the ‘Critique’, ‘man’ of civil society 
can serve as the basis for instituting true democracy against the state, in ‘On the Jewish 
Question’, it is the force that itself dominates the state and that therefore needs to undergo 
a transformation as well. That does not mean that Marx renounces in the latter text his 
trust in the people’s constitutive power or popular sovereignty, but he is more careful not 
to set the man of civil society as the simple truth of the new order of human emancipation. 
Because man is just as much the product of the civil-bourgeois social structure as ‘political 
man’ or the citizen, and it is thus not enough for him to just rise above the state and 
dominate the latter as opposed to being dominated by it. On this basis, Marx drops the 
idea of universal suffrage as a revolutionary strategy in ‘On the Jewish Question’, and 
substantially distances himself from his theoretical and political position in the ‘Critique’. 
This is one way in which the shift between the two texts needs to be read, namely as the 
firming-up of Marx’s opposition to any form of politicism with a political revolution that 
revolves around the state – be it Jacobinism, or more relevant here, the invasion of popular 
sovereignty or ‘constitutive power’ into the state, which we could call Marx’s Rousseauism 
of the ‘Critique’.  
It is in the ‘Critical Notes’ that Marx clarifies the fundamental difference between a 
political and a social revolution – defending the latter against Ruge’s criticism of the 
Silesian weavers’ uprising as lacking in political spirit. Against Ruge’s republican vision of 
emancipation, his demand for “a social revolution with a political soul”581, Marx holds that 
‘will’ – the principle of politics – and the overturning of state forms might help to put an 
end to the “isolation from the state and from power” of “the classes with no political 
power”, but it cannot put an end to man’s “dehumanised life” [das entmenschte Leben].582 
Ruge’s phrase is therefore “either a composite piece of nonsense” or “nothing but a 
paraphrase of what is usually called a ‘political revolution’ or a ‘revolution pure and 
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simple’”.583 Marx clarifies here something that he left ambiguous at times in ‘On the Jewish 
Question’: he concedes that “every revolution dissolves the old order of society; to that 
extent it is social. Every revolution brings down the old ruling power; to that extent it is 
political”584. But for a revolution to be truly social and leave the area of universalising 
pretension it ultimately needs to “throw its political mask aside”585. That does not mean 
that it does not need to act politically, but it means that its ultimate purpose, the purpose of 
its organising activity, needs to be directed at “the point of view of the particular, real 
individual”586 that is nobody else than “man himself”587.  
We can see this viewpoint manifest in the fact that in ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx 
drops the differentiation between democratic republic and true democracy altogether. He 
explicitly equates the former with realised political emancipation, whilst true democracy is 
replaced by ‘human emancipation’. Marx enters into his brief attempt at defining what he 
means by ‘human emancipation’ by, first of all, affirming what is true for all forms of 
emancipation, namely religious, political and human emancipation: 
All emancipation is the reduction of the human world and relationships to man 
himself.588 
Bauer’s attempt to combine religious and political emancipation led to a rigorist reduction 
of man to himself, his self-determined emptying out of his particular religious believes, 
which, however, Marx argued, misunderstood the real conditions in which man already 
existed. In the case of political emancipation, “the reduction…to man himself” was “the 
[historical] reduction of man, on the one hand, to the member of civil society, the egoistic, 
independent individual, and, on the other, to the citizen, the moral person.”589 Reduction is 
here separation, diremption, scission (and we could find many more words that Marx uses 
to describe this process) of man into the bourgeois and the citoyen, social and political man, 
who lives simultaneously in earth and heaven, civil society and the state: whilst man’s 
material freedom and equality is determined on earth, his political freedom and equality is 
determined in heaven. The former is man’s depoliticised profane everyday life, the latter his 
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republican political fiction, but a lived fiction with very real effects on man’s life as a whole 
(as opposed to purely illusory and supposed to be realised).590 That means that the question 
of emancipation, as it is framed in ‘On the Jewish Question’, is primarily the question of 
which or what kind of man he is reduced to qua practico-historical, social determinations. 
‘Man’, for which Marx also uses the Feuerbachian category of the species-being, is then, as 
he argues in a letter to Feuerbach from August 1844 as well as in the subsequently written 
‘Theses on Feuerbach’, “nothing else than the concept of society” 591 . Society as a 
historically specific totality is the structure that makes ‘man’ into who he or she is. 
The essence of ‘human emancipation’ is then given as the task of overcoming the 
reduction performed by political emancipation and the realisation of a different kind of 
reduction, namely to a different ‘man’ based on the creation of a new unity between man 
and citizen, i.e. on a new social bond. A task that differs substantially from having 
politically-emancipated man enter the state and assert himself as sovereign-subject in the 
name of the real (man, material existence) against the abstract illusion (state, constitution). 
Marx defines human emancipation as follows: 
Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as 
an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his 
particular work, and in his particular situation [Verhältnissen], only when man has 
recognised and organised his forces propres [own powers] as social powers, and 
consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political 
power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.592 
Before we enter into a more general interpretation of this definition, we need to return to 
the question – despite the previously identified differences between Marx and Rousseau 
and Marx’s turn against ‘true democracy’ as the right emancipatory means in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’ – of whether human emancipation can or should nevertheless be read as 
a ‘reversal’ of the Hegelian separation of civil society and state into a Rousseauian, and thus 
pre-Hegelian, unity of the two, or whether the basis for defining human emancipation 
contains elements that resist such an interpretation? If Rousseau is not the key to 
interpreting Marx’s emancipatory process, maybe it is nevertheless the key to the 
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emancipatory goal?  
One way to deal with this question, which we can find in Colletti, would be to refer 
back to Marx’s alignment with Rousseau on the question of popular sovereignty from the 
‘Critique’ that I sketched out above, and understand it thereby as settled: of course, for 
Marx the goal is the same unity that Rousseau advocated as part of the social contract.593 
Such a quick subsumption has been performed by well-meaning Marx interpreters as well 
as by those who were rather happy to be able to dismiss Marx’s unification of individual 
man with his species-essence in the name of an organicist, totalitarian overriding of the 
individual by the whole, of which someone like Benjamin Constant had accused Rousseau 
already early on.594 But the textual evidence that we find in ‘On the Jewish Question’ stands 
in the way of such an easy subsumption.  
First of all, Marx ventures into an explicit critique, when he states that Rousseau 
“correctly describes the abstract idea of political man”595, immediately before he moves on 
to his own definition of human emancipation.596 Marx cites Rousseau: 
 He who dares to undertake to establish a people’s institution must feel that he is 
capable of changing, so to speak, human nature; of transforming each individual, 
who by himself is a complete and solitary whole, into a part of a great whole from 
which that individual receives as it were his life and his being; of weakening man’s 
constitution in order to reinforce it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for 
the physical and independent existence we have all received from nature. In a word, 
it is necessary for him to take away man’s own forces in order to give him forces 
which are foreign to him and of which he cannot make us without the help of 
others.597 
By letting this long citation from one of the core chapters of On the Social Contract stand 
without any explicitly interpretative commentary, Marx leaves it entirely to us to spell out 
what he wants to say with it.  
Meanwhile, the two interpreters who have seriously taken on the relationship 
between Marx and Rousseau, Colletti and Galvano Della Volpe, have both been quick to 
dismiss Marx’s implied criticism of Rousseau. Colletti comments that Marx remained 
embarrassingly unaware of his debt to Rousseau, and instead even dared to 
“misinterpret…a fundamental passage from the contract”, although ‘On the Jewish 
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Question’ is “literally inconceivable without Rousseau”598. In Colletti’s view, Hegel’s very 
dominant reading of Rousseau is to blame for Marx’s distorted view of Rousseau and of his 
own debt to him. Della Volpe basically agrees that Marx’s hasty citation misses that the 
paragraph he cites contains much more than he gives Rousseau credit for. Della Volpe is 
thereby however no less critical of the social contract than Hegel, but he sees in Rousseau’s 
Second Discourse “a specific anti-levelling egalitarianism” that he understands to build the 
crucial element of Marx’s democratic socialism.599 
In it, it is entirely clear that it is Rousseau’s effort to integrate the homme naturel or 
the abstractly independent individual into the social body and to achieve this by 
making the individual as a whole, i.e. the singular natural individual….into the partial 
individual, that equals the Citoyen or the Homme à l’état civil or simply the homme social. 
… This certainly does not stand opposed to the fact that Rousseau’s democratic 
(egalitarian) spirit reappears in the antibourgeois and socialist concluding paragraph 
of The Jewish Question, whereby ‘the social emancipation of the Jew is the 
emancipation of society from Judaism’, i.e. from the Jew’s class egoism.600 
Della Volpe confirms here Colletti’s criticism of Marx that he simply misread Rousseau 
(but a different Rousseau than the one Colletti refers to), even though, in Della Volpe’s 
view, Rousseau implicitly said just what Marx put himself into different words a few 
sentences later. For Della Volpe, it is thus: Rousseau’s democratic egalitarian spirit = 
Marx’s social emancipation (which Marx uses interchangeably with human emancipation) = 
the emancipation of society from ‘Judaism’ (a synecdoche for the material and spiritual 
domination of civil society within the civil-bourgeois society, as argued in 3.2 and 3.3).  
The problem is that neither Colletti nor Della Volpe have spent enough time on 
the analysis of the final section of the first part of ‘On the Jewish Question’ to take into 
account the whole complexity of Marx’s critique of Rousseau, which in turn causes them to 
judge Marx’s interpretation somewhat prematurely. 601  In a very obvious sense, which 
Colletti and Della Volpe however ignore, Marx’s reference to Rousseau at this point in the 
text appears to be strikingly misplaced: because Rousseau’s notion of civil society is 
fundamentally at odds with Marx’s own use of the concept, which implies its specifically 
modern separation from the state and the doubling of man and citizen. It is true that 
Rousseau and Marx do agree on fundamental elements of modern civil society, namely that 
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it is driven by justice and the ability to utilise reason, instead of acting merely on natural 
drives. They would also agree that this implies the gain of a new form of freedom, which 
Rousseau calls civil freedom and Marx would probably call bourgeois freedom, that is, 
however, a double-edged sword in the sense that this new form of freedom does not come 
without a price, i.e. it is only possible on the ground of giving up a former, different type of 
freedom.602 Both Rousseau and Marx agree on a basic level that the new form of freedom 
that has been reached by civil society is progress or at least inevitable in order to preserve 
the existence of the species, or ‘genre-humain’ in Rousseau’s terminology, under new 
socio-political circumstances.603  
But their conception of what civil society is, how it changed human existence vis-à-
vis man’s previous existence, and how it relates to the state, is fundamentally discordant. 
First of all, for Rousseau, the man of civil society has replaced ‘natural man’. Natural man 
was the human individual that had no social bonds, and whose freedom was constituted via 
his absolute autarky and original, natural independence regarding his self-preservation.604 
Men, in that sense, are naturally or physically unequal, but because they do not have social 
bonds that bring these inequalities in relation and comparison with each other,605 they do 
not suffer from inequality. Natural man is ‘naturally’ free because independent from other 
men. Man’s entrance into civil society, his acquisition of property and of rights and the 
becoming necessary of cooperative work and the division of labour,606 was, in Rousseau’s 
view, his loss of this natural freedom, because man lost his independence and developed 
new needs. Thus, all the efforts to create a political institution, a state with sovereign power 
and laws, that could navigate man’s new social dependency, is, in Rousseau’s conception, 
dedicated to guaranteeing man’s freedom as it was naturally given to him, despite the new 
enchaining social circumstances. It is in this sense that Rousseau posits a ‘natural right’ as 
the critical instance or limit of positive right in the new civil society. Besides the natural right 
that he holds up, he, however, accedes that civil society and savage society are two 
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fundamentally different social forms, with two fundamentally different human species.607 
That, on the other hand, means that civil society, in Rousseau’s use, is synonymous with 
political society. Civil society is the society of the état civil and the homme civil or citoyen that 
is opposed to the previous état de nature and the savage.608 The citizen is a paradoxical being, 
as we discussed earlier, in the sense that he comprises his particular will and the general will 
within himself, which bears the danger of degeneracy. 609  Further, the citizen is 
simultaneously subject (that has to obey the laws of the state) and sovereign.610 All in all, 
that leads us to conclude that Rousseau’s civil society, with the citoyen as the single, but 
paradoxical unity, is not the one referred to by Hegel and Marx (see 3.4.2). For Hegel and 
Marx, civil society exists in separation and opposition to the state, and the bourgeois is 
separated from the citoyen. Besides, Marx had already clarified at length in the ‘Critique’ 
that the example of the Greek polis with its unity of private and public man, which is very 
close to Rousseau’s model, was not a viable solution to the modern problem of 
emancipation.611  
Why, under these circumstances, does Marx nevertheless refer – critically – to 
Rousseau’s notion of political man as the modern abstraction par excellence? Was it not 
obvious to him that the ‘Rousseauian problem complex’612 concerning civil society had 
been exhausted by the Declarations and the bourgeois revolutions, by the institution of the 
separation? In one sense, I do think that the lack of elaboration of the citation owes to the 
hasty, polemical style of the whole of ‘On the Jewish Question’. But despite this 
unfortunate absence, we can discern a perfectly good reason for Marx to criticise Rousseau 
at this point, because it allows him to point to another dimension of the limit of political 
emancipation that Rousseau, with his extreme historical foresight, captured very accurately, 
thereby transcending the outcomes of the bourgeois revolutions. Marx cites Rousseau as 
saying:  
                                                
607 Rousseau 2014b, 115–117 [264–271]. 
608 See Rousseau 2008, 172 fn214. 
609 See Rousseau 2014a, 179 [55]; and Rousseau 2010, 319 fn3. 
610 See Rousseau 2014a, 233 [205]; also Rousseau 2010, 324 fn4. 
611 See Marx 1975b, 90–91 [233]. 
612 Della Volpe 1978, 62. 
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Whoever dares undertake to establish a people’s institutions…has to take from man 
his powers [forces propres], and give him in exchange alien powers which he cannot 
employ without the help of other men.613  
We have already spent a great deal of time emphasising Marx’s fundamental insight from 
‘On the Jewish Question’ that the man of civil society has been created as an atomistic, 
self-interested egoistic individual, who is structurally cut off from the sphere of political 
universality and collective belonging.614 In this context, Marx juxtaposes Rousseau’s pre-
revolutionary notion of citizen-man, who cannot employ his powers without the help of 
other men, to the post-revolutionary and Hegelian notion of the man that emerged from 
the political, bourgeois revolution, who is, on the one hand, properly individualized, i.e. 
politically reduced ‘to man himself’, whilst he simultaneously remains in the exact same 
position as Rousseau’s political man: despite his individualization and emancipation from 
the feudal fetters, his powers have in fact not been returned to him, instead a political state 
holds them for him over him, in the form of an ideology. The citizen, who is separated 
from the bourgeois, receives the ‘moral, partial existence’ that Rousseau describes, but not 
because this guarantees the unity of man with his political powers adequate to the modern 
conditions, as Rousseau argued, but as an ideology that itself depends on and ensures the 
modern existence of man, as split into bourgeois and citizen. If we do not want to impute 
to Marx that he mistook Rousseau’s notion of civil society for the Hegelian one with which 
he otherwise operates, and which I think is unlikely, then this is the only defensible 
interpretation.  
 We can, therefore, conclude this section by asserting that neither the process of 
overcoming political emancipation, nor the concept of human emancipation, as the 
formulation of a goal, can be identified as straight-forwardly Rousseauian, due to the many 
divergences that we identified between Marx’s and Rousseau’s theories. That does not 
mean that Marx was not influenced and inspired by Rousseau, which is undeniably the case 
in both texts, the ‘Critique’ and ‘On the Jewish Question’, but it is to affirm that ultimately, 
Marx’s conception of emancipation leads beyond Rousseau. Most importantly, with the 
concept of human emancipation Marx ends up rejecting both Hegel’s and Rousseau’s 
theories of legitimising state power – whether in the name of the strong, ethical state, 
                                                
613 Rousseau cited in Marx 2010, 167-168 [370], amended trans. 
614 See ibid., 163-164 [366–367]. 
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which mediates the aberrations of self-interest of modern, civil society, or in the name of 
the state that makes man into its subject and sovereign and thereby unifies individual and 
state, which can be regarded as the basis for Marx’s notion of true democracy in the 
‘Critique’.  
4.2   From a materialist concept of social totality to human emancipation qua 
revolution: against Hegel and Rousseau 
In ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx shifts to a different basis for his critique of political 
power, which leads him to conclude that the modern, bourgeois condition can only be 
overcome by a transformation of the entire social order, which needs a second revolution. 
The option of invading the state with the whole of the people in the name of what they 
really are and want has been replaced by advocacy for a social revolution that is to follow 
on from the French revolution, which for Marx completed the social form that he refers to 
as ‘political emancipation’.  
Political emancipation is, of course a big step forward. True, it is not the final form 
of human emancipation in general, but it is the final form of human emancipation 
within the hitherto existing world order. It goes without saying that we are speaking 
here of real, practical emancipation.615 
Political emancipation is the final form of emancipation within the current world order. At 
the same time, it defines the constraints of Bauer’s solution to the ‘Jewish Question’, to the 
extent that he believed in the possibility of a ‘free humanity’ once all religion had been 
renounced. The true human emancipation Marx aims for is, however, only possible by 
overcoming this world order. That is because the order itself, marked by the fictional 
sovereignty of political power and the real power of civil society – in the shape of egoistic 
individual interests or “the power of money”, as Marx emphasises in the second part of 
‘On the Jewish Question’ – has the ability to hamstring human emancipatory efforts, 
reducing them to mere political emancipation. It thereby stabilises political emancipation’s 
disemancipatory tendencies. 
That means we end up having to take absolutely seriously Marx’s affirmation in 
‘On the Jewish Question’ that the modern separation of state and civil society, as the core 
characteristic of political emancipation, is to be considered progress, but needs to be 
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overturned by a second revolution aiming at human emancipation. By ‘taking seriously’ I 
mean that we need to interrogate human emancipation as a revolutionary concept in its 
own right. Human emancipation can neither be reduced to Marx’s theorisations in the 
‘Critique’ (or the writings that follow on from ‘On the Jewish Question’) nor to the 
conceptions of any of Marx’s predecessors or contemporaries, be it Rousseau, Bauer or 
Feuerbach, even though Marx shares several theoretical elements with them. It is in this 
regard that Della Volpe’s argument about the continuity between Marx and Rousseau in 
the name of a shared “egalitarian and anti-levelling democratic conception of the person”616 
– from which he extrapolates a more general continuity between existing democracies and 
democratic socialism – is ultimately unpersuasive. The problem is not that Marx is not 
doing justice to the profound inspiration he received from Rousseau, as Della Volpe 
contends, because, in the Italian philosopher’s view, this inspiration got drowned in Marx’s 
“obsession with social revolution”. In his mind it causes Marx to ignore that political and 
social freedom need to go together. 617  And whilst Della Volpe even acknowledges 
Rousseau’s limited (because ultimately bourgeois) conception of the relation between the 
individual and the general will or the ‘whole’, he sees the problem only in Rousseau’s 
treatment of the individual as superior to the whole (just like Hegel), thereby failing to see 
that Marx is just as concerned with the political domination of the whole over the 
individual. The latter is not merely a totalitarian problem, but just as much a condition of a 
political democracy, be it socialist or otherwise.  
 The question that we therefore need to answer now, and which, as we will see in 
the second part of this thesis, has today become almost impossible to ask because of 
immense historical-ideological blockages, is what Marx’s concept of human emancipation 
qua revolution implies in terms of the characteristics it devises for this revolution. The 
more common reaction to this identification is indeed the one expressed by Koselleck and 
Grass, when they dismissively acknowledge that Marx “repeatedly supplanted the use of 
emancipation in favour of revolution”618. But the argument of this thesis is that Marx did 
not only do so repeatedly, but conclusively and decidedly, and that he had good reasons to 
                                                
616 Della Volpe 1970, 105. 
617 Della Volpe 1978, 105–106, 116. 
618 Grass and Koselleck 1997, 176; my trans. 
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do so, which we need to understand. So, what does Marx tell us about this second, social 
revolution?  
First of all, in ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx does not tell us very much; but that 
does not mean that we cannot infer elements of his understanding of this social revolution, 
even if that might mean that we just take seriously what he does not say.619 We can first of 
all infer from his definition of ‘human emancipation’ that it refers to a profound social 
transformation, which is most likely going to be the outcome of a long-term process. That 
means, we can read human emancipation in parallel to how Marx conceives of the French 
Revolution, with which he refers to the entire process that led to ‘political emancipation’ – 
a process which, as Hobsbawm puts it, is “measured in centuries” 620  – rather than 
confining it to the immediate events of 1789 and the following years (see 3.2). It is in the 
same way that political emancipation replaced feudalism621 that human emancipation will 
replace political emancipation. In this regard, Marx relies on a universal concept of history 
as world history that mirrors the accounts of Hegel and Bauer. As the emergence and 
global assertion of political emancipation was the event of their most immediate history, the 
criticism of political emancipation and its transformation into human emancipation was for 
Marx “the general question of the time” in the sense of the necessary next step.622 As for 
Hegel and Bauer, also for Marx the progression to political and then to human 
emancipation would affect humanity as a whole, and was felt as urgent, as unavoidable, due 
to the miserable situation they all lived in.623 
 Secondly, Marx grounds the necessity of human emancipation carefully on his 
identification of the ‘limit point’ [referred to as Grenze and Schranke by Marx] of political 
                                                
619 This is important to emphasise, as several interpreters including Koselleck and Grass are quick to conflate 
various elements of Marx’s later theory with his identification of human emancipation = revolution. 
620 Hobsbawm 1985, 559, see also 558. 
621 As implied in the previous chapter, Marx’s understanding of the regime that replaces feudalism will change 
later in his life, when he understands it to be determined by the political-economical introduction of the 
capital-labour antagonism (which we today refer to as ‘capitalism’), rather than by new forms of political 
representation. However, as shown in Chapter Three, political emancipation itself is not a purely political 
concept for Marx. It is in this regard that I simultaneously agree and disagree with Balakrishnan’s major re-
evaluation of the difference between the young and the later Marx: whilst he is certainly right to distinguish 
Marx’s earlier concept of politics to his later understanding of political economy, his understanding of the 
early Marx and of ‘political emancipation’ is too indebted to the Althusserian reading. See Balakrishnan 2014, 
esp. p.121; Balakrishnan 2015. 
622 Marx 2010, 149 [350]; see also Grass and Koselleck 1997, pp.169. 
623 See also Scheidler 1973 [1840], whose dictionary entry on ‘Emancipation’ from 1840 shows a very strong 
historical-philosophical dimension, but who is much more Kantian in his definition of emancipation than 
either Bauer or Marx. See also Ma ̈der 2010, 28. 
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emancipation. He leaves no doubt that he has identified this limit-point when he argues 
that political emancipation ‘is the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto 
existing world order’. His identification of a limit-point of political emancipation means 
nothing else than that Marx thinks he has arrived at a structural account of civil-bourgeois 
society as a totality. You cannot define limits if you do not know what constitutes the 
inside of those limits, even if that whole works in a contingent, rather than fully determined, 
way. And this is the second, fundamental element of my argument about Marx’s concept of 
human emancipation as revolution: for Marx, you cannot identify the process that should 
bring about human emancipation without precisely defining the different elements that 
make up the social totality that require to be overcome. In other words, the concept of 
emancipation as revolution depends on a careful identification of the key structural 
elements and their ways of taking effect on the social form as a whole that need to be 
overcome, which makes it worthwhile to summarise the key terms of these elements as 
identified at length in Chapter Three here, before developing the implications for human 
emancipation. 
One element that makes up the civil-bourgeois social structure is the historically 
specific mediation of the republican-democratic state – also defined as the state as such. It is 
the entire state-centred political power complex that erects the very ideology that covers up 
the existence of the social individual, which is then put to work for the principles of civil 
society, by giving it an illusory existence in the political sphere, and depoliticising man’s 
everyday life. The political state presupposes the separation that is constitutive of the limit 
of political emancipation because it can either subordinate or elevate the individual over his 
social existence, but it cannot unite them.624 Marx thereby cuts himself off from the history 
of political philosophy that aims to legitimise political power (e.g. in the name of the chains 
in which Rousseau finds the modern individual, or of Hegel’s objective knowledge that sits 
in the rational state), in that he “questions political power as a historically specific form of 
the organisation of society” 625, thereby opening up the possibility of putting an end to its 
                                                
624 See Maihofer 1992, 100. 
625 Ibid., 102; my trans. This is absolutely congruent with Marx’s affirmations in the 6th and 7th Theses on 
Feuerbach: “that the abstract individual…belongs to a particular social form”; and therefore man is in its 
reality “the ensemble of the social relations”. (Marx 1998, 570–571.) 
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modern form – which, we should note in anticipation of Balibar’s critique that will be 
explicated in Chapter Six, is not the same as putting an end to politics altogether. The state 
is not only an illusory sovereignty, the heaven to which the man of civil society prays for 
his political emancipation, but it is thereby a very real, material institution that manifests as 
“an irreducible relation of domination”626 in the post-revolutionary social form. 
The other element that Marx identifies as needing to be overcome is the spiritual and 
material constitution of man’s life within civil society. Marx develops this element on the 
one hand through his critique of the Declarations and Bills of Right, but also in the entire 
second part of ‘On the Jewish Question’, unfortunately reproducing the anti-Judaic 
language that Bauer and many other commentators on the ‘Jewish Question’ at the time 
had used before him.627 The mediations of human life in civil society are material (practical 
need, self-interest, huckstering, and money) 628  as well as spiritual or ideological (the 
liberalism that grounds the ‘rights of man’). In civil society and in his everyday activity, man 
participates in his own self-alienation “by putting his products, and his activity, under the 
domination of an alien being, and bestowing the significance of an alien entity – money – 
on them”629. What Marx points to here is something that is not subsumed by the inversion 
thesis that he applied to criticise Hegel in the ‘Critique’: it is now no longer a false subject, 
namely the ideal state, that dominates real man, but it is real man himself who engages in 
practices that distance him from being the social individual Marx argues he should be (we 
will return to this in 4.3). Thus, Marx understands at this point that the material and 
spiritual practice man engages in has its own universalising effects that are not independent 
from the existence of the political state, but certainly autonomous from it, in the sense that 
they depend on their own mediations, or abstractions, that are not reducible to the ones 
emerging from the political state. Marx concludes thus: 
                                                
626 Blechman and Breaugh 2011, xvii. 
627 See Fine 2006, where he argues that this rhetoric was Marx’s way of ironising Bauer’s anti-Judaic rhetoric 
rather than meant seriously. I am however not content to redeem Marx as easily as Fine does, because, after 
all, his supposedly ironising speech is all too purposefully following a goal that implies the abolition of 
Judaism. Instead, I want to refer to Wendy Brown’s in my eyes extremely pertinent comment on how to deal 
with Marx’s anti-Judaic speech (which she equates with anti-Semitism, which is in my eyes the only problem 
of her comment). See Brown 1997, 91–92, fn10. But we will return to this issue in 4.3. 
628 See Marx 2010, 169-170 [372]. Carlebach refers to the slightly unclear influence of Moses Hess’ essay On 
the Essence of Money on Marx’s second part of ‘On the Jewish Question’. He states that it remains unclear 
whether Marx has indeed seen the essay before he wrote ‘On the Jewish Question’. See Carlebach 1978, 110–
111. 
629 Marx 2010, 174 [376–377]. 
 149 
Emancipation from huckstering and money, consequently from practical, real 
Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time. […] Once society has 
succeeded in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism – huckstering and its 
preconditions – the Jew will have become impossible, because his consciousness no 
longer has an object, because the subjective basis of Judaism, practical need, has been 
humanised, and because the conflict between man’s individual-sensuous existence 
and his species-existence has been abolished. The social emancipation of the Jew is 
the emancipation of society from Judaism.630 
Contrasted to the first part of ‘On the Jewish Question’, there seems to be an 
oscillation between Marx’s state-centred concept of society and of emancipation – whose 
prime object of critique is the state that gives rise to bourgeois ideology: “[Bauer’s] mistake 
lies in the fact that he subjects to criticism only the ‘Christian state’, not the ‘state as 
such’”631 – and an understanding in which civil society itself is the bearer of man’s self-
alienation, and thus also the locus of his self-emancipation. Hyppolite voices his 
reservations about a lack of rigour in Marx’s critique of 1843 and 1844 when he wonders if 
the contradiction between state and civil society is not only an expression of the 
contradictions inherent in civil society, as becomes apparent in The Communist Manifesto.632 
That would mean that Marx’s critique of the socio-economic mediations of civil society 
would ultimately replace his critique of the political mediations, and the second part of ‘On 
the Jewish Question’ would take precedence over the first. Alberto Toscano makes a 
similar (whilst more thoroughly spelled-out) suggestion when he argues that Marx’s overall 
aim, which he concisely formulates in the 4th Thesis on Feuerbach as the explanation of 
humanity’s self-alienation through “the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of [its] 
secular basis”633, is “to be conceived not in terms of the state but rather in those of ‘the 
entire hitherto existing mode of production and intercourse’.”634  
Although I agree with Toscano that, at the point of his early writings, Marx’s 
historical-materialist method has not been developed to the point that it could have 
captured the extent to which man’s social relations gave rise to religious phenomena,635 I 
want to emphasise the irreducible importance of ‘On the Jewish Question’: if we take the 
                                                
630 Ibid., 170, 174 [372, 377]. 
631 Ibid., 149 [350]; amended trans. 
632 See Hyppolite 1969, 123. 
633 Marx 1998, 573. 
634 Toscano 2010b, 13. 
635 See ibid., 14, 25. Toscano further argues: “it is also true that the ‘secular basis’ will increasingly come to 
signify the mode of production and social intercourse, and only secondarily the state-form.” (Ibid., 24–25.) 
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first and second part of the text together, it argues for a dialectical double determination of 
man’s life as simultaneously political and social. It posits a specificity of the post-
revolutionary social form that as much determines human life and the conditions of 
possibility of social change, as the on-going human existence determines the reproduction 
of the social form. Within the social form, the political state plays a role that is not 
reducible to the ‘economic base’, or that is entirely conditioned by the functioning of 
‘commodity fetishism’, even though the state exists as “a mere means, whose purpose is the 
life of civil society”636.  
 Now, in the context of seeking a definition of Marx’s concept of human 
emancipation qua revolution, the decisive next step would be to ask about a more precise, 
namely positive definition of the relationship between state and civil society that can help 
us to think of a strategy for how to overcome this double determination of civil-bourgeois 
society. But Marx does not give us a definitive answer. Of course, we learned that illusions 
(or more generally religiosity) are always an expression of a secular limit [weltliche Schranke], 
which means in turn that they need to be combatted by confronting the elements of the 
secular limit itself, rather than trying to rid oneself of the illusions in a direct sense. The 
secular limit is further constituted, as we just discussed, by “the nature of the state itself”637, 
whereas this same state is, later on in the text, defined as dominated by civil society. Does 
that now mean that one first needs to confront and abolish the state, as the institution that 
gives rise to illusions in the form of the republican ideology, or the nexus of liberalism and 
material individualised activity as found in civil society? The text, and here Hyppolite is 
right, does not give us a conclusive answer, because it does not at all engage with the 
strategic question of how to go about implementing the revolutionary processes that could 
lead to human emancipation. And this is certainly a blind spot that would need to be filled 
in order to reach a more specific concept of revolution; only a more precise and definitive 
conception of the interrelation of economic and political abstractions can allow a powerful 
strategy for their overcoming. But what is entirely clear from the lengthy treatment of 
political emancipation in ‘On the Jewish Question’ is that the definition of the social form 
                                                
636 Marx 2010, 164 [367]. 
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as a totality is the decisive condition in order to arrive at the process of its overcoming qua 
revolution. Even if Marx leaves the former slightly ambiguous, and if he does not provide 
us with a definitive definition of the latter (because he is more interested in revolution as 
long-term historical transformation, than in revolution as short-term political event at this 
point), he leaves us with a potentially productive starting point. We recognise here, in a 
positively defined sense, what transpired already in the previous section on Rousseau, 
namely that the definition of the social structure and its overcoming are intertwined in such 
a way that if Marx’s definition of the former diverges from Rousseau’s, then the latter must 
as well. 
 That leaves us to conclude, regarding the second characteristic of human 
emancipation qua revolution, that the revolutionary process is a historical concept, in so far 
as it depends on the correct identification of the existing historical conditions, which are 
nothing else than the totality of the social structure. This brings out an interesting relation 
between Marx and Bauer’s respective conceptions. Whilst Marx disagrees 
uncompromisingly with Bauer on the definition of the structural elements of the social 
form that makes up ‘political emancipation’, which is of primary importance, they 
nevertheless both insist on the possibility and necessity of rationally discerning and 
defining the social structure, which gives thought (or critique, as especially Bauer refers to 
it) a crucial role in the revolutionary process. 638  Because history, whilst a necessary 
condition for the revolution in terms of its definition and, as we will see in a moment, in 
terms of its emergence, does not automatically give rise to the revolutionary process, nor 
does it automatically define this process as break or progress. History holds the 
revolution’s elements, i.e. the possibility of a revolution depends on the historical 
conditions, but history does not necessarily give rise to any specific revolutionary goals or 
to a specific process of revolutionary events; it is not responsible for the revolution. For 
both Marx and Bauer the rational is no longer given by objective history, but instead it will 
need to be developed and posited against history’s actualisation in political emancipation, by 
breaking with it in the name of a different, truer aspect of that same history, called human 
                                                
638 See Moggach 2015, 179–181, who inscribes this alignment to a Fichtean Hegelianism as opposed to 
Feuerbach’s Spinozist Hegelianism, which emphasises substance as opposed to the intentional actions of a 
rationally thinking subject. 
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emancipation. Marx’s concept of revolution is conditioned by history, but it is not 
teleologically directed or indeed guaranteed in any way 639– because its conceptualisation is 
the task of the rational agents of the revolution, as we can see from the importance Marx 
confers onto the correct concept of political emancipation (which he argues Bauer is 
lacking) as the basis for even identifying human emancipation, let alone realising it.  
When we objected to Bauer earlier that he made self-consciousness into the 
instance that had to decide on the difference between history as actuality and history as the 
truth that needs to be actualised in the name of human emancipation (2.3), then we stand 
here at the same crossroad with Marx. Except that Marx does not talk about any agents or 
actors in ‘On the Jewish Question’, at least not directly.640 But we can once again infer 
some insights. On the one hand, philosophy or theory is indispensable as the instance of 
rationally conceiving of the secular limits of the current social form. But, in opposition to 
Bauer, Marx at this point does not demand from the individual with his rational capacity to 
affirm his universality against his particularities (e.g. religious beliefs), against the state, or 
against objective history more generally. Instead Marx understands the individuals 
themselves to be subjectivised into their individualised existences, which they cannot easily 
renounce, precisely because their existence is not a mere particularity, but itself part of a 
universality. That means that the revolution needs to replace one universal with another. 
The individuals need to rise up against the universal to which they are subjected and by 
which they are subjectivised – namely the civil-bourgeois social form – and initiate a 
revolution against it, whilst they themselves will be (self-)transformed as part of the 
revolution. Whilst philosophy lays the rational ground for the revolution, “real, practical 
                                                
639 See Ma ̈der 2010, 28–29; Lehmann 2011, 402–403. The only point in ‘On the Jewish Question’, where 
Marx gives the impression that human emancipation is the necessary continuation of political emancipation, is 
when he writes: “We recognise in Judaism, therefore, a general anti-social element of the present time, an element 
which through historical development - … - has been brought to its present high level, at which it must 
necessarily begin to disintegrate.” (2010, 170) In light of the final paragraph of the entire text, where Marx 
says “as soon as society succeeds to abolish…” (ibid., 174; amended trans.), we should read this “necessary” 
more as a political demand that will need to be realised by rational actors, rather than as an automatic 
development inscribed in history itself. 
640 Koselleck and Grass are not the only ones that jump quickly to the ‘Introduction’ and fill in the proletariat, 
which is certainly not wrong, as Marx still uses the concepts of political and universal, human emancipation in 
that text (see Grass and Koselleck 1997, 175). But it introduces a new problem into the discussion, which 
should not too quickly overlay the discussion in ‘On the Jewish Question’. See for a pronounced relation of 
the two texts the dictionary entry ‘Emancipation’ by Bensussan in the Dictionnaire critique du Vocabulaire du 
marxisme, Bensussan 2001, 382–384, and on the problem of the figure of the proletariat in the ‘Introduction’ 
Balibar’s essay in Citoyen Sujet, ‘Le moment messianique du Marx’, Balibar 2011, pp.243. 
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emancipation”641 is the real movement that realises it – and the two do not exist in a 
determinative relationship to each other. This is Marx’s indeterminate unity of theory and 
practice, in which the question of the political agents or revolutionaries remains a lacuna – 
which we keep purposefully open, instead of jumping to Marx’s subsequent texts in order 
to fill it with the figure of the ‘proletariat’.642 
 Finally, we come to discuss the last element of human emancipation as revolution, 
namely that it serves not only as a referent for the revolutionary process, but also, and 
crucially, as its goal.643 It is, at last, time to define positively what Marx might mean by ‘the 
reduction of man to himself’, beyond the superficial idea of returning sovereignty to man 
that Marx already discussed in the ‘Critique’. It certainly means the abolition of the civil-
bourgeois political and economic abstractions, which, however, does not mean that there 
cannot arise any new forms of political and economic mediation within the social form that 
Marx calls human emancipation. To define human emancipation as revolution certainly 
means primarily that such new forms of mediation will not be reached by radicalising the 
existing ones. Human emancipation as goal is the end point of civil-bourgeois society and 
the starting point of a new social form, which Marx at no point says will not have its own 
mediations and political conflicts, as many interpreters try to convince us, when they 
equate human emancipation with a state of perfect harmony, or total transparency,644 
captured by the religious notion of salvation.645 Instead, I would like to insist on paying 
attention to the text, in which the constitution of the new social form is not thematised – 
which also means that it is, whether intentionally or not, left open for the revolutionary 
movement to work out. What is, however, thematised is the goal of this social form: and 
that is the creation of the conditions in which man can exist as a ‘social individual’.  
 
                                                
641 Marx 2010, 155 [356]. 
642 See for such an attempt Lehmann’s definition of the revolutionary in Marx as the contingent double 
identity of man – philistine, in Lehmann 2011, 403–408. 
643 Koselleck argues that this is a common characteristic of modern political concepts, see Koselleck 2006, 
141. 
644 See e.g. Castoriadis 1998, 110. 
645 See Grass and Koselleck 1997, 174; Basso 2012, 181; I agree here with Kouvelakis 2005, 710. 
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4.3   From man as social individual to solving the ‘Jewish question’?  
Interpreting what Marx said, positively as well as critically, about the social individual in 
‘On the Jewish Question’646 will be the last interpretative step of this chapter before we will 
be able to conclude Section One. We already made the first steps in this direction in 4.1 
when we showed that the reduction that is the goal of human emancipation is framed as 
the negation of the prior, historical reductions of man, namely the feudal and the civil-
bourgeois one. That means that the task is to define an alternative social bond that implies 
a different ‘reduction’ or, we could say, a different definition of ‘man’ as the man of the 
future who has not yet existed. This is, if we will, the frequently invoked, but often 
overstated, ‘utopian’ element in Marx’s concept of human emancipation.647 It is however 
only in a very limited sense utopian because, even though man never existed in history in 
this new form, history holds it within itself – in this very limited sense, Marx, as well as 
Bauer, are still Hegelians. That is the case because, as argued above, the way Marx frames 
the final emancipatory reduction, it is thought as a re-opening of the closures that the civil-
bourgeois social form has performed on the revolutionary promise of freedom, or on 
man’s “capacity to become free”, as Bauer phrased it in his second text under Marx’s 
review. Man’s social and individual existence has been realised, but unfortunately in an 
antinomical form. But that means, once again, that the identification and politicisation of 
this limitation and of its overcoming are not a naturally or historically given, but they are a 
political act.  
I want to follow Moggach here and argue that Marx’s defence of a different type of 
freedom, in which man has his social and political powers united within himself and exists 
as an individual in harmony with his species, which I would like to call ‘social freedom’, is 
an “implicit ethic”648. Man’s existence should not be dominated by “alien abstractions”649 
implying that his individuation should not be generalised by a hegemonic socio-political 
form, man’s concrete individuality should not be reduced to some generic ‘man’ in order 
                                                
646 I am adopting the term ‘social individual’, which is not a term Marx uses in ‘On the Jewish Question’, 
from Jason Read and Luca Basso.  
647 See Koselleck 2006, 252, 261. 
648 Moggach 2015, 182. 
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for him to be able to become the subject of rights, and man should not be depoliticised.650 
Because all these different elements of domination give rise to alien abstractions – man’s 
religiosity – that tie humanity deeper into its domination, because it reproduces it in 
thought and in material life. Marx takes here an ethical stance, which, in the Holy Family, he 
calls “real humanism”651. Real humanism means, for Marx, self-determination, but self-
determination as non-autonomous, social individuals that are as much individuals as 
members of a species. That is only possible if man is fully conscious of his social and 
political powers, and can rationally decide how he exerts them in congruence with his 
fellow humans or in the context of “the networks that make up the life of the people”652. 
Human emancipation is the becoming re-united of real, individual man and abstract citizen, 
or of man’s social being with man’s political being; it means not to take away man’s own 
powers [forces propres] from him, as Rousseau and Hegel conceived of it in different ways, 
but to give them back to him, in a material sense, and with regard to man becoming 
conscious of his powers and how they are actually distributed in society (as opposed to 
what the Constitution says). 
But how should we exactly understand the becoming species-being of individual man, 
in the sense that it does seem to refer to an anthropological kernel of man? First of all, I 
agree with Luca Basso, when he outrightly rejects all interpretations that try to read 
organicism, the subsumption of the individual under the community, into this account of 
human emancipation. If anything is clear from the whole first part of ‘On the Jewish 
Question’, then it is Marx’s rejection of a force that subjects individual man to external 
domination and the overriding of his particular characteristics, beliefs, abilities and needs, a 
force that he mostly identifies with the state, but that I am confident to extend to any 
notion of community.653 Instead, Marx precisely posits human emancipation as a way of 
ending the individual’s illusory relationship to politics and the individual subsumption 
under the reign of civil society’s principles such as self-interest, private property, money. 
                                                
650 See Maihofer 1992, 96–97. 
651 Marx and Engels 1975, 15. 
652 Blechman and Breaugh 2011, xiii. 
653 See Basso 2012, 1, 28. 
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It is important to note in this context what Marx’s concept of ‘man’s own powers’ is. 
We already saw that he does not share Rousseau’s understanding of natural man as 
independent, self-sufficient and living in autarky. Instead man is a species-being – a 
concept Marx takes from Feuerbach and embeds into an explicitly historico-political 
context.654 And even though Marx’s species-being has conceptually very little to do with 
Feuerbach in terms of its derivation and definition, as I will discuss shortly, Marx 
nevertheless uses Feuerbachian language in a few places in ‘On the Jewish Question’, when 
he defines man’s existence in civil society as “sensuous, individual and immediate 
[nächsten]”655, which can give the impression that this might be his ‘true’ existence. But his 
life within the context of the modern civil society is not true either, because it has divorced 
him from his species existence, and made him live as if he was an atomistic individual. And 
this atomistic individual is, for Marx, the Christian notion of man that he wants to combat. 
We need to refer once again to this section from the text: 
Political democracy is Christian since in it man, not merely one man but every man, 
ranks as sovereign, as the highest being, but it is man in his uncivilised, unsocial form, 
man in his fortuitous existence, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted by 
the whole organisation of our society, who has lost himself, been alienated, and 
handed over to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements – in short, man who is 
not yet a real species-being.656 
Species-being therefore could refer to a transhistorical, metaphysical structure of man that 
implies certain “qualities, dispositions and characteristics”657, which are precisely denied or 
actively eliminated by the structure of civil society as emerged out of Christianity: Brown 
calls it an “ontological sociality”658. In the Holy Family Marx finds correcting words for what 
is implied when he speaks in ‘On the Jewish Question’ of the atomistic individual of civil 
society: 
Speaking exactly and in the prosaic sense, the members of civil society are not atoms. 
The specific property of the atom is that it has no properties and is therefore not 
connected with beings outside it by any relations determined by its own natural 
necessity. The atom has no needs, it is self-sufficient; the world outside it is absolute 
vacuum, i.e., it is contentless, senseless, meaningless, just because the atom has all its 
fullness in itself. The egotistic individual in civil society may in his non-sensuous 
imagination and life-less abstraction inflate himself to the size of an atom, i.e., to an 
                                                
654 See ibid., 27, 33. 
655 Marx 2010, 167 [370]; amended trans. 
656 Ibid., 159 [360]. 
657 Basso 2012, 26. 
658 Brown 1997, 105; see also Gould 1980, 105 on Marx’s social ontology. 
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unrelated, self-sufficient, wantless, absolutely full, blessed being. …It is … not the 
state that holds the atoms of civil society together, but the fact that they are atoms 
only in imagination, in the heaven of their fancy, but in reality beings tremendously 
different from atoms, in other words, not divine egoists, but egotistic human beings. 
Only political superstition today imagines that social life must be held together by the 
state whereas in reality the state, is held together by civil life.659  
On the one hand, Marx repeats here what he has affirmed time and time again in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’: that the primacy of politics and the rule of the state and its republican 
principles is a very effective ideology of the modern democratic republic, whilst it is really 
dominated by the profane life of civil society. But, Marx refers to a second contradiction, 
namely between man’s supposedly atomistic existence in civil society, where one man 
perceives every other man as a barrier, and his fundamental dependency on the other 
members of civil society on the level of “natural necessity … and interest”660, which is 
denied by the bourgeois way of life and by man’s image of himself. That means that the 
species-existence, i.e. an ontological relationality between human beings, is no less 
historically real than the atomistic existence, but in the structure of civil society the latter 
overrides the former. The outcome or “product” of the French Revolution is modern man 
who is ruled by the spiritual (ideological) and material power of atomism whilst he really 
depends on his fellow men: the man of civil society, the bourgeois, the man of democracy 
and of the secular principle has become ‘human nature’,661 but his ontological sociality rests 
within it in the form of a trace.  
Thus, even if Marx in the early writings, including ‘On the Jewish Question’, only 
conceives of man on the basis of his abstract human nature, and not on the basis of the 
practices that materialise and ‘class’ him, as Basso points out,662 his account of the French 
Revolution as the social transformation that successfully instituted the very structure of 
modern, split man – or of the ‘Bourgeois[ie]’ as Marx frames it in the ‘Critical Notes’663 – 
that allows for the subsequent capitalist subsumption of the individual, goes a long way. It 
should be rather regarded as lacking in specificity in attempting to define man’s historical 
                                                
659 Marx and Engels 1975, 162–163; my italics. 
660 Ibid., 162. 
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662 See Basso 2012, 22. 
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determination or ‘materialisation’ through his practices, instead of lacking this level of 
theorisation altogether. The aim of human emancipation is then to create socio-political 
conditions where man can return to his ‘essence’, i.e. to his ontological relationality that 
already exists as a condition for the ‘modern condition’ that is based on its ideological 
(=material) denial; in Basso’s words, in the post-revolutionary civil society “sociality and 
isolation mutually implicate one another”664. Marx has then simultaneously posited man’s 
species-being as constituting an ontological and thus transhistorical, as well as a historically 
concrete, reality of man, which he needs to be allowed to realise for himself instead of as a 
capacity that fuels man’s exploitation, as much as it is denied to man by his capitalist 
‘isolation’.665 Changing the socio-political conditions equals changing human nature, but in 
a way that recomposes man as the species-being, or “social individual” that he already is, 
albeit only in an unconscious, suppressed, and exploited form.  
The path between the two moments can only be opened up by a revolutionary 
transformation that is as all-encompassing of economic and political conditions, and in that 
sense repeats what Marx refers to under the label of the French Revolution, but with a 
different goal and starting from different conditions. That means – and this is significant, 
especially in light of a contemporary return to political anthropology, as we will for 
example see in Balibar in the next section – that Marx’s recourse to anthropology is not a 
relationship of merely unveiling or disclosing man’s hidden reality to him on the level of 
consciousness, in the way that Althusser describes Feuerbach’s method of inversion.666 
Neither does Marx believe in man’s anthropological essence, his species-existence, to be 
able to resist man’s civil-bourgeois individuation as some kind of resistant force. Nor is the 
Marx who writes ‘On the Jewish Question’ concerned with affirming man’s species 
existence over and against man’s particularities, such as his religious beliefs, or indeed, over 
and against his differences such as sexual difference.667 Man does not, as Bauer argues, need 
                                                
664 Basso 2012, 18.  
665 See Read 2011, pp.4. Read shows how Marx further deepens the historical dimension of his definition of 
individuation in civil-bourgeois society as isolation in the ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, in 
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666 See Althusser 2003, 94–112. 
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the early Marx as ‘abolitionist’. See Balakrishnan 2014, 106. 
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to overcome his alienated existence by means of emptying himself and becoming the man 
without properties who affirms his true genericity or universality.  
That, in turn, does not mean that Frank Ruda is wrong when he emphasises 
through his Badiouian reading of Marx’s notion of the proletariat that Marx’s concept of 
emancipation includes the need for dissolving, or losing, man [Ent-Wesung] in order to re-
constitute him based on a new social bond. But Marx’s aim is not to reconstitute man in 
the name of genericity and equality as Badiou and Ruda argue. 668  Instead, Marx is 
concerned with replacing man’s existence within one universal social form, namely civil-
bourgeois society, with another, following the aim of allowing man simultaneously an 
individual and social existence, without either side being dominated by the other. Marx’s 
ethical aim is the constitution of a different form of man’s existence in the name of human 
emancipation or social freedom – which depends on the determinate negation of the 
historically existing universalism that Marx called political emancipation. The recourse to 
Feuerbach’s category of species-being allows Marx to, on the one hand, reject the 
naturalised image of a liberal constitution of man as primarily individualised and expose it 
as historically determined,669 and, on the other, allows him to counter this image with that 
of the social individual, which he regards as a way for man to live a truly free life.670  
 Has this idea of freedom thereby left behind its Hegelian, and thus Christian, 
origins? Which implies the further question of whether it is still inscribed in a teleology that 
regards the Christian or, in Bauer’s case, a truly atheist freedom, superior to the idea of 
freedom inscribed in Judaism? I would argue yes and no. It has transcended its Christian 
origins in the sense that it rejects the ultimate recourse to the individual, which is 
predominant in Hegel, and in Bauer. But it does so by framing this new form of freedom 
as the final overcoming of the Judaism that returned in the figure of civil society, after 
Christianity had once before overcome it.671 When Breckman insists that Marx is more 
                                                
668 See Ruda 2010, 281. 
669 See Kouvelakis 2005, 709. 
670 Undoubtedly the definition of the new social form as well as that of the ‘social individual’ remain rather 
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671 See Marx 2010, 173 [376]. 
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bound up with the critique of Christianity than immediately apparent,672 it certainly speaks 
to this point. 
 What does this, however, mean for Marx’s solution for the ‘Jewish Question’? He 
argues early on in the text that “[o]nly the critique of political emancipation itself was the 
conclusive criticism of the Jewish question and its real merging in the ‘general question of 
the age’”673, by which he, however, refers to his own theoretical framing, which he deems 
necessary in order to properly grasp what this general question is. That means that Marx 
thinks it is possible to reach a conclusion, or solution to the ‘Jewish question’ that falls 
together with solving the ‘general question of the age’ by means of realising human 
emancipation.  
On the one hand, this approach seems to contain a certain naivety or even wilful 
ignorance, because his subsumption of the confessional religions under a more general 
religiosity of civil-bourgeois society implies that confessional religions will be dissolved 
together with the other types of religiosity or illusions, once the social revolution has been 
successful. Marx’s commitment is, after all, to end humanity’s domination from religion in 
all its forms.674 
He writes: 
Therefore, we explain the religious limitations [Befangenheit] of the free citizen by their 
secular limitations. We do not assert that they must overcome their religious 
narrowness [Beschränktheit] in order to get rid of their secular restrictions [Schranken], 
we assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their 
secular restrictions.675 
That the religious conflict can be reduced to the secular conflict means, in turn, that Marx 
makes Judaism, and all other confessional religions, into a historical attribute of civil-
bourgeois society, which has been banned to the private sphere. This, however, seems 
immediately questionable on several levels. On the one hand, the confessional religions he 
discusses existed prior to the particular social form of civil-bourgeois society, and it is not 
clear why they should not continue beyond a second revolution aiming at human 
emancipation. The other question is whether Marx is actually correct that they are confined 
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to the private sphere, and thus stopped exerting political influence in the realm of the 
state.676 Sara Farris points us to the contemporary situation in France in the context of the 
‘Muslim question’, which seems to resist Marx’s refutation of Bauer’s problematisation of 
religious identity as a non-existent ‘political’ problem. Whereas Marx argues that religious 
identity has already been fully privatised, i.e. depoliticised, in the context of the democratic 
republic, Farris argues the following:  
Ultimately, not only does the lack of social, economic and cultural rights prevent 
Muslim girls from entering the promised land of emancipation and equality in the 
public sphere, but also it reveals the contradictions at the heart of the political 
universalism of the state whereby religion is a mark of individual identity (or a 
particularity) that the French state politicizes, whereas social class and poverty are 
defined at the outset as non-political distinctions which can therefore continue to 
operate and divide.677  
The second part of the quote makes clear that Marx was wrong when he portrayed the 
French Republic as merely a not yet properly secularised antecedent stage to the American 
Democratic Republic. France’s radical secularism, in the name of laïcité, today seems to 
pose similar problems to those of Bauer’s and Marx’s time, where the minority religions 
become political targets by being accused of not living and behaving in a truly secular way. 
This was a blind spot in Marx’s analysis. 
 The first part of Farris’s quote, however, explicates the sense in which we need to 
understand what Marx means by solving the ‘Jewish question’. Religious narrowness is 
understood by Marx, and in opposition to Bauer and to Feuerbach, as a “socio-historical 
necessity”678 as long as the secularised social world is riven by the spiritual and material 
contradictions Marx has identified, which makes secularism, and all forms of secular 
humanism, an absolutely limited and ideological political goal. Viewed from this position, 
Marx’s reduction of Judaism to a historically specific attribute of civil-bourgeois society can 
be seen as a powerful theoretical move against Hegel and Bauer. He thereby implies that 
Judaism as religion is, and should not at all be, the central object of the debate on 
emancipation in the sense that the ‘Jewish question’ and, more generally, the specific 
oppressive conditions in which the European Jews live are a product of the post-
revolutionary social form.  
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It is therefore this particular social form that needs to be problematised as the 
barrier to emancipation, and once it will be overcome, the ‘Jewish question’ will also be 
solved, whereas it otherwise persists. That does not mean that Jewish emancipation would 
be solved in its entirety for all of history, or that Judaism would be abolished. But, it means 
that the problem of the ‘Jewish question’ will no longer appear in its current form, because 
it will no longer face the obstacles it faces within civil-bourgeois society. No more and no 
less. When Marx then identifies the Jewish struggle for emancipation with the struggle for 
the whole of humanity, that does not necessarily mean that he ignores the particular history 
of oppression, struggle and identities of the Jewish community that fuels their fight for 
emancipation and for citizenship. His personal support for the Jewish struggle by signing 
petitions and participating in the debate shows that he does not think that it is the wrong 
front to fight on. But he does urge an orientation of any struggle for emancipation towards 
the abolition of the civil-bourgeois social form. 
 
We can, however, conclusively assert at this point that it is no longer fruitful to 
criticise Marx’s concept of human emancipation as remaining Hegelian, Feuerbachian, or 
Bauerian, when used in their derogatory meanings, even though we have found traits of all 
three in Marx’s refutation of Bauer’s approach to Jewish emancipation and human 
emancipation. Is ‘On the Jewish Question’, under these circumstances, still appropriately 
characterised as a “threshold text”679? I want to end by saying, once again, yes and no. It is, 
because it remains dubitable whether Marx actually realised the full implications of his 
analyses, in the sense that he did certainly not follow it up in any stringent sense in his 
subsequent writings. 680  It is however a conclusive step over the threshold that exists 
between the ‘Critique’ and ‘On the Jewish Question’ with regard to Marx’s allocation of 
human emancipation on the side of revolution and not on the side of citizenship, even in a 
radically democratic sense.  
Of course, there is more work to be done in order to develop the concept of 
human emancipation as revolution into a timely and potent concept, employing Marx’s 
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later works as well as the best of Marxism’s elaborations in order to reach more definite 
conclusions how such a concept can be applied in the contemporary conjuncture. But, 
whilst the following chapters will clarify some more decisive angles of development, we 
need to postpone that work to a future project. 
We will now move on to Section Two of the thesis, where we will explore what 
happens to the distinction between political and human emancipation in the 1980s with the 
return of the problems that Marx formulated in ‘On the Jewish Question’.  
 164 
Section 2: Complicating, reducing or rejecting Marxian 
emancipation? 
The political and philosophical debate in France in the 1980s returns to the Marxian and, 
more broadly, Young Hegelian problems of the 1840s that we discussed above, with a 
startlingly large overlap. At stake in this debate are, once again, the political and 
philosophical meaning and importance of the French revolution, of democracy, citizenship, 
and human rights; and those Post-Marxists who are widely regarded as most faithful to 
Marx’s oeuvre and legacy are deeply entangled within it. To someone who wasn’t aware of 
the historico-political and theoretical developments that occurred between 1840 and 1980, 
and who looked at the 1980s (post-)Marxist debates, the situation could almost appear as if 
not much had actually happened in between. Except that Marx’s conception of human as 
opposed to political emancipation was suddenly treated with widespread disapproval, even 
by those closely familiar with and generally sympathetic to the German thinker’s work. 
This raises two questions that are crucial if a conceptualisation of a Marxian notion 
of emancipation is to be relevant in today’s conjuncture: a) what happened in the 1980s 
and before that led the debate to return to those early Marxian problems, from which it 
had significantly departed in the meantime?; b) what can we learn from the largely critical 
revaluations of Marx’s distinction between political and human emancipation for our 
overall project? Whilst this introduction focuses on the first part, the subsequent analysis, 
which primarily focuses on Balibar’s theorisation of emancipation as equaliberty, 
concentrates on illuminating the latter. 
 In the 1980s, the French Fifth Republic and its citizens found themselves 
confronted with several crises. For the Left it was very much the moment of the aftermath 
of 1968, including the subsequent ‘red decade’681, and of the failure of ‘real socialism’ in the 
USSR, which in turn led to the decline and disintegration of classically ‘left’ pillars (working 
class struggle, the role of the trade unions, etc.) and the crystallisation of new political 
orientations.682 Marxism and the institutions most closely aligned with it were certainly on 
the losing end, thrown into a deep crisis by their association – whether warranted or 
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otherwise – with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, a new institutional Left arose in 
France under François Mitterrand, who came into power in May 1981 backed by the Union 
of the Left, a union of three French Left parties – Mitterrand’s Parti Socialiste, the PCF, and 
the Radical Party of the Left – which had been formed in 1972.683 But the PCF, which had 
already played a much more minor role than it initially envisioned, resigned from the Union 
in 1984 – mainly due to its own internal disintegration in the wake of internal criticism of 
their popular-frontist strategy,684 the anti-institutional sentiment that spread through the 
radical or militant Left after ’68, and the PCF’s misguided position on Soviet 
Communism. 685  The latter again came into focus when Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s 
publication of the Gulag Archipelago led to a second wave of revelations about the 
atrocities committed in the Soviet Union. 686  Mitterrand’s election and subsequent 
leadership was also – despite being, in one sense, the biggest institutional success of the 
Left in the Fifth Republic – disputed from the very moment he came to power by a large 
part of the Left. For the part of the party that had supported Michel Rocard, his political 
approach to the Soviet Union was not de-Marxified enough687 and, for the more radical 
Left, it was too pragmatically Liberal-Republican. For both, he embodied the renunciation 
of what was left from ’68, in terms of the atmosphere of departure from, and reinvention 
of, what Left politics can be and can achieve.  
 The critics would soon be satisfied to see the French Republican state enter into a 
rather severe identity crisis in the midst of the economic after-effects of the mid-1970s 
global recession, the rise of globalised and neoliberal economic and power structures, and 
intensified flows of migration, especially from the former French colonies, just a couple of 
years after Mitterrand had become President. After an initial attempt by the new socialist 
government to implement a Keynesian economic policy, by 1983 it already had to 
backpedal from it to the disappointment of its voters, and adopt the tournant de la rigueur: 
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austerity measures in order to alleviate the growing budget deficit, trade deficit and, 
primarily, inflation.688 France had to face the fact that it could not master the end of the 
exceptional period of growth that followed World War II, and also swim against the 
international economic current of neoliberalisation.689 Moreover, the ability of the mass of 
French citizens to participate in democratic politics, to exercise full citizenship, was limited 
by the fact that politics had become the exclusive domain of a professional class.690 They 
did not feel adequately represented by professionalised and, moreover, corrupt politicians, 
and went as far as to question the limitation of their political involvement to the existing, 
exclusive institutions of representation.691  
In this tense political and economic climate, a sense of needing to protect France – 
its national identity, its institutions, and the right to citizenship with the political and social 
rights that come with it – especially from the increasing numbers of non-European 
migrants – spread throughout the Right and parts of the nationalist Left, fuelled by the 
rising popularity of the Front National. 692  The focus of these tensions – which were 
immediately critically confronted by several groupings on the Left, as, for example, by the 
“Malgré Tout Collective” in which Balibar, Badiou, and Michael Löwy among others took 
part and which worked over a long period in support of undocumented migrants’ [sans 
papiers] struggles – became a contestation over citizenship or civic rights.693 
 The more general question arose as to whether the image of citizenship that was 
initially part of the revolutionary principles of 1789, and was then shaped more concretely 
into the welfare state model under the Third Republic, was still adequate to the realisation 
of its function or ‘promise’ in the late 20th century.694 The contestation took many forms, 
but most notable was a centrist neo-humanism, or secular humanism that rose in defence 
of the Republic. It emphasised the need to resolve the tension between citizenship as 
egalitarian universalism and nationality, which had been simmering for some decades, with 
new integrative mechanisms in relation to the laïque school system and the final separation 
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of church and state, known as laïcité, that were instituted by the Third Republic and now 
turned out to be insufficient.695  Thus, the debate became not only one over territorial 
borders, namely over who will be granted the “droit de cité”696 [right of residence] including 
rights to work and to access social services, but also over cultural borders: how to integrate 
or assimilate the presence of growing numbers of so-called North African “immigrants” – 
none other than France’s former colonial subjects - and their “difference” within France.  
Many critical commentators of this renewed French Republicanism have identified 
the first occurrence of the ‘headscarf debate’ [affair du foulard islamique] in 1989 as a moment 
of the crystallisation of that neo-Republicanism, which is not entirely coincidentally also the 
year of the bicentennial of the French revolution. What has also been referred to as the 
return of the earlier ‘Jewish question’, but this time as the ‘Muslim question’697  is the 
problem of a certain incompatibility between the religious identity of primarily Muslim 
migrants and the French laïque Republic. The main concern was how to defend French 
secularism and the in-divisibility of the unity of the French nation, through new integrative 
measures, without giving in to an American multicultural model of liberal Republicanism, 
which was regarded as handing the Republican principles over to pure individualism and 
the ‘right to difference’.698 Just as in the Bauer–Marx debate, the question of which state-
form embodies true secularism has returned, which seems to prove Marx wrong in 
assuming that the French model would ultimately progress into an American-type secular 
Republicanism.699 The preferred French option was a properly neutral nation in whose 
name women could be demanded to take off their headscarf in certain public institutions in 
the name of abstracting from their particular attributes in the public sphere and becoming a 
properly abstract and free individual. If a certain group was deemed unable or “not 
susceptible to abstraction”700, it could legitimately be excluded from citizenship. As Joan 
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Scott makes perfectly clear, this question over representation and difference not only 
concerned Muslim women, but also relates to similar struggles over gender and racial 
differences.701  
Even the ‘Jewish question’ returned in, as Badiou puts it, “countless discussions 
about the status to be accorded to the word ‘Jew’”702, which were led by the previously 
mostly Maoist Nouveaux Philosophes, especially by Jean-Claude Milner, but also Bernard-
Henri Lévy, and Alain Finkielkraut. What Badiou identifies as remarkable in these debates 
is not the absolutely necessary identification and repudiation of continued anti-Semitism 
alongside other forms of racial discrimination. Instead, Badiou argues, Milner and the 
others treat the community that identifies with the signifier “Jew” as a particular, 
“sacralised” victim, who stands above all others based on its atrocious fate in Nazi Europe. 
Badiou sees in this usage of the word “Jew” a moralisation of a particular attribute, which 
inverts the denial of Jewish citizenship in the later stages of the Enlightenment, based on a 
Jewish communitarianism that was seen as resisting abstraction, into a special moral duty 
towards the “Jew” as the victim of the very idea of Europe that emerged in those same 
Enlightenment and idealist moments, and culminated in the Nazi extermination.703 These 
are the two sides of ‘identity politics’ that counter a universalist and egalitarian 
understanding of politics.  
All these debates over the politics of the Republic, which are dominated by a self-
proclaimed ‘centrist’ viewpoint, incorporating tendencies of the Left and the Right, are 
thereby more or less explicitly engaged in a critical re-examination of the revolutionary 
heritage as such. This re-examination is famously led by François Furet, who titled the first 
chapter of his book Penser la Révolution française (1978) – immediately disclosing his 
revisionist political agenda, “La revolution française est terminée”704. It signals his attempt 
to re-write its history in a way that frees the current moment from what Furet identifies as 
the ‘French exception’, which, he argues, has finally, nearly two hundred years later, come 
to an end. The primary exception, or new element, that the revolution brought to French 
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society, which Furet identifies with the help of Augustin Cochin, is a “democratic 
culture”.705 It is the idea of egalitarian sovereignty – which merely replaced the figure of the 
King and his divine power with the people’s self-institution qua general will, embodied by 
the Jacobin radicalisation and Rousseau as its master thinker – that is a thorn in Furet’s 
side.706 Furet’s fear of democracy is a fear of the excess of the demos, which he regards as 
potentially totalitarian and which Rancière therefore even labels “Hatred of Democracy”, 
by treating him together with other more moralist, liberal-Republican identifications of 
democracy with totalitarianism, of the kind that, for example, is to be found in Milner.707 It 
was, then, the liberal rights of individuals, as much as the collectivist Terror, which 
contained a threat that needed to be contained and administered by Republican public 
institutions in the name of pluralism.708 The 1980s was the time of the proper end of the 
extremes: the disintegration of the French communist party, the near end of the 
communist regime, and of the Jacobin tradition. Whilst they were not all the same for 
Furet, they nevertheless suffered, in his eyes, from the shared political principle of 
revolutionary election in the name of historical progress and a new beginning that relies on 
“a linear history of human emancipation”.709 
An important part of Furet’s approach is a rejection of economic determinism or 
what he perceived as the realist fury of the Marxist historiography of the French revolution, 
often referred to as Marxist science of history or scientific Marxism. He wanted to return 
to thinking the revolution as a political event, in the very sense that encompasses both terms 
of the expression, namely as deserving an autonomously political analysis, and as requiring 
interpretation and reflection due to its evental and thus contingent character. 710  This 
insistence on thinking politics again was not only taken up by Furet’s colleagues, such as 
Claude Lefort, and their students at the time, most prominently Marcel Gauchet and Pierre 
Rosanvallon. But this emphasis on thinking politics strongly resonated with the whole of 
post-Marxist and radically democratic Left thought, which needed to free itself from the 
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eclipse of political thought or political philosophy in favour of social scientific analysis that 
took place in the pre- and post-war period.711 The latter group was certainly also provoked 
to counter Furet’s and others allegedly consensual new image of the French Republic that 
tried to eliminate a radically democratic understanding of France’s revolutionary legacy and 
potential angles to rethink the French society or community.712 
The return of political thought took place most forcefully and visibly as a renewed 
fervour for thinking human rights against the totalitarianisms of the ‘short 20th century’, as 
Hobsbawm called it, which was, as Moyn emphasises, “nowhere…more startling in [its] 
rise to prominence than in French political culture and theory”713 . Human rights had 
undoubtedly been part of the political debate since the end of World War II, through the 
1946 Declaration on Human Rights, and subsequent philosophical works such as those of 
Arendt and Lefort. Especially Lefort insisted, in his work from the 1970s onwards, on the 
importance of reflecting on the failures of the liberal understanding of the rights of man in 
the face of the two state totalitarianisms, Nazism and real socialism.714 Their approaches 
were notably different from Marx’s much earlier critique of the rights of man in that a) they 
dealt with the very real issue of the need to limit the monopoly of state violence after it had 
been misused and b) because they remained faithful to a solution that could or had to itself 
be ‘humanist’, but not in any naïve sense of presupposing a “foundationalist concept of 
man”715.  
Whilst by the 1980s, the Republican neo-humanist and moralist camp of, for 
example, the Nouveaux Philosophes716 had taken up the human rights discourse in order to 
promote a politics that would transcend political and ideological differences, and put an 
end to the revolutionary fervour once and for all, a different kind of humanism (some call 
it minimal717 ) gathered broad support from those radical democratic and post-Marxist 
thinkers who, like Balibar, Badiou, and others, wanted to defend a politics that positions 
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itself within the revolutionary legacy, and did so, however critically, on the terrain of 
“humanist” notions such as human rights, universalism, emancipation, equality and liberty. 
This is surprising, especially with regard to those who were Althusser’s students, because it 
was Althusser who had prominently defended a radical anti-humanism, and the rejection of 
the young Marx’s ‘humanist’ problematisation of liberal-republican politics, as the only way 
to counter bourgeois individualism and the various totalitarianism’s misuse of humanist 
ideas, or their exposure of their insufficiencies. However, the returns to Marx’s and 
Marxism’s critique of human rights, which we can find not only in Balibar and in Lefort – 
who we focus on in the following chapter in more detail – but also in Rancière,718 in 
Žižek,719 and in several other Post-Marxists of the same generation, are across the board no 
less critical of Marx than Althusser was, whilst their criticisms rest on different theoretical 
premises. 
 More generally, the totalitarian events of the 20th century, the ’68 movement and 
other political and theoretical developments that I have discussed in this section have led, 
within the group of French radical and post-Marxist philosophers and political theorists, to 
a rethinking of the constitution of modern societies with heightened attention to their 
inherent aporias, limits, internal difference and contestations.720 A concern they all share in 
different ways is how to think a radically democratic constitution of society after what 
Oliver Marchart defines as “the crisis of the foundationalist paradigm”, i.e. of concepts 
such as “totality, universality, essence and ground”721 that are seen to be at the heart of 
economic determinism (embodied by the notions of proletariat and revolution 722 ), 
humanism, and, to a degree, communism. It is in the name of thinking “the political” 
against “politics” that a lot of this work happens in the 80s, in the vicinity of the Centre de 
recherches philosophiques sur le politique723, which was initiated by Jacques Derrida and run by 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe during its short-lived existence of four 
years. The political was here primarily used as a concept that emphasised its own specificity 
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and autonomy, including its primacy over the social, in the sense that it serves to theorise 
its “moment of institution/destitution”724 – something that all of the Centre’s affiliates saw 
to be in need of assertion against a climate of depoliticisation that came from scientific 
Marxism and Marxist party politics on the one side, and a moralist centre-Left on the 
other.725 Via Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Heidegger, especially in the famous essay 
‘The Ends of Man’726 – which led Marchart to call this strand of political-philosophical 
thought ‘Left Heideggerianism’727 – the political is widely understood and investigated as 
existing in difference to the ontic practices through which everyday politics manifest; not in 
any absolute difference, as if the political existed as an external alternative to politics that 
would allow to break with the status quo, but in an ‘ontico-onological’ relationship that 
Heidegger developed with regard to the relationship of Being and man, in which the 
proper of man, of his being, can only be understood by working through “the sense or the 
truth of Being”. Searching for the “truth” of the political in this way means to capture and 
express what escapes in the everyday manifestations of politics, and that is, however, a 
necessary part of the political constitution of society, of its ‘political’, and gives rise to 
society’s contingent, evental and limitless character.  
 This picture of the political and philosophical conjuncture of the 1980s 
undoubtedly complicates the very question of where the dividing line between citizenship 
or democracy and revolution actually runs, and how it can be theoretically re-drawn – even 
though, in another way, this introduction has also shown us how much the theorisations in 
this moment in France seem to directly return to the problems that the early Marx brings 
into view by erecting this very dividing line.728 It is necessary to understand how this 
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simultaneous complication and proximity relates more concretely to the Marxian 
conception of emancipation, if we want to develop something that responds to a 
contemporary philosophical and political problem or need.  
Both, Balibar and Badiou, confirm their continued commitment to remain immanent, 
or at least in close proximity, to the crisis-ridden or as Badiou says “destroyed” Marxism.729 
An interrogation of their theoretical developments would therefore uniquely allow us a 
better understanding of how these complications can weigh – of course, differently in each 
case – on re-reading the Marxian differentiation between political and human emancipation 
in the late 20th and early 21st century. Due to the scope of this thesis, I will focus on Balibar 
alone, because he engages most closely and directly with the Marxian problem complex 
around ‘emancipation’, whilst he explicitly defends ‘citizenship’ over revolution. A later 
extension of the project should however undoubtedly include Badiou’s position, who 
embraces Marx’s notion of ‘human emancipation’, including its universalist and 
revolutionary implications, more emphatically than Balibar,730 but he thereby also embeds it 
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5   Equaliberty instead of political emancipation 
 “After the subject comes the citizen.”731 This is the answer that Balibar gives to Nancy in a 
text first published in French in 1989, responding to Nancy’s question Who comes after the 
subject?732. Balibar explicates further:  
This answer does not have to be (fictively) discovered, or proposed as an 
eschatological wager (supposing that the subject is in decline, what can be said of his 
future successor?). It is already given and in all our memories. We can even give it a 
date: 1789, even if we know that this date and the place it indicates are too simple to 
enclose the entire process of the substitution of the citizen for the subject. The fact 
remains that 1789 marks the irreversibility of this process, the effect of a rupture.733 
Balibar’s statement is thus much more than a simple answer to a question posed to him. 
The replacement of the ancient subject with the modern citizen, in the wake of the 
bourgeois revolutions, becomes not only “the crucial event” for a renewed 
problematisation of the notion of the subject from within philosophy for Balibar. 734 
Importantly for this thesis, it also serves as the very basis for his theory of the modern 
political constitution, in the sense that Balibar will later designate citizenship as the modern 
“institution of the universal as truth”735. He thereby implicitly agrees with Marx on the 
fundamental importance of 1789 for our understanding of the creation of modern man, 
and its continued relevance for our historical moment, ‘our’ contemporary social 
formations and their possibilities and limits regarding any joint project of liberation and 
equalisation (the meaning of which will be subsequently clarified). Even though the ‘our’ in 
this regard primarily reflects a Western-European subject position, it is for Balibar 
inextricably linked with global dynamics of domination, subjectivation, and exploitation 
that cannot – as was to some extent the case with Marx and Hegel - be reduced to an un-
differentiated universal, and therefore world-historical, genericity, as we will see throughout 
the chapter. Overall, Balibar nevertheless confirms the relevance of Marx’s 
problematisation of the outcome of the ‘bourgeois revolutions’ at the end of the 20th, 
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century, immediately clarifying that they were of course “made jointly by the bourgeoisie 
and the people”736.  
But, as we will see his argument unfold throughout this and the following chapter, 
the affirmation “[a]fter the subject comes the citizen” also contains the most fundamental 
rebuttal of Marx’s advocacy of the concept of human emancipation, in order to overcome 
the limitations of political emancipation. For Balibar, the citizen is simultaneously the total 
possibility and unsurpassable limit of a contemporary political “movement of universal 
emancipation”737. Whilst the specific emancipatory possibilities and limits are in constant 
need of theoretical and political assessment, and of being acted upon, Marx is, and we 
would be, wrong to reject the horizon of citizenship for our emancipatory aims: because 
we are unable to determine where its absolute limit resides.738 
A few pages later in his ‘Citizen Subject’ essay, Balibar adds to our opening 
quotation: “The declaration…from 1789 produces a truth effect, which marks a rupture”739. 
He thereby becomes more specific in his analysis. 1789, or the bourgeois revolutions more 
generally, do not only mark an irreversible rupture, and produce an effect that is 
fundamental for our contemporary understanding of the possibilities and limits of thinking 
and practicing emancipatory politics. But the 1789 Declaration plays an important role 
within the larger revolutionary context. It ‘produces a truth effect’. And it is this truth 
effect that, in Balibar’s eyes, Marx misunderstood, because Marx misinterpreted “the 
materiality of the statements”740. 
 This is undoubtedly a nutshell presentation of Balibar’s position, in order to orient 
our inquiry, the task of which will be to develop the meaning and argumentation that hide 
behind this position. But it already shows how directly a confrontation with Marx’s 
argument from ‘On the Jewish Question’ can be distilled from Balibar’s work. On the one 
hand, it anchors its political-philosophical analysis of the present to the same historical 
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moment as Marx, and yet it comes to reject Marx’s conclusions regarding the limits of the 
‘rights of man and of the citizen’ in the context of the modern social constitution. For 
Marx, as we saw in the previous section, the Declarations contain the inscription of 
minimalist social ties, and an idea of man as the split subject of rights who has an 
individualist or bourgeois and a politically abstract nature that together build the ideological 
foundation of bourgeois-civil society. In contrast, Balibar’s reading of the 1789 Declaration 
centres on his identification of the proposition of ‘equa-liberty’, which implies the parallel 
unity of man = citizen, and his elaboration of the (textual or however else we will come to 
define it) materiality of this double unity.  
The purpose of this chapter is then to elaborate Balibar’s reading of the Declaration 
and the implied disagreement with Marx’s critical assessment. We will begin by introducing 
Lefort’s critique of Marx from 1978, which, I argue, we can understand as a precursor to 
Balibar’s position: on the one hand, because they both insist on the necessity to go through 
Marx’s critique of rights in order to reach beyond it, and, on the other, because they both 
contend that it is by taking seriously the political meaning of the rights of man or human 
rights in Lefort’s case, and the rights of man and the citizen in Balibar’s, that Marx’s 
critique can and needs to be left behind. For both thinkers, this political meaning has to do 
with a certain indeterminacy or groundlessness at its heart, which this chapter will explicate, 
whilst remaining sensitive to the differences between Balibar’s and Lefort’s positions. The 
central part of the analysis in this chapter, which focuses on Balibar’s writings since 1989, 
which is the year that he first introduces his idea of equaliberty, is dedicated to clarifying 
how he develops the different elements of the proposition of equaliberty, thereby reaching 
a position that is highly critical of the Marxian understanding of emancipation. To delimit 
the distance between Balibar’s and Marx’s respective understandings of politics, we pay 
attention not only to Balibar’s mostly abstract conceptual developments, but also to the 
intellectual debts he incurs when he credits thinkers like Lefort, Arendt and others with 
inspirational or conceptual contributions to his reading of the relationship between 1789 
and the contemporary politics of democratic citizenship. 
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5.1   Lefort as Balibar’s precursor in thinking the ‘politics’ of the rights of man 
Whilst Balibar describes Marx’s reading as “essentially a complete misinterpretation in 
relation to the materiality of the statements”741  (the precise meaning of which we will 
develop in the next section), Lefort argued not dissimilarly that Marx’s mistake was to 
ignore the ambiguities in the text of the Declaration and its “practical significance”742. It thus 
seems without doubt that Balibar shares Lefort’s sentiment, when the latter asserts: 
We must extricate ourselves from Marx's framework if we are to give the notion of 
human rights its full meaning.743 
Both understand by ‘full meaning’ the identification and defence of the political meaning of 
human rights against Marx and Marxism, as much as against their contemporaries, who 
mostly defend moralist and individualist pre-political versions of human rights. That means 
they also take a different route than Lefort’s student Gauchet, who, in light of those 
interpretative aberrations, chooses to deny a political relevance to human rights per se: 
“Les droits de l'homme ne sont pas une politique”.744 But we should bear in mind that 
Lefort’s attempt to achieve this extrication happens in a politically different context to 
Balibar’s. For Lefort, it was primarily the totalitarianism of the Stalinist and Maoist versions 
of really existing socialism that showed him how important it was to insist – against Marx 
and Marxism (especially against the Stalinist PCF), and against the individualist moralist 
Nouveaux Philosophes – on the political importance of the rights of man, or ‘human 
rights’745: because “[t]otalitarianism is built on the ruin of the rights of man”746.  
But that does, importantly, not mean that he follows the vulgar reasoning à la his 
colleague Furet, that any thought conflating man and citizen is itself totalitarian, making 
Rousseau, the Jacobins, and Marx with his notion of human emancipation into direct 
precursors of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, Nazism and real socialism, 
because they all defend an ‘abstract notion of man’.747 Extricating himself from Marx’s 
framework also means for Lefort to “not fall short of his thought”, which implies a 
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commitment to carefully differentiate between Marx’s important contributions to a critique 
of liberalism and his mistakes.748 However, we should not be blinded by this expressed 
appreciation, as it turns out that Marx’s mistake is, as we are about to see, far more 
fundamental than what is valuable in his critique of liberalism. 
Marx's framework has been undermined by the events of our time. But this leads to a 
second observation: his critique of the rights of man, situated as it is in the context of 
an analysis of the bourgeois democratic revolution, was already ill-founded. This 
does not necessarily undermine the whole of his critique.749 
Against Lefort’s conciliatory last sentence, I want to suggest that it is precisely Lefort’s 
conception of “the events of our time”, i.e. totalitarianism, in relation to the ‘bourgeois 
democratic revolutions’ and the Declaration, that indeed entirely undermines Marx’s 
critique. To understand this will subsequently help us immensely when we interpret 
Balibar’s theorisation. 
Lefort begins by criticising Marx’s conception of the socio-political formation of 
society after the end of feudalism, by means of the bourgeois revolutions, because, in his 
eyes, this conception does not hold true for the analysis of totalitarianism. As we know, 
Marx argued that politics (the rights of the citizen) and civil society (the rights of man) 
became the two poles of “one and the same illusion”, which was furthermore dominated 
by the definition of man qua the rights of man. But, so Lefort, in totalitarianism, politics 
becomes total, materialises in a totalitarian state that arbitrarily politicises everything, and 
simultaneously it denies, or better, violently crushes human rights. In his eyes, this fact 
proves Marx’s theory of the rights of man and the citizen wrong as it dissolves the “two 
poles of one and the same illusion” that the latter took to be the essence of post-
revolutionary society. But why?  
The first potential answer is that Marx misread the statements of the Declaration and 
drew false conclusions (which is a difficult argument to begin with, as we saw, because 
Marx’s analysis relies on a purposeful intertwining of textual interpretation and analysis of 
the contemporary socio-political formation). And indeed Lefort starts here: 
It is not so much what Marx sees in human rights that ought to elicit our criticism as 
what he is unable to find in them.750  
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Marx’s critique of the rights of man, his reading of the different articles from the different 
versions of the French and American Declarations, is not wrong to identify a certain 
ambiguity751 in some of the formulations in the text that can be read as individualist and/or 
in defence of the primacy of the holy right to property.752 But, what Marx is ‘unable to find’, 
according to Lefort, is that the Declaration, via its human rights claims, founds a form of 
society, i.e. a form of social ties between individuals, instead of their mere separation.  
Lefort’s reference points are the right to liberty, which for Marx becomes the right of 
the separation of man from man, and to the rights that Marx ignored in his reading of the 
Declarations, namely those that guarantee precisely the liberties of man, which totalitarian 
regimes suppressed, like the rights to freedom of opinion and to freedom of conscience. 
He argues that in the context of these rights even a separation is a form of relational 
modality and that all of those rights are more than merely individual rights, which is why 
Marx is wrong to reduce them to that.753 The right to freedom of opinion is, for example, a 
relational freedom that defines the relationship between men in the public sphere, and in 
that sense it opens a whole new form of access to the public sphere that cannot be denied 
to anyone without violating the rights of man. Lefort criticises Marx here for not taking 
into account the gains in liberties that men had through the ‘bourgeois democratic 
revolutions’, as he calls them. Lefort further criticises Marx for having ignored some of the 
Declarations’ articles, especially the entire 1789 version, as well as its “practical 
significance”, and for having been blinded to what those rights really inscribed politically 
into the social form, due to his own prejudice.754  
Indeed Marx falls into and draws us into a trap, which, on other occasions and for 
other purposes, he was very skilful in dismantling: that of ideology. He allows himself 
to become the prisoner of the ideological version of rights, without examining what 
they mean in practice, what profound changes they bring to social life. And, as a 
result, he becomes blind to what, in the very text of the Declaration, appears on the 
margins of ideology.755 
But Lefort’s argumentation is not convincing at this point. He himself admits, “the article 
of liberty” contains “the image of a power anchored in the individual and capable of being 
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exercised only up to the point at which it encounters the power of others”756. Thus, he 
concedes that Marx did identify a real problem, but he argues it away by criticising Marx 
for something he did not do (namely ignoring the increased liberties of individuals vis-à-vis 
the feudal regime) and by pointing to a different right in the Declaration that is a truly 
relational right, which Marx did not acknowledge enough. Furthermore, it is not clear that 
freedom of opinion could not be exercised by properly individualised bearers, a problem 
which Lefort himself raises as potentially compromising the quality of the relationality that 
he posited as implied in the right to freedom of opinion.757 
As argued in Chapter Three, I agree with Lefort that the image of the monad was a 
mistake by Marx, but that does not invalidate his critique of the individualising and 
abstracting function of right. And, in that earlier discussion, we concluded that Marx’s 
critique does not actually deny any relationality, neither in single articles of the Declaration, 
nor ontologically in humanity, but he argues that this relationality is doubly undermined, 
once by its affirmation on an ideological level, and twice by the material relations within 
civil society that are individualising and primarily enabled by the right to liberty in 
conjunction with the right to property. Lefort does not convincingly argue against this 
individualising formulation of the rights of man, instead he points out that they also have 
social effects, or that they imply a minimal sociality. He furthermore continues with the 
same problematic mixture of scattered textual references to the Declaration and the 
invocation of its “practical significance” of which he accuses Marx, thereby evading Marx’s 
critique. 758  He needed to challenge Marx’s argument that human rights essentially 
participate in enabling the reproduction of the civil-bourgeois social structure, which he did 
not do convincingly up to this point. 
But we need to add the second part of Lefort’s argumentation in order to assess his 
reinterpretation comprehensively, because it is only through this part that his stakes 
become apparent. Lefort fundamentally objects to Marx’s generalised dismissal of law in 
his critique of the Declaration. Marx does not differentiate between form and content, he 
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identifies the Declaration itself as a document that entails the basis for bourgeois law,759 
which is the real problem, the mistake, for Lefort. 
Because “such a theory does not allow one to grasp the meaning of the historical 
mutation in which power is assigned limits and right is fully recognised as existing 
outside power: this double movement becomes unintelligible, a mere sign of 
illusion.”760 
Here, Lefort holds against Marx a different narrative of the historical mutation that took 
place by means of the transition from feudalism to democracy.761 This historical mutation 
contains two steps. It is first of all grounded in the establishment of the Rechtsstaat, which 
institutes right separate from and above any specific incarnation of power, i.e. it allows for 
right to be invoked against power. But the Rechtsstaat is still compatible with the 
monarchical state, which means that its establishment is constitutive of the political 
revolution – something Marx entirely disregarded, because of his conception of the 
bourgeois revolution as a radical break. That means the Rechtsstaat does not exhaust the 
revolution’s specificity. The modern specificity goes one step further and marks the 
“disincorporation of power and disincorporation of right”, which differentiates the 
democratic from the monarchical Rechtsstaat, because it implies the “disappearance of the 
King’s body” and the emergence of the “rights of man”.762 Power and right thereby lose 
their fixed points, and everything that is established as positive right or positive institutions, 
i.e. society’s established order, is from now on open to contestation, opposition, and 
renewal. For Lefort, it is in this sense that Marx most importantly misread the Declaration, 
because he did not take notice of the fact that the rights of man give an indeterminate or 
groundless ground to the law – namely humanity – and that they are on the one hand 
binding for power and still open to public discussion and contestation (as we saw in the 
right to freedom of opinion). 
Balibar explicitly comments on this passage:  
In this fundamental point, I can only agree with Claude Lefort’s formulations: 
Human rights “go beyond any particular formulation which has been given of them; 
and this means that their formulation contains the demand for their reformulation, 
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or that acquired rights are not necessarily called upon to support new rights (…) The 
democratic state goes beyond the limits traditionally assigned to the état de droit. It 
tests out rights which have not yet been incorporated in it.”763 
For Lefort, it is not the separation between citoyen and bourgeois, or between public 
and private, but it is the separation between power, right, and knowledge (opinions, beliefs, 
scientific knowledge) and their disincorporation that marks ‘political emancipation’. This 
separation is the essence of the democratic form of society, and the discourse of right and 
rights builds its heart that enables or “is constitutive” of politics.764 The human rights that 
are formulated and declared in the declarations are “bound up with a general conception of 
society – of what was once called the polis or cité – which totalitarianism directly negates”765; 
they are, as Lefort affirms at a different point, the basis for this social model. Lefort sees 
the separation between power, right and knowledge inscribed not only in the right to 
freedom of opinion, but also in the right to security, and the assumption of innocence 
except where one has been found guilty according to an established law. Power has to 
follow right in exerting its force on individuals, and opinion is allowed to be uttered freely 
and challenge both power and established, positive law in the name of ‘right’. If Marx 
reduces the entire Declaration to empirical reality and calls it ‘ideological’,766 he misses that 
it is precisely human rights that allow for the demand of justice against power, and that 
furthermore allows for right to be invoked against existing rights. Lefort calls this the 
“symbolic dimension of human rights”767. The fact that Marx does not see this makes him 
unable to think the French revolution in political terms, or, rather, he thereby rejects to 
think “the political”768. 
Having arrived here, we now better understand Lefort’s starting point, namely his 
conception of totalitarianism as an aberration of the democratic form. 769  Lefort is 
concerned that totalitarian power disregards and overrides the public voice that is meant to 
be able to contest a certain positive institution of right in the name of ‘human rights’, 
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which, in the worst case, leads to the annihilation of human rights themselves. This is why 
Lefort outright rejects Marx’s principled critique of human rights. Regarding his 
disagreement with Marx’s more precise reading of the declarations’ articles, we can 
conclude that, for Lefort, the individualisation of society forms a particular historical 
problem, but it is not the essence of the political modern form. It might form part of the 
content of some articles of the Declaration, but essentially the democratic political form, 
which was much more importantly inscribed in the declarations, allows for any inscription 
of right to be contested, including those bourgeois forms. Political emancipation is about 
allowing for a politics of human rights, i.e. for the contestation of the established social 
order in the name of human rights, rather than abolishing politics and making it into a 
bourgeois illusion. But, most obviously, it thereby leaves Marx’s more fundamental 
objection against the constitution of the social ties of modern society as individualist, 
unchallenged. It just argues that any social constitution within modernity is up for 
contestation – but it does so on purely political terms. 
But we should move on to Balibar’s critique of Marx’s misreading of the Declaration, 
because it will shed additional light on Lefort’s problematisation, and allow us a more 
comprehensive assessment of the divergences. Because, despite the differences in 
theoretical and political concerns and method of analysis, Lefort’s reasoning is in a very 
fundamental way a precursor to Balibar’s, especially as Balibar shares the idea of the 
“democratic invention”770 at the heart of political emancipation, which he is similarly not 
ready to hand over to Marx’s criticism. 
5.2   Re-reading the Declaration: affirming the institution of modern ‘egalitarian 
sovereignty’ as the true political novelty of 1789 and the truth of citizenship 
We have already had a first sense of the starting point of Balibar’s accusation of Marx as 
“misinterpret[ing] the materiality of the statements of the Declaration”771. But we need to 
develop a much more concrete understanding of how Balibar reads the Declaration 
differently to Marx, what the consequences of his diverging interpretation are for his 
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conception of emancipation and its relation to human rights, the state, and revolution and, 
finally, what Balibar means by ‘materiality’, i.e. what he argues to be the ground for his 
alternative path – not least because it seems that this latter element could set him quite 
substantially apart from Lefort’s criticism. 
Where Marx sees a division between man and citizen that is already inscribed in the 
title of the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” and a subsequent 
domination of the political citizen by liberal-bourgeois ‘man’, Balibar reads first of all only 
an intrinsic equivocity.772 This equivocity is continued in the two dualities in Article 1, 
which reads: 
Article 1 (1789): Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. (my italics)773  
But even though Balibar acknowledges that this equivocity gives rise to diverging 
interpretative possibilities regarding whether the founding notion is that of man or that of 
the citizen, and whether it declares the rights of the citizen as man or of man as the citizen, 
he chooses an unequivocal path for his own interpretation, which is diametrically opposed 
to the one Marx advocates: the Declaration contains the idea of ‘man as citizen’. 
Let us follow Balibar’s example and initially remind ourselves of Article 2 and Article 
6 of the Declaration, as they are relevant for the subsequent argumentation.774  
Article 2 (1789): The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural 
and imprescriptible rights of man. These are the right to freedom, the right to 
property, the right to security and the right to resistance to oppression. 
Article 6 (1789): Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to 
participate personally, or through his representative, in its foundation. … All citizens, 
being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally eligible to all dignities and to all public 
positions and occupations, according to their abilities, and without distinction except 
that of their virtues and talents.  
Balibar’s strongest positive affirmation against Marx is that man and citizen are 
indeed equated in the statement of the Declaration, that there is no gap, no “difference in 
content: they are exactly the same.”775 As justification, Balibar argues that it is Article 2, 
which names the rights of man, and the rest of the articles, most prominently Article 6, 
specify how those rights will be guaranteed qua constitution. Balibar advocates thereby a 
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more straightforward way of reading the Declaration, which is based on the premise that 
the text itself gives no reason to doubt that man and citizen are equated: men are to remain 
free and equal in rights (Article 1), these rights are man’s natural and imprescriptible rights 
(Article 2), and they are realised qua political association, i.e. through the sovereign that is 
the people, the community of citizens (Article 3), whose expression is the law (Article 6).776 
At this point, Balibar asks a very similar question to the one Marx formulated in ‘On the 
Jewish Question’777: “Who is the citizen?” 
The citizen is a man in enjoyment of all his “natural” rights, completely realizing his 
individual humanity, a free man simply because he is equal to every other man.778 
This answer is crucial, because man’s equality to every other man as citizen pinpoints the 
specifically new universality of the ‘man as citizen’ that Balibar emphasises against Marx’s 
interpretation of the Declaration. Formulated differently, after the abolition of the King or 
any other form of personalised, hierarchically superior sovereign, the universality lies in the 
implication of the sentence that “if anyone is not a citizen, then no one is a citizen”. What 
might seem like a rather orthodox return to the Rousseauian roots of the Declaration, is 
however more complicated than that, if we are to believe Balibar. 
The specificity of these textual statements is, for Balibar, that they contain the 
paradoxical idea of an “egalitarian sovereignty”779 based on the double identification of 
man = citizen and equality = liberty.780  This double “unity of opposites”781, which he 
translates into identifications that mutually refer to each other, does not, in his eyes, go 
back to any prior ideology, such as classical natural right theories that, in Lockean or 
Rousseauian terms, base the political constitution and the institution of the state on a pre-
existing or, in some way foundational human nature, or on a notion of contract.782 Instead 
the Declaration posits this double unity of opposites as a simple “de jure fact”783 or, as 
Balibar also refers to it, an undeniable ‘truth effect’: “Men are born and remain free and equal 
in rights.” This is strong claim heavy with implications, which we will carefully scrutinise in 
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the discussion to follow. Let us therefore take one step back and examine each unity of 
opposites and their derivation more carefully, before we draw any conclusions, especially 
about the extent to which this interpretation relates to the one Marx put forward. 
5.2.1   From the feudal to the modern subject 
The first question that we need to confront is how Balibar delineates the modern ‘citizen-
subject’ from its pre-modern, pre-revolutionary precursors: if “[a]fter the subject comes the 
citizen”784, then we need to get the transitional changes in the political form of subjection 
into view. Balibar takes as his starting point not the historically different proclamations and 
attributions of what constitutes a subject, as in what are its presuppositions for freedom 
(which he refers to as subjectum), but he begins from the modes of subjection. In other 
words, he starts from the juridical figure of the subjectus, the subjected subject, or the 
Untertan, which historically exists for much longer than the Kantian transcendental subject 
of free will; “subjectus meaning ‘subject to’ a law or power”785. The figure of the subjectus, 
the subjected subject, exists since Roman jurisprudence, as we know from discussing the 
history of the idea of emancipation, which has its emergence in the same juridical context: 
whilst mancipium was the technical term for an acquisition (laying hand on) mainly of slaves, 
e-mancipatio would be the release from the hand. In Roman law, the same term mainly 
referred to the release of the son from his father’s care, when he came of age. Balibar refers 
to it in order to emphasise that this concept of subjection (as well as the concept of 
emancipation) is however entirely individualised, and does not yet refer to a collectivity.  
Only with the rise of Christianity were these individualised subjects rendered into a 
collectivity, but a passive one whose highest aim was to not fall from God’s grace, by 
showing faith. And they became the subjects of an empire, an imperium, in the service of an 
Emperor. At this point the subjectus becomes a subditus, because he is now inside a 
relationship of obedience, which he himself wills: he obeys the laws of the prince and 
(simultaneously) of God, in whom he believes and who is the source of the prince’s 
legitimacy.786 There exists, thus, a fundamental difference between the subditus – who we 
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encountered earlier in the form of the subject by right, the Rechtssubjekt that exists, as Lefort 
reminded us, already under absolute monarchy – and the subjectus, the earlier subjects as 
subject of law, the slave or the totally subjected.787 The subditus is subjected to the double 
domination of God and the Head of State that Bauer discussed so intricately in relation to 
Prussian Germany. On the one hand, the Christian state as an absolutist state forms for the 
first time a coherent body politic of subditi788 who understand their own particular interests 
as entangled with the interests of the sovereign. But, on the other hand, this state form 
contains an unstable contradiction between secular and religious authority, and between an 
entirely individualised obedience to a hierarchically superior sovereign and the existence of 
a collective, political body (what Rousseau referred to as civil or political society), that gave 
rise to different tensions as we saw in Chapter Two.789 One tension that gained importance 
in the pre-revolutionary moment was the ambiguity between identifying as a subditus or as 
a subjectus (subjected to the authority of the slave-master) in relation to the authority of 
God, which was often transferred into the inside of the individual, his soul. The question 
arose as to whether one was indeed more free from any arbitrary rule of the King through 
the internalised obedience to God, or, if it made the believer more into a subjectus, a slave 
to a higher, unquestionable authority, whilst, through this inner relationship, the reference 
to the collective body politic was weakened.790 Balibar emphasises here that under absolute 
monarchy, the two concepts, the theological, individualised and passive subject, and the 
concept of the subject as citizen, as subjected for the goal of collective freedom to the 
body politic, already existed side by side, doubling the doublet of subjection to God and to 
the absolutist monarch, the “spiritual-temporal sovereign”791.  
In his genealogical account, Balibar frames the appearance during the Middle Ages 
of the subject as citizen, as subditus, as a return of the Greek concept of the zoon politikon 
in a new form: the idea of the equality of citizens within the limits of freedom,792 as they 
were predefined by the regime of the absolute monarchy, but which they voluntarily 
                                                
787 Ibid., 44. 
788 See Douzinas 2000, 218. 
789 See Balibar 1991, 40. 
790 See ibid., 43. 
791 Balibar, Cassin, and Libera 2006, 34. 
792 In Ancient Greece, the predefinition was based on the anthropological difference between the free man 
and the slave, see Balibar 2013a, 65. 
 188 
obey. 793  The reason for the revolutionary break lies, for Balibar, in two contradictory 
developments. On the one hand, the emergence, or return if we will, of the notion of the 
subject as citizen rendered the subjects more autonomous, because they understood their 
subjection as essential to their freedom instead of accepting blindly whatever was 
demanded from them in whatever name (nature, God etc.). On the other hand, the French 
absolute monarchy, especially under Louis XIV, exacerbated the tension that existed due to 
the double subjection by trying to override and incorporate the spiritual power and make 
itself the only source of the State’s legitimation (‘L’État est moi.’).794 It thereby undermined 
its divine source of legitimacy, slid from absolutism into despotism, and endangered the 
political existence of its subjects as Rechtssubjekte. This development was the crucial spark 
that allowed for the tout court questioning of the divine order as the state’s source of 
legitimacy, and ultimately led to the revolutionary demand for a radical secularisation of the 
political order that ended (at least momentarily) in the 1789 Declaration. i.e. for Balibar the 
Declaration of egalitarian sovereignty of man=citizen.  
5.2.2   Defending equality = liberty as the ground for citizenship 
When Balibar re-reads the Declaration, he initially counters Marx’s problematisation of the 
missing out of equality in Article 2 (it only refers to freedom, property, security and, in the 
1789 version, the right to resistance to oppression), because Balibar regards it as 
compensated for in the emphasis on equality in Article 1 and Article 6.795 These articles say 
that men are not only born and remain free and equal, but all citizens are also equal in the 
eyes of the law, which is itself the expression of the ‘general will’, as in Article 6, or of what 
Balibar calls ‘egalitarian sovereignty’. He recounts here the Rousseauian lesson that all men 
as citizens are not only treated equally before the law, but they exist “at exactly the same 
level” as the law (although not identical with it)796: as a collective, a people, they are the 
sovereign and legislator, whilst as individual citizens they are subjects of the law. Even if 
the absence of equality in the enumeration of the rights of man in Article 2 is an expression 
of a ‘vacillation’ internal to the Declaration (to which we will return), it does not at all 
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contest the fact that equality is “the principle or right that effectively ties all the others 
together”797.  
But it does so also in another way, which will shed light on the real power of 
equality, as it is inscribed in the Declaration, which Rousseau did not anticipate. We are 
here concerned with how Balibar develops the identification of equality and liberty into 
“equaliberty” or in Latin aequalibertas, as the condition for the identification of man and 
citizen and its ground. 
 If one really wants to read it literally, the Declaration in fact says that equality is 
identical to freedom, is equal to freedom, and vice versa. Each is the exact measure 
of the other. … For it gives both the conditions under which man is the citizen 
(through and through) and the reason for his assimilation [Angleichung].798 
Balibar chooses the “portmanteau word” equaliberty, because it expresses, already on a 
purely linguistic level, a certain antinomy and impossibility that reflects precisely the ‘play’ 
that the Declaration engenders. And he thereby makes clear that it is certainly not an easy 
‘equal liberty’ that Marx in some ways reads in the text of the Declaration, when he argues 
it merely means that the same rights are valid for all.799 But why not?  
Interestingly, for the derivation of the identification equality = liberty, Balibar does 
not remain bound to a reading of the Declaration, but he reaches out to analyse the 
motivations of the revolutionaries, as well as the logical relationship of the two concepts 
and of their identification, in order to assert equality = liberty as a “self-evident truth”800. 
Balibar does not make an essentialist claim about a deeper identity between the two 
notions. Instead, it was the revolutionary insight that the historical conditions for equality 
and liberty are exactly the same, so that their existence depends on each other. That there 
can be no equality without liberty and no liberty without equality is the incontestable 
double negation that the identification expresses. 801  For Balibar, this was initially a 
“historical discovery” of the revolutionaries themselves, who fought at once against two 
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principles, against absolutism, which was the absolute negation of freedom, and against 
privilege, as the negation of equality.802  
But, beyond that, there is also a very straightforward logical explanation: if freedom 
does not go hand in hand with equality within any given society, one has either superiority 
and mastery or subjection and dependence, and thereby retreats from the specifically 
modern form of sovereignty.803 If there is freedom without equality in a society, i.e. if the 
universality of equality is renounced or perceived as something that can be reached at the 
end of some kind of movement towards greater freedom, then that means “men” are 
unequal and thus some are superior, privileged, or dominant in relation to others. But as 
soon as all men are not equal, all men are no longer citizens, and thus, they are no longer 
free, because they do not actually belong to the society anymore and the freedom that it 
has constituted. On the other hand, instituting equality without freedom implies, for 
Balibar, an image of an exaggerated, namely societal rather than individual, rigorism à la 
Bauer, i.e. the denial or negation of inequalities, which we could also call particularities or 
differences. On a societal level that results in a type of organicist total subjection or 
merging of the individual with the whole, which in fact annihilates society itself, in the 
sense that individuals would no longer be free citizens, but rather fully determinate parts of 
a self-identical community. But, for Balibar, that does not result in rejecting equality as a 
potentially totalitarian concept, as other liberal theorists have frequently done. Instead he 
actually affirms that equality as the fundamental principle of society is the ground for 
freedom, precisely because it a) implies the preservation of difference, because otherwise it 
would lead to the annihilation of society itself, and it b) can only apply universally for all 
(and not as limited or differentiated, i.e. applied to some but not other ‘men’), otherwise it 
does not apply at all. 
This insight leads Balibar to a further characteristic of the identification of equality 
and liberty, which is its absolute indeterminacy so that it works only as a “negative 
universality”; it has no prescriptive power in and of itself, i.e. it is by itself without any 
necessary consequences.804 That means it is precisely not realisable in any positive sense, as 
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constituting a society on either merely “symbolic” (or formal) equality or on “real”, factual 
equality (the same opposition exists regarding formal and real democracy).805 Balibar refers 
here to two political-theoretical commonplaces. Formal equality (which is incidentally 
frequently identified as at the essence of Marx’s critique of rights) means the proclamation 
of everyone as an equal citizen qua law, whilst disregarding man’s factual unequal 
dispositions or potentialities, which can be physical, material or intellectual. ‘Real’ equality, 
which is classically attributed to Babeuf and to a lesser extent to the Jacobins and others, 
who developed accounts of ‘material rights’ to be guaranteed by the state, refers to an 
understanding that regards equality qua law only meaningful if the citizens’ individual 
conditions are to some extent equal or equivalent. This makes Babeuf, for example, 
demand not only popular sovereignty in the Rousseauian contractual scheme, but also the 
abolition of private property as reproducing an inequality that invalidates the contract.806  
Balibar’s intervention is, at this point, hardly surprising, but also not entirely 
original: he rejects both positions as untrue and one-sided, because formal equality reduces 
equality into “nothing real” (in this sense, Balibar becomes, for a moment, the critic that 
Marx is usually accused of being), whilst real equality demands to invade and measure every 
aspect of life and, therefore, “must be all”.807 What is unconvincing in Balibar’s account is 
that he equates the demand for real, or factual equality with the aim of instituting a 
substantial ‘community’, which he understands as wholly positively constituted, namely by 
measuring and determining the equal existence of everyone and thereby drawing a clear 
boundary between who belongs to the community of equals and who does not. Levelling 
this criticism against Babeuf can hardly be justified, as Babeuf frames his demand 
negatively - calling for the abolition of private property – nor likewise against Marx himself, 
who, in the Gotha Programme, criticises the necessary unequal outcomes of equal laws in a 
bourgeois, class-based society, and demands its overcoming.808  
Nevertheless, Balibar’s focus is on interpreting the Declaration and, in that sense, he 
argues that the opening up of these two paths in the aftermath of 1789 is an indicator that 
                                                
805 See Balibar 1991, 46. 
806 See Heyer 2007, 13, 19. 
807 See Balibar 1991, 46. 
808 See Marx 1996, secs 1–2. 
 192 
the Declaration itself contains an antinomic concept of equality, which he calls “civic 
equality” or equality as “originary supplement” (here we start seeing Balibar’s Derridean 
debt, to which we will return properly at the end of Chapter Six).809 Equality contains these 
two possibilities within itself, but is not limited to either, because it contains within it an 
excess of universality that cannot be contained by factual equality nor real equality, because 
it is indeterminate. Equality is declared, but not as any positively defined quality of the 
social tie that holds the society together, nor as a specific form or ‘modality’ of political 
association.810 It exists ‘negatively’, because its force only comes to the fore in relation to 
the historical and conjunctural determinations that give it specific meaning e.g. factual or 
real equality.  
These two positions bring to light the truth-effect of equality or equaliberty – 
because we argued earlier that they only work together – namely that the revolutionary 
statements are revolutionary by engendering practical and philosophical conflicts about the 
implementation or the ‘putting-into-effect’ of the Declaration. That means that the 
proposition of equaliberty allows for demanding the end of the denial of rights to citizens, 
or the exclusion of citizens from a specific community.811 And it is precisely the excess of 
universality that prevents us from ever arriving at the ultimate, truly revolutionary solution: 
equaliberty as the ‘truth’ behind the truth-effect is a delimited truth that cannot be grasped 
once and for all, and certainly not with any guarantees – theory is just as clueless as practice 
in this regard, it can only analyse historical moments in relation to the aporias that were 
initially declared. That, however, does not mean that the proposition of equaliberty is 
reducible to its conflictual stakes, which would push Balibar into the relativist corner. It is 
still a universal proposition, at the heart of the concept of citizenship that Balibar sees as 
inscribed in the Declaration, because that is the only way that equality can underlie the 
newly founded freedom.  
 We can slowly see the disagreement with Marx taking shape, whose critique of 
political emancipation clearly relies on the identification of a certain civic-bourgeois ‘limit’ 
inscribed in the declarations and made manifest in the social-political forms of the post-
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revolutionary states. But that does not automatically mean that Balibar’s emphasis on the 
antinomical character and the negative universality of equaliberty is not helpful for, or even 
a crucial contribution to the further elaboration of a theory of civic-bourgeois ideology that 
Marx’s text only contains in a rudimentary form. But it is too early to cast any judgement. 
5.2.3   The French Revolution did not fail, it has been rendered strictly 
unrealisable: the dialectics of the post-revolutionary order  
We now need to bring back into focus the double unity of opposites, as Balibar calls it, 
equality=liberty and man=citizen. Because only as double unity are we able to understand 
why the unlimited, or negatively universal character of equaliberty has such a far-reaching 
influence. With the concept of egalitarian sovereignty at its heart, the Declaration marks 
the revolutionaries’ attempt to “found a constitution” and “erect a new state”,812 purely 
immanently, on the identification of man and citizen. But, as we just elaborated, this newly 
founded state is also based on the proposition of equaliberty, which does not only not 
contain a constitutional form for this new state order, but it does not even allow for a 
conclusive, once-and-for-all, or non-contradictory, institutionalisation.  
[F]rom the beginning, the ‘founding’ statements, by reason of their very simplicity 
and their revolutionary radicality, hide within themselves a contradiction that 
prevents them from becoming invested in a stable order.813 
Citizenship is rendered “problematic” once again, but in a fundamentally different way 
than under absolute monarchy. The contradiction that hides behind the ‘simplicity 
and…revolutionary radicality’ is indeed what Balibar associates with the Declaration’s act 
of politically instituting the new political order on the legislative power of the citizens, 
which he also refers to as its new democratic core. 814  But how precisely should we 
understand its problematic or contradictory nature? 
One way to get a clearer sense is by understanding to what extent Balibar thereby, 
on the one hand, confirms a certain ‘failure’ of the French Revolution, whilst his 
connotation of failure differs from most other historical and contemporary interpretations. 
It differs from Marx, as well as from Gauchet and Furet, for all of whom the failure is 
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caused by a certain “illusion of politics”. For Marx, it is the illusion of popular sovereignty 
and republicanism that fulfils a primarily ideological function, and is constantly undermined 
and co-opted by the relations of exploitation and domination exerted in the private sphere 
(i.e. relations of production) to which the political sphere is subjected. For Gauchet et al., it 
is the fact that this radically democratic core – that, in their eyes, furthermore contains a 
notion of representation as belonging to a collective (the national people) – poses a threat 
to a proper institutionalisation of ‘politics’, namely to a juridical framework and institutions 
of representation, as well as containing the potential for totalitarianism. Balibar also rejects 
an interpretation such as that of Florence Gauthier, who, in a more sympathetic account of 
the revolutionary events as a whole, defends “the natural, universal foundation of 
citizenship” between 1789-1793 against the counter-revolutionary determinate social 
foundation (on property) from 1795 onwards.815 
All of these interpretations see the Declaration as containing an unequivocal 
codification of a political form and content, which they either reject or affirm. Balibar, on 
the other hand, argues that the codification itself cannot be labelled as either truly plebeian 
or bourgeois, or popular or national, because such labelling misses its intrinsic instability, 
which, however, marks its radically democratic novelty. It is in that sense not a promise but 
rather a ‘hyperbolic proposition’816 that does not find its measure in the historical event, 
which gave birth to it, or in the social form that it is supposed to have instituted and that 
since then transformed into our contemporary representative democracies. Instead, it exists 
just as much, or even more so, in the practices that contest the given institutionalisations 
erected in its name.  
 The democratic core is thus defined as a new form of sovereignty that is instituted 
through the double unity of man = citizen and equality = liberty,817 which returns us to a 
closer examination of the concept of egalitarian sovereignty and its Rousseauian 
connotations, which we only touched upon briefly in the opening discussion of this section. 
Balibar relies here on the statements of the Declaration, and argues that if men are not only 
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born818 but remain free and equal in rights, of which they themselves are the bearers by 
means of the general will, then the equation man = citizen destroys the historically-existing 
bond between sovereignty and hierarchy, replacing it with a bond between sovereignty and 
equality.819 Balibar means here that if sovereignty used to be founded in a higher, usually 
divine eminence, in the sense that the king was the incarnation of God on earth, then the 
self-constituting people are not a mere replacement of the king, as commonly argued, e.g. 
by Gauchet and his teacher Furet. The equality of man in birth only remains if man is none 
other than the citizen, the bearer of the process of constituting a people into a community 
of citizens as well as its subject, which in turn means that it is enough to be ‘man’ to be 
sovereign. The political and social order is thereby grounded strictly immanently, in the 
activity of citizens alone.820  
 The ‘problematic’ aspect of this newly immanent ground of politics arises when we 
ask how the relationship man = citizen relates to the formation of a people, and thus to the 
formation of a political community as the new sovereign. As we remember from discussing 
equality as an original supplement, the institution of a community of citizens very quickly 
destroys equality if it becomes a fully constituted community, i.e. a community whose 
membership or basis of inclusion and exclusion is tied to a determinate factor such as 
nationality, which can be linked to territory or to cultural or other values (e.g. secularism), 
ethnicity, and so on. As soon as the question ‘who is a citizen’ receives any substantial 
answer beyond ‘a citizen is a man, who is equal to every other man’, a community loses its 
unlimited and thus dialectical and egalitarian foundation, because it no longer holds that all 
men are potentially citizens. 821  Balibar defines the truly democratic community as a 
community of non-essential or non-unified, purely civic (or we could say political) 
                                                
818 In Citizen Subject, Balibar emphasizes that already the first part “equality ‘of birth’” is a paradox, where it 
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on equality and inequality in relation to birth and right in the ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’. 
819 See Balibar 1991, 45. 
820 See Balibar 2013a, 42. 
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belonging,822 which he also refers to as “citizenship without community”823 or, following 
Deleuze, as “absent community”824. 
 Balibar thereby shifts his interpretative strategy. Instead of taking the articles of the 
Declaration at their word, this time his argumentation implies that those articles contain 
contradictions within themselves that disregard the radically democratic, ‘true’, content of 
the Declaration as a whole, and can therefore be elided. I am here referring to Article 3, 
which explicitly links sovereignty to the nation.  
Article 3 (1789): The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.  
Balibar concedes that this link between sovereignty and nation or nationality is an 
immediate consequence of the French Revolution, and the root of major conflicts over 
citizenship up to today. But, he quickly qualifies, this link is not the true expression of the 
radical democratic invention that was enunciated by the Declaration – because this 
invention is based on a necessary disjunction, or unstable relation between the people, who 
are sovereign, and the nation. 825  This concept of sovereignty also differs from the 
Rousseauian attempt to institute popular sovereignty through establishing a contract that 
would bind the paradoxical duality between particular interests and general interest 
together, with the help of additional means of mediation such as the suppression of parties 
or a civil religion. Because it is once again the non-institutability of the relationship 
between the citizens’ activity as sovereign and their obedience as subjects – which is in 
practice always asymmetrical and thus conflictual – that makes up the democratic core of 
citizenship in Balibar’s understanding.  
 This definition ultimately invokes a certain conceptual, as well as a ‘realist’ or 
‘empirical’ doubt. If egalitarian sovereignty works without a delimited concept of the 
sovereign, the sovereign’s role as a legislator would be seriously compromised, in the sense 
that the law that is legislated by a non-lasting community would itself not last; whereas 
Article 1 (1789) precisely argues for the institution of the rights of man and the citizen ‘in 
right’, as in positive right. In one way, this concept of the sovereign corresponds well with 
                                                
822 See Balibar 2013a, 6, 306–307 fn12. 
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824 Balibar 2013a, 290. 
825 See Balibar 2004, 151–152.  
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equaliberty’s underlying indeterminate negative universality without necessary positive 
consequences. For Balibar, it is not the institutional forms that emerged in the post-
revolutionary society that matter most in terms of identifying the essence of social and 
political change, but the new modality of subjectivation and subjection internal to 
citizenship (as inscribed in or better performatively enunciated by the Declaration). That is 
because this modality is where from now on truly democratic politics happens. But already 
on a conceptual level it is unclear to which extent such a sovereign could give rise to lasting 
political institutions and decisions. Besides, the dominant forms of actual existing and 
lasting sovereignty that have existed in different modalities ever since the French 
Revolution, have in fact been linked to the nation-state - something of which Balibar is of 
course well aware, as we can see from his discussions of the welfare state, which he also 
calls ‘national-social state’, or from his problematisation of the European construction.826  
Do these observations not make egalitarian sovereignty look like a rather formalistic 
political concept, not so different from Lefort’s separation of right and power, which 
functions as a kind of Kantian regulative idea of reason, allowing the practical political 
conflicts and insurrectional actions of citizens to be framed as internal to the antinomies of 
citizenship? We will once again suspend judgement for a deeper investigation into how 
Balibar further differentiates his concept of citizenship from a Rousseauian and a Marxian 
account on the level of a purely political definition of ‘man’. 
5.3   Man=citizen: with Arendt and against Marx towards a new concept of man? 
As already mentioned above, the identification of equality and liberty has far-reaching 
consequences for the second identification of man and citizen, at the same time as it is 
based on it:  
The treatment of equality in the Declaration is precisely the site of the strongest and 
most precise identification of man and citizen.827 
The very universality of the concept of citizenship, as Balibar understands it to be inscribed 
in the Declaration, depends on the fact that it contains the proposition of equaliberty 
                                                
826 See Balibar 2013a, 17–18; Balibar nevertheless insists that the nation-form, as the structure that underlies 
the actually existing nation-states, produces determinate “community-effects”, which can only be understood 
if one does not equate the nation-form with the concept of community or indeed society. See Balibar 2004, 
20–21. 
827 Balibar 2013a, 45. 
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within it. But the proposition of equaliberty could not function as a negative universality if 
the Declaration had not affirmed a ground-breaking rejection of all former theories of 
human nature and replaced it with man = citizen (homo sive civis).828 It is this element of the 
argument that we need to understand more deeply if we want to grasp it in its full nuance. 
It is, for Balibar, the groundless (negatively universal) ground for any political association829 
– and not, as for Marx, an unequivocal affirmation of the civic-bourgeois notion of the 
split man who is ultimately dominated by an individualist and egoistic human nature, the 
‘limit’ of political emancipation, instituted and reproduced through the statements of the 
Declarations.  
In natural rights theories, the origin of a political association was classically 
grounded in pre-conceived notions of human nature, whether humanity was defined 
metaphysically or speculatively.830 Attributions of human nature as violent, war-seeking, 
timid, or egoistic were common, and needed to be counteracted by the right form of 
association, i.e. the right form of subjection under sovereignty. It was thus common to 
conflate ontology and anthropology, or, in other words, to conflate what man is because he 
always has been, and what man can or needs to become as part of a community. Balibar 
agrees here with Marx on two accounts. First of all, Balibar, in line with Marx in the 
‘Theses on Feuerbach’, affirms that there is not anything like “a universal or formal human 
essence housed in each human individual”831. Man is not what he is qua nature, but only 
what he is qua ‘condition’: he is what he is made, and makes himself in the context of his 
societal existence, his social relations. From here, Balibar continues to argue that the 
Declaration indeed does not invoke a pre-political human nature, on which it then attempts 
to build a suitable constitution. Instead, it defines this human nature itself anew, within the 
body of its statements: for Balibar, it declares a human nature, which is itself a political act 
through and through.832 This far, the argument is indeed shared by Marx, who also asserts 
                                                
828 See ibid., 42, 307 fn14; Balibar adapts here Spinoza’s famous formula Deus sive Natura. See also Balibar 
1994c, 11. 
829 See Balibar 2013a, 43. 
830  See Schmidt’s introduction to Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity, esp. the section on natural law 
Schmidt 1996, xv; also Douzinas 2000, chaps 3–4. 
831 Balibar paraphrasing Marx in Balibar 2013a, 166.  
832 Although it does in the Preamble, where it invokes the revolutionary event, the supreme being and nature 
as grounds (see ibid., 307 fn13). But Balibar does not regard this as an obstacle to his interpretation.  
 199 
that the definition of a human nature in the Declarations is a thoroughly political act, which 
is indeed one of the important aspects of his critique of natural law theory, as we saw in 
Chapter Three. And yet, it is also the moment at which the agreement between the two 
thinkers starts to crumble. 
This is because Marx’s assessment is deliberately less ambiguous on this point than 
Balibar’s. Marx’s critique is based on the fact that, in his reading of the different articles 
from the various Declarations, he precisely finds the fact that they are a political institution 
of a “new man” hidden or veiled by the statements themselves. These statements are 
formulated in such a way that they portray man - the subject and object of the rights of 
man - “as the natural man”833, with equality, liberty, security and property as his ‘natural 
and imprescriptible rights’. Thus, for Marx the Declarations conceal their political act of 
defining the very nature of man as the newly-born modern political subject behind natural 
law terminology. Marx’s subsequent point is that the Declaration is doing so for a specific 
purpose, namely in order to create liberal-bourgeois man, and to naturalise his existence. 
Balibar rejects the interpretation by which Marx argues that the statements of the 
Declaration inscribe an egoistic, liberal human nature into the newly founded, socio-
political order and instead chooses a different alliance for his own interpretation, in 
Hannah Arendt and in Foucault’s genealogical account of the modern empirico-
transcendental doublet.834  Echoing Arendt’s theorisation, Balibar counters against Marx 
that the Declaration leaves human nature empty precisely in order to fill it with only the 
right to politics,835 which he ties in with Arendt’s conception of the oft-cited “right to have 
rights”836.  
We need to briefly summarise Arendt’s argument. In her observation of the 
growing number of stateless people in the aftermath of the two world wars, she contends 
that only this situation made clear that it is not any specific right included in the French 
Declarations or the Bills of Rights that decides over a man’s free and equal existence, but it 
is his very ‘right to have rights’: that means his right to action and his right to opinion, 
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836 Ibid., 169; Arendt 1973, 296. 
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which are both conditioned by man’s existence within a political community, as political 
man, a citizen. Because only being a citizen can confer these rights, which depend on 
recognition, onto him. Arendt thereby opposes, just like Balibar after her, the 
Enlightenment and liberal ideas of a past or originary right based on history or nature, 
which the revolution restored or recovered. To understand human rights as a radical 
“invention” or “continuous beginning (arché)” 837  means to acknowledge that the 
groundlessness of humanity, in which man never had anything other than a ‘second nature’, 
is only and continuously filled precisely by the very arché of citizenship – which makes the 
institution of the community co-constitutive with man, and therefore indispensable for his 
or her political and free existence.838  
This new situation, in which ‘humanity’ has in effect assumed the role formerly 
ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this context that the right to have rights, 
or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by 
humanity itself.839 
We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of 
our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. Our political life rests on 
the assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can 
act in and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with 
his equals.840 
Arendt here affirms a universalism of human possibility, and simultaneously criticises the 
political value of alternative normative or factual universalisms (that try to base political 
freedom on moral, social or rights categories alone), which are further supposed to contain 
their proper institutionalisation within them. 841  Politics can only be grounded on the 
potentially unlimited human ability to institute politics anew so that it comes closer to 
nobody being excluded from the ‘right to have rights’ or political freedom – which on 
Arendt’s part implies a concept of political equality between unequal, because distinct and 
plural individuals, which for her stands opposed to the modern concept of equality.842 
Politics, for her, can in this sense not be reduced to a liberal constitutional guarantee of the 
rights of man and citizen, enacted by parliamentary democratic institutions.843  
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Whilst this account is very close to Balibar’s negative universality of egalitarian 
sovereignty, Arendt does not shy away from highlighting the period between the two 
World Wars as a historical moment in which the effectivity of this political approach based 
on a ‘right to have rights’ was put into question. For Arendt, the growing number of the 
stateless, who were nothing but human – thrown back into the dark background of their 
natural, ‘mere givenness’ – exposed a certain powerlessness of human rights vis-à-vis a 
highly developed civilisation that was so rigorously separated into nation states. She 
describes how the demand to be granted the right to have rights could not be heard by the 
nation states or the supranational associations of the time. Instead the stateless were forced 
into seeking national recognition as their only chance. But, differently to Balibar, Arendt 
sees the reason for the problem to be located in the French Declaration, because, as we 
saw in Article 3 (1789), it binds human rights to national sovereignty.844 Arendt herself 
criticises the French Revolution as having instituted positive rights of man that depend on 
man being recognised as part of a national community that can confer this right, i.e. 
thereby denying man the ‘right to have rights’. For Arendt, the French Declaration 
continues the natural rights tradition,845 as does the American Bill of Rights, and only the 
mass violations of human rights in the 20th century have shown that these proclamations of 
human dignity qua nature, on whatever ground they have been made, do not hold against 
the ways these rights have been positively instituted. It is thus curious, how in Balibar’s 
adoption of the notion of the ‘right to have rights’, Arendt becomes one of the key 
interpreters of the antinomical notion of right that leaves human nature empty and that 
cannot be positively instituted – but within and not against the French Revolution and its 
1789 Declaration. 
Arendt makes us wonder then whether the “identification of the rights of man with 
the rights of peoples in the European nation-state system”, which she sees as the 
fundamental outcome of the French Revolution, might not be a more significant hindrance 
to humanity’s ability to overcome or change this identification in the name of ‘the right to 
have rights’846 – although she does not actually think beyond the system of the nation states 
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as such. Balibar, on the other hand, who is certainly dedicated to thinking citizenship as 
trans-national, runs the risk of reducing the power that the nation-state holds over the 
possibility of demanding the rights of citizenship qua being human, when he reduces the 
nation-state to merely one of other internal vacillations of the Declaration’s hyperbolic 
proposition. With an eye to Marx, we might wonder about other, equally fundamental 
seeming barriers that Balibar’s deconstructive Rousseauian interpretation of the 
revolutionary statements reduces to a specific historically-practical determination of an 
underlying regulative idea. But Balibar would probably counter that it is only on the basis 
of the “existence” of equaliberty that remains in excess of what has been declared that 
Arendt is even able to identify her subsequent criticism and demand for politicisation of 
the de-politicised stateless. Balibar’s and Lefort’s accounts are both based on a double 
inscription of rights that delimits their positive constitution: in Balibar’s case, it is the rights 
of man as the rights of the equal and free citizen, and in Lefort’s case, the modern 
disincorporation of power and rights. But, what in their eyes ensures a difference ad 
infinitum between the political community and its members, which makes the border of the 
community itself permeable, seems to be exposed in Arendt’s case as a kind of wishful 
thinking of political theory. It comes up against the extremely real and exclusionary borders 
of the imperialistic Western nation-states of the early 20th century, whose exclusions reduce 
the ‘right to have rights’ to an empty shell and are not easily contestable. But we will come 
back to this problem in the next, and final section of this chapter. 
This is not to suggest that Balibar in any way sidelines the problem of subjection or 
‘disemancipation’ and exclusion in favour of the emergence of a new form of citizenship, 
or of what he also calls “civic-bourgeois universality”847, with the French Revolution. He 
makes very clear that “the story cannot end with these great emancipatory gestures”848, 
meaning that the rise of this new form of universality, which implies a new form of 
subjectivation, also comes with new forms of subjection, subordination, oppression and 
violence. The rise of the modern concept of citizenship is, for Balibar, an epic, as well as a 
tragedy.849 That means Balibar is entirely aware that, even though he has on one level 
                                                
847 Balibar 2012b, 207. 
848 Ibid., 208. 
849 See Balibar 2004, 77. 
 203 
described the achievement of the Declaration as enunciating equality = liberty as “self-
evident truth” that can be constantly demanded anew by anyone, precisely because man = 
citizen means that there is no good reason [kein Grund] to deny citizenship as the right to 
political participation to anyone,850 on another level, this right to political participation has 
remained and remains denied to many to this day.  
His insight here is that these exclusions have to arise within the universal, i.e. in the 
name of the universal itself rather than as contradicting particularities; that is, in order to 
deny citizenship to anyone under the regime of civic-bourgeois universality and its 
institutions, they have to declare him or her as less than or in- human, which, for Balibar, 
happens by affirming ‘anthropological differences’. He takes his inspiration in this regard 
from Foucault, who has made important contributions to developing the genealogies of 
some of those anthropological differences Balibar identifies: ‘normality’ vs the pathological, 
sexual difference, as well as ethnic and ‘racial’ difference, the infantile vs. the adult, and 
manual vs. intellectual labour (although this is more Marx-inspired). 851  What all these 
anthropological differences have in common is that they introduce differences into the very 
constitution of the human, but in an uncertain manner, namely along shifting dividing lines. 
It is precisely through civic institutions such as courts, psychiatric wards, cultural 
organisations and so on that a society engages in the work of “defending” ‘human’ 
normality against a supposedly abnormal, infantile, or dangerous inhumanity. Balibar 
emphasises that, in order to keep the universality of equaliberty intact, this inhumanity can 
only emerge and has to remain on humanity’s inside, namely by being internally excluded, 
which happens along racial, gender and class lines.852 But that also means that the perversity 
and violence that emerges under the banner of civility in these processes can be contested 
in the name of demanding the re-opening of the dialectics of equaliberty. 
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5.4   Why insurrection is not civil disobedience, or towards Balibar’s concept of 
politics 
Balibar also mobilises Arendt’s thought in order to think the dialectics of constitution and 
insurrection that he understands to arise on the fundamental ‘uneasiness’ of the modern 
subject that we just described,853  and which he conceives as the unlimited movement 
through which egalitarian sovereignty can be “instituted”, if never once and for all. The 
dialectics of constitution and insurrection is Balibar’s modality of universal emancipation. 
He refers, in this context, to Arendt’s conceptualisation of “civil disobedience”, based on 
which she creates a relationship between politics and the law that is constitutively open to 
an an-archic interruption of the positively instituted law by the legitimate enactors of civil 
disobedience: it creates politics on the basis of “an ‘unlimited’ or ‘indeterminate’ arché”854. 
If we schematise Balibar’s thought along those lines, we would call citizenship the 
arché of the modern political form in that it has always already conferred a status of legality, 
of rights and duties, of forms of political participation and a sense of belonging, onto 
individuals.855 Or, more generally speaking, that its basis is “the pragmatic experience of 
birth, history and decadence of democracies”856. The figure of civil disobedience (or ‘civic 
disobedience’, as Balibar prefers to call it857) would be, in his terminology, the insurrectional 
moment of citizenship that challenges this pragmatic experience, i.e. content and borders 
of citizenship, by invoking equaliberty as negative universality. 
[T]here is undoubtedly a meaning of universality which is intrinsically linked with the 
notion of insurrection … (‘insurgents’ are those who collectively rebel against 
domination in the name of freedom and equality).858 
Arendt’s arché of political rights, or of the law, is de-limited by the figure of “civil 
disobedience”, because in its name the collectively organised minorities or masses can 
“return judgement to the side of ‘whatever’ citizens”.859 Balibar traces the origin of this 
figure back to the very first definition of citizenship that Aristotle developed in his Politics 
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(even though he tried to make it disappear due to its inherent danger to the order): the 
notion of an arché as the principle of authority that remains indeterminate, an arché aoristos 
[unbestimmte Regierungsgewalt; indeterminate sovereignty].860 Both, the arché aoristos and civil 
disobedience are essential, in Aristotle’s case, to re-balance the politeia, and, in Arendt’s case, 
to disrupt the potential totalitarianism of the law and return it to “the exercise and control 
by the community of citizens”861, i.e. strengthen it, while it will never become a guarantee 
for, and always simultaneously remain a risk to, the established order.  
However, Arendt markedly develops her idea of civil disobedience in reference to 
the American Revolution, in distinction to the French Revolution, and her invocation of 
Tocqueville as the thinker of the “dangerous freedom” that the Americans seek, against the 
authority and government that is in place, gives this “dialectic” a specific inflection, namely 
a purely political one862 - one that we associated before, at least to some extent, with Lefort 
and Furet.863 Whilst we should not conflate Arendt’s with Balibar’s conception too quickly, 
we nevertheless need to interrogate their affinity all the more carefully, taking the 
specificity of Arendt’s account of civil disobedience and politics seriously, including the 
effect it might have on Balibar’s theorisation of citizenship and, on the other hand, 
determining where they depart from each other. 
They both agree on the very fundamental need to understand and conceptualise 
democracy beyond its limited form of representative democracy and politics, and beyond 
its institutions, which both, in their different historical moments, perceive to be in crisis. 
They, for that purpose, reemphasise the element of constitutive power and a certain ‘an-
archic’ moment within democracy. 864  But that should not hide the fact that civil 
disobedience for Arendt is a specifically American concept, which is only a different form 
of “voluntary association”, as it was inscribed in the first amendment of the American 
constitution.865  This relies on a purely political understanding of democracy, ultimately 
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863 See Balibar 2013a, 176–177. 
864 See ibid., 175. 
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aimed at the realisation and perfection of ‘man’ and the political order. 866  “The civil 
disobedient’s taking the law in his own hands” is always thought of as a rectification of the 
formal institution of the law itself, but going back to the “original conditions” of the 
American constitution, this rectification has to be understood as absolutely possible and 
desirable.867 Integration into the law must be, as Arendt discusses regarding the civil rights 
movement, its highest goal.  
Truly political action, for Arendt, further has to be realised at a distance from the 
aberrations that the inclusion of the social question introduced into the French 
Declarations, at a distance from the social sphere as a whole, because it undermines man’s 
public, political existence by allowing necessity to intrude into the sphere that is concerned 
with freedom.868 This infamous separation between the political and the social introduces 
an ambiguity into Arendt’s theorisation regarding her definition of the autonomy of the 
political. On the one hand, the modern revolutions869 achieved, in Arendt’s eyes, a radical 
renewal of the political constitution of society, which is not reducible to any other renewal: 
it is especially not reducible to an economic revolution and the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in a purely economic sense, which is where Balibar and she agree. Instead, the 
revolutions mark autonomous political events, which we need to grasp as such if we want 
to gather their full meaning and consequences. On the other hand, Arendt redoubles this 
autonomy of the political at the level of content. She argues that political problems and 
questions, such as participation, representation and the overall problem of the political will 
formation [politische Willensbildung], have to remain purely political problems, located in the 
public sphere, and cannot be contaminated by social or socio-economic concerns, which 
are located in the private sphere.870 We could also say that she naturalises the social sphere 
as that which is non-political, whereby she refuses to think the political potential of civil 
society, which Hegel started to do in a minimal sense through the concept of material 
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rights or the figure of the rabble, but Marx properly emphasised against what he saw as a 
bourgeois separation between private and public, or socio-economic civil society and 
political state.871 Returning to such a separation opens Arendt up to an a- or even anti-
political rendering of politics, which cannot be separated from her account of ‘civil 
disobedience’.  
Our concern here is how the Arendtian separation might impact on Balibar’s 
association of his own dialectics of insurrection and constitution with her conception of 
civil disobedience or, to formulate it from a different angle, to stipulate what this 
association might tell us about the understanding of politics that underlies Balibar’s 
concept of citizenship – which in turn would allow us to determine not only the distance 
between Balibar and Arendt, but also between Balibar and Marx on a deeper level. Whilst 
Balibar does not make his stance on Arendt’s separation explicit, we should not assume 
that he therefore shares it – he just leaves it for us to work out.  
Towards the end of the essay ‘Citizen Subject’, Balibar summarises his previous 
analysis: 
I think that, […], the indetermination of the figure of the citizen – referred to 
equality – can be understood with respect to the major alternatives of modern 
political and sociological thought: individual and collectivity, public sphere and 
private sphere. The citizen properly speaking is neither the individual nor the collective, 
just as he is neither an exclusively public being nor a private being. Nevertheless, these 
distinctions are present in the concept of the citizen. It would not be correct to say 
that they are ignored or denied: it should rather be said that they are suspended, that 
is, irreducible to fixed institutional boundaries which would pose the citizen on one 
side and a noncitizen on the other.872 
Implied in this statement is, above all, the allocation of the politics of citizenship instituted, 
qua the dialectics of constitution and insurrection, beyond the private/public divide that, 
for Arendt, maps directly on to the divide of the social and political sphere. Insurrection is 
thus, like civil disobedience, a political concept, but, for Balibar, politics is not separated 
from the private, individual sphere, where, according to Arendt, necessity rather than 
liberty reigns. Modern, post-revolutionary politics, the politics of citizenship, encompasses 
the citizen’s existence as ‘neither [purely] the individual nor the collective, … neither an 
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exclusively public being nor a private being’; they are distinctions that exist at the inside of 
the concept of citizenship, but are simultaneously, on the level of the structure of the 
concept, in suspense.  
 Balibar affirms here, in general terms, what we have elaborated throughout the 
chapter, namely that the institutional boundaries that lead to the internal exclusion from 
citizenship of individuals who are deemed less than human, exist side by side with their 
contestations, leading to what he calls an “infinite contradiction”873. Citizenship necessitates 
the foundation of institutional definitions of who is a citizen and who is not a citizen, and 
is therefore always exclusive. But not in a historically determinate sense, because every 
institutional definition opens up new possibilities for contestation, whether in the name of 
politicising the individual against the collective, the collective against its individualisation, 
the private, or the public. The new, post-revolutionary citizen, who is “no longer subjectus 
[Untertan], but not yet subjectum [Subjekt]” 874, differs from the ‘citizen’ as subjectus under 
absolute monarchy, because it exceeds by definition its own institutionalisation, in an 
interminable conflictual process. It implies a new universality that is inscribed in the citizen, 
and becomes thereby attainable for the subject; which is something very different from a 
universality that is once and for all achieved or denied, because it is incorporated in a stable 
societal structure.875 Its historical unfolding is not linearly progressive876 and not “complete 
or enclosed in its origins”877 , i.e. the Declaration. It is a contingent process in which 
philosophy and politics can participate purely by analysing, schematising and acting upon 
its stakes – i.e. can know and contest “who is excluded, why, from what, by what 
mechanisms”878. More concretely, that means, for Balibar, analysing the process of the 
becoming-subject of the citizen, the “devenir sujet du citoyen” (the becoming subject of 
the citizen), because “the citizen is the subject, […] is always a supposed [or qualified879] 
subject (legal subject, psychological subject, transcendental subject)”880. 
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 But, we could ask with Marx, is not the citizen as largely individualised, legal subject 
more strongly presupposed than contestable in the post-revolutionary civic-bourgeois 
social form? Because sovereignty is distributed – or, one could say from a more critical 
viewpoint, suspended – between a modern, rational state and globalised capital that both 
rely on and enforce in their own ways the rule of law, it appears rather resistant to 
collective demands of returning constitutive power to the citizens. Regarding the state, 
Balibar refuses a portrayal that reduces the state to an “abstract state” that treats individuals 
equally merely on a juridical and administrative level, but disregards their conditions of 
existence, i.e. as “man ‘without property’ [eigentumslos], [and] ‘without particularities’ [ohne 
Eigenschaften]”881. Whilst he does not deny that this description of the state conforms closely 
to reality, he shows us that it contains within itself a ‘utopian’ dimension that Marx, in his 
critique of the state, for example, misses. Because the fact that the state functions as if ‘man’ 
was without property and without particularities does not only mean that the equality it 
administers does not really create a society in which property and particularities no longer 
play a differentiating and violently exclusionary role, but it implies that struggling to create 
such a society is a possibility. The abolition of class, sexual and racial differences within the 
category of ‘man’ can be demanded, Balibar argues, in the name of civic equality, against 
the way the ‘abstract state’ stages their inexistence.882 But that means – against Marx’s 
concept of human emancipation as a revolution that overcomes the limits of political 
emancipation, which Balibar calls “founding revolution” – that a politics of citizenship 
relies on the contestation of the state, but not its abolition. The citizen is a “constitutive 
element of the State and […] the actor of a revolution” as a “permanent revolution”883, a 
revolution that began in 1789 and continues to this day, as simultaneously epos and tragedy.  
 Balibar thus advocates an account of politics that functions simultaneously within 
and beyond and above the state. The last open question is, then, what happens in Balibar’s 
account to the Marxian-Hegelian counterpart of the state, namely to civil society? We know 
that the state is not equal to society, that society goes beyond the state. And Balibar has 
also made clear that the citizen is not, as in Marx’s account, confined to the sphere of the 
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state, whereas ‘man’ is confined to the private sphere of civil society. Both spheres are for 
Balibar equally constitutive for the citizen. The latter differentiation is, however, not 
actually as disjunctive as it seemed at the beginning of this chapter. Because, ultimately, 
‘modern man’ is also a split man for Marx, split into man and citizen. And whilst he 
allocates man to civil society and the citizen to the state, he does not deny in his 
theorisation that the dividing line between these two spheres can shift. Marx, however, 
contends that such a shift does not overcome the separation that is constitutive of the 
civic-bourgeois social form, determined by the simultaneous completion of “the idealism 
of the state” and “the materialism of civil society” with individualist, egoistic man as its 
“precondition”. 884  Thus, even though based on a more than rudimentary account of 
materialism, Marx rejects the appearance of the primacy of a republican citizen that the 
political state creates as part of an ideology that successfully veils the primacy of materialist 
social relations, which are themselves the ground on which the political state relies. Whilst 
Balibar is certainly very sensitive to and aware of the roles globalised capitalism and the 
legal system play in erecting and maintaining more or less visible borders around 
citizenship rights, his account of the politics of citizenship relies on a primacy of ‘politics’ 
based on the indetermination of the notion of the citizen that reduces socio-economic 
structures to secondary effects, manifesting themselves on the level of ‘anthropological 
differences’, and thereby returning into the politics of citizenship without limit and end.  
Whilst we began this chapter with Balibar’s criticism that Marx misunderstood the 
‘materiality of the statements of the Declaration’, we have now arrived at the moment 
where we can conclude that Balibar refers here not to the textual materiality as such. In 
‘Citizen Subject’, he explains that the hyperbolic proposition of equaliberty emerges from 
the Declaration because 
in effect, in this proposition, the wording of the statement [die Aussage] always 
exceeds the act of its enunciation [Äußerung] (l’énoncé excède toujours l’énonciation), the 
import of the statement already goes beyond it (without our knowing where) … In 
the statement of the Declaration, even though this is not at all the content of the 
enunciation of the subsequent rights, we can already hear the motto that, in another 
place and time, will become a call to action: ‘It is right to revolt.’ Let us note once 
more that it is equality that is at the origin of the movement of liberation.885 
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But even “the wording of the statement”, which is relevant because it is the énoncé, that 
which exceeds the moment-specific act of its enunciation [l’énonciation] and lives on, seems 
to ultimately only matter to a limited extent. As Balibar says, it is enough if we hear in it the 
“motto” of revolt, we do not need to take it too literally. Balibar goes on, in the text, to list 
some examples of the énoncés he has in mind: property as imprescriptible right of man, 
the citizen as man (and woman?), its silence regarding the colour of the citizens886 – all these 
inscriptions will become heavily contested immediately after they are declared or stated, 
and in a certain way enunciated or indeed enacted in more definite terms on the basis of 
the underlying proposition of equality or equaliberty. Important for Balibar is that, due to 
their radicality, they all point to an unconditional equality beyond its limited, exclusionary 
inscriptions.887  
The contradiction that engenders these contestations does then actually not lie in the 
founding statements in and of themselves, even though that was the outcome of Balibar’s 
first attempt to formulate its existence – namely as the statements’ inherent aporeticity, 
which resonates with some moments of our analysis, where he relies on the statements’ 
content. But he corrects himself and suggests a more precise definition when he formulates 
better still: the contradiction, to the second degree, resides in the instability of the 
relation between the aporetic character of the statements [énoncés] and the conflictual 
character of the situation in which they arise and which serves as their referent, so 
that every attempt to reactivate the statements of the rights of man and citizen, based 
on its very truth, cannot help but run into the effects of the development of its own 
tensions.888 
Thus, the aporetic character of the statements of the Declaration only leads to the specific 
revolutionary contradiction when it is doubled with the conflictual character of the 
situation from which the Declaration(s) arose (“the revolutionary conjuncture”)889, or, we 
could extend, with the conflictual character of modern society as it was properly 
instantiated by the bourgeois revolutions. It is thus the political materiality of the relationship 
or encounter between the enunciation of the statements and the contingent historical 
situations and movements that followed that Marx misunderstood.  
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6   Balibar’s critique of Marx’s critique of politics: how does Marx 
misunderstand the materiality of the Declaration?  
Before we cast any conclusive judgement on the specificity of the political materiality with 
which Balibar opposes Marx, in the name of a politics of citizenship, we need to shift our 
point of view. This chapter returns to Balibar’s early deconstructive readings of Marx’s text 
and Marx’s conception of politics that date mainly, although not exclusively, to the late 70s 
and 80s, in order to understand how Balibar arrived at his disagreement with Marx over the 
materiality of politics – which, if we remember Balibar’s work with Althusser and others of 
his students on Reading Capital, constitutes not only a peculiar change of position, but also 
of his object of theoretical inquiry. Whilst one might argue that his work on citizenship 
from 1989 onwards could just as well be read as entirely unconnected to the Marxian 
problem, in the sense that, in that context, Balibar critically distances himself from Marx, 
alongside other ‘interlocutors’; an inquiry into the most immediate pre-history of Balibar’s 
work, which is intimately connected to Marx and Marxism, will bring to light important 
findings that would otherwise get lost.  
In this chapter, we will discuss Balibar’s direct critique of the young Marx and, more 
specifically, of ‘On the Jewish Question’ and thereby be able to show that his conception 
of the politics of citizenship, based on the proposition of equaliberty, gives direct answers 
to the problems he identifies in Marx’s understanding of politics. Balibar’s critique focuses 
on the role of the bourgeois split between state and civil society, and the related absence of 
a theory of ideology, which, he argues, limits Marx’s ability to develop a convincing 
account of non-bourgeois, or anti-capitalist politics, in his early as well as in his late works. 
The final part of this chapter goes on to show that it is nevertheless a particular choice that 
Balibar makes, at a marked theoretical crossroad, when he opposes the weaknesses or 
‘absolute limits’, as Althusser would have said, of Marx’s theorisation of politics with a 
politics of citizenship. The chapter ends with a critical discussion of the implications of 
Balibar’s choice by explicating its Derridean-Rousseauian borrowings, before we consider 
the more general learnings for our overall project of conceptualising ‘emancipation’ after 
Marx in the conclusion. 
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6.1   Adopting Hegel’s state/civil society dualism as Marx’s fundamental mistake 
Starting from his contribution to the book Marx et sa critique de la politique, which was 
published in 1979 and contained essays by Luporini, Tosel and Balibar, Balibar placed great 
importance on the ambiguities in Marx’s text regarding his definition and thinking of 
politics. This ‘turn’, which he himself characterises as moving from trying to “reconstruct 
or remodel Marxism”, to deconstructing the Marxian text by exposing its inherent 
contradictions,890 was not, however, exclusive to Balibar, and it was not actually, as it could 
appear, in and of itself the issue over which he disagreed with Althusser. More precisely, 
even though Balibar tells his readers that he started to part company with Althusser in 
1978,891 we should not overlook that 1978 is thereby the starting point of a long and 
complex process – about which we will get a better idea throughout this chapter. Besides, 
the turn towards identifying the contradictions and gaps in Marx’s thinking of politics, as 
opposed to trying to read his writings as a doctrine that could be completed, was shared by 
several thinkers of Western Marxism, including Althusser and Balibar and is widely 
regarded, including by Balibar himself, to have been initiated by Norberto Bobbio’s 
provocation that there is no theory of the state in Marx. Whilst we will investigate how this 
provocation is reflected in Balibar’s deconstructive reading of the early and the later 
Marx,892 which we aim to bring to bear upon the problem of emancipation, it was actually 
born out of a very serious political objection of Marxist theorists, primarily in France and 
Italy, to the relationship between the respective communist parties and the state. It led, 
whilst starting from an initially shared problem, to rather divergent theoretical positions on 
how Marxist politics and the role of the state could be thought differently, which is also 
where Althusser and Balibar begin to disagree.893 
Above all, even though different texts place a different emphasis on this problem, 
Balibar sees Marx’s adoption of the Hegelian separation of state and civil society, in order 
to capture the post-revolutionary modern society, as causing more problems than it 
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solves.894 In ‘État, Parti, Idéologie’, which elaborates on the absence of a consistent theory 
of the state in Marx’s oeuvre, and the problems it causes for his and Marxism’s subsequent 
accounts of the party and of ideology, Balibar makes his disapproval of the Hegelian 
import very clear.895 His strongest claim against the doublet political state and civil society – 
which never disappears in Marx and Engels’ writings, even though they introduce the 
alternative topology of base and superstructure, where the state becomes part of the 
superstructure, as in the 1857 ‘Introduction’ and the 1859 ‘Preface’ (plus several variations 
on the concept of the state within those topologies themselves)896 – is that it reduces the 
world of politics to  
“a place of an illusionary and inverted phenomenon. The world of politics and of the 
State (the political state vis-à-vis the economy) is that in which the real human 
relations are inverted, which makes it the world of a fundamental illusion.”897 
In order to examine why this is a problem for Balibar, we need to reach a better 
understanding of what precisely he means by politics as illusion.  
From our exegesis of ‘On the Jewish Question’, we know that Marx himself 
introduces the term illusion into his critical, political vocabulary. He speaks of “the illusory 
sovereignty” of the State 898  and he refers to the “optical illusion” in the political 
emancipators’, the Jacobins’, consciousness, who misunderstood themselves to practise the 
primacy of purely political, as in Statist, action, whilst they participated in finalising a social 
form in which that State became subordinated to socio-economic laws and conditions (in 
Marx’s confusing wording, which gives away his theoretical masters, it says ‘not politics but 
“theory is the rule”’).899 Balibar refers especially to the latter example, framing it as the 
voluntarist account of politics, and of the bourgeois revolutionary ideology par excellence, 
whose biggest mistake, for Marx, was to have not taken account of the material structures 
that they operated within, because these remained concealed to them. The revolutionaries 
remained unaware or unconscious of the truth of the historical and socio-economic, and 
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thus of the true political conditions in which they operated. Balibar’s contention is here, 
however, that, whilst he understands the insight that politics does not depend on willpower 
and reason alone as important and unique to Marx’s thinking of politics, he is not 
convinced by the grounds on which Marx erects this critique of a disjuncture between 
motive and strategy in the Jacobin account of politics as ‘voluntarist’.900 Balibar objects that 
Marx’s critique is based on an alternative understanding of politics that only inverts the 
Jacobin one. That Marx portrays the effectivity of politics as “illusory” implies for Balibar 
that it becomes entirely determined by the material structures of civil society and thereby 
loses any effectivity of its own.901 This would be a false reversal from Jacobin politicism to 
an economic determinism. 
In this context, Balibar describes Marx’s conception of the state as based on an 
inverted Hegelian schema, which reduces the state to an expression of the struggle that 
goes on within civil society.902 Balibar even labels the political state/civil society concept of 
the young Marx “the expressive conception of the State”903 – which marks clearly the 
continuity that exists between Balibar’s and Althusser’s critique of the young Marx’s 
account of politics in the name of a Hegelian expressive totality, as Althusser called it in 
Reading Capital.904 Balibar bases this description on Marx’s critique and inversion of the 
Hegelian state as that which overlays and distracts from the real life of man, namely his 
everyday, profane life in civil society with the ideal of a collective sublation that is however 
only a philosophical Idea. Marx instead assigns true reality to civil society and calls the state, 
its sovereignty and thereby its force, “illusory”, because it is in reality dominated by civil 
society. Remembering Chapter Three, Balibar also appears here to repeat the impetus of 
Althusser’s critique, in the sense that they both generalise an anti-dialectical portrayal of 
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Marx’s account of politics from the 1843 ‘Critique’, without taking the different stages of 
Marx’s break with Hegel into account. 
On a more general level, there exists an odd duality in Balibar’s argumentation. 
Doubting the state’s sovereignty, and describing it as illusory on Marx’s part, only means 
that the state is not sovereign, i.e. it does not reign on its own and the effectivity of political 
measures and actions does not depend on state power and political will alone – but, as 
Marx tries to show, the depend on the material relations within society of which the state 
and its creation of illusions is a part. Above all, it seems that Balibar himself delivers the 
argument as to why the state cannot ever merely express what goes on in civil society, 
when he adds that the state, instead of realising the highest form of collective political life, 
as in Marx’s reading of Hegel, fulfils a mystifying task regarding man’s profane life in civil 
society. But if the state merely expresses the truth of civil society, how is it able to 
simultaneously conceal this truth from the French revolutionaries? How can the state 
mystify anything, how can it create illusions, when it is the mere expression of the reality of 
civil society? 
For Balibar, this is not a contradiction. Marx’s political state creates a mystified 
representation of society based on giving man a social, collective existence that contradicts 
and abstracts from his individualised existence and his conflicts of interest in civil society. 
But the state thereby still fulfils the function of society’s real, as in actual, existence as civil 
society. It “masks the internal antagonism” of civil society,905 which is no different to 
expressing it, albeit in a mystified form. If the mystified form directly emanates from civil 
society, the state remains without any attribution of autonomy or efficacy of its own. And 
that means it does not allow us to think the state’s contribution to the form and content, 
the continued functioning, of civil society, because civil society is always already there, fully 
formed.  
Balibar identifies the cause for this, in his opinion, misleading construction of the 
relationship between state and society under modernity, in that the political state/civil 
society couple is, and remains, pervaded by a crude and contradictory conception of the 
problem of alienation throughout Marx’s work. The first level of alienation, alienation as 
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Entfremdung, is constituted by the scission internal to ‘man’, separating him into man and 
citizen,906 or as Marx also refers to them, into the real but untrue [‘unwahr’ in the Hegelian 
sense] individual of civil society, man or bourgeois, and the fictitious but true [‘wahr’, again 
referring to the Hegelian vocabulary] man as species-being, as communal being or 
citoyen.907 Whilst we have discussed Balibar’s disagreement with Marx on this point in the 
previous chapter, we will now examine it again, but coming from the other side, so to say, 
namely from a direct and explicit critique of Marx’s account, rather than from Balibar’s 
alternative understanding. Balibar develops this critique in the closing chapter of his 
recently published book Citoyen Sujet908 and in direct reference to, and close alignment with, 
Rancière’s critique of ‘On the Jewish Question’ in his book Disagreement. 
Marx’s usage of the notion of ‘man’ as man of bourgeois-civil society is, in Balibar’s 
opinion, agreeing here with Rancière’s assessment, problematic because it is ‘amphibolic’, 
which leads Marx however to unproductive simplifications.909 Let us initially reproduce 
Rancière’s argument, not only because Balibar relies upon it so fundamentally but, also, 
because it is, besides Lefort and Balibar, undoubtedly one of the important and influential 
post-Marxist criticisms of ‘On the Jewish Question’ and should be acknowledged in its 
own right. Rancière argues: 
At first the gap signifies the limits of politics, its powerlessness to achieve the 
properly human part of man. Human emancipation [l’emancipation humaine] is then the 
truth of free humanity outside the limits of political citizenship. But, along the way, 
this truth about man trades places. Man is not some future accomplishment beyond 
political representation. He is the truth hidden beneath this representation: man of 
civil society, the egotistical property owner matched by the non-property owner 
whose rights as a citizen are only there to mask radical nonright. The inability of 
citizenship to achieve man’s true humanity becomes its capacity to serve, by masking 
them, the interests of man the property owner.910 
Thus, for Rancière and Balibar, ‘man’ is two things at once in Marx’s text. On the one hand, 
he is the alienated individual, whose social existence makes him into an egotistic property 
owner, or indeed a non-property owner, both of which existences contradict, as in deny, 
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his ontological sociality or relationality. 911  This is for Marx the condition of modern 
humanity, in his critique of which he is aligned with Hegel before and Arendt after him; 
and it is the “truth” that Rancière sees “hidden beneath” the citizen as the related modern 
illusion. The second meaning of man contradicts this first, when it also defines him as “the 
subject and object of a true emancipation”912, by means of which he will be able to realise 
his truly human capacities, to utilise his forces propres in a non-alienated way, which lies 
beyond his split existence. But, Balibar and Rancière object, Marx thereby actually 
eliminates politics – understood as conflict or struggle – from both definitions, because in 
both cases he fully identifies ‘man’ with the social.  
In the first case, man is the alienated social being, for whom politics and rights are 
merely an illusion, which masks the real ruler that is property. This condition marks the 
powerlessness, and thus the limit, of the political sphere, which becomes subjected to the 
reality of civil society for which it only fulfils an additional, illusory function. Man is at this 
point reduced to a bourgeois existence, and politics stripped of any significance. This is 
where, for Balibar, the second dimension of Marx’s concept of alienation comes in. 
Alienation is here simultaneously Entäußerung, the projection of that communal life that was 
destroyed by the modern revolution onto the external institution of the state, which 
thereby appears more real than the everyday life of civil society. 913  But, really, the 
community, which the citizen believes he is part of, and which he sees as his defining 
attribute, allowing him to achieve his social freedom and equality, is “a fictitious 
phenomenon”, it is a semblance [Schein], a sophistry that allows us to see the sophistry of 
the entire modern state.914  
It is this expelling of politics from the social, precisely in the way that the liberal 
framework suggests, that causes Marx, in Balibar and Rancière’s eyes, to arrive at the 
“expressive state conception”.915 The social becomes the material, the real life of man, and 
politics is reduced to an illusion whose only effect is to distract man from this reality, 
mystify it and cause him to believe he did live a properly communal, social life, whilst he 
                                                
911 See also Balibar 1979, 158. 
912 Balibar 2011, 470; my trans. 
913 See Balibar 1979, 158. 
914 See Marx 2010, 154 [355]. 
915 See Balibar 2013b, 445. 
 219 
really does not. Politics is, in this sense, only effective as an expression of the social, which 
means it contributes to ruining man by allowing the social to reduce him to the egotistic 
liberal individual. In Rancière’s words, once again: 
Political “participation” is then just the mask of the allocation of lots. Politics is the 
lie about a reality that is called society [and more specifically class society]. But, by 
the same token, the social is always ultimately reducible to the simple untruth of 
politics.916 
Here, Rancière points us towards the inverted implication of reducing politics to a 
mystification: it also means that the social itself contains nothing of the ‘untruth’ of politics 
within it and nothing of what man is told he is as citoyen. Nothing of the state’s actions 
and its apparatuses has a real, or material effect on what the social is and how it continues 
to reproduce itself. It is the inversion of the liberal economic ideology of the invisible hand 
of the market, where the economy is the solution to everything.917  
Balibar adds here to Rancière’s analysis that the same suppressed amphibology that 
afflicts Marx’s usage of ‘man’ can be discerned in his treatment of the ‘citizen’.918 Based on 
the linguistic ambiguities within the historical development of the notion of citizen, which 
in the German word ‘Bürger’ refers to bourgeois as well as to citoyen, Balibar tries to show 
that this permeability persists in the modern split subject, and is not petrified, as he sees it 
to be in Marx’s model, on the side of ‘illusory politics’. Where Rancière criticises Marx for 
locking ‘man’ either in his alienated state, or by theorising him as the emancipated, 
authentic being whilst excluding the possibility of thinking their political relationship, 
Balibar develops a parallel problematisation of the bourgeois - ‘citizen’ relation. He argues 
that not only in language are there citizens who are Bürger, and Bürger who are bourgeois, 
but also in politics – because the bourgeois and the citizen are not, as he reads in Marx, 
separated along the dividing line between the social and the political. Instead, their 
transition into each other is a social and political problem, and therefore always an open 
possibility. Furthermore, the exclusion of anyone from citizenship, for Balibar, is only 
possible on the basis of denying her ‘humanity’, i.e. on introducing an anthropological 
difference to the category of ‘man’ or the ‘human’. By petrifying both sides, and separating 
                                                
916 Rancière 1999, 83 [120]. 
917 See Balibar 2014, 55. 
918 See Balibar 2011, 471. 
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them by a gap, Marx not only locks man to a bourgeois existence that is unaffected by 
politics, he also remains blind to the struggle over citizenship as the struggle over 
anthropological differences.919  
Marx’s flipside mistake is that he follows Hegel in identifying politics entirely with 
the state. 920  Thereby, he becomes unable, in Balibar’s eyes, to think the possibility of 
transcending the modern social form politically, i.e. qua political struggle. Why? Could he 
not locate an alternative, proletarian politics, within the sphere of the social, of civil society, 
which he understands to be the source of the contradiction that causes man to live a split, 
alienated life? In Balibar’s eyes, he can, but it causes his theorisation to get caught “in a 
vicious circle”, as long as he locates proletarian politics on only one side of the duality. And 
Marx did this famously in the ‘Introduction’, where he defines the proletariat as that which 
is the included excluded of civil society, the untruth of politics, the non-class that can serve 
as negation of negation, and bring about universal emancipation.921 The overall problem for 
Balibar is that, 
[t]o ‘develop’ the contradiction then is to pass it on to the superior element of the 
State, or conversely to draw and re-absorb the State into the element of civil society. 
But the State and civil society are merely mirrors of each other. As a result, one ends 
up going round in circles, and, in particular, instead of finding a way of considering 
proletarian politics as another practice of politics, which creates a change in the 
meaning of the word ‘politics’, one can only treat it as the anticipation of a reconstituted 
unity between Society and State, to the detriment of one or the other.922 
This leads us to the second case of identifying ‘man’ with the social. Balibar sees in 
Marx’s framework only one viable possibility for overcoming the alienation of man as 
simultaneously scission and projection, i.e. to enable him to become conscious of his 
profane everyday reality as that which really determines his existence, or to realise human or 
social emancipation, namely by once again eliminating politics: either through the fin d’État or 
through the radical negativity of the proletariat as non-class. Balibar calls this a situation of 
“tout ou rien”, all-or-nothing – an argumentative logic we encountered in the previous 
chapter in relation to formal versus real or factual equality.923 Here, it is, once again, the 
adoption of the Hegelian totalisation of civil society and the state that is responsible for 
                                                
919 See ibid., 467, 474. 
920 See Balibar 1985, 9. 
921 See Balibar 2011, 243, esp. 246–248; Marx 1975c, 255–256; Draper 1977, 145. 
922 Balibar 1985, 18. 
923 Balibar 1979, 132. 
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Marx’s error. The teleological anticipation of the arrival of the new state order not only 
makes Hegel let “a part of politics” – namely everything that is not geared towards it – “fall 
by the wayside”924, but, through sharing his concepts, it also affects Marx’s theorisation.925 
As society’s proper end is for Marx no longer the state or politics, as it was for Hegel, it 
must be the abolition of the state and politics that allow humanity to become truly free and 
equal.  
The problem that Balibar identifies here is that the question of becoming conscious 
of the reality of the relations of domination and exploitation qua political struggle and the 
problem of transition lose relevance in such a scenario, because the realisation of man as he 
really is, as the social individual, lies immediately beyond the abolition of the state/civil 
society couple. Either alienated man is inverted once again into his authentic being, or the 
eruption of the radical negativity of the proletariat is inherent in the alienated subject. Truly 
emancipated man once again becomes united with the social, only this time he is free, and 
neither under the domination of private property nor political representation. If Balibar 
sees the first image as a reduction of man, he regards this as the idealisation of man into an 
anthropologically unified existence, where the process that leads there cannot or does not 
need to be thought, because of its messianic quality. Either man exists under, or he exists 
beyond politics, but never in politics; his existence always has significance for politics, but 
not within it.926 
The critique amounts, in Rancière’s case explicitly, and in Balibar’s case implicitly –by 
aligning himself so closely with his colleague – to an accusation that Marx’s 
problematisation of emancipation is metapolitical.927 Metapolitical is to be understood in the 
double sense that Rancière gives it: on the one hand, it defines real emancipation as 
something beyond politics (referring to human emancipation), and, in the second sense, it 
serves as a scientific accompaniment of politics, i.e. that which knows in advance the 
relationship between “names and things”928 , or how the political work of naming and 
                                                
924 Balibar 1985, 9. 
925 See ibid., 14. 
926 See Balibar 2011, 469–471. 
927 See Rancière 1999, 81, 85 [118, 123–124]. 
928 Ibid., 82 [119]; amended trans. The precise French phrase is “les noms et les choses”, not ‘les mots et les 
choses’ as Foucault’s famous book title. 
 222 
inscribing relates to its “subtending reality” (which, with regards to political emancipation, 
refers to Marx’s account of civil society).929  
Now, there is no point repeating our conflicting interpretation of the relationship 
between state and civil society that Marx establishes in ‘On the Jewish Question’ at any 
length, because the purpose of this chapter is not to defend Marx against Balibar and 
Rancière’s criticisms. The core achievement of Chapter Three was to establish the duality 
that Marx opens up as itself a dialectical duality, with both sides constituting a different 
form of foundation of civic-bourgeois society. That means neither side is the illusory 
expression of the other, because both civil society and state – earth and heaven – 
participate equally in their newly found modern autonomy in the constitution and 
reproduction of bourgeois society. But they do not do so as perfectly constituted and 
rational categories of bourgeois society, rather they themselves are split between their 
existence as rational categories and their empirical determinations. “[T]he completion of 
the idealism of the state was at the same time the completion of the materialism of civil 
society”930 does not mean that the idealism of the state or the materialism of civil society 
are, each on its own, actually perfectly or non-contradictorily instituted. In this sense, man does 
not, for Marx, exist outside and in total separation from the citizen, and politics and rights 
are not reduced to an illusion that leaves man or the social unaffected, because they are 
perfectly determined functions of the social.  
Furthermore, it is bourgeois politics and bourgeois rights that Marx criticises as 
limited in their emancipatory power, because of their blindness towards their material 
constitution; and material here means as much economic as ideological. In this sense, 
Balibar and Rancière’s overall critique appears forced, and overly indebted to the 
Althusserian generalisation of the young Marx into a unified and anti-dialectical position. 
But our interest is here in the good reasons that led them to follow this critical strategy, 
namely their aim of exposing the ambiguities in Marx’s critique of politics that might afflict 
his accounts of political and human emancipation. We thus need to ask more carefully 
                                                
929 Ibid., 85 [123–124]. 
930 Marx 2010, 166 [369]. 
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what those ambiguities are that allow for an interpretation that is also the basis on which 
Balibar accuses Marx of misreading the materiality of the Declaration. 
Balibar tellingly begins his reproduction of Rancière’s critique of ‘On the Jewish 
Question’ by affirming that he will “take for granted…the formation of a subject who is 
split into concrete and abstract, particular and universal, or as Foucault will say an 
‘empirical-transcendental doublet’”931, which suggests that he considers himself here to be 
in agreement with Marx before diverging into his criticism. Balibar thus implies that Marx 
regards bourgeois man as concrete and particular, which needs to be affirmed as primary or 
truly real against the Hegelian universal embodied by the state, the citizen, and his citizen 
rights. The problem that we need to take very seriously here is that Balibar apparently does 
not see any indication that Marx wants to or tries to think the category of ‘man’ as itself 
conflictual, and just as problematic as the category of the citizen. Both Balibar and Rancière 
are only able to launch their criticism at Marx on the basis that his categories of man and of 
civil society are themselves the given, and, in that sense, pre-political truth of non-
bourgeois politics – instead of understanding civil society and the related constitution of 
man as bourgeois as the locus of a political struggle. That means the problem that they 
identify is, above all, the absence of a notion of class struggle vis-à-vis the bourgeois 
definition of politics, which includes the lack of a Marxian interrogation of how this class 
struggle could strategically be thought, in relation to and against the bourgeois state – civil 
society duality.932 Rather than affirming one side against the other, or reducing politics to a 
theoretical thought experiment, this critique demands thinking emancipation as a political 
practice933 within a structurally complex society. 
                                                
931 Balibar 2012c, 6. 
932 See Balibar 2013b, 445. 
933 In his work from the 70s and early 80s, Balibar tries to develop what he calls “a new practice of politics” 
or “new (mass) political practice”. See Balibar 1977, 153; Kalampokas 2015. We will clarify how this concept 
of class struggle relates to his politics of citizenship in the later parts of this chapter. Whilst there is no doubt 
that he remains committed to investigating and pinpointing the weaknesses of Marx’s approach in the name 
of the lack of a clear commitment to the primacy of class struggle (see e.g. his essay “Klassenkampf als 
Begriff des Politischen”, 2013b), the real challenge is to trace how Balibar reframes the very meaning of ‘class 
struggle’ throughout his work and specifically in relation to the politics of citizenship. 
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6.2   Marx’s move towards an account of proletarian or materialist politics beyond 
the state/civil society dualism 
Balibar argues that it is by asking what is unique to proletarian politics versus bourgeois 
politics that we might be able to capture the singularity and importance of Marx’s approach 
to thinking politics, which, after all, imposes “irreversible constraints” on his successors.934 
He suggests that this angle, which moves the focus from Marx’s early writings to his later 
ones, might enable us to wrest Marx’s account of politics from the metapolitical 
inscriptions that he and Rancière found in Marx’s early critique of politics. 
Negatively framed, proletarian politics denies that we can think of politics as the 
realisation of political will or ‘reason’, as we saw in Marx’s critique of the French 
revolutionaries, and that politics is exclusive to the state and its professional politicians. 
Balibar acknowledges this as a strength in Marx’s position, because “it exposes ‘the 
fetishism of the state’, as present in its abstract negations as in its fantasies of reformist 
utility”, thereby “clear[ing] an autonomous space for the problem of the politics of the 
working-class movement”.935 If proletarian politics is based on straightforwardly abolishing 
the state, then, Balibar argues from the very end of the 70s onwards, it has misunderstood 
that the state is itself traversed by class struggle rather than existing externally to the 
proletarian struggle.936 And, if it thinks it can focus on party politics alone, it not only 
mirrors bourgeois politics, but also limits its own strategic tools to those of the bourgeoisie, 
which has utterly disabling consequences.937  
Positively defined, proletarian politics for Marx must essentially consist in politicising 
that which is labelled non-political by the existing dominant form of politics, i.e. bourgeois 
politics, and by the economists who argue that their discipline is a science.938 (Proletarian) 
politics’ task is to question the separation that is drawn between politics and non-politics 
                                                
934 See Balibar 1994a, ix; Balibar 1985, 1–2, 24–25 incl. fn1. 
935 Balibar 1994a, 154. 
936 This argument comes out of Balibar’s rejection of his stance that he still held in The Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat, namely that the political problem of the withering away of the state is co-constitutive with the 
economic problem of ending exploitation. (See Balibar 1977, 153). It marks also the first fundamental 
disagreement with Althusser to which Balibar holds on ever since. Althusser instead insisted that the position 
that the state is external to the class struggle, because that’s the only way that it can intervene into it against 
the immediate interests of the bourgeoisie but in the long-term interest of capital. See on their disagreement 
Althusser 2006, xxvii – xxix, 69–71. 
937 See also Balibar 1979, 162–164. 
938 See Balibar 1985, 15. 
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within the modern, or capitalist social form, including the identification of the necessary 
means. In the Introduction to Masses, Classes, Ideas, Balibar portrays this achievement of 
Marx in parallel to that of Rousseau. Whilst Rousseau was the thinker of the autonomy of 
political and popular sovereignty, as that which can only be founded upon itself rather than 
handed over to a transcendentally legitimated ruler, Marx thought the heteronomy of politics,  
meaning that the “truth” and “reality” of politics is not within itself, in its own 
political consciousness or activity, but outside itself, in its “external” conditions and 
objects. […] Marx has indeed identified the political process (in which individuals 
and groups are active) with the complete development of the contradictions intrinsic 
to its “other”: the “economic” field in the broad sense. Therefore politics in Marx is 
not negated, or nullified; on the contrary it is dialectically recreated as a more effective 
process. It becomes “class politics”, … which, from both sides or camps (the 
dominant class, the revolutionary class) constantly crosses the border of “the political” 
… .939 
This is why Balibar argues that we need to seek proletarian or class politics as the ‘third 
term’ or “le tiers inclus” [the included third] besides the state and civil society, or politics and 
economics, precisely because its aim is to question and displace the boundary between 
them. It follows that we need to search for it in everything that resists the state/civil society 
dichotomy.940  
If anywhere, this understanding of politics can, according to Balibar, be found in 
Marx’s later writings that focus on the critique of political economy, because it is here that 
Marx is closest to dismantling the dichotomy of state and civil society, or politics and 
economics, which was handed down to Hegel from economists as an effect of economic 
ideology.941 Balibar thereby argues strongly for understanding Marx’s shift from his early, 
explicit critique of politics to a critique of political economy as a reinforcement of the 
political meaning of his theory, rather than its reduction or even the elimination of politics 
in favour of economism.942 But, we need to ask, how is this possible, or more precisely, 
how does this identification of politics with the contradictions in the economic field as its 
“other” work, and how does this operation enforce the overall political meaning of Marx’s 
theory?  
                                                
939 Balibar 1994a, x–xi; note the use of “truth” and “reality” of politics in relation to our examination of 
Rancière’s vocabulary in the previous section. 
940 See Balibar 1985, 1, 18, 24 note; Draper agrees, see 1977, 163; also Balibar 1994a, 96. 
941 See Balibar 1985, 18. 
942 See Balibar 1994a, 136, also 118 (on economism); Balibar 1985, 15. 
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In Balibar’s view, it is through the creation of a “theoretical short-circuit”943 that 
Marx carries out the work of ‘dismantling’ the dichotomy of state/civil society. Marx 
identifies the labour relation as the fundamental social relation, or, and here Balibar speaks 
with Althusser, as “the organisation of a material constraint upon social groups defined as a 
function of the nature of this constraint”944. In other words, a capitalist social relation is not 
the alienated version of a true, authentic non-capitalist social relation, but instead it is the 
way individuals are forced to exist in relation to each other due to the specific capitalist 
form of organisation of their specific material constraint, i.e. not owning any means of 
production, which under the capitalist social form forces them to sell their labour-power in 
order to meet their needs for subsistence. This is then simultaneously the essence of the 
“proletarian condition”.  
This understanding implies, in Balibar’s view, a fundamental change to the way that 
Marx defines social relations in ‘On the Jewish Question’ and other parts of his early 
writings, where the social relation is conceived “as a communal bond” that exists in two 
forms, one true and one alienated, “a bond between men that unites them or divides them 
as a function of the relation they have to a common idea (essence, origin, destination, 
species, descent, etc.)”945. And, whether this absolute antithetical judgement is true to ‘On 
the Jewish Question’ or not,946 it is absolutely crucial to agree with Balibar that Marx had 
not yet arrived at “an economic underpinning”947 of civil society with a general notion of 
class and especially class struggle based on an antagonistic labour relation, because we need 
to seriously consider the implications of these later developments for a Marxian conception 
of emancipation. Only through the introduction of an economic understanding of class 
division based on exploitation does Marx truly relativise the dichotomy between bourgeois 
                                                
943 Balibar 1994a, 156; in Balibar 2013b, 452 he calls it “political short-circuit" (my trans.). 
944 Balibar 1994a, 140–141. 
945 Ibid., 140. 
946 As shown in 3.3., I do not think that Balibar’s is a fair portrayal of Marx’s conception of social relations at 
this point, precisely because already in ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx defines social relations as something 
that is not only based on an idea held by individual men, but that is imposed on them by the organisation of 
the material constraint within civil society. That the (even if not very clearly defined) material constraint leads 
to divide individuals from each other was for Marx an effect of the constraint itself, of its economic and 
legal/political dimensions. Draper shows how Marx notices in The German Ideology the slipperiness of the term 
civil society and replaces it with “economic society”. This also shows that the commitment to its basic idea, as 
it was already expressed in ‘On the Jewish Question’, remains. See Draper 1977, 33–34. 
947 Ibid., 146, see also 163–164. 
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state and civil society, because he introduces the struggle between classes, the ‘antagonism’, 
into civil society itself.  
The next step of Marx’s “short-circuit” is to understand the labour relation as a social 
relation that is “in fact neither economic nor political, neither “public” nor “private” as the 
terms are classically understood”948. The exploitation of the labourer that generates surplus 
value does not function without domination, without legal norms – the contractual form – 
and power relations, which means that there is always already a political dimension 
inscribed at the heart of the labour relation, independently of whether it is acknowledged as 
such by the official political institutions. In addition, the labour relation as fundamental 
social relation is also inherently antagonistic. Antagonistic in the sense that, based on the 
condition of private property,949 there exists a class that owns the means of production and 
one that only owns its ability to sell labour power, an exploiting and an exploited class, 
whose relationship is necessarily one of economic and political inequality. This implies that 
the labour relation carries within itself a struggle or an instability that is not only always 
already a political as much as an economic problem, but that also contradicts the very 
possibility of a stable constitution of society – e.g. as Hegel envisioned it, namely through 
the mediation of conflicts within civil society (labelled as particularities or issues limited to 
an abstract universality) by the universal state.950  
It implies, in Balibar’s formulation, a short-circuit between a political moment 
underneath the state, namely inscribed in the labour relation itself, and a political moment 
that necessarily points beyond the state, because the antagonism resists, by definition, a 
successful mediation or regulation by the state. 951  Balibar had already formulated this 
thought, which accompanies him throughout his Marxiological research, as early as 1981, 
when he wrote: 
Marx’s effort might move above all to a new definition of politics co-extensive over 
the whole field of class struggle, over the polarised though not unified, and even less 
ordered or normalised system of its practices […].952 
                                                
948 Balibar 1994a, 156. 
949 See Balibar 1985, 16. 
950 See Balibar 2013b, 448–449. 
951 See ibid., 449, 452. 
952 Balibar 1985, 10. 
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For proletarian politics that means that it cannot be limited in its definition to the state, its 
constitution, its apparatuses, its bureaucrats, because bourgeois political power itself 
extends beyond the state, even though it denies this in its official delimitation of political 
from non-political concerns. But neither can “[proletarian] politics […] disregard the state 
[…] in the field of class struggle, there is always already a State organisation, its control or 
transformation being one of the things at stake”953.  
Thus, we can momentarily conclude, Marx “incompleted” or “interrupted” Hegel’s 
speculative idea of the state954 as the proper mediator of societal conflicts, whether within 
the family, civil society or the state itself, by replacing what he used to call ‘civil society’ 
with his understanding of the economic sphere, which already contains a properly political 
moment, namely class struggle, within itself. Thereby he breaks open the unity of civil 
society as “a single interest block”955, as Draper calls it, and replaces it with an antagonistic 
class structure that is itself rooted in the capital and labour antagonism. Introducing this 
antagonism into the economic sphere implies that there is a double constraint at work, on 
the one hand “the process of the accumulation of capital”, and on the other, “workers’ 
struggles, which even the capitalists are forced to take into account”.956  Marx thereby 
acknowledges the economic sphere defined by the labour relation as itself universal. That 
means he frees himself, once and for all, from the Hegelian framework that caused him to 
differentiate between the particular interests that reign in civil society and the universal 
interests within the state. He does so by not only defining civil society as the dominant 
sphere, but he attributes it, in the name of ‘the economic’, its own universality, which 
simultaneously constitutes an economic and a political problem. 
The immediate question that arises from identifying this shift is to ask whether this 
puts Marx’s distinction between political and human emancipation at risk of becoming 
obsolete? It is helpful to remind ourselves, at this point, of a moment when Engels, in his 
later life, takes a stance on the significance of this shift from a humanist to a class 
understanding of politics in his shared work with Marx, namely when he writes the new 
                                                
953 Ibid., 10–11. 
954 See Balibar and Raulet 2001, 127. 
955 Draper 1977, 244. 
956 Balibar 1985, 17–18. 
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Preface to the English translation of The Condition of the Working Class in England (originally 
published in German in 1845) in 1892. He recognises there that his text is heavily imbued 
with “the dictum that Communism is not a mere party doctrine of the working-class, but a 
theory compassing the emancipation of society at large, including the capitalist class, from 
its present narrow conditions.”957 This is visible in the first pages of the chapter “The two 
great towns”, whose vocabulary resonates heavily with the one Marx uses in ‘On the Jewish 
Question’. See for example his description of the life of the ‘Londoners’:  
The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his private interest, 
becomes the more repellent and offensive, the more these individuals are crowded 
together, within a limited space. And, however much one may be aware that this 
isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking, is the fundamental principle of 
our society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced, so self-conscious as 
just here in the crowding of the great city. The dissolution of mankind into monads, 
of which each one has a separate principle, the world of atoms, is here carried out to 
its utmost extreme. Hence it comes, too, that the social war, the war of each against 
all, is here openly declared. Just as in Stirner's recent book [The Ego and Its Own], 
people regard each other only as useful objects; each exploits the other, and the end 
of it all is that the stronger treads the weaker under foot; and that the powerful few, 
the capitalists, seize everything for themselves, while to the weak many, the poor, 
scarcely a bare existence remains.958 
We are witnessing in this passage the convergence, in Engel’s thought, of processes of 
centralisation and atomisation that concern each individual in the big English industrialised 
cities such as London or Manchester, and their polarisation along class lines based on the 
rule of private property and the reign of capital. The convergence implies not only that 
both centralisation and atomisation are part of the processes that shape the condition of 
the working class, but also that communism would not only abolish the polarisation itself, 
but also the bourgeois-individual condition: they arose in conjunction with the new 
capitalist mode of production, so they will die together. In 1892, he confronts this 
conception with the words: “This is true enough in the abstract, but absolutely useless, and 
sometimes worse, in practice.”959 His judgement is at the same time critical of the strategic 
worth of the humanist position that aims at emancipating the whole of humanity, as it does 
not reject it as false or contradicting his new class understanding.  
                                                
957 Engels 2009, 38 (New Preface). 
958 Ibid., 60. 
959 Ibid., 38 (New Preface). 
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 From our standpoint, it allows us to seriously wonder whether Marx’s early duality 
of state/civil society, and his discussion of the bourgeois human condition that is the basis 
of Engel’s observation, is indeed as incompatible with his conception of politics qua class 
struggle in his later work as Balibar’s Althusserian juxtaposition of the early and later Marx 
might make us believe. Engel’s evaluation further helps to clarify Marx’s earlier position in 
‘On the Jewish Question’. It allows us to see the possibility of a fruitful disjunction 
between the overall aim of emancipation – namely the aim of emancipating the whole of 
humanity from its egotistic, and individualised, economically-driven bourgeois condition – 
and the strategy to arrive at this aim, which Marx and Engels agree, has to be bound to a 
working-class movement or ‘proletarian politics’. The important question for us now is 
what happens to the universality of the state and Marx’s critique of its ideological function 
once the labour relation has become the fundamental social relation? How does it impact 
Marx’s account of politics? And more specifically, how does it relate to Marx’s 
understanding of the outcomes of the French Revolution, of the limits of ‘political 
emancipation’, especially regarding the impact of the Declaration, and its subsequent 
political and economic implications? 
Balibar himself is quick to clarify that what follows from the de-Hegelianisation in 
the later Marx is once again not a proper solution, instead it remains still “partial” as “it 
does not possess a uniquely consistent principle for understanding class struggle (which 
Marx perhaps believed it did)”960. Why not this time? Because Marx, once again, fails to 
convincingly think the direct intertwinement between the ideological discourse and the 
conflictual relationships it aims to control. That means he once again totalises and thereby 
abstracts from the real material impact that ideology has on and within class struggle, even 
though it is in the context of Capital, namely through his theory of commodity fetishism, 
that Marx develops “his only rigorous attempt to follow up this line of thought”961.  
Replacing ideology with commodity fetishism962 reflects, in Balibar’s view, Marx’s 
realisation that “[t]he critique of economic categories can no longer consist in the prior 
                                                
960 Balibar 1985, 15; amended trans. 
961 Ibid., 21. 
962 “There is nothing about ideology in Capital, …”, Balibar 1994a, 89; see also Balibar 2014, 42. 
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separation of the domain of the real from that of illusion”963. Marx’s thesis on commodity 
fetishism is then that the form of value brings about real social relations and their “mode of 
appearance”964 (appearance meaning both illusion [Schein] and phenomenon [Erscheinung]). 
Balibar goes on to argue that the commodity is “an object always already given in the form 
of a representation” 965 . That means that the social relation, which is a relation of 
exploitation, is not experienced as such by the labourer. Instead, “‘the fetishism of 
commodities given rise to by the form of value implies the personification of certain things 
(money-capital) and the 'reification' [Verdinglichung] of a certain relationship (labour).”966 For 
both Balibar and Althusser, the essence of the meaning of fetishism is captured by Marx in 
the following section from the first volume of Capital:  
To the producers…the social relations between their private labours appear as what 
they are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their 
work, but rather as…social relations between things.967 
That means the producers do not see the value-form as an effect or result of their labour 
and its division, i.e. as a product of individually or collectively engendered relations, but 
they regard the value form as that which engenders their social relations, perceiving them 
in a reified form as relations between things.968 
The use of the concept of fetishism in Reading Capital was, however, the only 
moment at which Althusser and Balibar’s project of thinking through Marx’s theory, and 
the relationship between his critique of political economy and politics, relied positively on 
this concept. Here, they argue that, through commodity fetishism, Marx overcomes his 
earlier concept of ideology as “a subjective phenomenon related either to the illusions or to 
the perceptions of the agents of the economic process”969. Instead, the concept of fetishism 
gives a structural account of “the mechanism which conceals the real functioning (the real 
movement [wirkliche Bewegung]) of the dominant structure in the social formation”970. In 
Balibar’s and Althusser’s interpretation, fetishism accounts for the relationship between 
                                                
963 Balibar 1994a, 96. 
964 Balibar 2014, 61. 
965 Ibid., 67. 
966 Althusser and Balibar 2009, 351 (dictionary entry on fetishism); amended trans. 
967 Cited in Balibar 2014, 56; see also Althusser 2006, 127. 
968 See for more detail Balibar 2014, 56–67; also Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 160–163; Marx 1976, chaps 1–
3. 
969 Althusser and Balibar 2009, 211. 
970 Ibid., 351. 
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agents and their “purely objective illusion” that can be traced back to the ‘dominant 
structure’, or the determination ‘in the last instance’, of the social form within which they 
live. The determinant, in the last instance, in capitalism that defines fetishism as commodity 
fetishism is the ‘economic structure’. 
But, both subsequently distance themselves from the theory of fetishism - Balibar 
initially in his ‘Self-criticism’ text from 1973, and Althusser in ‘Elements of Self-Criticism’ 
from 1974, where he argues that he had always been critical of the theory of fetishism, 
because it is itself ideological.971 The reason for their criticism is the idealist nature of the 
theory, which in Balibar’s words a) “makes the misrecognition/recognition a ‘structural 
effect’ (or ‘formal effect’) of the circulation of commodities” and b) “makes the 
commodity itself…the source or subject of its own misrecognition”.972 They object that 
fetishism is ultimately deduced from one abstraction – value – and its commodity form, 
which in turn renders the complex reality of the advanced capitalist world, including money, 
capitalist exploitation, the specificity of labour as commodity, as well as the role of the state, 
law and the different forms of ideology, once again reducible to more or less illusory 
effects, even though now objectively illusory because deducible from an identifiable structure, 
of the operation of one subject: the form of the commodity.973 In turn, society becomes “a 
non-subject”, as Balibar calls it, in which individuals are fully constituted as “economic 
subjects”, including their subjectivity and consciousness, without any active participation 
on their part.974 The theory of commodity fetishism, concludes Balibar’s critique, remains a 
classically philosophical – post-Kantian - attempt at thinking the genesis of a subject 
(capital, commodity form) in an alienated form à la Feuerbach.975 Marx inverted, or even 
revolutionised, the idealist philosophies of the subject by giving the modes of man’s 
subjection primary importance and thinking them strictly historically. But he bent the stick 
too far in the other direction (to loosely paraphrase Lenin), reducing complex and 
antagonistic social processes to real or imaginary effects of value, as the new general 
equivalent, thereby once again abandoning politics as class struggle. 
                                                
971 Althusser 1976, 126. 
972 Balibar 1973, 57. 
973 See Althusser 2006, 39, 131; Balibar 1973, 58. 
974 See Balibar 2014, 66–67. 
975 See Balibar 1973, 58; Balibar 1985, 21; Balibar 1994a, 97. 
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Balibar further problematises the function of commodity fetishism as “detached 
from any reference to the State”976. The economic process, and its double appearance, its 
representation or discourse if we will, arises directly from the abstraction of value. Balibar 
goes as far as to present this as directly dichotomous with the earlier short-circuit between 
ideology and the state, which he criticised as internal to the state/civil society model: he 
calls fetishism “a theory of the market”977. But, not only is a reference to the state entirely 
missing, the lessons that can be drawn for a theory of capitalist ideology are also 
unsatisfactory, in Balibar’s view, because the economic sphere becomes, in turn, “the reality 
which explains the production of ideology” 978 , now called commodity fetishism. The 
critique here is that Marx, on the one hand, renders economic ideology into something that 
arises automatically from the value-form, instead of something actively produced and 
struggled for by the dominant class, and, secondly, that he does not take into account the 
role of law, specifically private law, but also public law, and the role of juridical ideology a) 
in the production and reproduction of the value-form itself and b) in the composition of 
an overall dominant bourgeois ideology.979 Fetishism is, then, an expression of Marx again 
hitting his ‘absolute limit’, as Althusser calls it, his inability to conceptualise ideology as 
having a material existence, with its own effects on the constitution of the world, or more 
precisely, on the capitalist social form, i.e. “in the materiality of the class struggle”980.  
Whether this critical assessment of the theory of commodity fetishism is indeed a 
productive interpretation of the opening chapters of Capital has to remain somewhat in 
question at this point, as our purpose here is very limited. We needed to understand the 
reason that Balibar turns once again away from Marx’s theorisation of the relationship 
between the economic and the political, partly to be able to assess the continued pertinence 
of Marx’s concept of emancipation in light of the later Marx’s theorisations, partly in order 
                                                
976 Balibar 1985, 21.This accusation on Balibar’s part is supported by a detailed critique of Marx’s “later” 
concept of the state, which he develops in ‘État, parti, idéologie’. 
977 Balibar 2014, 78. 
978 Balibar 1985, 21. 
979 See ibid., pp.20; esp. Marx’s difficulty to distinguish between “State ideology number 1 of the bourgeois 
class” – economics – and “the particular ideology which internally ‘cements’ the bourgeois State apparatus … 
which is in fact juridical ideology” (ibid., 21–22). 
980 Althusser 2006, 138; see Balibar 1979, 167. 
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to better understand the lead-up to Balibar’s own post-Marxist developments, and in order 
to disentangle these two issues from each other. 
Underlying Balibar’s rejection of thinking the role of the state and the law internal 
to commodity fetishism is his specific understanding of the universality of the labour 
antagonism, at which point he starts to contradict Althusser’s position. The politics of 
labour exists underneath and beyond the state, as we introduced earlier. In a more recent 
text on the Marxian short-circuit,981 Balibar frames these as two different moments of class 
struggle’s “critical relation to the notion of the universal” 982 . Firstly, the relation of 
exploitation, that marks the labour relation, engenders a struggle against the limitation and 
negation of the universal, i.e. for the universal’s validity for the working class. And, by the 
universal, Balibar means here what we discussed in the name of negative universality in the 
previous chapter: not only freedom and autonomy, but true equality, equaliberty.983 On the 
other hand, the very existence of this antagonism deconstructs the universal as necessarily 
unlimited or forever unachievable, because its closure would be nothing other than an 
unacceptable, violent subsumption of a fundamental difference. Again, remembering the 
juncture between negative universality and indeterminacy regarding equaliberty, we see here 
how Balibar renders the class struggle without end [ad infinitum]. Because if the universality 
that was demanded by the exploited class was ever truly fulfilled, then humanity would lose 
its inner, constitutive difference and become a fully constituted community – Balibar’s 
unrivalled abhorrence.  
At this point, Balibar has made an immensely significant turn away from his own 
earlier understandings of class struggle. And he made his understanding of the politics of 
class struggle incompatible with Marx’s differentiation between political and human 
emancipation, because, by tying the universality of class struggle to the politics of 
citizenship qua equaliberty, he rejects the Marxian aim – which used to be his aim – of 
overcoming the limits of civil-bourgeois or capitalist society that are defined by the 
intertwinement of political or ideological domination and economic exploitation beyond the 
bourgeois state/civil society duality. Not only does he reject the validity of aiming at 
                                                
981 “Class struggle as concept of the political” (my trans.), first published 2013. 
982 Balibar 2013b, 451; my trans. 
983 See ibid. 
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human emancipation as a renewal of social ties in the name of the social individual, or as a 
classless society, which was Marx’s project, but he also rejects his own previous 
commitment to such a project, a project which he formulated in 1977 as the overcoming of 
antagonistic capitalist social relations – “the last possible historical form of exploitation” – 
in the name of instituting communist social relations.984 
In order to understand the kind of shift that Balibar performs here within the 
notion of class struggle – which can undoubtedly no longer be attributed to the ambiguities 
inherent in Marx’s understanding of politics – we need to focus more deeply on the reason 
for his second turn away from Marx. Balibar’s accusation is that with ‘commodity 
fetishism’, Marx ends up theorising ideology, in particular political ideology, for a second 
time as something less than real. He contends that Marx fails to think the difficult 
intertwinement between the production of ideology and the proletarian condition, which 
amounts to lacking a coherent account of the materiality of ideology.985 We will thus move 
on to an investigation into the solution Balibar offers with his own approach to thinking 
the materiality of ideology. This allows us to shed light on the transition from his early 
framing of class struggle as a new political practice dedicated to realising a classless society, 
to his later framing of class struggle as a practice performed within the confines of 
equaliberty. And we can finally return our discussion to the problem of what Balibar means 
precisely when he criticises Marx for misunderstanding the political materiality of the 
Declaration. 
6.3   From thinking the materiality of ideology and an extended concept of the 
mode of production to equaliberty as ideal universality: rectifying Marx by 
giving up on his challenge 
Balibar ends up asking himself in the final pages of his discussion of the Marxian short-
circuit in Masses, Classes, Ideas: 
Indeed, how can a social relation (the exploitation of labour) whose effects extend to 
any social practice be defined without identifying social practice as such with the 
development of this relation?986 
                                                
984 Balibar 1977, 62. 
985 See Balibar 1985, 21. 
986 Balibar 1994a, 142. 
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He delivers the answer in his own attempt at transcending Marx’s inability to stabilise his 
discourse on politics, by offering an alternative of how to think the ‘materiality’ of ideology 
and its relationship to the economic sphere. Defining a social relation that extends to any 
social practice, without a priori reducing social practice to the structural laws and effects of 
this social relation, can certainly be seen as Balibar’s guiding principle from the very 
beginning of his academic and political career, including his contribution to Reading Capital 
on the periodization and transition between different modes of production. For him, the 
Marxist challenge is to think a determining effect of the social relations of production, or 
what he later calls the labour relation, on the entire field of the social, i.e. not only on 
economic practice, but on political practice, and the various other ideological fields, without 
reducing these other fields into merely functional elements of an entirely economically 
determined structure. To understand this basic insight into the structural complexity of the 
social whole is, in Balibar’s view, the only viable basis for Marx to be able to identify the 
stakes (levers, obstacles, limits) of another politics, a proletarian politics. 987  He thus 
acknowledges in this quote what Marx has already achieved, when he insists in his later 
work on the universal and universalising force of the labour relation – the fact that it 
indeed extends to any social practice – which makes it a crucial, but also difficult, stake in 
the political struggle of the proletariat.  
On the other hand, Balibar implies in the second part of the sentence – “without 
identifying social practice as such with the development of this relation” – a cautioning 
against what he regards as the root cause for several simplifications or complexity 
reductions988 in Marx’s various attempts to theorise the stakes of a proletarian politics (by 
defining a political strategy). Balibar objects to Marx’s continued denial that the “illusion” 
of bourgeois politics has a terribly real and contradictory influence, not only on the 
capitalist social form as a whole, but thereby also on proletarian politics, which needs to be 
                                                
987 See Balibar 1979, 162. 
988  Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 165–167. Balibar points here especially towards the inscription of the 
anticipation of or a teleological progression towards its end within the social relation itself and the reduction 
of the political, organisational problem of transition to a dynamic prescribed by the structure of the social 
relation. He calls it Marx’s ambiguity between his economism, that “the economic effects of capitalist 
relations of production cannot but be transformed into their opposite”, and his politicism, where he makes 
“human labour-power” into something irreducibly political, because “irreducible to the state of a commodity” 
(ibid., 165). Instead, Balibar as we will see, regards all those problems as the subject and object of an open-
ended class struggle between and within bourgeoisie and proletariat (see Balibar 1994a, 131–132). 
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acknowledged on a theoretical and political-strategic level.989 Balibar does not deny that 
Marx did actually aim at thinking the effect of the subordination of proletarian politics to 
the rules and forms of bourgeois politics when he inverted Hegel’s theory of the state, and 
when he created a short-circuit between the state and ideology. But, Balibar’s aim is now to 
pinpoint more concretely than Marx ever did what the existence of ideology, which is by 
no means limited to the state apparatus, means for thinking any kind of working class 
political project that wants to establish an emancipatory political practice. 
Balibar’s most fundamental reference point here is undoubtedly Althusser’s 
groundbreaking two-part definition of ideology. The first part of Althusser’s definition, 
which we briefly mentioned in Chapter Three, is that “ideology represents the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence”990. The emphasis here lies 
in ideology being an imaginary relationship, i.e. based on the representation of the real 
conditions of existence that individuals develop for themselves. That means that there is a 
layer of contingency between real conditions (i.e. the relations of production as 
determining in the last instance) and ideology, rather than a directly determining 
relationship. The second part of Althusser’s definition of ideology in his famous ISA essay 
is that “ideology has a material existence”, because it exists “in an apparatus, and its […] 
practices”.991 These apparatuses are of course the ideological part of the state apparatus 
(besides its repressive function), but also other “Ideological State Apparatuses” such as 
religion, education, family, the law, the political ISA, and so on.992 Without being able to go 
into much detail here, Balibar relies on this fundamental Althusserian lesson, in order to 
not only show, as he did with the short-circuit, that relations of exploitation rely always also 
on domination, but to show that political antagonism is also itself never pure. That means 
that inhabiting a certain economically determined structural place, such as the place of the 
worker, is overdetermined by the materiality of ideological apparatuses, which itself is 
dominated by the (dominant) bourgeois ideology.993 
                                                
989 Balibar 1979, 163. 
990 Althusser 2014, 256. 
991 Ibid., 258–259. 
992 See ibid., 243. 
993 See Balibar 1994a, 141. 
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There is, further, a very specific contemporary background to Balibar’s acute 
awareness of the problem of proletarian ideology in his writings of the 1980s, which, he 
had by then realised, formed a blind spot in the Marxist theory and politics at the time. 
When Balibar speaks in 1981 of the “rise of racism in France”994, he detects this racism 
precisely in the actions and policies of the PCF. He accuses the party of its anti-colonialism, 
having been for a while secondary to its secret nationalism, which mirrored Soviet 
nationalism. Balibar names here specifically the most recent incident in which the 
Communist mayor of Vitry ordered a bulldozer to tear down a residential home for Malian 
workers that had been erected against his orders. Balibar’s argument is that this is however 
only the latest expression of the PCF’s nationalist aberrations. He argues that they are 
already legible in the way that party officials referred to protests at the Metro station 
Charonne in 1962, where several protestors were killed in clashes with the police. Balibar 
accuses the commemoration of that tragic event of silencing the actual cause of the protest, 
which was the massacre of the 17th of October 1961, when thousands of Algerian workers 
and their families went to the streets to demand their liberation, and when upwards of 200 
were killed with impunity by French police.  
He charges the PCF with propagating an alleged anticolonialism, whilst drawing a 
clear line of difference between French workers and migrant workers. 995  The French 
working class has struggled over decades for recognition as worker-citizens, who are, whilst 
still exploited and separated from the citizens of other classes, more than just unskilled, 
interchangeable mass labourers. Their life is determined by their work, and yet they are 
integrated in social and institutional structures on the level of their social reproduction and 
political representation. Migrant workers, who are now allowed to enter France on the 
condition that they are “only labourers and nothing else”, that they are pure labour power 
without political or social rights, become the opposite of these “French” worker-citizens. 
Thus, the hierarchy, which is structurally beneficial for the reproduction of capital in times 
of crisis and increasing world market competition (as it allows for “super-exploitation”996), 
                                                
994 Balibar 1992, 17. Publishing this text in 1981 in Le Nouvel Observateur with the open accusations of the 
PCF led to Balibar’s exclusion from the party (see Artous 2010, 24–25). 
995 See Balibar 1992, 23–25. 
996 Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 177. 
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seems to be reproduced in the political struggle, even by the PCF. The protection of the 
normalised exploitation and exclusion of the French worker-citizens is prioritised and 
settled on the back of an accepted over-exploitation and apartheid-like exclusion of the 
migrant workers. 
The conclusion Balibar draws is as much a diagnostic of the time, and of the larger 
crisis in France, as it is a prefiguration of his commitment to a ruthless theoretical 
deconstruction of some of the doctrinal parts of Marxism, especially as they had entered 
PCF party ideology, which he saw having especially detrimental effects in conjunction with 
the simultaneous lack of an account of proletarian ideology.997 Not only is the party not a 
state within the state that is closed off and thereby immune from the larger moralism and 
racism that has found its breeding grounds in the French society, but rather it is steeped in 
it.998 More importantly, Balibar realises that the intensification of the class struggle in a 
moment of crisis, and the drift to the right in the French political landscape, including 
openly proclaimed racism in the context of the ‘immigration debate’, were inherently 
bound up with each other, and yet irreducible to either one of the problems (economic 
crisis and racism).  
Balibar now acutely understands class struggle to be immersed in and overlaid by 
an ideological struggle, that also takes place within each of the antagonistic classes, and 
always with the participation of the (mostly national) state, which needs to be reflected in 
the theorising of politics.999 Neither the working class, nor the party in the Leninist sense, 
have any privileged access to the ‘truth’ of the social order, or thereby of its overturning, 
because they themselves exist inside ideology: the antagonism is thus neither reducible to a 
simplistic version of either side (be it proletariat or bourgeoisie), nor does it contain a 
teleological character.1000 
This insight is carried on the back of a more fundamental re-evaluation of Balibar’s 
understanding of the significance of ‘class struggle’ itself, with regard to its role in 
                                                
997 See Balibar 1985, 2. 
998 See Balibar 1992, 29–30. See also the Manifesto of the Malgré Tout Collective from 1995 (in which both, 
Balibar and Badiou, took part) for the theoretical convergence of the problem of civic rights, of the 
relationship between politics and the state and the complete dissociation from the Leninist party as “the 
master liberator part excellence” (see Malgré Tout Collective 1995). 
999 See Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 169–171. 
1000 See Balibar 1994a, 170; see also Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 167. 
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determining the social and political present and future of the contemporary capitalist 
societies, which he develops in the context of his collaboration with Immanuel Wallerstein. 
On the one hand, he casts a final and lasting critical judgement on Marx’s “grand 
phenomenology of class struggles and class consciousness”1001, whose rooting in the social 
relations of production will always, according to Balibar, make the division between 
working class and capitalist class primary to the constitution of the social and to political 
strategy, and tie it back to a substantially identitarian understanding of what class struggle 
looks like and who participates in it (i.e. an identity between working class and proletariat 
as characteristic of the classical labour movement).1002 This leads to continually expelling 
other social relations, e.g. racism, to another, less determining ‘scene’, even though the 
construction of racism as a social relation is, in conjunction with the nation-form, just as 
constitutive of global capitalism and its exclusions.1003 
When Balibar argues that it was the events of 1848-1850 that made Marx realise 
that there was a problematic gap between the working class and its constitution as a 
political subject,1004 based on the non-linear intertwinement of ideology with the proletarian 
condition, then we could say the same for the role that the 60s and 70s in France played for 
Balibar’s own theoretical project. 
The results for Balibar’s theorisation of politics in relation to the social are far-
reaching. He formulates the most immediate one already at the end of his 1979 essay, ‘État, 
parti, idéologie’:  
We must confer onto ideological forms and the politics that inform them an entirely 
different reality than previously done; we need to wrest them away from their status 
as an illusion and bestow them with a proper materiality [pleine matérialité].1005 
According to Balibar and the majority of post-Marxists, Marx never achieved the 
development of a concept of ideology with its own materiality.1006 He regards this as the 
only way to think together what Marx insisted on combining, despite that causing him so 
                                                
1001 See Balibar 2012c, 10. 
1002 See Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 180. 
1003 See ibid., 41, 63–64. 
1004 See Balibar 2014, 55. 
1005 Balibar 1979, 166; mt trans. 
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much trouble, namely a critique of political economy that thinks the antagonisms in 
production as inherently political, and a critique of what is commonly designated as politics, 
namely the sphere of the state, its sovereignty and institutions and of private and public law. 
But how can this be done?  
By thinking – as opposed to a Marxian-Althusserian topology of base and 
superstructure – “two ‘bases’”, namely the mode of production (political economy) and the 
mode of subjection (ideology) as “two determinations both incompatible and 
indissociable”.1007 Balibar does not deny that one could even call them the real and the 
imaginary base, but he insists that would presuppose  
that we “keep in mind that in any historical conjuncture, the effects of the imaginary 
can only appear through and by means of the real, and the effects of the real through 
and by means of the imaginary: in other words, the structural law of causality1008 in 
history is the detour through and by means of the other scene”.1009  
That means that both political economy and ideology – as the two scenes – have their own 
materiality, that they are both active and relatively independent forms of mediation of the 
social, whilst they find their respective effectivity only through the other, instead of in the 
structure of the whole. The class struggle within late capitalist society that reproduces this 
society, at the same time as it contests its borders, functions on the basis of the economic 
passing through the ideological, and the ideological passing through the economic. In that 
sense, the real and the imaginary are present within both political economy and ideology, 
and these latter are both internal to class struggle. By designating the two bases, proletarian 
politics as another politics can really be ‘the third’ that struggles to displace the border 
between the economic and the political within and against the real and the imaginary, the 
economic and the ideological forces. Balibar has thereby developed a properly immanent 
conception of politics to the social.1010  
                                                
1007 Balibar 1995, 160. 
1008 Balibar’s reference to structural causality discloses here his continued debt to Althusser’s utilization of a 
Spinozist notion of causality against a mechanical causality or determinism and against what Althusser 
designated as a Hegelian expressive causality (because bound to a spiritualist concept of history). Whilst a 
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research project, we need to point out that Balibar emphasizes that his debt only refers to structural causality 
that does not imply the thinking of a totality. See Balibar 1994b, 32–34. 
1009 Balibar 1995, 160; Althusser made a similar point in the ISA essay Althusser 1971, 166; also Read 2003, 
10 and fn11. 
1010 See Kalampokas 2015. 
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(Proletarian) politics is now properly overdetermined, because it is neither part of 
what Balibar defines as society (civil society or the economic sphere), nor of the state (the 
political state).1011 “Overdetermined” signifies that Balibar wants to distance himself once 
and for all from the slightest possibility of finding his account of politics contaminated by a 
notion of totality that is not thoroughly conjunctural, i.e. tied to what Lenin defined 
Marxism to be, namely “the ‘concrete analysis of a concrete situation’”1012. But, for Balibar, 
this means more than tying political analysis and strategy to the current moment. It implies 
that the existence and effectivity of an alternative politics is as much “a conjunctural fact” 
as it is “an effect of the conjuncture”. He understands the “truth” of politics (Balibar’s 
designation), the materialist basis on which it grounds its political representations in 
difference from dominant, bourgeois political representations, to be entirely contingent on 
whether they become “true”, i.e. whether this knowledge will become effective as a 
practical critique of the dominant ideology and social practices. 1013  Conjunctural or 
overdetermined then also means that class struggle is rendered incomplete or “incomplete-
able”, depending on the practice that emerges.1014  
It is this radical co-existence of the economic and ideological that comes to bear, in 
turn, on his understanding of class struggle: 
 The class struggle can and must be understood as a determining structure affecting 
all social practices, without however being the only one.1015 
What he thereby means is not only its subjection to conjunctural forces, but the fact that 
there are other antagonisms in society that function as universals. Where we referred earlier 
to Balibar’s acknowledgement of Marx’s achievement of ‘incompleting’ Hegel by 
introducing a short-circuit between the economic and the political that deconstructs the 
universality of the Hegelian state, whilst it understands the politics of political economy as 
the struggle to keep a certain universal promise open for the proletariat, Balibar has now 
also incompleted this Marxian incompletion. He explicitly refuses the possibility of 
identifying any one universal as the fundamental social relation, not even ‘in the last 
                                                
1011 See Balibar 1987, 20. 
1012 See Balibar 1994b, 33; Balibar 1994a, 170. 
1013 See Balibar 1994a, 170–171. 
1014 Ibid., 174. Balibar thinks the same is true for historical materialism, which “abused” ideology to fill the 
whole or gap, see p.173. 
1015 Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 181. 
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instance’, unlike in Marx where the labour relation is identified as determining the social 
form through a “single dialectical progression”1016.  
Balibar’s redefinition of the materiality of ideology as a second base, beside the 
economic base or the ‘mode of production’, replaces the Marxian position with another 
conception of politics that leads us purposefully away from Marx’s understanding of the 
relationship between the economic sphere, politics, and history, which he started to 
develop in ‘On the Jewish Question’. Balibar ends up replacing Marx’s urge towards 
reducing the ideological level of the struggle to the fundamental class antagonism, which 
allows Marx to think its genesis as well as its end, with a properly political, as opposed to 
“meta-political”, open-ended understanding of ideology, which operates as another level 
where the struggle plays out, with its own materiality. But he thereby also explicitly and 
decidedly enters into post-Marxist terrain, as he himself acknowledges. 1017  Balibar 
transforms class struggle into a struggle (without class as a privileged antagonism) of and 
within multiple, competing universalities that exist side-by-side within modern society, 
instead of any one being subordinated to the other – political economy and ideology are 
the two bases he starts with, but others follow shortly.1018  
The final step – which returns us to the end of Chapter Five – consists in clarifying 
Balibar’s progression from constituting these two overdetermined bases, towards affirming 
politics as primary in the name of a politics of citizenship qua equaliberty. Because, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, it is on the inside of the politics of citizenship that the modern 
citizen-subjects struggle over and against universals in the name of claiming citizenship-
qua-humanity. Balibar thus binds the functioning of modern ideology (which he also calls 
fictive universality or politics, and which is opposed to the Althusserian transhistorical 
account of ‘ideology in general’) to the existence of equaliberty as ideal or symbolic 
universality, whilst the role of the extra-ideological, overdetermining forces such as capital, 
or economic social relations, becomes more doubtful.  
                                                
1016 Balibar 2002, 146. 
1017 See Balibar 1994a, 172; Balibar 1995, 160–161.  
1018 See Balibar 2002, 148. Balibar’s most prominent and influential examples are his discussion of racism as a 
universalism that he identifies as a supplement of nationalism (also a universalism) and of the universalism of 
sexual difference. See Balibar 1994a, pp.191, esp. 203. 
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Balibar’s re-definition of the materiality of ideology starts, as we have seen, from 
identifying in Marx’s work to what it must not be reduced. In his critique of fetishism, we 
learned that it must not be reduced to economic ideology as an objective illusion, which 
would reduce the law, the state etc. to institutions that exist to ensure the continued 
functioning of the relations of production, which Balibar perceives as a deterministic 
reduction. But we also know from his rejection of Marx’s critique of the Declaration that 
ideology is not reducible to juridical ideology either, which, for Balibar, is the second 
“Marxist” option.1019  Fundamentally, the law cannot be reduced to mere dominant or 
bourgeois ideology, in the sense of an institution that fully dominates [beherrscht] the 
proletariat or the oppressed, by means of which its only purpose becomes to generate 
illusions or false consciousness (and conversely the illusion created by the law cannot be 
the truth of society or politics).1020 But, at this point, Balibar gives us a different reason why 
these reductions are politically and theoretically insupportable than those we discussed in 
6.1. He argues that if we want to be able to think ideology as something that is not forced 
on the dominated, and instead sustains itself based on its support and reproduction by the 
dominant and the dominated classes, then we need to find a way to understand how and 
why the dominated participate in the continued functioning of the dominant ideology.1021 This 
is, in Balibar’s view, a question neglected by Marx, which became, in Marxist theory, the 
question of the discourse of hegemony, of “hegemonic domination”1022.  
It follows that, in the modern civic-bourgeois society, equaliberty as “ideal 
universality” fulfils precisely this function (whose danger of a functionalist aberration is 
here removed through the absence of a base). So far, we have mainly discussed equaliberty 
as containing political possibility without guarantees, because it allows for anyone to 
politicise or democratise their existence. Equaliberty exists, then, as the ideality of the 
autonomy of politics: the self-institution of the people into egalitarian sovereignty as a de 
jure universality.1023 We have mainly focused on the fact that it is a negative universality 
insofar as it only unfolds its truth-effects through its mediations and their historical 
                                                
1019 See Balibar 1987, 39. 
1020 See Balibar 1994a, 166–167. 
1021 See ibid., 98–99; Balibar 1987, 22, 40. 
1022 Balibar 2002, 7. 
1023 See ibid., 2. 
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negotiation. But, most importantly, the inverse is true as well: the fact that its mediations 
function historically, that they exist in changing modes but nevertheless continue to exist, 
depends on what Balibar calls “the ideological universalisation of its principle”1024: that 
there exists an ideality – the de jure equaliberty – which can be invoked against the 
principle’s de facto negation by these mediations. Balibar therefore calls equaliberty the 
symbolic frame of the ideological (or imaginary).1025  
Balibar argues – mirroring an important point from Althusser’s Machiavelli 
interpretation – that this ideal universality is also the condition for ideology, in the Marxist 
sense, to work at all.1026 Because, in contrast to some of Marx’s and Marxism’s attempts to 
define ideology, Balibar rejects the idea that it becomes either a mere reflection of the 
economic base or that ‘the dominant ideology is always the ideology of the dominant class’ 
(German Ideology),1027  both of which he regards as errors of Marxist reductionism or 
simplification, as we discussed earlier. Instead, Balibar defends here  
the (only apparently) paradoxical idea that the necessary condition for an ideology to 
become dominant is that it should elaborate the values and claims of the ‘social 
majority’, become the discourse of the dominated (distorted or inverted as it maybe 
appear).1028  
Balibar makes the ideal universality of equaliberty into the condition of ideology’s 
functioning, because if we do not want to reduce ideology to coercion or trickery, we need 
to account for why it works and becomes dominant all by itself, if it is not indeed serving 
the interests of the majority of society (because it is still the dominant ideology, ultimately 
serving the interests of the dominant class that is in the social minority). The answer to this 
is that it genuinely captures the masses’ interest, belief and political investment, which is 
provoked in the name of “universalistic values” such as “rights, justice, equality, welfare, 
progress, …”.1029 This reflects the latent existence of equaliberty within ideology, namely as 
trace that bears its own efficacy that whilst fuelling ideology extends beyond it.1030  
                                                
1024 Ibid., 7. 
1025 See Balibar 1995, 160. 
1026 Balibar 2002, 164; see also Althusser 2001, 59. 
1027 See Balibar 2002, 164. 
1028 Ibid. 
1029 Ibid. 
1030 See Žižek 2005, 130. 
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Miguel Abensour delivers the adequate assessment of this fundamental theoretical 
manoeuvre, which allows us to connect the dots back to my designation of Lefort as a 
precursor to Balibar. Abensour argues, whilst assessing Lefort’s notion of savage democracy: 
Lefort- unlike the young Marx who, in his critique of human rights in The Jewish 
Question, confused the symbolic with the ideological, or rather reduced the symbolic 
to the ideological by not having bothered to truly think the symbolic- posits that 
human rights form an essential piece of the symbolic constitution of modern 
democracy. This means among other things that it is through human rights that the 
citizens of a modern democracy can apprehend what presents itself to them as real, 
just as they discover the same and the other.1031 
What does Abensour mean here and how does it precisely relate to Balibar’s argument? 
First of all, it allows us to draw a parallel between human rights in Lefort and equaliberty: 
they are both conceived as an ideality to which the real is not subordinated, in the sense 
that Marx has portrayed bourgeois law as a mode of modern or capitalist subjection. 
Instead, it is an ideality in suspension, which allows the democratic community to exist as a 
democratic community, as a divided or split community: divided between its ideological 
existence, which is no more than its real existence (that Balibar also refers to as fictive 
universality),1032 and its symbolic existence, allowing for a permanent contestation between 
the two levels. It allows for what Abensour refers to as “a separation proper to modern 
society”1033.  
Whereas the savage essence of democracy forces democracy as a symbolic form to 
leave the field open for an experience of indetermination – for an experience of the 
loss of foundation – ideology will continually attempt to seize the symbolic, to 
appropriate it as to better domesticate it, to impart in the name of a group or a 
person a determined content to that which resists and evades all determination.1034 
This description of the essential indetermination of the symbolic, and the urge of the 
ideological to fill it with content, or historical ‘mediations’, captures the dynamic that 
Balibar insists upon when he describes equaliberty as trace or ideal universality.  
Whether we understand, with Lefort, the indetermination as the pole of power 
remaining empty, as we outlined in 5.1, or with Balibar as equaliberty, the aporetic ground 
of modern citizenship – they both mark “a loss of foundation” that allows not only for its 
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historical determination, but also for interrupting these determinations in their very name. 
But, and this is the second point their arguments have in common, the political action that 
interrupts, that which Balibar argued Marx was searching for in the name of proletarian 
politics, cannot be derived from the ideality in whose name the interruption is enacted, 
because it is a suspended or aporetic ideality, without arché and end. 1035  Balibar 
undoubtedly finds himself here closer to Lefort than to Marx, in the sense that he develops 
a theory of ideology whose efficacy is grounded by being doubled on the level of the ideal 
or the symbolic, instead of gaining this efficacy in any direct or immanent relation to the 
‘second base’, namely the capitalist relations of production and the connected class 
antagonism. This shift becomes even more apparent in Balibar’s presentation of the 
historical mediations of equaliberty.  
Balibar identifies “two great mediations” that form “the most general ideological 
form of class struggle”, and, in other words, equaliberty’s heteronomy: community and 
property. 1036  Where we earlier specified that Balibar understands the contradiction of 
modern society to have emerged in and continues to exist between the aporetic character 
of equaliberty and the “conflictual character of the situation”1037, he means by this latter the 
conflict that exists within those mediations, which was already present in the original 
revolutionary situation according to Balibar. Community and property are both internally 
divided into two, in so far as the mediation of community contains within it the possible 
but contradictory determinations of national sovereignty and popular sovereignty, and 
property divides into property of labour and property as capital.1038 Even though we are 
now reminded of the “two bases thesis”, we need to be aware that these two mediations 
and their struggle is entirely set within ideology, i.e. within only one of the two bases. And 
Balibar affirms that when he argues that they can be understood as referring to the great 
                                                
1035 See ibid., 116. 
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modern “ideologies” of the political struggle, namely socialism and liberalism, fighting over 
property, and communism and nationalism contesting the connotation of community.1039 
What these brief elaborations on the historical mediations of equaliberty1040 confirm 
is that the force of the symbolic, in Balibar’s case embodied by ‘equaliberty’, exists beyond 
the capitalist social form or capital’s intrusion, if it can be invoked by political action 
against the status quo. And, only once we have acknowledged the need to ascribe an 
irreducible materiality to ideology, are we able to discern this no less irreducible existence 
of the symbolic dimension of equaliberty. Ideology thereby becomes equated with the 
realm of the politics of citizenship, whilst economic and historical relations are part of the 
social as a whole. But what becomes apparent in Balibar only now referring to the latter in 
political terms, is that the doubling of equaliberty as ideal universality, and ideology as 
fictive universality, erodes the immanence of the political and the social, and replaces it 
with a conception in which equaliberty as the absent, but nevertheless unchanging, 
regulative idea is the primary political motor of the subject’s struggle to become citizen, as 
well as of the many modes of subjection in which the citizens find themselves. Equaliberty 
turns the immanent account of politics into a transcendent one, which unquestionably 
removes Balibar from the Marxian project of emancipation, in so far as it situates itself, 
whilst acknowledging a certain tragic inescapability, within ‘political emancipation’. 
Our final concern is to return more explicitly to the ‘political materiality’ of 
equaliberty, as inscribed in Balibar’s opinion of the Declaration and ask, one last time, what 
kind of materiality it is – if, as we just showed, it differs from the materiality of ideology or 
fictive universality, for which it is the condition? Here, we return to the end of Chapter 
Five and ask more forcefully: in what form does the énoncé continue to exist, after its 
initial enunciation? Balibar finds different conceptions for it, ranging from “trace”1041, and 
“supplement of universality”1042 over symbolic, to ideal or idealistic universality.1043 What he 
wants these concepts to capture is equaliberty’s status as a universality that, even though it 
                                                
1039 See Balibar 2013a, 54. 
1040 See Balibar’s periodisation of modernity and his conception of the state in relation to the succession of 
universal citizenship by social citizenship that he identifies. See ibid., 105–124. 
1041 Ibid., 3. 
1042 Ibid., 131. 
1043 Balibar 2002, 163. 
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cannot be instituted once and for all, contains a universal possibility that is not relativistic, 
nor reduces politics to particularistic concerns, but that “corresponds to the incorporation 
of differences and singularities into the very construction of the universal”1044, which can 
be demanded by everyone. It is, however, no more than “a mere possibility, a ghost or an 
idea as opposed to the world of facts”, or, as Balibar formulates it, relying once more on 
Derridean phraseology, “some spectre which can never be deconstructed”1045. It is this 
immortality or irrepressibility of equaliberty, underneath its shifting historical modalities, 
that makes it a trace or an ideal universality.  
This import of the Derridean concepts of trace, supplement, and spectre1046 is not 
something we can brush over lightly, as it delivers an answer to the question of how 
precisely the symbolic level of modern democracy exists beyond capital’s influence, as the 
trace that can never be deconstructed. In her Preface to Of Grammatology, Gayatri Spivak 
describes the operation of the figure of the trace as follows:  
“trace” (the French word carries strong implication of track, footprint, imprint), a 
word that cannot be a master-word, that presents itself as the mark of an anterior 
presence, origin, master. … Derrida, then, gives the name “trace” to the part played 
by the radically other within the structure of difference that is the sign. … 
Heidegger’s Being might point at an inarticulable presence. Derrida’s trace is the 
mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at 
the origin that is the condition of thought and experience.1047 
In Derrida, the figure of the trace as it emerges from his critical reading of Saussure, Freud, 
Husserl, Heidegger, Levi-Strauss, and the figure of the supplement that he sees loathed or 
repressed as ‘dangerous’ in Rousseau’s writings, points towards the inexistence of the origin 
of the text or of ‘writing’, which in turn makes it impossible to appropriate it fully. It 
removes the point of origin by placing it into the trace as “the origin of the origin” or 
“arche-trace”,1048 signifying “a primordial nonself-presence” that asserts the impossibility to 
ever reach, appropriate or conquer the ‘true’ origin. As writing itself is, as Spivak notes to 
be something Derrida struggles to clarify throughout Grammatology with more or less 
                                                
1044 Balibar 2013a, 131. 
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1046 On the relation of all these concepts that seem to be replaceable by each other, Derrida says in an 
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1048 Derrida 1998, 61. 
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success at different points throughout the work, “a broader concept than the empirical 
concept of writing, which denotes an intelligible system of notations on a material 
substance”. It is “the name of the structure always already inhabited by the trace.”1049  
This is, then, the moment where Derrida’s conceptual toolbox opens up to the 
transposition that Balibar carries out, when he applies it to the structure of the modern 
political form as originating in the French Revolutions. He thereby, in some sense, ‘solves’ 
the problem of the relationship between revolutionary events, the actions and intentions of 
the revolutionaries, the texts of the Declarations, and the subsequent instantiations and 
interpretations, even the relationship between the economic and the political before, during, 
and after the events: they all become, in one way or another, moments of a trace that has 
been declared as impossible to define, once and for all. He has removed, as Spivak 
formulates it, the “epistemological cut-off points” that would allow us to step outside the 
“metaphysical enclosure”1050 without a centre, without any hierarchy between oppositions, 
without any discernible line of demarcation between the universal and the singular, that 
Derrida initially formulated as a critique of metaphysics in Hegel, 1051  which he saw 
insufficiently carried out by Heidegger (a problem too big to deepen at this point).  
Whilst Balibar sees the import of a Derridean critique of metaphysics, in allowing 
him to theorise an “equivalence without a general equivalent”1052, the role of capital in the 
later Marx of Capital, he seems to neglect that he simultaneously divests himself of Marx’s 
fundamental critique of politics instead of working ‘through’ it. He does so by, on the one 
hand, placing the struggle over conflicting universals, or over equivalents, inside the 
political sphere, namely by affirming the singularity of political practices rather than 
developing another political philosophical defining “the political”1053. But, on the other 
hand, he relies thereby on the philosophical assertion of a framework of modern politics 
that cannot be deconstructed, which, in the last instance, seems to quietly exchange Marx’s 
conviction that politics is practice, and not theory, for a purely philosophical assertion.1054 
                                                
1049 Spivak 1998, xxxix. 
1050 Ibid., lxxxi. 
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1052 Balibar 2013a, 131. 
1053 See Balibar 2002, 35. 
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Balibar, time and time again, affirms that his project is continuing “the legacy of Marx 
(…his critique of “bourgeois universalism” in the early essay ‘On the Jewish 
Question’…)”1055. But, more concerned with defying any form of theoretical commitment 
to totality than to confronting the authority of political economy that holds society, its 
citizen-subjects, and their latitude of political action in its grip, Balibar reads Marx against 
his own itinerary and instead back into the Marx of 1843, who asserted in the ‘Critique’ that 
“[d]emocracy is the sole truth of all constitutions”1056. 
It is certainly true, that, for both, the Declaration is what Balibar himself calls “an 
emblematic text” for the kind of universalism that was inaugurated by the French 
Revolution, which Marx refers to as political emancipation and Balibar as “civic-bourgeois 
universality”. But, Balibar makes this civic-bourgeois universality into the revolutionary 
achievement and horizon of modernity, as it is unlimited and thereby unsurpassable in its 
exclusionary but also its utopian moments.1057 It is political and human emancipation at the 
same time, the very framework of class struggle (whilst now properly without class), which 
functions without teleological inscription, but also cut off from a revolutionary perspective. 
Balibar confines us to it as the unsurpassable, because indeterminable, limit of modern 
democracies, whereas Marx wants to think its overcoming. 
On a theoretical level, this leads Balibar into several unfortunate contradictions. For 
once he contradicts his own dictum, namely when he affirms:  
the social relations we are speaking of here cannot be reduced to class relations or 
relations of the production and reproduction of exploitation (which is not to say, 
conversely, that we could undervalue, let alone forget, them).1058 
And yet, he does seem to forget them, or at least he can only take them into account 
politically. Costas Douzinas further objects to Balibar’s emphasis on the symbolic function 
of equaliberty that it undermines our ability to take the law at face value, leading us, or in 
this case Balibar, to overemphasise its egalitarian effects.1059 Also, on a practical level, these 
egalitarian effects stand in question. At the end of his essay ‘Class Struggle as Concept of 
the Political’, Balibar questions whether in times where citoyen and bourgeois dissolve into 
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the post-national and post-statal institutions of neoliberal capitalism, the concepts of class 
struggle, and Marxism more generally, have not lost their critical potential, and thereby 
their political relevance, because of the multiplication of levels, forms, and scenes on which 
political conflicts are carried out.1060 But, should we not turn this question around and ask 
whether the global zones of non-reproduction,1061  the forms of hyper-exploitation, the 
unattainability of citizenship, have not developed into violent closures of what it means to 
be human, or “[w]hich men are citizens?” that might have catapulted us into a political 
moment where social citizenship needs to be abandoned as a valid objective of communist 
struggle?  
                                                
1060 See Balibar 2013b, 454–455. 
1061 See Federici 2012. 
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7   Conclusion 
 “The alternative, it seems to me, is to refuse the separation of the 
concrete and the abstract, the social and the political, and to ask 
instead what Marx’s notion of “real emancipation” would look 
like […].”1062 
We know now what Marx’s notion of ‘human emancipation’ looks like. In the first part of 
the thesis, we examined its conceptual and political origins, its stakes vis-à-vis Marx’s 
primary interlocutors, its trajectory and how the Marx of ‘On the Jewish Question’ 
conceives of the society that he wants to leave behind in its name. We found that most of 
the weight of Marx’s conceptualising effort lies in painting a picture of the limits of the 
merely politically emancipated civil-bourgeois society, whereas human emancipation 
appears more like a vague and distant vision that has not much content of its own, except 
that once it is achieved by means of a (second) revolution, the limits of political 
emancipation will be overcome. These limits are, as we argued, structural limits created by 
the separation between civil society with socio-economic and private man on the one side 
and the state with the political and public citizen on the other; a divide that is constitutive 
of the civil-bourgeois society. Their overcoming qua revolution would involve as much a 
remaking of society as a whole, by founding it on a different social bond in the name of a 
different kind of freedom, as the simultaneous remaking of human individuality in the 
sense of self-emancipation of ‘man’ towards becoming and acting as a social individual.  
 This conclusion, as well as the underlying careful separation of Marx’s critique of 
civil-bourgeois society and emancipatory vision from Bauer’s, Hegel’s and Rousseau’s 
respective approaches, represents in and of itself a significant contribution to 
contemporary Marxist political thought and more generally to political theory concerned 
with the late 18th and early 19th century. Firstly, we have placed Marx’s conceptualisation of 
emancipation more explicitly in dialogue with Hegel’s conception of a secularised Christian 
state and with Bauer’s attempt at radicalising his former teacher’s efforts than has previous 
research, which allows for a fuller and more nuanced understanding of the disagreements 
between the three authors on the potentialities and limits of secularisation. Most 
importantly, our research has allowed us to determine the precise points at which the 
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Althusserian subsumption of the Marx of ‘On the Jewish Question’ under a ‘generally 
young, Hegelian Marx’ (although Althusser is by far not the only one to have suggested 
such a generalisation) fails to do justice to Marx’s theoretical achievements in that text. 
Against such a curtailment, we have, in the first part of the thesis, excavated the most 
potent elements of Marx’s critique of bourgeois politics, the politics of democratic 
citizenship, namely the interrelation and respective roles of liberal and republican ideology 
and of the socio-economic relations. This conception of the critique of politics marks an 
advancement towards a materialist critique of bourgeois politics or ‘political emancipation’ 
in Marx’s writings, which significantly surpasses the critique of politics formulated in the 
1843 ‘Critique’ and is not reducible to a Rousseauian vision of ‘true democracy’ as Colletti 
and Della Volpe suggested: a result that should shift the role that ‘On the Jewish Question’ 
and Marx’s theoretical and political ambitions reflected in this text play within future 
general assessments of ‘the young Marx’. These research findings should also help to 
stimulate further research examining Marx’s political critique and its goals against the 
background of his later critique of political economy without reducing either side to the 
other’s supposed “truth”. We have thereby re-opened the problem of the relationship 
between the different stages of Marx’s work along a line of inquiry, namely the relationship 
between his critique of politics and the critique of political economy, that presents a 
substantial challenge to the possibility of maintaining those clear cut distinctions upheld by 
the existing gulfs between structural Marxism, political Marxism and Hegelian Marxism, to 
mention only the most concerned strands. 
 But we cannot return to Marx’s critique of politics within the confines of 
democratic citizenship today without going through the criticisms that have been levelled at 
his approach in the more recent past, most prominently from within French Post-Marxism, 
which brings us to the role and significance of the findings in the second part of the thesis. 
On the one hand, Balibar’s careful and critical reading of the young Marx, within the 
context of his entire oeuvre, has allowed us to push significantly further the analysis of the 
strength as well as of the gaps and ambiguities in Marx’s theorisation of political and 
human emancipation from the first part. As we saw, for Balibar, who analyses every shift in 
Marx’s theorisation with a concern for the tensions and contradictions that appear 
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throughout his oeuvre, rather than looking for the one conception that provides the key to 
all the others, the shift between Marx’s early and late accounts of the place and role of 
politics does not only fall short of a convincing, univocal position. For Balibar, Marx 
ultimately fails to conceive of politics in its bourgeois and proletarian form as having its 
own proper materiality, which is not and cannot be determined by economic laws or socio-
economic relations; Marx, in this view, lacks a consistent concept of ideology and its 
materiality. Whilst this observation in and of itself is certainly not new, in the sense that it 
was one of Althusser’s most important contributions to Marxist thought in the 20th century, 
it gains a new and pertinent significance in the context of this thesis and in direct 
conjunction with the first part. Because, whilst Balibar’s insight on the one hand still 
problematically relies on the reductive Althusserian reading of the young Marx – a reading, 
which we have explicitly and implicitly dispelled through a critical engagement with 
Balibar’s argumentation and complicated through the analysis of the first part of the thesis 
– his problematisation on the other hand supports the overall premise of this thesis: 
namely, that the problem of politics and its materiality, which Balibar acknowledges was 
the primary concern of the young Marx, is to be taken seriously.  
 Our analysis in the second part thus opens up a new and extremely promising angle 
onto the question of the Marxian critique of politics: from this angle, conceptualising 
emancipation ‘after Marx’ means taking seriously Balibar’s challenge regarding the lack or 
under-development of a concept of ideology when we return to Marx’s critique of 
bourgeois politics. This is a challenge to which neither Althusser nor Balibar himself, nor 
even Marx’s later works, provide the answer. As a result of our research, we have placed 
this concern for the materiality of ideology as one cornerstone within the larger project of 
revivifying Marx’s critique of politics and his account of an alternative, emancipatory 
politics in light of his critique of political economy. 
 That it is in the end precisely Balibar’s writings on Marx that pave the way for such 
a critical but faithful interrogation of the relationship between the political and the 
economic in Marx is a somewhat curious outcome. After all, we have prominently argued 
in the second part of the thesis that Balibar’s own turn towards a radically democratic 
politics of citizenship in the name of equaliberty is to be understood as an exit not only 
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from Marx’s specific project of human emancipation qua revolution as formulated in ‘On 
the Jewish Question’, but more generally from aiming to formulate a critique of bourgeois 
politics and a concept of emancipatory politics in the Marxian vein. This turn against Marx 
is marked by Balibar’s interpretation of the Declarations and of the outcomes of the 
French revolution, which contradicts the Marxian interpretation and provides the ground 
for his alternative conception of emancipatory politics. As we have seen in the first part of 
the thesis, Marx argues that even in the most radical Jacobin Declaration from 1793 the 
political power of the rights to equality and liberty is limited to what they can come to 
mean in light of the “materialism of civil society” with individualist, egoistic man, which he 
understands to dominate the related, but separate sphere of the state and the citizen within 
civil-bourgeois society. In opposition to Marx, Balibar denies such a limit and holds that in 
fact the initial 1789 Declaration pronounces a hyperbolic double equation of equality and 
liberty and man and citizen that provides the means for everyone to contest any specific 
determination of citizenship rights as well as the boundaries drawn between citizens and 
non-citizens. Because, based on the Declaration, so he argues, everyone is a citizen simply 
by virtue of being a ‘man’; human nature is left empty to be defined by the political actions 
of the citizens, who are the sovereign. As we have shown, Balibar thus returns to a politics 
of emancipation that takes place between the enunciation of the Declaration and the 
subsequent ongoing conflicts over how it is put into effect for different groups and 
members of society, but that is located entirely in the sphere of politics and ideology, 
reducing socio-economic relations to secondary effects. He thereby undoes the Marxian 
emphasis on the importance of conceiving all these categories – equality, liberty, man and 
citizen – as always already determined and thus limited within the civil-bourgeois society by 
the complex, autonomous and heteronomous, relation of civil society and the state, or the 
economic and the political.  
 But – and this is the last but not at all least significant insight emerging from the 
research of this thesis – as clearly as we have articulated our criticism of Balibar’s  
Kantian-Derridean positing of the primacy of politics, our critique by no means implies any 
outright rejection of Balibar’s defence and radically democratic re-casting of a politics of 
transnational citizenship. Nor do we intend to issue a call to simply return to Marx’s 
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demand for human emancipation qua revolution, as the only truly radical politics of 
emancipation. The two parts of the thesis in this sense allow for a result that crucially 
depends on the constellation of the two thinkers within the two historical moments, Marx 
and Balibar, and their diverging concepts of emancipation, split along the line of revolution 
and citizenship. An argument no doubt in need of further elaboration. 
 A large part of the research has been concerned with articulating the existence of 
the dividing line citizenship/revolution and with spelling out where it runs, within Marx’s 
own early works and between his and Balibar’s diverging interpretations of the French 
revolution, their antithetic understanding of the implied relationship between man and 
citizen and the overall significance of this disagreement for a contemporary emancipatory 
politics. The question that remains to be confronted is thus what kind of conclusion we 
can draw from the divergence of the two accounts across the two historical moments if the 
results of our research make the simple taking of either side impossible, in that it would 
falsely reduce the complexity of the reading that was put forward throughout the thesis.  
 We are today in yet again another political moment from those of the 1840s or the 
1980s and 90s, even though Badiou suggests that the ruthless and “cynical” capitalism of 
today, in conjunction with the decline of workers’ political organisation or other forms of 
lasting and visible class struggle, looks a lot like that at the time of the Young Hegelians.1063 
And it was certainly not necessary for the so-called “refugee crisis” to be declared in 2015 
by a majority of European nation-states in order to understand that the struggle for 
citizenship is a deeply political struggle and a question over life and death for millions of 
people. A demand for transnational citizenship, or for political citizenship that reaches 
beyond nations and their borders, beyond ethnicities and other forms of identitarian 
belonging, as Balibar formulates it, is thus a radical and necessary counter-voice to those 
who simply ‘manage’ the situation in the best interest of each national government, and 
those who try to exploit it for their own, nationalist and racist agendas. 
On the other hand, we cannot ignore the challenge that Marx’s emphasis on the 
limits of a politics of democratic citizenship poses to Balibar’s position, even if, as we have 
seen, the latter’s politics of equaliberty cannot be simply equated with what Marx called 
                                                
1063 Badiou 2010, 258–259. 
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political emancipation. Marx’s view is based on the conviction that, in modern society, 
citizenship and the state on one side and what he called civil society and later economic 
society on the other are separated but dialectically intertwined, whilst the economic 
relations are determining (but not dominant)1064. This understanding causes him to see the 
possibility for truly human emancipation only in a revolutionary project that aims at ending 
the intertwinement of economic exploitation and political domination through taking 
seriously and opposing the entire relational structure with its determining and determined 
parts. The key is to see this argument for what it is. It is, first and foremost, a critique of 
those positions that defend a political dialectic, e.g. of man and citizen and equality and 
liberty, as holding the ability to challenge the bourgeois juridical universalism by affirming 
another, more radical political universalism immanent to but in conflict with the given 
democratic order; a critique of those positions that assume the possibility of going beyond 
the bourgeois political form of the state, the people and the political mechanisms of 
representation by invoking a different humanity, one that is not currently represented but 
that exists. Marx is not in this regard the revolutioniser of natural rights theory that Bloch 
tried turn him into.1065 The separation of man and the citizen is not for Marx a potentiality 
that allows one side to challenge the other, but a problem on both sides of the divide: man 
and citizen are, as we have seen, both equally subjected by the economic and ideological 
mechanisms of civil-bourgeois society, which is why the political power to emancipate 
humanity from this societal form will need to emerge in opposition to both sides of 
‘modern man’: man and citizen. It is in this way that I want to suggest we understand Joan 
Scott’s invocation of a refusal of the separation as essential to Marx’s account of human 
emancipation – a problem that Balibar renounces when he focuses primarily on the 
political power of the enunciated equation of man = citizen. 
Beyond this clarification, we are left to address the problem of the seemingly 
temporal succession of the different forms of emancipation in Marx’s portrayal that 
strongly suggests a teleological outlook onto historical development that has lingered over 
this thesis from the very beginning: religious emancipation is superseded by political 
                                                
1064 See Althusser’s differentiation, which I am adopting here; Althusser and Balibar 2009, 319. 
1065 See Bloch 1996, 125 and p.120 of this thesis. 
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emancipation is to be superseded by human emancipation. Having gone through Balibar’s 
critique of this early Marxian conception and his own account of a radically democratic 
politics of citizenship qua equaliberty leaves us with the challenge of confronting the 
Marxian schema not only as a problem internal to his account of emancipation. Instead, 
the question becomes how we will be able to conclude on the relationship between the 
Marxian and the Balibarian conflicting concepts of emancipation from a contemporary 
perspective against the background of Marx’s seemingly clear teleological schema of 
supersession. In other words: How can we take the challenge that Marx’s critique of 
political emancipation poses for a Balibarian politics of citizenship seriously, without 
reducing the latter to nothing but the antechamber of the revolution that will bring about 
truly human emancipation? 
In concluding the first part of this thesis, we already showed that the apparent 
linearity of Marx’s conceptualisation of emancipation is complicated by the fact that Marx 
nevertheless does not allow any sacrifice or subordination of politically emancipatory 
projects, e.g. the struggle of the Jewish community for full citizenship rights, which Marx 
strongly supported, to the ultimate goal of human emancipation. Extrapolating from this 
insight when casting our judgement on the significance of the Balibarian politics of 
citizenship for a project that aims to think emancipation ‘after Marx’, we are able to 
conclude that the two thinkers’ political approaches are not mutually exclusive, but they 
both have their place within an emancipatory and revolutionary politics. Whether the 
struggles of women, people of colour, of the disenfranchised and the displaced focus on 
challenging the border that is drawn between what counts as private and what counts as 
public, as political and non-political, between activities remunerated by a wage and those 
that are unwaged, or on who is granted access to either side; whether they focus on 
challenging the very definitions of freedom and equality that reign on either side of the 
divide or precisely through upholding the separation; whether they focus on gaining 
something the existing social order denies them but grants others or on abolishing the 
order as such: neither the struggle for equaliberty, nor that for human emancipation leaves 
the socio-political order or the individuals concerned unchanged or unchallenged, which is 
what counts.  
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This seemingly conciliatory conclusion is not to be misunderstood as an attempt at 
levelling out the disagreements that we have so painstakingly unearthed. We instead want 
to apply the important lesson contained in reading Marx’s theoretical and practical 
approach to the ‘Jewish question’ alongside the critiques that have been directed at Marx’s 
work by French Post-Marxism (alongside other strands of course) starting from the mid-
1970s, which both confirm that one would be mistaken to conceptualise the emancipatory 
nature of struggles as well as the development of the civil-bourgeois or today capitalist 
society in a linear and teleological manner based on having identified the structures of the 
society in question. The temporalities and the modalities of revolutionary politics have to 
be captured as multiple, non-linear and specific to the particular historical conjuncture – a 
lesson that recent research into the global history of the development of capitalism has 
already learned, 1066  but that can now be extended to researching further into the 
relationship between this development and the manifestations and imaginations of 
emancipatory politics. 
The achievement of this thesis is then to have distilled a disagreement that 
maintains its pertinence beyond the historical-conjunctural specific difference between the 
two accounts of emancipatory politics of the young Marx and Balibar: namely a 
disagreement over how the universal structure of the modern, post-revolutionary society is 
to be defined and where a revolutionary project that wants to challenge and remake this 
structure is thus to be anchored. The recognition that this is a problem that needs to be 
confronted had as good as disappeared under the larger Post-Marxist embrace of a radical 
democratic approach to emancipatory politics that developed from the mid-1970s onwards 
and has by today become largely hegemonic in the Marx-inspired fractions within political 
thought. But only by challenging the hegemony and returning to this disagreement with all 
the theoretical and practical resources available to us, over and over again, we can continue 
to speak of a commitment to an emancipatory politics in the Marxian sense, aimed at a 
world in which individual and collective freedom do not contradict each other and at 
searching for the means to make such an imagination reality.  
  
                                                
1066 See Harootunian 2015; Tomba 2013; Anderson 2010. 
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Calvié, Lucien. 1989. Le renard et les raisins: la Révolution française et les intellectuels allemands, 
1789-1845. Paris: Etudes et documentation internationales. 
Carlebach, Julius. 1978. Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism. London: Routledge & 
Paul. 
Castoriadis, Cornelius. 1998. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Celikates, Robin. 2010. Ziviler Ungehorsam und Radikale Demokratie. Konstitutive vs. 
Konstiutierte Macht. In Das Politische und die Politik, edited by Thomas; Röttgers 
Bedorf, 274–300. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Char, René. 1971. Recherche de la base et du sommet. Edition collective. Paris: Gallimard. 
 264 
Christofferson, Michael Scott. 2004. French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian 
Moment of the 1970’s. New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Cohen, Jean L. 1987. Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory. Amherst: 
Univ of Massachusetts Press. 
Colletti, Lucio. 1974. From Rousseau to Lenin. New York; London: Monthly Review Press. 
Comninel, George C. 1987. Rethinking the French Revolution. London; New York: Verso 
Books. 
Cusset, François. 2006. La décennie: le grand cauchemar des années 1980. Paris: La Découverte. 
Della Volpe, Galvano. 1970. The Marxist Critique of Rousseau. New Left Review (59). I: 
101–109. 
Della Volpe, Galvano. 1978. Rousseau and Marx. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Demirović, Alex. 1992. Freiheit oder die Dekonstruktion des Politischen. In Postmoderne und 
Politik, edited by Jutta Georg-Lauer. Tübingen: edition diskord. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1984. The Ends of Man. In Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass, 
111–136. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1998. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 
Corrected ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Dosse, François. 1989. 1789-1989 - Sous le linceul: la Révolution. In Permanences de la 
Révolution: pour un autre bicentenaire, 17–30. Montreuil: La Brèche-PEC. 
Douzinas, Costas. 2000. The End of Human Rights. Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing. 
Draper, Hal. 1977. Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution / 1, State and Bureaucracy. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Engels, Friedrich. 2009. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Edited by Victor 
Kiernan and Tristram Hunt. London: Penguin Classics. 
Fackenheim, Emil L. 1982. The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Farris, Sara. 2013. Althusser and Tronti: The Primacy of Politics Versus the Autonomy of 
the Political. In Encountering Althusser: Politics and Materialism in Contemporary Radical 
Thought, edited by Katja Diefenbach, Sara Farris, Gal Kirn, and Peter D. Thomas, 
185–203. London: Continuum. 
Farris, Sara. 2014. From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question. Republican 
Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation. 
Constellations 21 (2): 296–307. 
Farris, Sara. n.d. From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question: Republican Rigorism, 
Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation. 
Federici, Silvia. 2012. The Reproduction of Labor Power in the Global Economy and the 
Unfinished Feminist Revolution (2008). In Revolution at point zero: housework, 
reproduction, and feminist struggle, 91–111. Oakland, CA; Brooklyn, NY; London: PM 
Press. 
Feuerbach, Ludwig. 1989. The Essence of Christianity. Translated by George Eliot. Buffalo, 
N.Y.: Prometheus Books. 
Feuerbach, Ludwig. 2013. The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings. Translated by Zawar Hanfi. 
London; New York: Verso. 
Fine, Robert. 2001. Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx and Arendt. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Fine, Robert. 2006. Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Anti-Semitism. Engage Journal (2). 
Available from <https://engageonline.wordpress.com/2015/11/04/karl-marx-
and-the-radical-critique-of-anti-semitism-robert-fine-engage-journal-issue-2-may-
2006/>. . Accessed26 February 2016. 
Fischer, Lars. 2006. Hegel in Support of Jewish Emancipation: A Deliberate Political Act? 
The Owl of Minerva 37 (2). 
Franco, Paul. 2002. Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. 
Furet, François. 1978. Penser la Révolution française. Paris: Gallimard. 
Furet, François, Jacques Julliard, and Pierre Rosanvallon. 1989. La République du centre : La 
fin de l’exception française. Paris: Hachette Littérature. 
Gaille-Nikodimov, Marie, Justine Lacroix, and Diogo Sardinha. 2014. Pourquoi Balibar ? 
Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. 
Gascoigne, Robert. 1985. Religion, Rationality and Community: Sacred and Secular in the Thought of 
Hegel and His Critics. Dordrecht; Boston; Lancaster: Nijhoff. 
 265 
Gastaut, Yvan. 2000. L’ immigration et l’opinion en France sous la Ve République. Paris: Seuil. 
Gauchet, Marcel. 1980. Les droits de l’homme ne sont pas une politique. Le Débat (3): 2–21. 
Geroulanos, Stefanos. 2010. An Atheism that Is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
Gordon, Colin. 1993. Question, Ethos, Event - Foucault on Kant and Enlightenment. In 
Foucault’s New Domains, edited by Mike Gane and Terry Johnson, 19–35. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
Gould, Carol C. 1980. Marx’s Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx’s Theory of 
Social Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Grass, Karl Martin, and Reinhart Koselleck. 1997. Emanzipation. In Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe : historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, edited by 
Otto Brunner, Werner Conz, and Rudolf Walther, Band 2 E-G:153 – 197. Vol. 
Band 2 E-G. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 
Greiffenhagen, Martin. 1971. Emanzipation. Edited by Joachim Ritter and Karlfried 
Gründer. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Basel: Schwabe. 
Greiffenhagen, Martin. 1973. Emanzipation. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. 
Habermas, Juergen. 1988. Natural Law and Revolution. In Theory and Practice, 82–120. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Harootunian, Harry. 2015. Marx After Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism. 
New York: Columbia Univers. Press. 
Hartfiel, Günter, ed. 1975. Emanzipation - ideologischer Fetisch oder reale Chance? Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1971. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind: Part III of the Encyclopaedia 
of the Philosophical Sciences. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1986a. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, oder, Naturrecht 
und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1986b. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion 1. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1991. The Encyclopaedia Logic, with the Zusätze: Part I of the 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze. Edited by Théodore F. Geraets, 
Wallis Arthur Suchting, and Henry Silton Harris. Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2003. Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Edited by 
Allan W. Wood. Translated by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2008a. Phenomenology of Spirit [bilingual]. Translated by 
Terry Pinkard. Available from <http://terrypinkard.weebly.com/phenomenology-
of-spirit-page.html>. . Accessed22 February 2016. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2008b. Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume I: 
Introduction and the Concept of Religion. Edited by Peter C. Hodgson. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2009. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im 
Grundrisse: 1830. Dritter Teil. Die Philosophie des Geistes. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2010. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 2011. Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 
Volume I: Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822-1823. Edited by Peter C. 
Hodgson. Translated by Robert F. Brown. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Heil, Reinhard, and Andreas Hetzel. 2006. Die unendliche Aufgabe: Kritik und Perspektiven der 
Demokratietheorie. Bielefeld: transcript. 
Heine, Heinrich. 1972. Reisebilder, Kapitel 29. In Werke und Briefe in zehn Bänden: Band 3, 
257–260. Berlin; Weimar: Diogenes Verlag. 
Herwig, Hedda J. 1980. Formen des Emanzipationsbegriffs : zur Kritik der unbestimmten 
Selbstverwirklichung. München: Wilhelm Fink. 
Hewlett, Nick. 2007. Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Rethinking Emancipation. London: Continuum. 
Heyer, Andreas. 2007. Die Last der Verschwörung – Gracchus Babeufs Theorie der 
Freiheit und Gleichheit. UTOPIE kreativ 195: 5–19. 
 266 
Hobsbawm, Eric. 1985. Revolution in the Theory of Karl Marx. In Marx en perspective: actes 
du colloque organisé par l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, décembre 1983, 
edited by Bernard. Chavance, 557–570. Paris: Éd. de l’École des hautes études en 
sciences sociales. 
Hyppolite, Jean. 1969. Studies on Marx and Hegel. London: Heinemann. 
Isaac, Jeffrey C. 1990. The Lion’s Skin of Politics: Marx on Republicanism. Polity 22 (3): 
461–488. 
Israel, Jonathan I. 2008. Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of 
Man, 1670-1752. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jaeggi, Rahel. 1997. Welt und Person: zum anthropologischen Hintergrund der Gesellschaftskritik 
Hannah Arendts. Berlin: Lukas-Verlag. 
Jaeschke, Walter. 2009. Es ist ein Begriff der Freiheit in Religion und Staat. In Staat und 
Religion in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, edited by Andreas Arndt, Christian Iber, and 
Günter Kruck, 9–22. Hegel-Forschungen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
Jainchill, Andrew, and Samuel Moyn. 2004. French Democracy between Totalitarianism 
and Solidarity: Pierre Rosanvallon and Revisionist Historiography. The Journal of 
Modern History 76 (1): 107–154. 
Jellinek, Georg. 1927. Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte. Edited by Walter Jellinek. 
4th ed. München: Duncker & Humblot. 
Jennings, Jeremy. 2011. Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France Since 
the Eighteenth Century. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kalampokas, Giorgos. 2015. Towards a New Practice of Politics [unpublished]. London. 
Available from 
<https://www.academia.edu/18374098/Towards_a_new_practice_of_politics_H
M_2015_talk_>. . Accessed8 February 2016. 
Kalmring, Stefan. 2012. Die Lust zur Kritik: ein Plädoyer für soziale Emanzipation. Berlin: Dietz. 
Kaltenbrunner, Gerd-Klaus. 1975. Zur Emanzipation verurteilt : der Preis unserer Mündigkeit. 
München: Herder. 
Kanda, Junji. 2003. Die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen und die Philosophie: Studien zum 
radikalen Hegelianismus im Vormärz. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang. 
Keane, John. 1988a. Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives. London; New York: 
Verso. 
Keane, John. 1988b. Democracy and Civil Society: On the Predicaments of European Socialism, the 
Prospects for Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and Political Power. London; 
New York: Verso. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. 2002. The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. 2006. Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen 
und sozialen Sprache. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Kouvelakis, Stathis. 2003. Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx. London: Verso. 
Kouvelakis, Stathis. 2005. The Marxian Critique of Citizenship: For a Rereading of On the 
Jewish Question. South Atlantic Quarterly 104 (4): pp. 707–721. 
Laborde, Cécile. 2008. Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Laclau, Ernesto. 2007. Emancipation(s). London: Verso. 
Lefort, Claude. 1986. The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Lefort, Claude. 1991. Democracy and Political Theory. Cambridge: Polity. 
Legal Information Institute Staff. 2010. First Amendment. LII / Legal Information Institute. 
Available from <https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment>. . 
Accessed28 February 2016. 
Lehmann, Maren. 2011. Revolution als Beruf. In Philister: Problemgeschichte einer Sozialfigur der 
neueren deutschen Literatur, edited by Remigius Bunia, Till Dembek, and Georg 
Stanitzek, 397–414. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
Lettow, Susanne. 2015. Editor’s Introduction–Emancipation: Rethinking Subjectivity, 
Power, and Change. Hypatia 30 (3): 501–512. 
Loick, Daniel. 2013. Abhängigkeitserklärung. Recht und Subjektivität. In Nach Marx: 
Philosophie, Kritik, Praxis, edited by Rahel Jaeggi and Daniel Loick, 296–318. Berlin: 
Suhrkamp. 
 267 
Losurdo, Domenico. 2004a. Hegel and the Freedom of Moderns. Durham; London: Duke 
University Press. 
Losurdo, Domenico. 2004b. Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat: Hegel, Marx und die zwei 
Liberalismen. Zeitschrift Marxistische Erneuerung 57. Available from 
<http://www.zeitschrift-marxistische-erneuerung.de/article/941.buergerliche-
gesellschaft-und-staat-hegel-marx-und-die-zwei-liberalismen.html?print=1>. . 
Accessed3 March 2015. 
Löwith, Karl. 2011. Menschenrechte und Bürgerrechte bei Rousseau, Hegel und Marx. In 
Die Revolution der Menschenrechte : grundlegende Texte zu einem neuen Begriff des Politischen, 
edited by Christoph Menke-Eggers and Francesca Raimondi, 381–393. Berlin: 
Suhrkamp. 
Löwy, Michael. 2003. The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx. Leiden; Boston: Brill. 
Luporini, Cesare. 1979. Le politique et l’étatique: une ou deux critiques? In Marx et sa 
critique de la politique, 53–106. Paris: Maspero. 
Ma ̈der, Denis. 2010. Fortschritt bei Marx. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
Maihofer, Andrea. 1992. Das Recht bei Marx: zur dialektischen Struktur von Gerechtigkeit, 
Menschenrechten und Recht. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Malgré Tout Collective. 1995. Manifesto of the Malgré Tout Collective. Available from 
<http://malgretout.collectifs.net/spip.php?article20>. . Accessed23 June 2015. 
Manning, Susan, and Peter France. 2006. Enlightenment and Emancipation. Lewisburg: 
Bucknell University Press. 
Marchart, Oliver. 2007. Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, 
Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Marx, Karl. 1975a. Critical Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. 
By a Prussian’. In Early Writings, 401–420. London: Penguin. 
Marx, Karl. 1975b. Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State (§§261-313). In Early Writings, 
57–198. London: Penguin. 
Marx, Karl. 1975c. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. 
Introduction. In Early Writings, 243–257. London: Penguin. 
Marx, Karl. 1976. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1. London: Penguin Books. 
Marx, Karl. 1996. The Civil War in France. In Marx: Later Political Writings, edited by Terrell 
Carver, 163–207. 
Marx, Karl. 1998. Theses on Feuerbach. In The German ideology : including Theses on Feuerbach 
and the introduction to the critique of political economy, 569–571. Amherst, N.Y.: 
Prometheus Books. 
Marx, Karl. 2010. On the Jewish Question. In Collected Works, 146–174. London: Lawrence 
& Wishart. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1956. Marx-Engels-Werke, Band 1: 1839 bis 1844. Berlin: 
Dietz. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1975. The Holy Family. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. 
House. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1981. Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA). - Vierte 
Abteilung, Band 2: Exzerpte, Notizen, Marginalien: Exzerpte und Notizen 1843 bis Januar 
1845. - Apparat. Berlin: Dietz. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1982. Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA). - Erste 
Abteilung, Band 2: Werke, Artikel, Entwürfe Mrz.1843-Aug.1844 - Apparat. Berlin: 
Dietz. 
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 2009. Marx-Engels-Werke, Band 8: August 1851 bis März 
1853. 9th ed. Berlin: Dietz. 
Michelet, Jules. 1847. History of the French revolution. London: H.G. Bohn. 
Moggach, Douglas. 2002. The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer. Modern European 
philosophy. Cambridge (UK), New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Moggach, Douglas. 2006. Republican Rigorism and Emancipation in Bruno Bauer. In The 
New Hegelians: Politics and Philosophy in the Hegelian School, edited by Douglas Moggach, 
114–135. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moggach, Douglas. 2015. Subject or Substance? The Meta-ethics of the Hegelian School. 
In Die linken Hegelianer: Studien zum Verhältnis von Religion und Politik im Vormärz, 
edited by Michael Quante and Amir Mohseni, 177–198. Paderborn: Fink. 
 268 
Moyn, Samuel. 2012. The Politics of Individual Rights: Marcel Gauchet and Claude Lefort. 
In French Liberalism from Montesquieu to the Present Day, 291–310. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Niederberger, Andreas. 2008. Wie viel Gemeinwohl braucht die Republik? Überlegungen 
zu neuen Varianten des Republikanismus jenseits von substantieller Gemeinschaft 
und Tugend. In Politik der Gemeinschaft: zur Konstitution des Politischen in der Gegenwart, 
87–105. Bielefeld: transcript. 
Norton, Anne. 2013. On the Muslim Question. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Novara Media. 2015. Interview: Yanis Varoufakis. Novara Media. Available from 
<http://novaramedia.com/2015/10/interview-yanis-varoufakis/>. . Accessed20 
February 2016. 
Peled, Yoav. 1992. From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the 
Question of Jewish Emancipation. History of Political Thought 13 (3): 463–485. 
Pepperle, Heinz, and Ingrid Pepperle. 1985. Die Hegelsche Linke. Dokumente zu Philosophie und 
Politik im deutschen Vormärz. Leipzig: Reclam Philipp jun. 
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 1992. Emancipations, Modern and Postmodern. Sage Pubns. 
Post, Werner. 1975. Emanzipation und Krise: Studien zur Idee der Emanzipation bei 
Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach und Moses Heß. Habilitationsschrift, 
Pädagogische Hochschule Bonn. 
Power, Nina. 2015. Das kollektive politische Subjekt: Aufsätze zur kritischen Philosophie. 
Hamburg: Laika. 
Power, N., and A. Toscano. 2009. The Philosophy of Restoration: Alain Badiou and the 
Enemies of May. boundary 2 36 (1): 27–46. 
Prussia [Kingdom]. 1810. Gesetzsammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten, Nr.5 
- No.80: Edikt betreffend die bürgerlichen Verhältnisse der Juden in dem 
Preussischen Staate. Vom 11. März 1812. Available from 
<http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b3094006;view=1up;seq=427>. . 
Accessed22 February 2016. 
Rancière, Jacques. 1995. La mésentente. Paris: Editions Galilée. 
Rancière, Jacques. 1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Rancière, Jacques. 2004. Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man? The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 103 (2): 297–310. 
Rancière, Jacques. 2007. Hatred of Democracy. London; New York: Verso. 
Read, Jason. 2003. The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Read, Jason. 2011. The Social Individual. Utah Valley State College. Available from 
<http://www.unemployednegativity.com/2011/10/social-individual-collectivity-
and.html>. . Accessed1 October 2016. 
Rehmann, Jan. 2014. Theories of Ideology: The Powers of Alienation and Subjection. Chicago, 
London: Haymarket Books. 
Reitz, Tilman. 2004. Die Politik der Menschenrechte: Étienne Balibar. In Die Rückkehr des 
Politischen - Demokratietheorien heute, edited by Oliver Flügel, Reinhard Heil, and 
Andreas Hetzel, 113–128. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 
Riedel, Manfred. 1975. Hegels Begriff der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und das Problem 
seines geschichtlichen Ursprungs. In Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, edited by 
Manfred Riedel, 2:247–275. Vol. 2. 
Ritter, Joachim. 1984. Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on ‘The Philosophy of Right’. 
London, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Rödel, Ulrich. 1990. Autonome Gesellschaft und libertäre Demokratie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Rohrmoser, Günter. 1995. Emanzipation und Freiheit. 2nd ed. Frankfurt a.M.: Propyläen. 
Rose, Gillian. 2009. Hegel Contra Sociology. London: Verso. 
Rosen, Zvi. 1977. Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer on Marx’s Thought. 
The Hague: Nijhoff. 
Rotenstreich, Nathan. 1953. Hegel’s Image of Judaism. Jewish Social Studies 15 (1): 33–52. 
Rotenstreich, Nathan. 1959. For and against Emancipation: The Bruno Bauer Controversy. 
Leo Back Institute Year Book 4. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2008. Diskurs über die Ungleichheit. Discours sur l’inègalitè: Kritische 
Ausgabe des integralen Textes. Mit sämtlichen Fragmenten und ergänzenden ... Zweisprachige 
 269 
Ausgabe: Deutsch / Französisch. Edited by Heinrich Meier. 6th ed. Paderborn: 
Schöningh UTB. 
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 2010. Du contrat social / Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag: Französisch/Deutsch. 
Edited by Hans Brockard. Stuttgart: Reclam, Philipp jun. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2014a. On The Social Contract; or, Principles of Political Right. In 
The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Two Discourses and Social 
Contract, edited by John T Scott, 153–272. Chicago, London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2014b. Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. In The Major 
Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Two Discourses and Social Contract, edited 
by John T Scott, 37–151. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 
Ruda, Frank. 2010. Proletarischer Aristokratismus und das Gattungswesen Mensch. Marx 
mit Badiou. In Der sich selbst entfremdete und wiedergefundene Marx, edited by Helmut 
Lethen, Birte Löschenkohl, and Falko Schmieder, 277–292. München: Fink. 
Ruge, Arnold. 1985. Die Hegelsche Rechtsphilosophie und die Politik unsrer Zeit. Erster 
Artikel. In Die Hegelsche Linke, edited by Heinz Pepperle and Ingrid Pepperle, 443–
472. Leipzig: Reclam Philipp jun. 
Rürup, Reinhard. 1975. Emanzipation und Antisemitismus: Studien zur »Judenfrage« der bürgerlichen 
Gesellschaft. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Sauer, Birgit. 2008. Emanzipation. Edited by Stefan Gosepath, Wilfried Hinsch, Robin 
Celikates, and Wulf Kellerwessel. Handbuch der Politischen Philosophie und 
Sozialphilosophie: Band 1: A - M. Band 2: N - Z. Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Scheidler, Karl Hermann. 1973. Emancipation (1840). In Emanzipation, edited by Martin 
Greiffenhagen, 48–74. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. 
Schick, Friederike. 2009. Der Begriff des Verhältnisses von Staat und Religion nach §270 
der Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. In Staat und Religion in Hegels 
Rechtsphilosophie, edited by Andreas Arndt, Christian Iber, and Günter Kruck, 23–36. 
Berlin: Akad.-Verl. 
Schmidt, Alfred. 1973. Emanzipatorische Sinnlichkeit. Ludwig Feuerbachs anthropologischer 
Materialismus. München: Carl Hanser Verlag. 
Schmidt, Dennis J. 1996. Translator’s Introduction. In Natural law and human dignity. 
Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press. 
Schmidtgall, Harry. 1988. Welche Bibliothek benutzte Marx für seine ‘Kreuznacher 
Exzerpte?’ In Die Französische Revolution 1789-1989: Revolutionstheorie heute, edited by 
Johannes Henrich Heiseler and Heinz Jung, 285–300. Frankfurt a.M.: IMSF. 
Schrader, Fred E. 1985. Die Auflösung der ‘Politischen Theologie’ Hegels; Von der 
nominalistischen Abstraktionskritik Feuerbachs (1843) zu Marxens Kritik der 
idellen Verdopplung (1857/58). In Der Fürst dieser Welt: Carl Schmitt und die Folgen, 
227–248. 2., verb. Aufl. München [u.a.]: Fink. 
Schwarzmantel, John J. 2003. Citizenship and Identity: Towards a New Republic. London: 
Routledge. 
Schweppenhäuser, Hermann. 1973. Zur Dialektik der Emanzipation. In Emanzipation, 
edited by Martin Greiffenhagen, 387–410. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe. 
Scott, Joan Wallach. 2005. Parite!: Sexual Equality and the Crisis of French Universalism. Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press. 
Scott, Joan Wallach. 2012. The Vexed Relationship of Emancipation and Equality. History 
of the Present 2 (2): 148–168. 
Siep, Ludwig. 2015. Säkularer Staat und religiöses Bewusstsein. Dilemmata in Hegels 
politischer Theologie. In Die linken Hegelianer: Studien zum Verhältnis von Religion und 
Politik im Vormärz, edited by Michael Quante and Amir Mohseni, 9–27. Paderborn: 
Fink. 
Smith, Steven B. 1998. Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jewish Identity. New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press. 
Soboul, Albert. 1974. The French Revolution, 1787-1799: From the storming of the Bastille to 
Napoleon. Edited by Alan Forrest and Colin Jones. London : NLB,. 
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I. 1997. The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary 
Investigation. New York: Basic Books. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1993. Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida. In Outside in 
the Teaching Machine, 97–119. London: Routledge. 
 270 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1998. Translator’s Preface. In Of Grammatology, ix–lxxxvii. 
Corrected ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Taylor, Charles. 1977. Hegel. Princeton, N.J.: Cambridge University Press. 
Tomba, Massimiliano. 2005. Krise und Kritik. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang. 
Tomba, Massimiliano. 2006. Exclusiveness and Political Universalism in Bruno Bauer. In 
The New Hegelians: Politics and Philosophy in the Hegelian School, edited by Douglas 
Moggach, 91–113. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tomba, Massimiliano. 2013. Marx’s Temporalities. Leiden: Brill. 
Tomba, Massimiliano. 2015. Emancipation as Therapy. Bauer and Marx on the Jewish 
Question. In Die linken Hegelianer: Studien zum Verhältnis von Religion und Politik im 
Vormärz, edited by Michael Quante and Amir Mohseni, 161–175. Paderborn: Fink. 
Toscano, Alberto. 2010a. Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea. London: Verso. 
Toscano, Alberto. 2010b. Beyond Abstraction: Marx and the Critique of the Critique of 
Religion. Historical Materialism 18 (1): 3–29. 
Toscano, Alberto. 2014. The Abstraction and Abolition of Value. Available from 
<https://values.doc.gold.ac.uk/blog/16/>. . Accessed19 March 2016. 
Vogl, Joseph. 1994. Gemeinschaften. Positionen zu einer Philosophie des Politischen. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp. 
Weil, Eric. 1998. Hegel and the State. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Wellmer, Albrecht. 1999. Hannah Arendt über die Revolution. In Recht auf Menschenrechte - 
Menschenrechte, Demokratie und internationale Politik, 125–156. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp. 
Woloch, Isser. n.d. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen - 1789. Available 
from <http://www.columbia.edu/~iw6/docs/decright.html>. . Accessed3 March 
2016. 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. 1995. Democracy Against Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge Press. 
Yovel, Yirmiyahu. 1998. Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Žižek, Slavoj. 2005. Against Human Rights. New Left Review (34). II: 115–131. 
Žižek, Slavoj. 2009. The Sublime Object of Ideology. New edition. London: Verso Books. 
1991. Who Comes After the Subject? New York: Routledge. 
 
